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For New Open Access Edition of 
Remembrance of Pacific Pasts
Remembrance of Pacific Pasts’ new open access edition is a liberating 
read. It serves as a powerful platform for decolonising hegemonic scripts 
of Pacific pasts through the incorporation of both western and indige-
nous pacific scholars interpretations. The Longue durée outlined in Re-
memberances helps us to excavate the ‘middle ground’ as the current 
indigenising of historical and economic forces of modernisation and de-
velopment, and in so doing liberates the indigenous agency in the shap-
ing of Pacific futures. Malo lava!
Melani Anae, qso
School of Māori Studies and Pacific Studies, Te Wānanga o Waipapa, 
University of Auckland
This new open access edition reaffirms why Remembrance of Pacific 
Pasts continues to provide an essential platform from which to launch 
a multi-vocal, critical and engaged Pacific history. The range of authors, 
the breadth of their interests, and the fluency of their writing reflect the 
kinds of histories that we need in the Pacific, in conversation and in con-
testation with each other.
Chris Ballard
Senior Fellow, School of Culture, History & Language, 
Australian National University
As the chair of the 13th Festival of Pacific Arts and Culture and someone 
who travels extensively throughout the region, I believe this an import-
ant book for anyone interested in learning about the Pacific through an 
indigenous lens. It puts Pacific Islander framings of the past on equal 
footing with those of Western academics. This book encourages each of 
us to bring together diverse framings and sources of the region’s past into 
narratives that add meaning and purpose to our lives. This is a must read!
The Honorable Kalani English
Senate Majority Leader, Hawaii State Legislature
Pacific pasts are remade anew with each generation. As Borofsky writes in 
the new introduction to this volume: “history lies less in the teller than in 
the dialog the teller shares with his or her audience. It lies in the conver-
sations.” In reissuing this book as an open access text, its editor and au-
thors multiply conversations that can be provoked, goaded and guided by 
the deep thinkers who have contributed to Remembrance Pacific Pasts. 
The volume presents a confluence of ways Pacific Island pasts have been 
narrated, and it provides a valuable resource for those who will fashion 
Oceanic pasts and futures.
Noelani Goodyear-Ka‘Ōpua
Chair and Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, 
University of Hawai‘i
I initially encountered many of these essays and authors as a graduate stu-
dent and still recall my excitement at seeing such a powerful, eclectic set 
of writings gathered under one umbrella. More than a decade later, this 
collection continues to resonate around the region, bringing together 
many of the peoples and papers that shaped 20th century Pacific studies.
Anne Perez Hattori
Professor of History, Micronesian Studies, and Chamorro Studies, 
University of Guam; President, Pacific History Association; 
Co-Editor, The Journal of Pacific History
The most engaging treatment yet of history and anthropology’s predica-
ment regarding the interaction between indigenous understandings and 
western/academic approaches in the Pacific. This edited volume is ex-
ceptional, its multidisciplinary, multivocal and multiperspective chapters; 
insider and outsider views of the Pacific pasts are included and interrogat-
ed to produce improved holistic historical analyses. Borofsky’s combina-
tion of clarity, and intellectual reflections on objectivity, representation, 
and narration in academic literatures of the Pacific helps us transcend 
the imaginary boundaries of history and culture. The new open edition 
should make this book accessible to a wide audience.
Sa’iliemanu Lilomaiava-Doktor
Associate Professor of Hawaiian-Pacific Studies, 
University of Hawaii-West Oahu
Borofsky enables readers to surf the cultural waves that crash down upon 
recorded Western perceptions of the Pacific’s colonial and post-colonial 
period.  Realizing many histories, many truths, abound in Oceania, read-
ers can ride these waves recognizing that only through engagement with 
our varied histories can we truly negotiate a better future for Oceania 
wherein we can represent our stories while also honoring those of others. 
Accept Borofsky’s “Invitation” to remake history and you will find your-
self navigating through Pacific Island histories as never before. 
Ian ‘Akahi Masterson
Coordinator for the Ocean Education Academy, 
Windward Community College 
The new open access version of Remembrance of Pacific Pasts reminds us 
of why it remains an important and path-breaking work. Departing from 
strict chronology or discipline, it is more than an edited collection or an-
thology: it is a meditation on the very nature of historical experience and 
understanding. Woven together by historians, anthropologists, critical 
studies scholars, poets, writers, activists and artists, the voices here arise 
to shape pasts that are fully resonant in the present. Widely praised and 
debated, Remembrance is an “invitation” to consider how the dynamics 
of encounter, exploitation, empire, memory, and the geopolitical worlds 
of the Pacific Islands shaped and continue to shape the making of the 
region’s history.
Matt Matsuda
Professor of History and Academic Dean of the Honors College, 
Rutgers University-New Brunswick
In an overwash age of accelerating and intensifying scholarly publication 
notable for the resulting paradox of diminished attention to foundation-
al volumes, it is past time to remember Remembrance of Pacific Pasts. 
Current and emerging scholars engaged in the study of Oceania across 
disciplines will find this volume as generative and, somehow, still radical 
in its vision of historians’ labors as a ceaseless remaking rooted in Ocea-
nian epistemologies and temporalities in the here-and-now as when it was 
first published. 
Alexander Mawyer
Associate Professor, Center for Pacific Island Studies, 
University of Hawai’i; Editor, The Contemporary Pacific: 
A Journal of Island Affairs
 
Deconstructing Whiteness is one way to describe this book, so is prophet-
ic and inevitable. What’s powerful about Remembrance is the ‘one-truth’ 
epistemology gets revealed, and hermeneutics - the massive potential and 
purpose of interpretation - gets activated. There’s no telling what will 
happen next. Science calls it Complementarity in the Quantum Phys-
ics field. I call it mutual self-emergence within a mana moana evolution 
vital for world-wide awakening. Enjoy reading this book! Ho‘oulu lahui o 
moana-nui-akea!
Manulani Aluli Meyer
Professor of Education, University of Hawaii West O‘ahu; 
Indigenous Epistemologist
For many years I have valued this book for the conversations it opens, the 
questions it asks, the curated juxtapositions that it provides and the way it 
connects Pacific histories with ‘views from afar’. It invites historians of the 
Pacific to look outwards and those looking towards Oceania to appreciate 
the worlds of history it contains. It is a vital tool and reader for teaching 
about Pacific histories, and approaches to them, which repays repeated 
visits.
Adrian Muckle
Senior Lecturer, School of History, Philosophy, Political Science, 
and International Relations, Victoria University of Wellington; 
Co-Editor, The Journal of Pacific History
My father is a whaikōrero (oratory) expert. He can recall the histories 
of tribes in Aotearoa. He can connect people through their whakapapa 
(genealogy). He can make you feel like a vital part of a story. I will give 
him this book. I know he will inhale Wendt’s ‘Inside us the dead’, con-
template Sahlin’s ‘Kingdom and kingship’ and cunningly bypass, some 
of the more academic pieces that I quite like that are too important to 
remain confined to the private domain of conventional scholars.  Let us 
celebrate the open access launch of Remembrance of Pacific Pasts. The 
book encourages Pacific academics to select new mediums of knowledge 
and understanding that will enhance their work in local communities.  
Marama Muru-Lanning 
Senior Research Fellow and Director at the James Henare Research Centre, 
University of Auckland
Remembrance of Pacific Pasts is a text that, with open access, will bring 
the talent and insights of an older generation of magnificent writers to 
both younger and wider audiences. It will also remind us of the dynamic 
spirit of an earlier age when the wisdom and insights of a Dening would 
be confronted by the clear and implacable voices of Native sons and 
daughters: Wendt, Grace. Teaiwa, Diaz, Hereniko. This is a book to be 
re-read.
Jonathan Kay Kamakawiwo‘ole Osorio
Dean of Hawai‘inuiākea School of Hawaiian Knowledge, 
University of Hawai‘i
The invitation to remake Pacific history this book first declared over a 
decade ago remains an open opportunity for us today. Open too, is its 
offering of diverse views and phrasings from scholars young and old to 
envision indigenous and non-indigenous ways of narrating the past vis-
à-vis one another. The Pacific past very much matters to us today.  It will 
continue to matter in our shared future.  Even as the terms and narratives 
of our history-making are contested time and time again, the contribu-
tions in Remembrance offer enduring value.  Its embracing of diverse 
voices, diverse narratives, is something to mark. It draws us to read and 
reread the book.
Damon Salesa
Pro Vice Chancellor (Pacific) and Associate Professor of Pacific Studies, 
University of Auckland
Originally published more than a decade ago, this extraordinary book 
was ahead of its time. Combining scholarly pieces, creative work and in-
terviews, the book set the standard for new approaches to Pacific histo-
ry that foreground indigenous voices and epistemologies and that take 
non-European ontologies not as anthropological curios but as important 
accounts of history memory and culture. And while focused on history 
the collection raises questions about multi-vocality that extend into every 
discipline that engages with indigenous life. Taken together, these essays 
stand as a foundational text for Pacific studies and must be read by every-
one interested in the field.
PAIGE WEST
Claire Tow Professor of Anthropology, Columbia University; 




From Original Printed Edition of 
Remembrance of Pacific Pasts
For many, the image of the Pacific is a foggy, sentimental distillation of 
Robert Louis Stevenson, Herman Melville, Paul Gauguin, and Marlon 
Brando’s Fletcher Christian. As such it is on the periphery of the aca-
demic vision. Remembrance of Pacific Pasts, edited ingeniously by Rob-
ert Borofsky, blows away this fog and situates the region and its history 
at the central crossways of contemporary discussions on colonialism and 
post-coloniality, memory and forgetting, altern and subaltern histories.
Benedict Anderson, 
Aaron L. Binenkorb Professor of International Studies, 
Government & Asian Studies, Cornell University 
Many of the key historical movements over the past millennia have hap-
pened in the Pacific during a more condensed and more recent period of 
time than in any other region of the world. As a result, students of history 
interested in microcosmic case studies of exploration, cultural contact, 
colonial control, and post-colonial politics will find much insight in turn-
ing to the Pacific and specifically to Remembrance of Pacific Pasts. It is 
an exciting, important book offering scholars of diverse appetites much 
food for thought.
Alfred Crosby
Professor of History, Geography, and American Studies, 
University of Texas
The selections in Remembrance of Pacific Pasts are truly excellent. The 
cumulative impact conveys a sense of conversation, dialogue, and argu-
ment that moves us beyond “conventional” historical styles of writing 
about a period.
Robert Darnton
Shelby Cullom Davis ‘30 Professor of European History, 
Princeton University 
Remembrance of Pacific Pasts is brimming over with new ideas about 
how history can be found, rethought, understood, and told. The worlds 
of the Pacific emerge over several centuries in the hands of these talented 
writers, some celebrated historians and anthropologists, some just mak-
ing their mark. Whether set in Samoa, Fiji, Hawaii, Papua New Guinea or 
elsewhere, each fascinating essay has resonance for questions being asked 
by scholars everywhere. Rob Borofsky’s edited volume is multicentered, 
dialogic history at its best.
Natalie Zemon Davis
Henry Charles Lea Professor of History and Director of the Shelby Cullom 
Davis Center for Historical Studies, Princeton University
Remembrance of Pacific Pasts is an invaluable anthology that brings 
trans-disciplinary depth and cosmopolitan insight into debates over colo-
nial and post-colonial politics and culture. It is simultaneously a welcome 
antidote to Europe-centeredness and an exhilarating compendium that 
communicates what is at stake in the history of the Pacific. Borofsky’s 
timely challenge is not only to existing histories of that region but to 
future historians of our planet. 
Paul Gilroy
Charlotte Marian Saden Professor of Sociology and 
African American Studies, Yale University
With an impressive array of contributors and a brilliantly innovative for-
mat, Remembrance of Pacific Pasts makes a crucial invention not only in 
our attempt to understand the Pacific but also in our attempt to refashion 
cultural and historical study. This multi-faceted volume is a model for a 
whole new interpretative practice, a practice based not on monolithic 
claims but on multiple voices, shifting perspectives, and open-ended crit-
ical conversations. 
Stephen Greenblatt 
John Cogan University Professor of the Humanities, 
Harvard University 
Remembrance of Pacific Pasts is a unique contribution to Pacific litera-
ture in the way it attempts to transcend the artificial boundaries between 
academic history and living culture. This book should be read by a wide 
audience.
Bruce Hill 
Presenter of the afternoon edition of ABC Radio 
Australia’s Pacific Beat 
History is always interpretation. The French Revolution as told by an 
aristocrat and by a sansculotte are not the same. The problem is how 
to bring these different views together in a way that makes sense of the 
whole. Rob Borofsky wonderfully succeeds at this difficult task. He turns 
widely different points of view into an asset. The narrative ceases being 
linear. We have instead a multidimensional history that the reader must 
approach from several angles and the meaning of which, like that of a 
musical piece, is apprehended globally. Remembrance of Pacific Pasts is 
a very impressive and important work.
Claude Lévi-Strauss
Member of the Académie française, Chair of Social Anthropology at the 
Collége de France between 1959 and 1982
This dazzling collection offers a new and provocative set of interpreta-
tions that enliven the reader’s understanding of multiple and conflicting 
Pacific histories. It also provides a daunting template for reordering our 
vision of the whole of the post-colonial world. It embodies an eclectic 
selection of materials from both within and without the Pacific, from a 
stunning range of academic, polemical, and fictional perspectives. Borof-
sky’s deft and wise introductions and connections infuse and synthesize 
the whole. 
David Lowenthal
Fellow of the British Academy, Professor of Geography, 
University College, London
Remembrance of Pacific Pasts fulfills an important legacy of the “Writing 
Culture” critique better than any other work on history we have read. It 
is a book that anthropologists and historians should read and ponder 
whatever their regional specialization.
George Marcus 
Joseph D. Jamail Professor of Anthropology, Rice University and 
Patricia Seed 
Professor of History, Rice University
There is much in Remembrance of Pacific Pasts that is very fine stuff 
indeed. With its concern for multiple points of view in a part of the world 
much too rarely studied, it raises issues that we all need grapple with 
whatever our area of specialty.
William McNeill
Robert A. Milikan Distinguished Service Professor of History 
at the University of Chicago 
 
Finding Middle Ground
An Introduction to the Open Access Edition
Robert Borofsky
Remembrance of Pacific Pasts is a book of both empowerment and hope. 
It draws people with diverse perspectives to engage with one another in 
ways that collectively encourage them to compose richer, more subtle, 
and fuller historical narratives of the Pacific. We are led to consider a 
number of questions: What are the strengths (and weaknesses) of West-
ern senses of the past vis-à-vis Pacific Islanders’ sensess of the past? Do the 
Western senses dominate because they are more accurate, more effective 
at recounting the past? Or is this dominance mostly a matter of contin-
ued Western power in another form? The fact that the question is often 
expressed in terms of written versus oral history (or some variant thereof) 
suggests that we tend to oversimplify the issue. Many professional Pacific 
historians are uncertain about how Pacific Islanders acquire and validate 
their historical knowledge (note Borofsky 1987). As such, it is long over-
due that Pacific historians and islanders address their differences and dis-
cuss the ways they “make” history. Dare I suggest that such conversations 
would help improve how both groups convey the region’s past to others?
  To understand the region’s historical narratives, one has to under-
stand the contexts within which they are told. In a very real sense, the Pa-
cific islands cannot, as yet, be viewed as decolonized. Since this statement 
may seem problematic to some—given that the region has a number of 
independent countries and decolonization is a thriving field of study in 
the Pacific—let me explain what I mean. 
  General histories of the Pacific by Howe, Kiste, and Lal (1994), De-
noon (1997b), Campbell (1996), and Scarr (1990) emphasize that the 
energy behind decolonization came more from the colonizers than from 
the colonized. Wesley-Smith, for example, in discussing Australia’s and 
New Zealand’s decolonizing efforts, observes: “In Papua New Guinea, 
Niue, Tokelau, the Cook Islands, and to a lesser extent Western Samoa, 
the colonizer rather than the colonized set the pace of change. In all cases 
except Nauru, the colonial power bestowed a greater degree of political 
autonomy than the people themselves sought at the time. Political free-
dom was returned to these colonial peoples in the 1960s and the 1970s 
essentially for the same reason it was removed in an earlier era—to meet 
the needs of the colonial power” (Howe, Kiste, and Lal 1994:220–221). 
  Remembrance of Pacific Pasts clarifies the ways Islanders continue 
to economically depend on external powers—whatever their level of 
political independence (see pp. 303–313, 443 ff.). As Said states, “the 
postcolonial period has not really occurred” (p. 443). Kiste observes: 
“While the [Micronesian] Compacts of Free association provide . . . 
sovereignty over both internal and external affairs . . . it is an understate-
ment to suggest that the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic 
of the Marshall Islands are heavily dependent on the financial arrange-
ments [with the United States] provided by the compact” (Howe, Kiste, 
and Lal 1994:254; cf. Scarr 1990: 299). Part of the problem is that many 
Islanders enjoy a relatively high standard of living thanks to government 
services and wages that cannot be funded by the island governments 
themselves.  As a result 30 percent of the Cook Island’s national income, 
and 36 percent of Western Samoa’s national income, comes from out-
side funding (Scarr 1990:340; cf. Denoon 1997b:388). Increased “devel-
opment” has often meant increased dependency. “Far from decreasing 
with the passing of time,” Campbell notes (1996:214), “the need for assis-
tance to Pacific island economies increased.” Indeed, Nkrumah observed 
long ago that to become a nation-state under the terms offered by the 
colonial powers often generates another form of colonialism. We need 
understand how various narratives of the Pacific past operate within this 
political/economic framework.
  What we perceive in this perpetuation of economic dependence/co-
lonialism is the type of hegemonic framework Antonio Gramsci described 
in his Prison Notebooks. (He recorded his ideas in more than 30 notebooks 
from 1929–1935 while in an Italian prison.) For Gramsci, hegemony is 
a form of subtle control, “the ‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great 
masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life 
by the dominant fundamental group”—which, in this case, is the dom-
inant political and economic powers in the Pacific (1971:12). And so, 
while many in the Pacific might embrace the idea of decolonization, the 
underlying economic/political hegemony means the decolonization is 
often more appearance than substance.
  To see how this hegemonic structure shapes historical narratives in 
the Pacific, let me add one more concept—paradigm—as interpreted by 
Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. While Kuhn uses 
the term in various ways, I focus here on paradigms as a “constellation 
of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared [to a certain degree] by 
members of a given community” (1970:175).  Kuhn perceives paradigms 
as providing “models from which spring coherent traditions” (1970:10). 
(Elaboration of this point is found in Borofsky 2019:27 ff.)
  Given the above political/economic context, Epeli Hau‘ofa and, 
more broadly, subaltern historians ask: How has colonial domination 
shaped the region’s historical narratives? (Cf. Hau‘ofa 1994c, this book 
pp. 453–454 ff.) This is the question Prakash raises when he writes: “[N]
ationalist historiographers accepted the patterns set for them by British 
scholarship” (1990:388). Chatterjee suggests that nationalist history had 
“no choice but to choose its forms from the gallery of ‘models’ offered by 
European and American nation-states” (1993:9; see also Spivak 1987:97 
and Dirks 1992:15). In respect to the Pacific, Banivanua Mar calls both 
“colonization and decolonization . . . imperial projects” (2016b:461).
  Many Pacific historians would agree that “history-making”—repre-
senting past times today—is an imperfect process. As I note in the book’s 
introductory chapter, materials abound for writing about the Pacific past. 
There are official and unofficial documents, diaries, memories, chants, 
artifacts, and landscapes waiting to be discovered (or rediscovered). Yet a 
major complication concerns how to organize and prioritize them. How 
does one weave a coherent narrative out of the many materials without 
denying their differences, ambiguities, and complexities?
  History-making for many Western-trained Pacific historians means 
something akin to supporting an historical narrative with a range of doc-
uments wherein readers can evaluate how and why the author developed 
the conclusions she or he did. But as Grafton observes: “Only the rela-
tively few readers who have trawled their nets through the same archi-
val waters can identify the catch in any given set of [foot]notes. . . . For 
most readers, footnotes play a different role. In a modern, impersonal 
society, in which individuals must rely for vital services on others whom 
they do not know, credentials perform what used to be the function of 
guild membership or personal recommendations: they give legitimacy” 
(1997:7–8). If Western-trained Pacific historians accept each other’s foot-
notes on faith, as clearly happens, what is the difference between oral 
and written accounts? Provocatively, Smith writes that “the archive reveals 
‘rules of practice’ which the West itself cannot necessarily describe be-
cause it operates within . . . rules [which] . . . are taken for granted” 
(1999:44).
  Let me compare how two groups construct their narratives regarding 
times past: Pukapukans—Polynesians dwelling on a northern Cook Is-
land atoll—and professional Pacific historians. (This comparison is elab-
orated upon in “An Invitation,” the book’s introductory chapter; see pp. 
7–9.) Both groups value primary sources; eyewitness accounts are seen 
as better than secondhand recountings of an event. Both groups believe 
that one should not take a person’s testimony at face value; it needs to be 
scrutinized for both biases and unstated personal advantage. Both groups 
also analyze the contexts within which testimony is presented in order to 
ascertain the validity of that testimony. For example, accounts that cite 
numerous details—especially details about which others are only vague-
ly familiar—often suggest that the accounts’ authors are knowledgeable 
about a subject. Moreover, both groups are impressed when testimony is 
presented in public forums that other authorities do not contest, since 
public consensus often conveys that the assertions being made are true. 
Also, both groups rely extensively on recognized experts, though how 
they determine expertise is a complex process, given that they themselves 
often lack sufficient subject knowledge of the subject to assess that ex-
pertise. But in both cases, the evaluation tends to support existing social 
hierarchies.
  It should be noted that the credibility of a narrative, for both Pacific 
historians and Pukapukans, may well change over time depending on the 
contexts in which it is presented and who else supports it. Historical nar-
ratives are not invariant truths. What we call history—the study of times 
past, as well as what remains of these times in the present—gains credi-
bility through others providing additional information that confirms an 
author’s assertions. Without such confirmation, assertions about the past 
remain just that—assertions. 
  To summarize: there are two patterns in the paradigms many profes-
sional Pacific historians and Pacific islanders use in their constructions 
of times past. (1) History-making is not a clear-cut process. There are 
ambiguities, uncertainties, and divergent interpretations of historical 
material. Various people, with various agendas, will perceive the materi-
al in different ways. And (2), the ways Pacific historians and islanders—
certainly Pukapukans—resolve such ambiguities often overlap. Neither 
group can claim to present the whole truth of an event or period. What 
makes Pacific historians confident in their history-making, and critical of 
Pacific islander history-making, is their willingness to ignore significant 
ambiguities in their own historical narratives—while pointing out ambi-
guities in the accounts of Pacific Islanders. This faith in their paradigmat-
ic perspective reflects the hegemonic control Western powers have today 
in the region. Conversations among Pacific historians and islanders re-
garding how their accounts overlap and diverge could help to illuminate 
for the historians ways their views could more accurately reflect islanders’ 
experiences. This could help to soften the confidence Pacific historians 
feel about their narratives—which in turn could soften the hegemonic 
control they hold in depicting the region’s history.
Two Paradigms
The hegemonic framework that shapes the region politically and eco-
nomically, the paradigmatic efforts—which, in principle, seek to “decol-
onize” Pacific history—often end up supporting the existing colonial 
framework to a certain degree.  As Antonio Gramsci observes, those op-
posing a set of hegemonic structures often are unable to think outside 
the “box” created by these structures (see Crehan 2002:104). To explain 
this point, let me suggest two general paradigmatic perspectives that 
frame “decolonization” in the Pacific today: a more Western version, of-
ten termed “island-centered” history; and a more indigenous one, which 
seeks to separate itself from the decolonization process. Of course, just 
as beauty resides in the eye of the perceiver, the meaning of “decoloniza-
tion” differs for each perceiver.
  “Island-centered history” largely developed out of James Davidson’s 
research program at the Australian National University (ANU). To quote 
Howe (1984:xii–xiii): “As colonies became decolonized, so historians be-
gan to decolonize history. . . . [T]he history of the Pacific islands had 
consisted of a history of imperial agents—explorers, missionaries, admin-
istrators—in the islands. And their activities were viewed from the mis-
sion, commercial and government headquarters in England, the United 
States, Germany, or France.” Matsuda concurs:
The “formal” institutional historiography of Pacific history is 
conventionally traced to the inauguration of the first chair 
in “Pacific History” at the Australian National University 
by James Davidson in 1954. This self-declared new history, 
famously “centered not in Downing Street but in the islands,” 
was a project shaped by “the general postwar spirit of decol-
onization” and organized around an attempt to combat a 
literature dating from the nineteenth century [that included 
the “fatal impact” of Western contact] (2006:764–765).
  Davidson emphasized two key points in his inaugural lecture at ANU: 
(1) “To understand the history of colonial government in the Pacific, 
it has been necessary to shift the centre of interest from the metropoli-
tan capitals to the islands themselves” (1966:14) and (2) the policies and 
practices of the Western powers and various Western groups in the Pacif-
ic “are still subjects that demand . . . attention; but they must take their 
place . . . alongside . . . analyses of the indigenous forces that have simi-
larly contributed to the making of the contemporary Pacific” (1966:21). 
Focusing on the indigenous residents of the region and their attempts to 
resist Western domination became the paradigm’s mantra. It dominated 
Pacific History in the 1970s. Hempenstall observes that ANU “controlled 
the terrain of the subject area . . . through institutional patronage of 
postgraduate students, possession of The Journal of Pacific History and a 
productive publishing programme” (1992:61).
  Without doubt, much good has come out of this island-centered fo-
cus. ANU produced a small but steady stream of scholars who empha-
sized Pacific-oriented courses and perspectives in Australia and New 
Zealand. American universities, such as the University of Hawai’i, fol-
lowed suit. This island-centered focus also helped facilitate the academ-
ic appointments of a number of Pacific Islanders (and those of mixed 
descent). To name some: Sione Lātūkefu, Albert Wendt, August Kutuai, 
Helen Morton, Brij Lal, Majorie Crocombe, Vicenta Diaz, Malama Me-
leisea, Damon Ieremia Salesa, Tracey Banivanua Mar, Epeli Hau`ofa, 
Helu Konai Thaman, Vilisoni Herniko, David W. Gegeo, Caroline Sina-
vaiana-Gabbard, Teresia Teaiwa, Katerina Teaiwa, Linda Tuhiwai Smith, 
Haunani-Kay Trask, Ty Kawika P. Tengan, Lilikala Kame’eleihiwa, and Jon 
Kamakawiwo’ole Osorio. “The increasing participation of Pacific Island-
ers in Pacific-related research, teaching, and administrative positions is 
clearly an important development,” Wesley-Smith writes. “While Pacific 
Islanders are still markedly underrepresented in Pacific branches of key 
disciplines such as history and anthropology, Islanders now staff and di-
rect many, but not all, of the specialized programs for Pacific studies. 
More and more Pacific Islanders participate in Pacific-related academic 
conferences” (2003:120–121). 
  Clearly there have been positive steps. But it is far from clear whether 
the region’s history departments accept more indigenous-centered his-
tory-telling on equal footing with island-centered telling. Pacific island-
ers’ perspectives are usually framed in Western terms and for Western 
audiences.
  Damon Salesa’s Racial Crossings offers a possible explanation.  It asks: 
Why, with Britain seemingly in “a new age of the individual and equal-
ity,” having banished slavery following the Reform Act of 1832, did ra-
cial distinctions became more important? (University of Auckland, n.d.). 
Salesa observes that, by the 1870s, racial amalgamation, or mixed racial 
marriages, was viewed in positive terms. He notes that central to the un-
derstanding of 
racial amalgamation was a broadly conceived intermarriage of 
fusion of races under a unified domain of sovereignty, govern-
ment and law. What made racial amalgamation . . . distinctive, 
however, was that it was not just any kind of crossing. Racial 
amalgamation was not just any combination. A proper amal-
gamation did not combine two races into a “new” race that 
was substantially mixed or intermediate; rather the process of 
amalgamation projected, very baldly, the disappearing of one 
race into another” (2011:242). 
He continues, “Racial amalgamation was an inclusion through which 
the other race would be consumed or absorbed, ceasing to exist yet still 
visible and practically different. The inclusion was unequal, and its pro-
cesses and mechanisms fashioned and enabled continuing inequities” 
(2011:242).
  This “inclusion” parallels the problem Vilsoni Hereniko faced in pub-
lishing The Woven Gods with the University of Hawaii Press (see” p. 18 of 
the text). In a review in The Contemporary Pacific, William E. Mitchell states 
that Hereniko’s work “is not a conventional ethnography. . . . [A] short 
time ago it would have been unpublishable by a university press because 
it violates established editorial principles for a scholarly monograph. 
. . . By privileging his anthropological self,” Mitchell writes, Hereniko 
feels he “he had failed to connect with his fellow Islanders. In a reverse 
way,” Mitchell continues, “by privileging his Rotuman and fiction-writing 
selves . . . he has failed to connect as effectively as he could with his an-
thropological audience” (1997:280–281). Mitchell calls it an unsuccessful 
experiment in ethnographic writing. 
  Both Salesa’s analysis and Mitchell’s review raise important questions: 
Is real difference—in terms of emotion, multiple voices, and alternative 
presentation styles—barred?  Are Western scholars only willing to em-
brace Pacific Island intellectuals when they express themselves in West-
ern terms? When, we might ask, is a difference embraced in its own terms, 
allowing us to grow beyond our present paradigmatic understandings so 
as to honestly engage with perspectives different from our own?
  The alternative decolonizing paradigm to island-centered history calls 
for a stronger Pacific islander presence. While a range of “outlander” 
(in the book’s phrasing) university-based historians embrace it, the par-
adigm takes much energy from Pacific islanders seeking to represent is-
lander perspectives in their own terms. 
  Given that the first paradigm seemingly embraces indigenous per-
spectives while often reframing them in Western terms, one thread of 
this alternative paradigm seeks to downplay Western perspectives. Lilika-
la Kame`eliehiwa suggests: “Natives have often wished that white people 
would study their own ancestors . . . instead of us, whom they generally 
misunderstand and thus misrepresent” (1994b:112). “For Hawaiians,” 
Haunani-Kay Trask asserts, “anthropologists . . . are part of the colonizing 
horde because they seek to take away from us the power to define who 
and what we are, and how we should behave politically and culturally. 
This theft testifies to the stranglehold of colonialism and explains why 
self-identity by Natives elicits such strenuous and sometimes vicious deni-
als by members of the dominant culture” (1991:162, see also 1985:786–
787). L. T. Smith writes, “Coming to know the past has been part of the 
critical pedagogy of decolonization. To hold alternative histories is to 
hold alternative knowledges. The pedagogical implication of this access 
to alternative knowledges is that they can form the basis of alternative 
ways of doing things” (2000:258–259). 
  Pacific islanders have a point regarding the myopic and biased per-
spectives of outlanders.  Consider the classic exchange between Keesing 
and Trask. Keesing suggests many “colonized peoples have not only in-
corporated and internalized conceptualizations . . . of colonial discourse 
at the level of thought . . . but . . . have valorized elements of their own 
cultural traditions . . . as symbols of the contrast between those traditions 
and Western culture” (2000:240). To this, Trask replied—as quoted above 
in full—“the colonizing horde . . . seek to take away from us the power to 
define who and what we are” (1991:162).
  There is merit in Keesing’s view that any group’s traditions are framed 
and reframed in relation to the changing social contexts. But acknowl-
edging this point does not mean that Westerners can become the arbiters 
of what is and is not a group’s “proper” traditions. Keesing ignores the 
disempowerment his assertion conveys. In this respect, Trask’s response 
is spot-on. 
  This is why Remembrance of Pacific Pasts embraces conversations across 
differences. No group wants to be intellectually and emotionally disem-
powered by another’s pronouncements—neither “colonizers” nor the 
“colonized.” But this is not to suggest that Pacific islanders have a monop-
oly on the construction of Pacific pasts. Outlanders have an important 
role to play as well, since their different perspectives on the region’s past 
can be illuminating. For example, consider Gordon Wright, an American 
historian of modern French history, for whose work the French govern-
ment awarded him the Commandeur de l’Ordre des Arts et des Lettres. 
He was also an honorary, corresponding member of the Academie des 
Sciences Morales Politiques. The French establishment clearly found 
his publications valuable and insightful vis-à-vis those of many French 
historians.
  There is a softer, more powerful, phrasing of this alternative para-
digm. The most famous example is Epeli Hau`ofa’s conceptualization of 
Pacific identities in terms of “Our Sea of Islands.” The boundaries that we 
presently draw in the region, he suggests, tend to obscure salient dynam-
ics by which Pacific Islanders craft their senses of self through movement 
within and beyond the region. He writes: Pacific islanders live in “a world 
of social networks that crisscross the [Pacific] ocean. . . . [I]t is a world we 
have created through our own efforts, and have kept vibrant and inde-
pendent of the Pacific islands world of official diplomacy and neocolonial 
dependency” (2000:113).  
  Tracey Banivanua Mar, author of Decolonization and the Pacific, sug-
gests indigenous people have reconfigured independence “as a state 
of being, as a social and cultural structure that transcends borders and 
exceeds the constraints of colonial legal systems. It lies in their reforma-
tion of decolonization as a stateless, albeit fragile and contingent form 
of sovereignty and independence” (2017:461).  Building on this, Gerard 
Prinsen and Séverine Blaise suggest a new form of sovereignty in the 
Pacific: “[A]nalyses have found that non-self-governing islands tend 
to have much better development indicators than sovereign islands. 
Perhaps  unsurprisingly, since 1983 no non-self-governing island has 
acquired political independence. [We argue] that rather than mere-
ly maintaining the status quo with their colonial metropoles, non-self- 
governing islands are actively creating a new form of sovereignty” 
(2017:56).
  Chris Ballard seeks to widen our sense of history: Anthropologists 
from a number of locations around the world have converged on the term 
“historicity” to express the broad field of their inquiries 
into culturally specific forms of consciousness of the past 
(2014:100). . . . So we apprehend the world and recall the past 
through all of our senses, combining our understanding of 
location or setting, with a parallel appreciation of our audito-
ry, olfactory, and tactile surroundings. And we then draw on 
this same range of senses to communicate that past, through 
what Greg Dening calls a “dramatic unity” of performance 
(1991:361): “We dance our histories, we paint them, sing 
them, picture them, film them, mime them, as well as write 
them” (1997, 426) (2014:100, 108). 
  Matsuda similarly suggests, “Pacific histories remain narrations formed 
at the confluence of different tides from academic scholarship, political 
activism, and creative arts and literature. The Oceanic vision is composed 
by document and fiction, archives, film, poetry, chants, dances, novels, 
and writing by island researchers, writers, and scholars” (2006:779). Vari-
ous authors in Remembrance embrace this broader paradigm. One need 
only look, for example, at the chapters by Albert Wendt, Teresia Taeiwa, 
Greg Dening, Klaus Neuman, Vilsoni Hereniko, Vincent Diaz, and W. S. 
Merwin.  They seek to widen our collective sense of the region’s history 
and how it is rendered.
  Where do we go from here? We have two paradigms, both of which 
focus on presenting post-colonial accounts in a colonized Pacific. In dis-
rupting the first paradigm’s framework, the second paradigm has intel-
lectual momentum behind it. It has thus had considerable impact, both 
within and beyond the academy. An array of publications by Pacific is-
landers with the University of Hawaii Press and Duke University Press 
supports this momentum with books that both derive from and reach be-
yond the outlander/islander divide.  As highlighted in Hereniko’s Woven 
Gods, the tension remains: phrasing one’s historical narratives in Western 
academic terms so as to foster publication and academic status, versus 
emphasizing more indigenous narrative styles and frames of reference.
  Despite the noted progress, the colonial powers that dominate the 
region’s universities and academic publishing houses lean toward the 
first paradigm. We see this particularly with David Armitage and Alison 
Bashford’s academically acclaimed Pacific Histories: Ocean, Land, People 
(2014). This book seeks to be inclusive, by which the editors mean bring-
ing together “the histories of the Pacific Islands, the Pacific Rim, and the 
Pacific Ocean” (back cover). But except for a chapter by Damon Salesa, 
the collection offers few indigenous voices, perspectives, or styles of histo-
ry-telling. Instead, prominent Pacific historians describe the region’s past 
in mostly Western, academic terms.
If we step back a bit, to gain a broader perspective, we can see a dynamic 
at work that has been ongoing in the region for centuries. 
Structures of the Longue Durée and the “Middle Ground”
The “longue durée” view of history was first conceived by Marc Bloch and 
Lucien Febvre in the 1930s and 1940s. In the late 1950s, Fernand Braudel 
expanded the construct perceiving structures of the longue durée as op-
erating within a set of geographic/ecological parameters. They extend 
beyond hegemonic formations which come and go with kingdoms, em-
pires, and generations of rulers. In Braudel’s words, “The longue durée is 
the endless, inexhaustible history of structures and groups of structures. 
For the historian, a structure is not just a thing built, put together; it 
also means permanence, sometimes for more than centuries. . . . This 
great structure travels through vast tracts of time without changing; if 
it deteriorates during the long journey, it simply restores itself as it goes 
along . . . and in the final analysis its characteristics alter only very slowly” 
(1980:75). They involve “certain geographic frameworks, certain biologi-
cal realities, certain limits of productivity” 1980:31). 
  Braudel writes about these structures in the Mediterranean world. 
Bailyn and Gilroy discuss them in the Atlantic world.  Taking a cue from 
their work, let me suggest four structures of the longue durée that have 
played out in the Pacific in recent centuries. 
  The first structure of the longue durée concerns the enormity of the 
Pacific Ocean. Exactly how enormous it is varies according to assessments 
regarding its boundaries with the Indian, Arctic and Southern oceans, as 
well as whether one includes the South China Sea, the Sea of Japan, and/
or the Sea of Cortez. However one divides it, the Pacific covers roughly 
a third of the earth’s surface. Europeans have found crossing it to be 
problematic—much more so than crossing the Mediterranean or Atlan-
tic. The travel logs of those intrepid European explorers, and the traders 
who followed them, make clear the difficulties of crossing such a large 
body of water with the limited technology they possessed. (The fact that 
Pacific Islanders traversed vast areas of the Pacific in open boats using 
celestial navigation centuries before Europeans ventured there continues 
to awe navigators and readers alike.) 
  The second structure of the region is its plethora of islands. There are 
perhaps 25,000 islands, the majority in the South Pacific. (Sadly, with sea 
levels rising from global warming, the number of islands is decreasing.) 
Until well into the twentieth century, crossing the Pacific usually meant 
stopping at one or more islands along the way. For the earliest explorers 
in need of supplies to WWII American military in need of refueling, is-
lands and Islanders have played a central role in taming the Pacific’s vast-
ness.  Crossing the Pacific meant visiting Pacific islands and interacting 
with Pacific islanders. 
  The third structure of the longue durée concerns how, comparatively 
speakikng, these islands possessed less of the resources, products, and 
markets that stimulated aggressive Western intrusions in other regions of 
the world. As such, traders in search of new markets for Western goods, 
or new resources to transform into Western goods, would turn to China 
before considering, for example, the Cook Islands. But while the com-
modity resources that Westerners valued were not ubiquitously plentiful, 
the pleasant climate undoubtedly was—as were Western desires for what 
seemed to be a more easy-going lifestyle.
  The Pacific islands’ comparatively limited resources lead to an im-
portant insight. Baudet (1965) suggests that Western explorers viewed a 
number of foreign locales—notably in the New World, China, and Poly-
nesia—in quite positive terms, at least at first. But in many cases, these 
positive images turned sour with increased contact. I suggest that it was 
not contact per se that caused this. It was what followed in the wake of 
contact: Western entrepreneurs—working within Western mercantile and 
capitalistic systems—sought resources, products, and markets that would 
generate wealth for themselves. Where the economic possibilities were 
considerable—as in the New World and China—the economic conflicts 
were greater. We see this in the Pacific as well. The Pacific was not with-
out wars; note, for example, the New Zealand wars of 1845–1872 and the 
New Caledonia war of 1878–1879. On these islands there was substantial 
wealth to be had in respect to land and resources and Westerns violently 
competed with indigenous populations for them. Western writers rarely 
portrayed this competition in glowing terms, especially when the conflict 
turned violent.
  If we view the Pacific as a whole, its perceived commercial wealth is 
comparatively less and so the intensity and duration of conflicts over its 
resources has tended to be less. These combined with beautiful vistas and 
easier-going lifestyles have produced, I would suggest, the enduring im-
age of Polynesia we see on travel posters today (see Borofsky 2004).  
  The final structure of the longue durée involves the regions’ rims—the 
United States, Canada, and Latin America on the east; and China, Japan, 
Korea, and Southeast Asia on the west—where valued resources, prod-
ucts, and markets abound, driving trade across the Pacific. 
  Drawing various threads together, we can see that these structures of 
the longue durée played a central role in the history of the Pacific.  While 
both outlanders and islanders may have wanted to dominate the other, 
for centuries neither could do so completely. Western accounts often 
convey that Western technology made them the dominant competitor. 
But, reading between the lines, we can see that such control was far from 
absolute. It is true that Western weaponry could intimidate; Boenchea 
(in Corney 1913:333) referred to the “terror and dread in which . . . [the 
Tahitians] hold our weapons.” But it should be stressed that this intimida-
tion rarely prevented Pacific Islanders from challenging Europeans; they 
simply took a more indirect approach: theft. 
  Western accounts indicate that thievery was ubiquitous from the time 
Westerners first arrived. And the longer outlanders stayed in port, the 
more theft increased. As Greg Dening writes, “Thieving by the Polyne-
sians almost drove the sea-captains to distraction. The ingenuity with 
which handkerchiefs and hats and goods were stolen out of cabins, grap-
pling irons from under boats, even nails from wood with bare fingers far 
surpassed the ability of the Europeans to guard against these” (1966:40). 
  One might perceive such “theft” as a “ritual of possession”—as Pacific 
Islanders’ effort to negotiate positions of power vis-à-vis European explor-
ers and traders (see Borofsky and Howard 1989:250–260). Polynesians 
of high status continually demonstrated their power so as to affirm (and 
retain) their status. Much of the contact literature suggests that Polyne-
sian chiefs played a role in fostering theft.  The more theft that went on, 
the more explorers were drawn into relying on chiefs to stop it. Ultimate-
ly, theft reinforced European dependence on island chiefs, facilitating a 
constant supply of gifts—or tribute—to them.
  These complex interactions constitute a form of “middle ground.” 
Richard White writes in Remembrance (p. 170–171):  
The middle ground as I formulated it was a process of mutual 
invention among Indians and Europeans. . . . It depended on 
the inability of both sides to gain their ends through force. 
Those who operated on the middle ground tried to under-
stand the world and reasoning of others in order to assimilate 
enough of that reasoning to put it to their own purposes. That 
they often got this exotic reasoning terribly wrong mattered 
less than that the other side, for similar reasons, reciprocated. 
Each side would gladly have coerced others into obeying their 
rules if they could, but they could not, and so instead they 
built surprisingly durable worlds from mutual misunderstand-
ings. (See also White 1991, especially ix–xv.)
  At first glance, this middle ground may now appear to be receding. 
Technological innovations have reduced the need for boats or planes to 
stop en route when trading and travelling between the two rims. And yet 
the “middle ground” remains very much alive today. Pacific islanders are 
gaining new powers vis-à-vis the West.
  The Pacific now plays a major role in tuna fishing. The Pew Charita-
ble Trusts reports: “The Pacific Ocean is the source of about 70 percent 
of commercially landed tuna and 65 to 70 percent of the global value of 
tuna at both the dock and the final point of sale” (Pew Charitable Trust 
2016). This commerce involves billions of dollars. The 200-mile fishing 
zones around the islands teem with financial possibilities.
  Even more dramatic is the increased economic, political, and mili-
tary presence of China in the South Pacific. In contrast to the Japanese 
invasion of the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea during World 
War II, China is challenging Western regional dominance in a less violent 
form. Headlines in the British Guardian observe: “Huge increase in Chi-
nese aid pledged to Pacific. Beijing poised to outstrip Australia as largest 
donor for the first time, with Papua New Guinea the major beneficiary” 
(Lyons, 2018). The New York Times (Oct. 16, 2019) reports:
The island of Tulagi served as a South Pacific headquarters for 
Britain then Japan, and during World War II, its natural deep-
water harbor made it a military gem. Now, China is moving in 
with plans to effectively take control. Under a secretive deal 
signed last month with a provincial government in the Solo-
mon Islands, a Beijing-based company with close ties to the 
Chinese Communist Party has secured exclusive development 
rights for the entire island of Tulagi and its surroundings. The 
lease agreement has shocked Tulagi residents and alarmed 
American officials who see the island chains of the South 
Pacific as crucial to keeping China in check and protecting 
important sea routes” (Cave 2019). 
Fairfax Media reports “China and Vanuatu are in negotiations to allow 
China to open a permanent military base on Vanuatu. China is fund-
ing the construction of a new wharf on Espiritu Santo, which Australian 
government officials believe could be used to host naval vessels” (Wroe 
2018). 
  In other words, the middle ground continues. World powers still clash 
for regional dominance—just as the French and British once did. Fol-
lowing Braudel’s structures of the longue durée, we might suggest, “Plus ça 
change, plus c’est la même chose”—the more things change, the more they 
remain the same.
An Invitation to Remake History
When Remembrance of Pacific Pasts was first published, its effort to decolo-
nize Pacific history was praised by a number of prominent scholars such 
as Natalie Zemon Davis (Princeton), Stephen Greenblatt (Harvard), Wil-
liam McNeill (Chicago), Robert Darnton (Princeton), and Claude Lévi-
Strauss (École pratique des hautes études). Many of the new endorse-
ments (found in the front matter) do so as well. Escaping decolonializing 
paradigms, the book stresses, involves intellectually escaping the colonial 
structures that frame the decolonizing process. 
  Natalie Zemon Davis asks:
Does the West own history? That is, must the subjects, con-
cepts, categories of analysis, and narrative models emerge 
from western historical writings in order to count as “real” 
history? . . . The historian should welcome historical inquiry 
beyond the profession, engaging with it critically whenever 
needed and facilitating constructive research by others. When 
done well, non-professional history has much to teach not 
only its practitioners and their publics . . . the questions asked 
about the past by people with training other than our own—
the things they notice in the evidence—can be startling and 
enlightening. . . . There are always multiple claims [to histo-
ry]. It is a gift that can only survive through debate (1989:24, 
27–28,34).
  We need to step outside the oppositions framing Pacific history as 
Hau’ofa and Banivanua Mar have done.  That is the value of the Clifford, 
White, Prakash, and Said commentaries in the book. They draw us toward 
new possibilities beyond the standard familiar frameworks. They ask us to 
navigate new possibilities, new narratives. 
  A key contribution of Remembrance is that it puts Pacific Islanders’ 
constructions of the region’s past on equal footing with more West-
ern-framed accounts. Pacific islander narratives have not been absorbed 
by Western accounts. Pacific islander narratives stand on their own terms 
with their own styles of presentation—even when translated into English. 
Decolonizing Pacific history calls for stepping outside the hegemonic 
frame of dominance. 
  Another key contribution of the book is that it fosters engaging with 
those who perceive the past differently. It involves White’s sense of a 
middle ground. There need not be harmony. There may well be heated 
arguments. But it is an engagement in which the parties to the inter-
action—islanders and outlanders—meet on equal terms and, whenever 
possible, create empowering narratives that positively engage with each 
other’s differences rather than just talking abstractly about engaging with 
them. In addition, the format encourages readers, in thinking through 
these differences, to formulate their own narratives.
  In closing, let me highlight three points that are elaborated at greater 
length in the book. They emphasize why, if embraced, Remembrance is a 
book of hope.
  First, recountings of times past, however seamlessly ordered, are al-
ways incomplete. Narrators curate—selecting this, silencing that—to 
build an account whose coherence lies, not in the material itself, but in 
the words (and mind) of the narrator and his or her audience. Books 
such as Remembrance can only provide points of reference for thinking 
about or reflecting on the region’s past.
  Second, “history” is more than a product to memorize. It is more than 
a set of facts—collected and organized by others—that one should duti-
fully learn in order to be conversant with times past, or to affirm a con-
nection to those now dead. Presenting historical narratives is an active, 
participatory process. Exploring “the past” is more than a professional 
calling. It is also a personal, participatory, empowering experience. His-
tory-telling belongs to a much wider audience. 
  Third, history-telling lies less in the teller than in the dialog the teller 
shares with the audience. It lies in the conversations across different per-
spectives. Despite the politics of polarization, we often see today, we need 
to remember that Islanders and Outlanders share not only centuries of 
overlapping, interwoven pasts but often overlapping standards for judg-
ing accounts about these pasts. We need to listen to these conversations 
across our differences. 
  Remembrance provides points of historical reference for readers to 
think with. It offers tools to assist readers in weaving further narratives 
and developing further conversations about the region’s past. The book, 
as its subtitle affirms, represents “an invitation to remake history.”
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Follow one word, back
“Mai” Come.
from Hawai‘i
Back across the wide green water
all the way to Indonesia . . . “Mai”
Means, “Come” in Bahasa Bali, the old tongue
Think of them leaving
Men and women on boats laid low with pigs,
Coconut, yams, tapioca, taro root, a pregnant dog.
That last real Indonesian on the way to becoming
The first Hawaiian
By what river of current crossing?
Stopping along the way to become Maori, Samoan, Fijian, 
Tahitian . . .
Who chartered them with bamboo maps to Easter Island?
They took Gods, Goddesses, seeds and pottery which 
breaks,
Like clay postcards.
This baby has no English yet.
“Mai” he sings, sweeping a fat hand toward his heart.
“Come, come to me.”
Follow one word forward,
Follow one forward from each new child who speaks.
“Mai” by Robin Lim, reprinted from bamboo ridge: A Hawai‘i’s Writers Journal 73,
Spring 1998 (Honolulu: Bamboo Ridge Press): 225.
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Preface: In the Beginning
The Story of Latmikaik
Cheldecheduch er a Latmikaik
So you want to hear the story of Latmikaik
Ng soam el orrenges er a cheldechedechal a Latmikaik
Belau was completely empty and there were no people in it
A Belau a mle bechachau e ng diak a chad er ngii
Uchelianged [Foremost of Heaven] looked out at it, looked at this 
expanse of sea, both on the surface of the water and underneath the 
water
A Uchelianged a ullumes er ngii e ng omes er a tia el klou el doab 
mo er a bab el daob er a eoa el doab
The voice of Uchelianged said: let a land rise up, let a land rise up
A Uchelianged a ngerel a melekoi ua sei loluchel a ta er a beluu 
loluchel a ta er a beluu
There arose to the top of the sea what we call Lukes, which lies 
between Ngeaur and Beliliou today
Ng merael a mei me er a bab a se el domelekoi er ngii el ua sei a 
Lukes el ngar er a delongelel a Ngeaur me a Beliliou er a 
chelechang
A Belauan Story of Creation by Ngirakland Malsol of Ngeremlengui, told on October
13, 1978. Recorded and translated by Richard J. Parmentier.
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And so there was a clam which was created there
Ng solai ng ngar er ngii a kim el dilubech er ngii
This clam grew bigger and bigger, and so did the soft insides of the 
clam
Tia el kim a merael el mo er klou e ngar er ngii a dmengel a kim
The insides of the clam grew bigger and bigger, like a pregnant 
woman with a large belly, a very large belly
Se el dmengel a kim a merael el mo er mo er klou e ng mo ko er a 
chad e ng mo mo er dioll e ng klou a dillel ng kmal el klou a dillel
But she was not able to give birth
Ng diak el sebechel el omechell
Uchelianged saw this and said: Let there be powerful waves and 
heavy swells; and so a strong running sea shook the clam and she 
gave birth
A Uchelianged a ullumes er ngii e solai ng melekoi el ua sei ng mo 
er ngii a mesisiich el brius er a daob e ng mo mesisiich er a brius er 
a daob me a bekerurt el a daob e ng mengetengtik er ngii e ng 
omechell
After the birth there were many, many fish
A lmchell a ngikel e ng kmal el betok el betok el ngikel
And so these fish in turn gave birth and gave birth until the sea was 
crowded
E solai a ngikel a mo omechell e ng omechell di omechell e ng mo 
meseked a daob
The sea was so crowded that Uchelianged said to Latmikaik: Go tell 
your children to collect rocks and coral and carry them to the surface 
of the sea so that you will be able to climb out, since the sea is so 
crowded
Ng mo meseked a daob e a Uchelianged a melekoi er a Latmikaik 
el ua sei mmelekoi er a ngelekem el lbo lomuut er a bad me a 
merangd e me me er a bebul a daob a lbo lsebechiu el tuo mo er 
ngii e ng mla meseked a daob
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So they cleared a place next to Ngeaur and carried the rocks and 
coral up to the surface of the sea
Te mo mengiut er a bita er a Ngeaur e ngmai a bad me a merangd 
e merull er ngii me me er a bab e me er a bebul a daob
Uchelianged said: Make it so that you will be able to travel to the 
heavens
A Uchelianged a melekoi el ua sei mmerull er ngii e ng mo 
sebechiu el merael el me er a eanged
Latmikaik said to her children: Make it long enough so that we can 
be near the heavens and ask for earth from the heavens to connect it 
together so that we can travel to the heavens
A Latmikaik a melekoi er a ngelekem mmerull er ngii el mo keke-
mangel el sebeched el kmeed er a eanged e olengit er a chutem er a 
eanged e omech er ngii el mo sebeched el merael el mo er a eanged
The meaning of this is that this Babeldaob is the heavens and these 
creatures are creatures from within the sea
A belkul el tia el tekoi a kdu el ua se tia el Babeldaob a eanged e 
tireke el chad a chad er a chelsel a daob
They built it up so that it was very tall, but it was also a bit tilted
Me a lorull er ngii a mo mo kmal el kekmangel e ko er a telkib el 
dullokl
He notified Latmikaik that it was not going to be able to stretch all 
the way to the heavens and that it was going to tip over
Ng ouchais er a Latmikaik el ua se ng mla mo diak el sebechel el 
mo kmeed er a eanged e ng di mla mo dullokl
Latmikaik said to her children: Go get a rule and let me take a look 
at it
A Latmikaik a melekoi er a tir el ua sei bo mnguu a telkelel el mei 
el kisang
She took the rule and measured it and realized that the end would 
come to Oikull if it fell over
Ng ngmai a telkelel e msang el bong e tia el omukel er a Oikull a 
ullebongelel
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So she said, this is the end, and she kicked it and it fell over and the 
rubble became Beliliou and all the rock islands all the way to Oikull, 
next to Irrai, at the end of the rock islands
Ng dilu e merekong e sobekii e mukel e mo sobekii e mukel er ngii 
a Beliliou me a betok el chelebacheb e ng mo mo er a Oikull er a 
bita er a Irrai el ullebongelel a chelebacheb
And so now the children of Latmikaik were able to walk all the way 
to Babeldaob
Ng solai ngmai sebechel el merael er ngii a rengellel a Latmikaik e 
me er a Babeldaob
And so they walked and walked until the land of Belau was crowded, 
and the villages filled with these creatures.
Ng di merael merael e ng mo mesekid er a chutem er a tia el Belau 
ng meseked er a beluu er a chad
xv
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Bengal must have a history, or else there is no hope for it.
Who will write it? You will write it, I will write it, all of us will
write it.
—Bankim
How does one make sense of the Pacific’s varied pasts? Materials
abound for the project: There are writings, memories, chants, artifacts,
and landscapes waiting to be discovered (and rediscovered). Yet a
major complication exists: how to organize and prioritize what one
reads, what one hears, what one discovers? The past—in our ambig-
uous knowing of it—does not proclaim its meanings in a single voice.
There are multiple voices. Which ones deserve primary attention—in
what ways, for which contexts? How does one weave a coherent
narrative out of the many materials without denying their differences,
ambiguities, and complexities?
This introduction begins by discussing three interconnected issues
involved in examining the region’s varied pasts—regarding objectivity,
representation, and narration. The three are examined at some length,
not to discourage readers, but because many authors acknowledge the
problems surrounding these issues, stress their importance, and then
subtly shelve them in presenting their particular accounts. The prob-
lems will not go away with the wave of a pen. They need to be
addressed. And if readers consider them as they move through this
volume, not only will the volume make more sense, but they should
find it—dare I say?—more provocative.
Searching for Objectivity1
There is always selectivity in describing the past. One has to
make sense of a host of ambiguous, multiple, and (not infrequently)
1Readers interested in exploring additional references relating to points raised in this
section might consult the following (page numbers refer to particularly relevant parts
when
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contradictory accounts as best as one can. The available data to peruse
can be staggering. Writing about the material relating to Europe’s early
contacts with the “New World,” Greenblatt observes:
Journals, letters, memoranda, essays, questionnaires, eyewitness
accounts, narrative histories, inventories, legal depositions, theo-
logical debates, royal proclamations, official reports, papal bulls,
charters, chronicles, notarial records, broadsheets, utopian fanta-
sies, pastoral eclogues, dramatic romances, epic poems—there is
in the sixteenth century a flood of textual representation, along
with a much smaller production of visual images that professes to
deliver the New World to the Old.
When I contemplate this torrent of words and images, I feel
overwhelmed—a lifetime would not suffice to grasp what was dis-
seminated throughout Europe in the first few generations alone.
(1991:145)
Also, many of the materials do not necessarily speak to us—across
gaps of time—in self-evident ways. We often must make inferences,
offer interpretations, in the process of understanding them. Even a
of the reference): history’s constructed nature: Dening 1988a:xi, 93–116, 1988b:4–5,
27, 99–101, 1992a:281, 366, 372; Trouillot 1995:13, 58–59; Comaroff and Comaroff
1991:18, 1992:22–25, 38; Greenblatt 1991:23, 121; Browning 1997:10; King 1997;
plethora of sources: Heller 1993; historical importance of silences: Trouillot 1995:49;
Chakrabarty 1992:21; Chatterjee 1993:154; Said 1993:267; Lucas 1997:8; Bhabha
1994:160; exploring the dynamics of silences: Trouillot 1995:27–28; Steedly 1993:
30, 177; Chatterjee 1994:214; Said 1993:265; Thompson 1963:55; additional exam-
ples of silences: Gutiérrez 1991:xvii, 50; Laracy in Howe, Kiste, and Lal 1994:153–
154; Thomas 1994:159; Schell 1997:17; Seed 1995:15; Chatterjee 1993:156; Guha
1989:304; Pels 1997:178; Binney 1996:114; King 1997; and Lourie 1997; no final
reading of history: Lacquer 1997:5; Lal in Howe, Kiste, and Lal 1994:402; Said 1993:
3; Craig 1997:20; and Trouillot 1995:19, 131, 140; question of standards: Haskell
1998 especially 57–223; Nagel 1996; Novick 1988; Ranke (1824, 1973); problematic
nature of historical objectivity: Greenwood, Neumann, and Sartori 1995:8; Roberts in
Greenwood, Neumann, and Sartori 1995:130; Pandey 1992:50; Feierman 1995:52;
Guha 1989:214; application of history to non-Western cultures: Lâtûkefu 1992:15;
Salmond 1985:259–260; Binney 1997:5; Nagel 1996; problems in establishing credi-
bility: Steedly 1993:35, Trouillot 1995:8, 11, 158 fn.4; Shapin 1994:xxv–xxvi, 48, 83,
123–124, 212, 218, 250, 307; Greenblatt 1991:6, 22, 30–31, 35, 122–123, 147; Seed
1995:191; Borofsky 1987:106–130 ff., 1997; Wright 1979; Stoler 1992a:183; Salmond
1985:249–254; oral versus written accounts: Finnegan 1977; Portelli 1997; Lord 1960;
Fielding 1996; Manoa 1997; Humphreys 1997:100–101, 330–332, 339–380 ff., 388–
397 ff.; Seed 1995:170; alternative forms of history writing: Manoa 1997; Fabian
when
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single vote—a vote on which everyone agrees regarding the tallied
result—can be highly problematic. Constitutionally, the American
annexation of Hawai‘i needed a two-thirds majority by the U.S.
Senate to pass. The result of the Senate vote was 42 “aye” and 21
“nay.” Everyone agrees on that. But did this vote constitute a two-
thirds majority? Coffman writes: “Of those who voted, exactly two-
thirds voted yes, but nearly a third of the entire Senate ducked out of
voting. As a result, America’s annexation of the previously sovereign
nation of Hawai‘i rested on the votes of fewer than half the members
of the United States Senate” (1998:311). This raises a significant ques-
tion: Was the American annexation of Hawai‘i, therefore, an illegal
act? It is a matter of heated debate.
There are, moreover, “silences” in describing the past—selections
that, in emphasizing one set of materials, ignore (or downplay) an-
other. Silences are central to the tellings and retellings of history and,
critically, to the messages historians seek to convey. They allow one
to transform a cascade of data not only into coherent narratives but
into coherent narratives of one’s liking. Trouillot (1995) notes the Hai-
tian Revolution—the first successful slave revolt in the New World—
was perceived as too revolutionary by many revolutionaries in Europe
and America. Important aspects of the revolt were ignored as a result
—were silenced—in European accountings of the event. Renan pro-
vocatively proposes: “to forget and—I will venture to say—to get one’s
history wrong, are essential factors in the making of a nation” (1939:
190). “Without oblivion,” Grafton adds, “history could not continue
to be written” (1997:230).
Exploring the hows and whys of silences often produces valuable
1996; Evans 1997; Steedly 1993:75, 238; Fielding 1996; Lerner 1997; Finnegan 1977:
241–275; Lord 1960; Keesing and Tonkinson 1982; Scribner 1985; Keller and Keller
1996:159–179; Reilly and Heke 1995:204 (cf. Gunson 1992:4); imperialism’s impact
on the construction of knowledge: Thomas 1994:25; Asad 1994:78–79; Cohn 1996:
10; see also chapters by Neumann and Hempenstall (Section One) and “Colonial En-
gagements” (Section Three); power and storytelling: Trouillot 1995:28–29; Steedly
1993:176, 198; Shapin 1994:403; Thompson 1963:552, 761; Greenblatt 1991:146;
Herzfeld 1997:5, 65; Grant 1995:156–163; Appadurai 1996:15; and Said 1991:22;
power and “truth”: Trouillot 1995:6, 56; Stoler and Cooper 1997:21; Handler 1994:
3; Seed 1992:10; Chatterjee 1994:3; Herzfeld 1997:5, 91; history as a negotiated con-
versation: Roberts 1997; Denoon 1992:xv; Binney 1997:7; Said 1993:3; Shapin 1994:
351–353.
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insights. Maier’s American Scripture (1997), for example, shows
Jefferson’s framing of the American Declaration of Independence was
not necessarily the heroic act it sometimes is conveyed to be. She un-
covered ninety other declarations of independence Americans adopted
between April and July 1776. What has been silenced—presumably
in lionizing Jefferson—is the context in which Jefferson wrote his
“American scripture.” Many others were formulating similar docu-
ments at the time and Jefferson, it turns out, had ready reference to
George Mason’s draft of the Virginia Declaration of Rights in writing
the American Declaration of Independence.
Because those who write about times past not only belong to dif-
ferent periods, places, and persuasions but also possess different stan-
dards for selecting, interpreting, and silencing material, there is always
flux in how the past is presented in the present. Different people make
sense of the past in different ways. To assert the past has a single, fixed,
interpretation—that everyone concurs on through time—is to rob it of
the one thing we can be certain about, the past’s contingent, nego-
tiated, changing nature. “Our view of the past can never be a per-
manent one,” G. Craig observes. “Revision is part of the historical
process” (1997:20).
Standards
We can reasonably ask, however, if everything is fair game: Are there
no standards by which readers can judge how differing authors select,
interpret, and silence material? Behind this question is a tension fram-
ing two intellectual traditions within the West, often referred to as the
Enlightenment and Romantic Counter-Enlightenment. Let me leave
aside that these movements have been interpreted differently in differ-
ent times (so that, again, ambiguity and flux surround perceptions of
them; e.g., see Darnton 1997). It is fair to say, however, that central
to the tension between the two intellectual traditions is the degree to
which certain concepts—such as reason—constitute universal (or at
least transnational) standards for assessing divergent beliefs and be-
haviors. For Enlightenment writers such as Voltaire, Diderot, and
Condorcet, Berlin suggests, there was “only one universal civilization”
or standard of judgement. For the Romantic Counter-Enlightenment
writer Herder, Berlin states, there was “a plurality of incommensura-
ble cultures” (in Gray 1996:122). Juxtaposing the two perspectives
one to another raises important questions: Is the past a foreign coun-
try (to quote Hartley)? Can we understand it despite its differences
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from us? Need we follow Foucault (1980:131) in believing “each
society has its régime of truth . . . types of discourse which it accepts
and makes function as true” (“another power, another knowl-
edge,” he asserts, 1978:226)? Or can we apply “our” standards to
“others”—separated though they be from us by time, space, and
context?
In the early 1970s, an important exchange took place between
Munz and Davidson related to this issue: Could Pacific Islander
accounts of the past be viewed as “history”? Davidson suggested that
history “is a methodology for the study of society through the anal-
ysis of change over time” (1971a:119–120). It represented a method-
ology drawn from the European past but one that need not be limited
to Europe. It had broad application. Munz questioned whether non-
Europeans could have history—as he knew it—if they did not have
time reckoning schemes that could be placed on a broad, compara-
tive grid regarding what happened when, and, importantly, if others
could not evaluate the primary source material. For Munz: “History
as we have come to understand it . . . is a way of viewing the past of
a particular set of societies which harbour a certain set of thoughts.
. . . In societies where there are no recorded facts or where the facts
recorded are the precipitate of a different form of thought, history in
our sense of the term is not possible” (1971:16–17).
In working our way through this issue, it seems appropriate,
following Darnton, to first point out that the Enlightenment did not
represent—as some postmodernists suggest today—the totality of eigh-
teenth-century Western thought. By viewing the Enlightenment “as a
concerted campaign on the part of a self-conscious group of intellec-
tuals, one can reduce it to its proper proportions” (1997:34). It con-
stituted a historical nexus of people who aspired to visions (and
actions) that carried them beyond the parochial worlds they lived in.
To quote Darnton again: “It had neither borders nor police. It was
open to ideas from everywhere. . . . No one in it . . . conceived of the
idea of nationalism” (1997:37, cf. Roche 1998). Its sense of univer-
salism might be described in the same way we describe the twentieth
century’s two great wars as “World Wars.” The description overstates.
But behind the overstatement is a stress on the disruption of old boun-
daries, the widening of the universe of discourse. There is moreover a
subtext in both cases—the implied dominance of Western civilization.
We also need to note that standards commonly applied today in
examining Pacific pasts contain important contradictions. “Every
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schoolboy knows—at least every German high school student once
knew—what scientific history is and who invented it,” Grafton writes.
“Scientific history rests on primary rather than secondary sources:
Leopold von Ranke . . . was its first famous practitioner . . . Ranke be-
came the academic historian par excellence” (1997:34). Ranke’s goal
was to write history (in an often-cited phrase) “wie es eigentlich
gewesen”—as it really was. (There is a politics behind the phrasing: In
criticizing the work of other scholars, such as Guicciardini and Sis-
mondi, Ranke not only established the importance of primary sources
but also his skills as an historian.) Yet, as just noted, the past does
not speak to us in one clear voice. It speaks in many voices, through
a host of primary sources. Ambiguities, uncertainties, contradictions
abound about what happened, when, how, and why. To describe a
piece of the past “as it really was” is to impose an order on that past
it never had—even for those who lived through it. Ranke implicitly
realized this. He never produced all the documentation available re-
garding a particular period, nor even all the documents he himself
used. “Nobody would want to publish the whole archives,” he said.
“But he insisted that intelligent readers should work through at least
the documents he did print” (Grafton 1997:51–52). (It turns out
Ranke was not always precise in his citations, a point Heinrich Leo
made.) Writing history “as it really was” meant, then, something more
akin to supporting a historical account with a range of documents that
others, if they worked their way through them, could use to evaluate
how and why the author developed the conclusions he or she did.
There is also a problem in current efforts to deconstruct earlier con-
structions of the past. That political and cultural perspectives shape
constructions of the past has become gospel for many postmodernists.
But how can we “prove” this to be true? To emphasize the constructed
nature of our narratives and then, at the same time, to criticize the
biases of other accounts opens us up to a crucial contradiction. What
lets us—to follow Weber’s famous criticism of Marx—remain inside
the “cab” of historical constructionism, emphasizing the constructed
nature of historical understandings while, at the same time, seeming
to alight from it as an objective, outside observer? Why is our “post-
modern perspective” not simply another construction, responding to
another set of political structures? Or, alternatively, acknowledging it
is just that, what suggests this position is verifiable?
The point is that we need to approach our present “standards”—
our “Western standards”—with a critical eye. Still, that does not mean
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we cannot cross cultural communities or intellectual perspectives in
using them. Not only do Islanders (a loose term for early residents of
the Pacific Islands) and Outlanders (a still looser term for those who
settled in the region during the past three centuries) share overlap-
ping pasts—that is to say, their recent pasts involve each other in sig-
nificant ways—but, importantly, they share many standards for ex-
ploring these pasts. (The reason this is not always recognized is
because Islander standards for evaluating divergent claims are often
framed in terms of fallacious stereotypes. They are rarely investigated.)
Islander and Outlander are far too broad as categories, of course,
to facilitate productive comparison. But we can compare subsets of
each: Pukapukans—Polynesians dwelling on a northern Cook Island
atoll—and professional Pacific historians. (When I say Pukapukans, I
refer only to the 230 Pukapukans I interviewed in 1977–1981—see
Borofsky 1987:xix–xx.) Both groups value primary sources. Eyewit-
ness accounts are seen as better than secondhand or thirdhand re-
countings of an event, for example. Both groups also believe that one
should not take a person’s testimony at face value. It needs to be
scrutinized for biases, for unstated personal advantages sought. Both
groups analyze the contexts within which testimony is presented to
ascertain its validity. Is there something in its telling, or the contexts
of the telling, that lends credibility—or doubt—to the testimony?
Citing lots of details—especially details about which others are only
vaguely familiar—often conveys, for both parties, that a person is
knowledgeable about a subject. Both groups moreover are impressed
when testimony is presented in public forums and other noted au-
thorities do not contest it. Public consensus—the broader the better
—suggests, for both, that “truth” is at hand. And both groups rely
extensively on recognized experts. That is to say, they believe some
people are quite knowledgeable about a subject and others should
generally defer to them. How people conclude someone is an expert
—given they themselves possess limited means to test an expert’s ex-
pertise—is a complex process. But in both cases, the evaluation tends
to support existing social hierarchies.
There are other more subtle similarities between Pukapukans and
Pacific historians we might also note. Take the commonly stated op-
position between oral and written accounts. Professional Pacific histo-
rians place far more stress on written reports than Pukapukans do.
Yet as Maude asserts (1971:12), most written records in the Pacific
are Eurocentric. They were generally written by westerners—Western
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explorers, Western missionaries, Western merchants—involving a
Western bias (even when they claimed to describe Pacific Islanders).
De-emphasizing oral accounts, questioning their reliability regarding
times past, emphasizes a point Shapin makes: Credibility assessments
often support the status system of the assessor (1994:93). What is in-
triguing is that most academic scholars take most academic docu-
mentation on trust. Rarely do they check one another’s footnotes or
sources. Few of the twenty-nine reviewers of Obeyesekere’s Apotheosis
of Captain Cook, for example, actually went back and examined his
documentation (see Chapter 28). Fewer still, I believe, have checked
Sahlins’ 1995 documentation, despite the praise the book has received
for its meticulous scholarship. As Grafton observes, “Only the rela-
tively few readers who have trawled their nets through the same
archival waters can identify the catch in any given set of notes. . . .
For most readers, footnotes play a different role. In a modern, imper-
sonal society, in which individuals must rely for vital services on others
whom they do not know, credentials perform what used to be the
function of guild membership or personal recommendations: they
give legitimacy. Like the shabby podium, carafe of water, and ram-
bling, inaccurate introduction which assert that particular person
deserves to be listened to . . . footnotes confer authority on a writer”
(1997:7–8). If professional Pacific historians accept each other’s foot-
notes on faith, as clearly happens, what is the difference, then, be-
tween oral and written accounts?
Take another case. Many Pacific Islanders, such as Epeli Hau‘ofa,
Vili Hereniko, John Pule, and Albert Wendt, voice an uncomfortable-
ness with the more structured forms of Western history writing. In
turn, various academic historians express uneasiness with the poetry,
plays, performances, and novels Pacific Islanders use as forms of his-
tory telling. Yet we should not overdraw the differences involved. Not-
able examples exist of history and literature overlapping in the West.
The Great War and Modern Memory—which won the National Book
Award, the National Book Critics Circle Award, and the Emerson
Award from Phi Beta Kappa—is one such example. Its author, Fussell,
writes: “I have tried to understand something of the simultaneous
and reciprocal process by which life feeds materials to literature while
literature returns the favor by conferring forms upon life. And I have
been concerned with something more: the way the dynamics and
iconography of the Great War have proved crucial political, rhetori-
cal, and artistic determinants on subsequent life. At the same time the
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war was relying on inherited myth, it was generating new myth, and
that myth is part of the fiber of our own lives” (1975:Preface).
In respect to the historical validity of literary accounts, the Peruvian
novelist Mario Vargas Llosa writes in The Truth of Lies: “The recon-
struction of the past in literature is almost always false in terms of his-
torical objectivity. Literary truth is one thing, historical truth another.
But although it is full of lies—rather, because of this fact—literature
recounts the history that the historians would not know how, or be
able, to write because the deceptions, tricks, and exaggerations of
narrative literature are used to express profound and unsettling
truths which can only see the light of day in this oblique way” (see
Parini 1998:B5).
This is not to say there are no differences between Pukapukans and
professional Pacific historians in their standards of judgment. There
clearly are. Pukapukans, for example, are open to a wider range of
sources than professional Pacific historians. Both mine written texts
and genealogies for information, but Pukapukans pay more attention
to chants, folk tales, and landscapes as important sources of data.
There is also a greater concern among Pukapukans with the interper-
sonal contexts that produced a piece of information. Questions such
as “Did the person look you straight in the eyes?” or “Did the person
smile while telling the story?” are important in assessing a person’s
testimony. Professional Pacific historians—even those emphasizing the
postmodern concern regarding the role of the knower in the known
(to borrow M. Polanyi’s phrasing)—are largely focused on texts. One
hears little about the smiles or the personalities of informants (only
about the smiles and personalities of historians).
Objectivity as a Process
Let me draw this section to a close with four points. First, it is clear
complications and contradictions abound in how we make sense of
the past. Selecting, interpreting, and silencing information is rarely a
straightforward process. And our claims of how we go about doing it
are, at times, at odds with the reality of our practices. “Knowing the
past,” Kubler states, “is as astonishing a performance as knowing the
stars” (1962:19). Our changing styles for exploring the past, the com-
plexities of how we discover and weigh information through time,
means there will always be a contingent, changing aspect to our under-
standing of past events.
Second, tensions encapsulated in the conflicts between the Enlight-
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enment and the Romantic Counter-Enlightenment—between the
degree we can use a set (or our set) of perspectives to cross cultural
borders—frame today’s history-telling debates. But we need remember
that each position possesses unstated complications. The Enlighten-
ment, for example, in seeking to tear down parochial boundaries,
affirms a form of imperialism that implies one perspective applies
(or should apply) to many (if not all). And the Romantic Counter-
Enlightenment’s bounded nationalism impedes any crossing of bor-
ders, perpetuating the present’s parochialisms rather than challenging
them. Still, and this is crucial, such problems do not mean that—in
practice—significant overlaps do not exist between professional Pacific
historians and Pukapukans regarding how to make sense of the past.
The fact that Islander and Outlander styles for exploring and for
assessing the region’s pasts overlap in significant ways means that we
need not be paralyzed by abstract philosophical arguments.
Third, the standards people apply to evaluating accounts of the
past—even with such overlaps—remain very much embedded in con-
texts. That is why historical accounts change with changing perspec-
tives, changing audiences, and changing times. I am not suggesting
that standards for assessing credibility are continually in flux. (Shapin
1994 makes clear some Western standards—such as judging a person’s
statements by his past actions—have endured for centuries.) I am say-
ing their application in specific contexts or the weighing of one stan-
dard against another often fluctuate with the teller and/or the teller’s
audience. We need be sensitive to how contexts shape content. The
fact that many professional Pacific historians stress the need for
Islander perspectives but tend to include only token Islander repre-
sentation emphasizes the power imbalances remaining in the “post-
colonial” Pacific. And the fact that many Islanders silence differences
within Islander communities to lend greater authority to their own
perspectives illustrates that the power plays are not all one sided. “In
a war between unequals, especially when the more powerful side is
rampantly duplicitous,” a recent New York Times editorial asserts
(discussing the controversy surrounding the historical authenticity of
I, Rigoberta Menchú), “we expect that truth will be on the side of the
innocent” (December 17, 1998). I am suggesting that, in our tellings
and retellings of the past, there are no “innocents.” We need to be
sensitive to contexts—all around.
But fourth, it is clear that we can still strive for objectivity under
these conditions. Objectivity, while an incomplete project at best, is
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something many (perhaps most) history tellers aspire to as they ana-
lyze how others (or justify how they) select, interpret, and silence
information. This holds true for Pukapukans as well as professional
Pacific historians, for writers of the Romantic Counter-Enlightenment
as well as the Enlightenment. Objectivity always remains a work in
progress. It is an ever continuing, ever incomplete effort because it
does not reside in the rhetoric or in the appearances of objectivity. It
resides in the arguments and counterarguments—in the continuing
conversations—of people through time. What we call history—the
study of times past with what remains of these times in the present—
gains greater credibility, gains greater objectivity, through challenges
and counterchallenges. We saw this with Ranke. He criticized the
work of Guicciardini and then, in turn, was criticized by Leo. We
never discover “how it really was” in the European pasts Ranke dis-
cusses. But their back-and-forth conversations/arguments allow us to
sift through the material discussed, refining our understanding of it.
As Shapin observes in A Social History of Truth (1994:338), the cir-
culation of knowledge in public space has been critical for assessing
knowledge claims. Davies’s Europe: A History (1996) provides a case
in point. The book has been reviewed favorably in the New York
Review of Books (Evans 1997) and has over a hundred thousand
copies in print. Yet Rabb, in the New York Times, asserts: “Without
looking anything up, this reviewer spotted inaccuracies, on the aver-
age, every other page. Things go so bad that eventually I counted
seven wrong dates in 11 lines” (1996:16). Objectivity, in other words,
is not something to be proclaimed with stylistic displays, rhetorical
assertions, or publishing numbers. It is a process of negotiation in-
volving conversations across divergent perspectives, with challenges
and counterchallenges. Without such conversations, we cannot move
toward any reasonable sense of objectivity. To claim otherwise is
innocence indeed.
The Politics of Representation2
The politics surrounding who claims the right to speak about
the Pacific’s pasts means that one’s ability to entertain broad conver-
2For further references see: the problem of communicating across difference: Reilly
1996:404; using difference to unsettle the accepted: Hempenstall 1992:74; Nero in
when
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sations—across a range of different perspectives—is not a simple pro-
cess. Listen to some statements regarding the issue: Kame‘eliehiwa
suggests “Natives have often wished that white people would study
their own ancestors . . . instead of us, whom they generally misunder-
stand and thus misrepresent” (1994b:112). “For Hawaiians,” Trask
asserts, “anthropologists . . . are part of the colonizing horde because
they seek to take away from us the power to define who and what we
are, and how we should behave politically and culturally” (1991:
162). A New Zealand Herald headline, for a story regarding Hanson’s
“The Making of the Maori” (1989), reads: “US Expert Says Maori
Culture Invented”—this at a time when the New Zealand govern-
ment’s compliance with the Treaty of Waitangi was the subject of an
ongoing investigation (see Linnekin 1991a:446; cf. Levine 1991; Han-
son 1991). Hereniko (in this volume) asks: “Do outsiders have the
right to speak for and about Pacific Islanders? . . . Westerners seem to
think they have the right to express opinions (sometimes labeled
truths) about cultures that are not their own in such a way that they
appear to know it from the inside out. Most seem to think they have
the right to speak about anything and everything.”
We need to be sensitive to the contexts surrounding such state-
ments. They challenge the existing structures for framing (and autho-
rizing) explorations of the region’s pasts. More is involved than what
Gellner termed “kicking the dead dragon of colonialism” years after
its official demise (see Wrong 1999:5). We might, more perceptively,
regard these challenges in relation to recent reservations regarding the
development paradigm—in which a rising tide of Western capitalism
was supposed to lift all (or most) “Third World” boats. Now decades
into the project, its limitations are clear. “Whatever progress has been
achieved has been inadequate in relation to basic human needs,”
Denoon 1997b:439; Borofsky 1987:145–156; history as a double construction: Dening
1988a:xi, 93–116; 1988b:4, 27, 99–101; Thomas 1994:108; New York Times editorial
October 20, 1997; Keesing and Tonkinson 1982:297–301 ff., 370–372; Mendelsohn
1997; Kaplan 1997; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983:1–14 ff., 247–259; Hereniko in
Howe, Kiste, and Lal 1994:424; Comaroff and Comaroff 1991:12; and Gordon 1997:
B5; value in questioning accepted accounts: Luttwak 1997; Shapin 1994:338, Green-
blatt 1991:127; Smith 1997; Binney 1997:9, 523; Reilly 1996:404; opening up his-
tory to others: Douglas 1992:98–99; Lal 1992:230; Trouillot 1995:21; not leaving
history simply to “professional” historians: Shea 1997:A21; MacCarthy 1997:36–37;
and Trouillot 1995:21, 25.
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Mehmet writes in the Harvard International Review. “The bottom line
is that the promises of mass prosperity made in the 1950s and 1960s
to justify Western intervention have not been realized” (1998/99:54).
As noted in a later section on “Postcolonial” Politics, development
has tended to become another form of dependency. In acknowledging
the limits of the development paradigm, we are led to an important
question: What forms of cultural, historical, and/or intellectual inde-
pendence might be effectively asserted by Third (and Fourth) World
countries today?
There is another context, as well, that shapes the politics of repre-
sentation: the tendency to view people as grouped into homogeneous
cultural units or “blocks.” In opposing “the West,” many Third
World intellectuals present their perspectives in terms Western audi-
ences understand. Oppositions such as Hawaiians versus haoles,
Maoris versus Pakeha, and Islanders versus Outlanders are intelligible
to these audiences because the implicit frame of reference—involving
the overlapping of political and cultural identities—relates to the ideol-
ogy of nationalism in Western history.
But there is no denying important differences existed (and still exist)
within Islander communities that should not be skimmed over in such
cultural “blocking.” Wilcox and Nâwahi, for example—important
leaders of the Hawaiian community during the protests against
American annexation of the archipelago—opposed the concept of a
Hawaiian monarchy (which is to say, Queen Liliuokalani’s right to
rule: Coffman 1998:238; see also 103–104). And the British govern-
ment, in its conflict with the Maori leader Te Kooti, often relied on
other Maori for military support—“a deliberate and remorseless
unleashing of tribal hostilities by the government,” Binney suggests
(1997:165). Neither Hawaiians nor Maori, then, marched in a col-
lective lockstep during key periods of Western intrusion. (From the
traditions that have come down to us, the same might be said for pre-
contact times as well).
We need also note that pervasive hybridities muddle any neat
demarcations between groups. Borderlands is a term frequently used
for emphasizing the ambiguities that disrupt the easy association of
cultural borders with national borders (e.g., see Rosaldo 1989;
Alvarez 1995). But it would be fair to say there are hybridities all
across the board, not just at the borders. They exist at the center
as well as the periphery. Symbolic of such hybridities, the Office of
Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) defines Hawaiians—for purposes of partic-
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ipation in OHA affairs—as those claiming to possess some degree of
Hawaiian ancestry. (This degree of ancestry is left ambiguous—it can
range from 100 percent to less than 10 percent—and, by and large,
rests solely on the individual’s self-accounting of his or her ancestry).
“No one can deny the persisting continuities of long traditions,” Said
writes. “But there seems no reason except fear and prejudice to keep
insisting on their separation and distinctiveness, as if that was what
all human life was about” (1993:336). “For good or evil,” Dening
observes, “these past 400 years of cultural encounters in Oceania
have so bound-together black and white that now there is no black
without white, no white without black” (1995:75). And Narayan sug-
gests (as a “native” anthropologist), “a person may have many strands
of identification available, strands that may be tugged into the open
or stuffed out of sight” (1993:673).
One result of the tendency toward cultural blocking is that certain
reviewers of this book will look closely at the proportion of Islander
contributors. By my account, fourteen (or 40 percent) of the contribu-
tions involve Islanders: Balaz, Diaz, Grace, Hau‘ofa, Hereniko, High-
land, Kituai, Lee, Malsol, Molisa, Rasmussen, Teaiwa, Thaman, and
Wendt. (If we exclude Prakash, Said, and White—who are offering
comparative perspectives, as outsiders, on the Pacific—the percentage
goes up to 44 percent.) Some might query if an appropriate number of
pages, not simply contributions, is allowed Islanders. (Many Islander
contributions are shorter in length because of their poetic form.) This
question leads to others: Should all contributions be the same approx-
imate length? How many Outlander poems need be included to pro-
vide a sense of symmetry with Islander poems? Clearly, things tend to
get murky as we move further into the politics of cultural blocking.
And how should we classify various authors? Take for example
Vicente Diaz: His father’s father is indigenous “Filipino,” his father’s
mother is half Spanish. His mother’s father is Ponapean, his mother’s
mother indigenous “Filipino.” His parents moved to Guam from the
Philippines following World War II, and Vicente was born and raised
there. Does that make him a Pacific Islander? If one focuses on gene-
alogical connections, he is mostly “Filipino.” Would that put him out-
side “the Pacific” (as it is generally conceived of by Pacific historians)?
If one focuses on the contexts within which he grew up—and clearly
relationships and behaviors play an important part in many Pacific
Islanders’ definitions of themselves (see Howard 1990)—an “Islander”
classification seems appropriate. (I would add that Vicente’s mother
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affirms strong Ponapean connections through family narratives.) Or
take Helen Morton. She was born in England and raised in Australia.
She married a Tongan, had a child by him, but is now divorced.
To what degree can she be said to be an Islander in terms of rela-
tionships—especially as she still works closely with Tongans in her
research (see Morton 1996)? Brenda Lee describes her background as
Hawaiian, Chinese, Portuguese, Spanish, Inca Indian, and English.
(Her husband is a Hawaiian homestead land lessee.) If she is, as she
says, “heavy duty” Chinese and Hawaiian, does that make her more
Islander or Outlander? It all depends on to what degree one includes
immigrant Chinese within “the Pacific.” I would add that grouping
Michel Panoff and Klaus Neumann together as Outlanders while sepa-
rating Marshall Sahlins and Vicente Diaz by the Outlander/Islander
distinction ignores important intellectual differences (in the case of the
former) and similarities (in the case of the latter). Ambiguities, sub-
tleties, and complications abound, in other words, in trying to clas-
sify contributors in these stereotypical terms. Outlander and Islander
are, at best, constructed notions that leave out as much as they include.
Still, there is no denying the politics and polarizations involved
in these classifications. Opposing Outlanders offers a ready way to
mobilize Islanders—silencing the differences that separate individuals
and communities from one another. It becomes a call to action against
“others.” For Outlanders, the polarization frames ambivalences re-
garding their dominance of the region. It nourishes a sense of liberal
guilt. It also sidesteps coming to terms with the specifics of this con-
trol and the political structures reinforcing it.
Stepping on Silences
A way to dig deeper into the political tensions surrounding cultural
blocking today is to recognize that people in both groups, if I might
speak in very general terms for the moment, tend to step on—disrupt
—the other group’s silences. Outlander accounts—by their form of
presentation (as published books) and their concern for “objectivity”
—imply a certainty they rarely possess. Credentialing for professional
Pacific historians involves publishing. Pacific historians often are aware
of the uncertainties in their publications. But they rarely emphasize
them. They are usually allocated to passing, cautionary phrases early
on in a book. If authors emphasize these uncertainties too much, pub-
lishers might question publishing their work. (Why not wait until more
is known?) It is, ultimately, a matter of scholarly salesmanship. For
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those unfamiliar with this rhetorical posturing, the writing style con-
veys an air of arrogance. It implies—whatever the realities of academic
life—that few spaces exist for alternative accounts (and for alternative
forms of credentialing). Binney writes: “Maori objections to Pakeha
dominance in historical writing have been intended not so much to
claim an absolute ownership or monopoly over their history, nor to
claim a right to censor . . . but rather to ensure that Maori understand-
ings and values be given their full weight. The debate is about the nar-
rating of history in ways which are meaningful to Maori. For while
written historical accounts can usually inform, misconceived assump-
tions about who possesses ‘the truth’ and what are the appropriate
ways of assessing, analysing and judging have been set up and perpetu-
ated with the pre-eminence of European historical writers” (1997:5).
I would add that professional historians frequently face another
problem as well. Many professional historians remain uneasy regard-
ing how historical nonfiction often trips over into historical fiction.
We noted above Mario Vargas Llosa’s remark concerning the “truth
of lies.” “Writing is an art, and art means artifice, the artificial,”
Joyce Carol Oates observes. “That we are keenly aware of this today
testifies to our higher standard of truth no less than to our diminished
expectation of encountering it. The contemporary predilection for
‘nonfiction’ in the form of . . . ‘memoir’ testifies, perhaps, to our des-
perate wish that some truth of the spirit be present to us though we
know it’s probably invented. We want to believe! We are the species
that clamors to be lied to” (1998).
Caught between a narrowing base for purely academic writings
and the widening base for popularized—less precise, more dramatic
—accounts of the past, professional Pacific historians often appear
edgy and defensive when faced with Islander objections to their writ-
ing styles. Why do more people not read our accounts, many histo-
rians ask? And to fend off the answer, they often establish a border
of credentialing around “proper” academic writing to give it a sense
of professional authority. The other silence of academic writing in the
Pacific, then, is that few read Pacific historians’ books. Munro (1996a:
57) writes that Pacific history “is becoming isolated and marginalised
within the Pacific . . . the very place where . . . [it] ought to be empha-
sized” (see also Munro 1995:83). In their heated critiques, Islanders
may be paying proportionally more attention to the work of profes-
sional Pacific historians than many Outlander audiences do.
Various Islanders have their own silences. Islander writers fre-
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quently read by Outlander audiences may hold marginal positions
within their own natal communities. They are often hybrids: Educated
in the positionings and posturings of Western academics, they may be
partially alienated from the world in which they grew up. The basis
for their authority—as representatives of a particular community—
consequently remains unclear. Not infrequently, their authority derives
from positioning themselves in the borderlands between Islander and
Outlander communities. Outlander anthropologists and historians—
who by living in a particular community come to know it in an inti-
mate way—undermine and compete for this same borderland author-
ity. Look again at Trask’s critique of anthropology: “For Hawaiians,
anthropologists . . . are part of the colonizing horde because they seek
to take away from us the power to define who and what we are”
(1991:162). What is left unsaid in Trask’s statement is that diverse
voices exist within the Hawaiian community, and many take strong
exception to her views.
We might place this issue in perspective by noting the ambiguity sur-
rounding the position of the noted intellectual Frantz Fanon. He
remains highly regarded in the West. Sartre, in his preface to Fanon’s
Wretched of the Earth, wrote: “The Third World finds itself and
speaks to itself through his voice” (in Fanon 1963:9). Yet Fanon’s
status remains unclear in the Third World, certainly in Algeria, the
country with which he is often associated. Born to a French mother
in Martinique, he was viewed as an outsider by the Algerian revolu-
tionaries with whom he sought to associate. They tended to see him
as a European interloper. The authority he had came not primarily
from Algerians but from straddling two audiences—Algerian and
French—who were in conflict with one another.
While noting the silences Outlanders and Islanders step on, we need
also take note of the silences that are not disrupted in their exchanges
—which silences remain silent. Significant among these is a sense of
liberal tokenism that allows Outlanders to gain a “taste for ‘the
Other’ ” (in Dominguez’s 1994 phrasing) without seriously disrupting
Outlander political dominance. The strategy draws a select number
of Islanders into elite Western circles of status—as artists, for example
—while keeping most Islanders at arm’s length. This is not to say
that these Islanders do not benefit. For the highlighted individuals,
Dirlik observes: “Postcolonial discourse is an expression not so
much of agony over identity . . . but of newfound power” (1994:339).
One might suggest, then, that the two parties—despite their conflicts,
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despite their rhetorics—are at times drawn into the rhythms of a
shared “postcolonial” tango that neither fully acknowledges.
Moving Beyond Polarizations
Let me suggest three possibilities for working our way through these
problems.
First, bringing different perspectives to bear on our understandings
of times past is essential for recognizing the shape of our construc-
tions and strategic silences. Without such differences to confront, we
tend to live comfortably within our own complacencies. Without dif-
ferences we have a rather limited sense of perspective, of “objectivity.”
We go galloping about on our rhetoric unappreciative of the silences
that speed us along.
Mitchell’s review of Hereniko’s The Woven Gods emphasizes a key
problem in this regard. Mitchell comments that Hereniko’s book “is
not a conventional ethnography. While its level of scholarship is high,
a short time ago it would have been unpublishable by a university
press because it violates established editorial principles for a scholarly
monograph. . . . To read the book is to veer clumsily among a farrago
of data and styles. . . . By privileging his anthropological self,” Mitchell
writes, Hereniko “notes that he had failed to connect with his fellow
Islanders. In a reverse way,” Mitchell continues, “by privileging his
Rotuman and fiction-writing selves . . . he has failed to connect as effec-
tively as he could with his anthropological audience” (1997:280–281).
Mitchell calls it an unsuccessful experiment in ethnographic writing.
Mitchell’s review raises an important set of questions for Outlander
academics: Can Western scholars only embrace Third World intellec-
tuals when they express themselves in First World terms? Is real differ-
ence—in terms of emotion, multiple voices, and alternative writing
styles—out? In learning the lingo of Western intellectuals, do Third
World authors become First World hybrids (as Fanon did)? When
does a difference, borrowing Bateson’s phrase, make a difference? And
when is a difference embraced enough as a difference that it allows us
to grow beyond our present understandings—letting us, so to speak,
alight from the cab of historical constructionism and perceive other
perspectives?
Second, in trying to move beyond the present polarizations, we
need to remember that exploring “the past” is more than a profes-
sional calling. It is often a personal, participatory, empowering expe-
rience for humans. It adds meaning to life not only by explaining
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what “was” but by putting what “is” in perspective. History telling
can be a deeply political process. To quote Chatterjee: “Reviewing the
development of historiography in Bengal in the nineteenth century,
Guha shows how the call sent out by Bankimchandra—‘We have no
history! We must have a history!’—implied in effect an exhortation to
launch the struggle for power, because in this mode of recalling the
past, the power to represent oneself is nothing other than political
power itself” (1993:76). In a related vein, Lowenthal writes: “Identi-
fication with a national past often serves as an assurance of worth
against subjugation or bolsters a national sovereignty” (1985:44). His-
tory telling, in other words, extends beyond professional historians.
It belongs to a much wider audience. It is something we all can—
indeed should—participate in to personally place ourselves within the
continuum of time.
Such participation, of course, disrupts the easy silences we live with
regarding professional history telling. It returns us to Oates’s comment
about people seeking meaning as well as “facts.” (How do we deal
with that?) If we are “the species that clamors to be lied to,” what
does that portend for professional tellings and retellings of times past?
We need to remember that “history” always involves a double con-
struction. The documents used to construct the past had a particular
politics of construction—were directed toward a particular audience
—when they were first recorded (decades or centuries ago). And there
is another politics of construction, involving another audience, in the
assessing and ordering of these earlier constructions today. Viewing
history telling as a solitary, individual experience denies one of its cen-
tral components. It occurs among people, for people, by people—in
their interactions with one another through time.
Hersh’s The Dark Side of Camelot (regarding the presidency of
John F. Kennedy) illustrates what can happen when we step outside
the confines of academic writing. We find credible writing styles that
challenge the notion history can only be written by people with doc-
torate degrees. What do academic historians make of “a reporter with
a professional style notoriously similar to the single-minded ferocity
of the wolverine, a meat-eater of the north woods known among fur
trappers of yesteryear for its ability to tear its way through the log
wall of a cabin for a strip of bacon . . . Hersh does not write history
in the usual sense of the term, but he makes life difficult for histo-
rians by digging up just enough about distressing matters so they
can’t honestly be ignored” (Powers 1997:13). The message of Hersh’s
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work is not simply about the foibles of an American icon but also
about the foibles of leaving history only to professional historians.
“Professional historians have made good use of the creation of the
past as a distinct entity,” Trouillot writes, “a creation that paralleled
the growth of their own practice. The more historians wrote about
past worlds, the more The Past became real as a separate world. But
as various crises of our times impinge upon identities thought to be
long established or silent, we move closer to the era when profes-
sional historians will have to position themselves more clearly within
the present, lest politicians, magnates, or ethnic leaders alone write
history for them” (1995:152).
Which brings us back—and this is my third point—to shared con-
versations. I have emphasized that Islanders and Outlanders share
overlapping standards for assessing credibility in the Pacific as well
as more than three centuries of overlapping pasts. Together these offer
a foundation for meaningful conversations across differences of repre-
sentation, differences of silence, differences of perspective. Finding a
way to productively engage in such discussions constitutes the essence
of critical history telling. We need to broaden our conversations, our
audiences of participation, if we are to move beyond the politics of
polarization and learn something new about ourselves and our pasts,
as well as the pasts of others.
Narratives3
“The grand narrative,” Lyotard writes in The Postmodern
Condition, “has lost its credibility” (1984:37). The clarity of vision,
the ordered trajectory of unfolding events espoused by such narra-
tives of world history as Marxism, Christianity, and Progress seem
less credible today. Many scholars are attuned, instead, to the frag-
mented, contradictory accountings that disrupt the coherence and
power of these panoramic histories. No single narrative today seems
to fit all sizes, all contexts, all perspectives regarding how times past
merge into the present.
3For further references see: human narration: Todorov 1984:x ff.; Geertz 1997;
Steedly 1993:29; Assman 1997; history as narrative: Le Goff 1992:116–119; Green-
blatt 1991:2; Campbell 1992:54; Trouillot 1995:2, 55; Steedly 1993:15; Stoler 1992a:
152–153; Pandey 1992:41; and Said 1989:221.
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And yet, Lyotard’s statement needs to be qualified in an important
way. Humans are born storytellers. They are addicted, as part of the
human condition, to telling narratives. Morris suggests: “When con-
fronted with situations of inexplicable impasse, our brains are predis-
posed to the creation of narrative. . . . Narrative . . . is not just some-
thing we can do but something we cannot help doing. It is as if the
human brain cannot rest until it has produced a verbal explanatory
structure—employing whatever resources are available in the culture
—to account for what it cannot know” (1998:254–255). The psychol-
ogist Bruner asserts: “The most natural and the earliest way in which
we [humans] organize our experience and our knowledge is in terms
of the narrative form. . . . We impose coherence on the past, turn it
into history” (1996:121, 144). Human beings, the anthropologist Car-
rithers writes, “perceive any current action within a large temporal
envelope, and within that envelope they perceive any given action,
not as a response to the immediate circumstances or current mental
state of an interlocutor or of oneself, but as part of an unfolding story”
(1992:82). (De Certeau 1988, Rosaldo 1989, and White 1973 discuss
variations on this theme.)
Two examples illustrate the problem this gets us into. Take recent
critiques of “whiggish history”—critiques of the writing of history as
progress. Many today would challenge the notion that the past always
unfolds into the future as ever increasing progress. But the critics of
whiggish history face a problem: In suggesting that their critiques im-
prove on earlier whiggish narratives, they are, in fact, also participat-
ing in a progress narrative themselves (but with different players at the
top). The critique finds itself caught up, in other words, in the hege-
monic framework it seeks to disrupt. And what are we to make of
the fact that, in these postmodern times of disrupted narratives, mem-
oirs—narratives that claim not to be invented but (as Oates notes)
occasionally are—have become one of the more popular forms of
reading (and writing)? There seems no getting away from narratives
—even today.
We might note that the broad histories of the Pacific tend to fol-
low a narrative format. Reaching beyond the specifics of this or that
event, they offer coherent stories—with political implications—regard-
ing Islander-Outlander interactions. Oliver (1989 [1961]), for example,
focuses on the transformations in the region from Western contact
through 1950. While not denying indigenous agency—the active role
Islanders played in the process—the emphasis is on the changes
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wrought by the West. Through brief case studies, he examines partic-
ular impacts (such as depopulation) and particular foreign enterprises
(such as missionaries and sugar production). Howe (1984), in con-
trast, emphasizes indigenous agency in the face of Western intrusion,
how Islanders played key roles in transforming the region prior to
colonial control. Where Oliver focuses on topics, Howe describes in-
digenous developments on particular archipelagoes. The rise of the
Pomares, for example, is examined in Tahiti; changing British-Maori
relations are considered in New Zealand. The authors in Denoon
(1997b), in focusing on political and economic trends, balance be-
tween these two positions—noting Islander agency without denying
Outlander impacts. Denoon, in a chapter on “Land, Labour and Inde-
pendent Development,” states, for example: “Throughout the nine-
teenth century, ambitious Pacific Islanders saw a variety of chances
to transform their lives and their production and exchange. Several
formed alliances with foreign adventurers, to extract or exploit re-
sources. As the balance of political power tilted against the chiefs,
however, it became increasingly difficult to retain land, labour, and
autonomy” (1997b:152).
I would add two final—but critical—points. Narratives are not
simply about “the past”—about the content or analysis of this or that
event. They constitute ways for people to think with “the past.” They
involve engagement. They help conceptualize the present in terms of
the past and the past in terms of the present. They constitute active
orderings in and of the world. And second, stories are told in con-
texts. They are not only presented but listened to. Storytellers and
audiences tend to collectively participate in the unfolding of a narra-
tive (see Finnegan 1977).
“Pacific Histories”4
With this broad framework in place—regarding objectivity,
representation, and narration—let me turn to the specifics of “Pacific
history.” (The quote marks emphasize that it is a self-constructed field
that, as Dening 1989 reminds us, leaves ambiguous whether it is a
4For further references see: Pacific history’s history: Howe in Howe, Kiste, and Lal
1994:xi–xiii; Gunson 1992:2, 4, 10–11; Denoon 1992:vii; Lal 1992:x; Macdonald
1996:23–26; Munro 1996a:47, 51; Shineberg 1996:10; Moore 1997:194; Pacific his-
tory
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subject unto itself, the perspective of a region, or a location where
broader historical perspectives are brought to bear on an array of
events.) The field has an interesting history. One might say it began
in 1950 when Davidson arrived at the Australian National University
(ANU) to assume the chair of Pacific History. There had been various
accounts of Islander-Outlander and Outlander-Outlander interactions
in the Pacific prior to this, but they were generally framed by dynamics
beyond the Pacific—such as Masterman’s Origins of International
Rivalry in the Pacific, 1845–1884 (1934). (By contrast, anthropolog-
ical accounts such as Buck’s Vikings of the Pacific [1938] focused on
Islander oral traditions.)
Davidson emphasized two key points in his inaugural lecture: (1)
“To understand the history of colonial government in the Pacific, it
has been necessary to shift the centre of interest from the metropolitan
capitals to the islands themselves” (1966:14) and (2) the policies and
practices of the Western powers and various Western groups in the
Pacific “are still subjects that demand . . . attention; but they must take
their place . . . alongside . . . analyses of the indigenous forces that have
similarly contributed to the making of the contemporary Pacific”
(1966:21). Pacific history, he asserted, needed to focus more on the
residents of the region. This became the mantra of the discipline as a
whole during these early years because, as Hempenstall notes, ANU
“controlled the terrain of the subject area . . . through institutional
patronage of postgraduate students, possession of The Journal of
Pacific History and a productive publishing programme” (1992:61).5
But there was a major problem. Many Western residents left
tory’s present problems: Campbell 1992:48; Howe 1992:226–229; Denoon 1997a:
405; Hempenstall 1992:70; Macdonald 1996:24, 35, 37; Munro 1995:83; Munro
1996a:46, 49–51, 57; Chappel 1995:318, 326; Diaz 1995:160; Teaiwa, Nicole, and
Durutalo 1996:273; Spate in Daws 1979:125; limited Pacific resources to attract out-
siders’ attention to the region: Macdonald 1996:29; Herr in Howe, Kiste, and Lal
1994:296; Henningham in Howe, Kiste, and Lal 1994:135; Bennett in Howe, Kiste,
and Lal 1994:41; broadening perspectives beyond the Pacific: Aldrich 1992:91; Howe
1992:231; Macdonald 1996:30–32, 34–35; Munro 1996a:45, 53; Firth in Daws 1979:
127; problems of history writing in the Pacific: Munro 1995:94–95; Moore 1997:
200; the Pacific as a construct: Dening 1989; Dirlik 1992:58–59, 65–67; Macdonald
1996:28.
5We might add a silence about Pacific history’s history. Davidson and Howe—key fig-
ures in the field’s early development—both strongly criticized what they called “impe-
rial
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written records of their experiences. Few Islanders did. How then
to grasp indigenous perspectives—through oral narratives, archeo-
logical excavations, Western accounts of Islander views? The ques-
tion emphasizes an abiding difficulty with the Davidson perspective:
Despite its rhetoric, it was oriented more toward Pacific Islands than
Pacific Islanders.
In the early 1980s, with the Davidson school in decline, Dening
and Sahlins—both outsiders to the school—reignited Pacific history.
Focusing on Islander metaphors (Dening) and Islander ritual struc-
tures (Sahlins), they suggested new ways to analyze Islander perspec-
tives. Dening—exploring the “history of Strangers in their ships, of
Natives in their islands, of their possession of one another” (1988b:
29)—considered the metaphors each used to incorporate the “other”
into their respective worlds. Sahlins focused on indigenous structures
—as manifested particularly in rituals and myths—and how they
were transformed through time as Islanders applied them in contexts
of contact. (“The great challenge to an historical anthropology,”
Sahlins writes, “is not merely to know how events are ordered by
culture [in contact situations], but how, in that process, the culture is
reordered,” 1981:8.) A productive tension exists between the two
friends: Neither doubts there were indigenous structures and meta-
phors that framed native and stranger relations in the Pacific. But
to what degree they tended to guide action (more Sahlins’s posi-
tion) versus tended to provide contexts for meaningful action (more
Dening’s position) remains the question.
The field has entered troubled times in the 1990s. Intellectual
attention now seems focused on other regions. With the bloom off
the field, so to speak, we can see some of its limitations. It has been
caught in a contradiction of its own making. In turning away from
European framings to regional concerns, it has been able to establish
rial histories”—histories of empire. But neither Davidson nor Howe ever elaborated
in significant detail regarding who the authors of these works were. The only person
cited at length was Moorehead (1966). But his work was meant for a popular audi-
ence, and the telling quote—that is usually held up for criticism—comes from the
book’s dust jacket (presumably written by the publisher’s public relations staff). One
might infer that John Ward, who held a chair of history at Sydney, was an intended
target of both Davidson and Howe. But he is never mentioned—in print or in their
bibliographies. The critique of imperial history, then, remained rather vague and
focused on a straw man.
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an identity of its own, apart from European history. But in embracing
the local, it has often seemed constrained by local perspectives with-
out ever being able to effectively include the perspectives of the real
“locals”—Pacific Islanders. Pacific history—with the exception of
Sahlins’ and Dening’s work—rarely seems to influence work done in
other regions of the world. As Munro writes, “The Pacific has always
been the marginalised backwater of non-European studies” (1993:88).
Part of the problem perhaps is that the region’s resources have not
been in particularly high demand compared to those of Asia and
South America. There has, as a result, not been a particular rush by
outsiders to the region to understand its historical dynamics. But
equally significant, I would suggest, the field has tended to stick to its
local roots—focusing on regional concerns and island-specific studies.
As early as 1979, Howe complained of how scholars were “finding
out more and more about less and less. Few writers seem able to pull
back from the microcosm to consider the implications, if any, for a
broader or macrocosmic view of islands’ history” (1979:83). Leckie
calls it “a lack of synthesis” (1992:151). Trends that sweep the social
sciences beyond the Pacific—such as subaltern history—tend to only
slowly move into the region’s scholarly writings.
Returning to a point suggested above, we need to remember that
the field’s self-defined area of study—the “Pacific”—is a constructed
artifact of the discipline. Why, for example, should Pacific historians
study large Pacific islands such as New Zealand and New Guinea but
ignore the Philippines and Indonesia? (Why is Australia included in
some accounts but not in others?) For those living in Hawai‘i, the
“Pacific” refers to the islands lying within “Melanesia,” “Polynesia,”
and “Micronesia” (constructed categories themselves). For others on
the West Coast of the United States, the “Pacific” usually includes the
Pacific Rim—China, Japan, and Korea. Edmond observes: “Until the
end of the eighteenth century the Pacific was more commonly known
as the South Sea. By the middle of the nineteenth century this latter
term was obsolescent, except when used adjectivally for romantic or
picturesque purposes. Spate [1977] explains this shift mainly in terms
of geography and trade. As exploration of the Ocean extended north-
wards and trade followed in its wake, with Honolulu becoming an im-
portant centre of commerce, the name became inappropriate” (1997:
16). Dirlik suggests “it was the activity of Europeans . . . that con-
stituted the region”—the “demands of the nascent capitalist order”
(1992:65–66; cf. Lewis and Wigen 1997).
26 An Invitation
Whatever the problems in defining the region, whatever the am-
bivalent localisms that inhibit the field’s development, there is still no
denying the field’s strengths. It has an amazingly rich body of Islander-
Outlander interactions stretching over centuries. “One of the . . .
beauties of Pacific history,” Scarr notes, “is the richness of the docu-
mentary material” (in Daws 1979:126). Even a cursory examination
suggests the vast literature that exists on the subject. Dening’s (1980)
study of the Marquesas, for example, contains more than 950 refer-
ences; Gunson’s (1978) study of South Sea missionaries over 750.
These references are full of the hybridities, the mimicries, the ambiva-
lences that are at the heart of recent postcolonial analyses (e.g., see
Bhabha 1994). They constitute a rich source of data for cross-regional
comparison. And while the field has tended to be theoretically paro-
chial, it does not mean that various scholars have not been interested
in developments elsewhere. Hempenstall, for example, advocated a
greater concern for subaltern studies as early as 1992 (1992:74). And
Douglas has called for a “strategic appropriation of others’ concepts.
. . . We cannot ignore the insights of critical theory, structural linguis-
tics and hermeneutics” (1992:106). One can see the field’s strengths
in another way: Stoler and Cooper in their recent Tensions of Empire
emphasize that “imperial elites may have viewed their domains from
a metropolitan center, but their actions, let alone their consequences,
were not necessarily determined there” (1997:29). This has been
Pacific history gospel since the 1950s. Elsewhere, Stoler refers to a
“second wave” of intellectual development concerned with identifying
“the active agency of colonized populations as they engaged and
resisted colonial impositions” (1992b:319–320). She cites Rosaldo
(1980), Taussig (1980), Comaroff (1985), and Roseberry (1986)—all
books published in the 1980s. This has been Pacific history gospel
since the 1960s.
Whatever the limits of the field’s “local” understandings, what-
ever the regional politics of representation, one need only read the
arguments being played out in other regions of the world to see the
intellectual and emotional sophistication many writers—from diverse
backgrounds—bring to their overlapping discussions of the region’s
pasts. As early as 1989, Dening suggested: “History surely is not
something to be learned so much as to be made. . . . For strangers of
Pacific outlands and natives of Pacific islands to have a bound-
together present means that we share a dead past. Neither of us can
say to the other: You have no history to make. Our histories might be
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different. Our histories will always be political. But we each must say
to the other: My past is your past and you must make sense of it as
you can” (1989:137, 139).
In respect to specific historical studies of “West-Rest” interactions,
Binney (1997) and Salmond (1991b) represent the state of the art—for
any region. They offer in-depth accounts that broach the “us”/“them”
divide to provide subtle, multifaceted analyses of key dynamics at
work in these engagements. And significantly, given Munro’s previous
comments, both Islander and Outlander audiences enthusiastically
embrace these works as part of their own pasts. They provide mate-
rial in which people—across the board—find space to craft their own
narratives.
The Volume’s Vision6
A central question arises out of the collective concerns dis-
cussed in this introduction: Can Remembrance of Pacific Pasts do
more than simply reproduce and reinforce the scholarly status quo?
On the one hand, we should note that many Pacific historians
have made genuine efforts at addressing the problems discussed.
Howe’s Where the Waves Fall (1984), for example, includes more
Islander perspectives than Oliver’s The Pacific Islands (1989).
Denoon’s Cambridge History of the Pacific Islanders (1997b) includes
Islander voices and, developing this further, Greenwood, Neumann,
and Sartori (1995) emphasize the centrality of such voices to the
region’s history tellings. Greenwood, Neumann, and Sartori’s Work
in Flux (1995), Denoon’s Emerging from Empire? (1997c), and
Munro’s Reflections on Pacific Island Historiography (1996b) all
grapple with postcolonial and postmodern critiques in an effort to
rethink the discipline.
On the other hand, progress seems to merge into stasis at times—
problems tend to be more acknowledged than addressed. (Plus ça
6For further references see: history as incomplete: New York Times editorial October
20, 1997; history as a participatory process: Shapin 1994:xix; Keller and Keller 1996:
174; New York Times editorial October 12, 1997; Gunson 1992:4, 11; Steedly 1993:
237–238; New York Times editorial August 28, 1997; Limerick 1997; Luckacs 1997;
history as a negotiated conversation (again): Roberts 1997; Denoon 1994:xv; Binney
1997:7; Said 1993:3; Shapin 1994:351–353.
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change, plus c’est la même chose.) In the Sahlins-Obeyesekere dispute
regarding the apotheosis of Captain Cook, for example, Obeyesekere
(1992) repeatedly emphasizes the ambiguities of the data but then, in
turn, defends his hypotheses against all comers (Obeyesekere 1993,
1994; Borofsky 1997). Howe stresses Pacific Islander agency in Where
the Waves Fall, but Islander concerns tend to be perceived through
Western prisms. Their agency is the agency Western writers define for
them (cf. Chappell 1995:318, 326). And in an introductory chapter
to The Cambridge History, Linnekin stresses the importance of sub-
altern historiography (1997:31). But neither Linnekin nor the volume’s
other contributors then use it in subsequent chapters. (The references
Linnekin cites regarding subaltern historiography are even left out of
the volume’s bibliography.) Regarding the politics of representation in
New Zealand history, Reilly observes: “Too often the only response
of Pâkehâ [i.e. Outlander] historians . . . has been to encourage tal-
ented Mâori scholars to address Mâori topics and issues. Though en-
tirely laudable, this assumes that such intellectuals will want to restrict
themselves, in a sort of latterday knowledge ghetto, to a Mâori topic.
Such a decision also allows Pâkehâ not to engage with or even en-
counter mâtauranga Mâori: they no longer have to wrestle in their
intellectual work with the language or its associated cultural values”
(1996:404).
How then to proceed? Remembrance of Pacific Pasts emphasizes
three interrelated principles as a way out of the current maze.
First, recountings of times past—however seamlessly ordered—are
always incomplete. Narrators select this, silence that, to build an
account whose coherence lies, not in the material itself, but in the
words (and mind) of the narrator and his or her audience. How could
one bring together the plethora of materials—the 950 references of
Dening (1980), the 750 references of Gunson (1978), for example,
with the hundreds of references of hundreds of other books (not to
mention additional unpublished chants, memories, and artifacts)—to
form a “complete” account of an island, of a period, or of the region
itself? Books such as Remembrance of Pacific Pasts can only provide
points of reference for thinking about or reflecting on the region’s
pasts.
Second, “history” is more than a product to memorize. It is more
than a set of facts—collected and organized by others—that one must
dutifully learn to be conversant with times past or to affirm a con-
nection to those now dead. History telling is an active, participatory
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process (as the epigraph by Bakim at the beginning of this chapter
emphasizes). To deny history-telling’s empowering elements is to deny
the politics of representation as well as the politics of history making.
In the democracies and quasi-democracies that span the region, his-
tory telling is too important to leave to a coterie of select (and often
unread) Outlander scholars. It is a part of ordinary citizenship. His-
tory telling invigorates the present; it charts identities. It affirms who
we are by describing what we have been. It inspires what we might
yet become.
Third, history telling lies less in the teller than in the dialog the teller
shares with his or her audience. It lies in the conversations—involving
challenges and counterchallenges—that embrace differences that make
a difference (to quote Bateson again). Both Islanders and Outlanders
strive for a sense of “objectivity” that suggests their accounts are
more than glib pronouncements or casual assertions. Despite the poli-
tics of polarization, we need to remember that Islanders and Out-
landers share not only centuries of overlapping, interwoven pasts but
often overlapping standards for judging accounts about these pasts.
Remembrance of Pacific Pasts does not provide the complete
account, then, of the region’s pasts. It cannot. But it does provide
points of reference for readers to think with. It offers tools to assist
readers in weaving further narratives and developing further conver-
sations. The book, as its subtitle affirms, represents “an invitation to
remake history.” The sectional introductions point out what others
have written on the subject so readers can build productively on
them and the chapters that follow in framing their own narratives.
It is not hard to perceive how the professional dynamics of special-
ization have tended to fragment scholarly conversations. It is harder
to see how academics can work their way out of the hole dug by
asserting others should become more like themselves. I have noted
the narrow readership for most books in Pacific history and the con-
cern this has spawned, within the discipline, regarding its limited rele-
vance to others of the region. Outlander scholars need to open them-
selves up to broader conversations about history making—to the
challenges and counterchallenges of wider audiences. Outlander aca-
demics have nothing to lose but their chains (to quote Marx).
Remembrance of Pacific Pasts, in summary, seeks to cut through
the Gordian knots entangling Pacific history telling today. It empha-
sizes the need for conversations across differences—involving chal-
lenges and counterchallenges drawn from overlapping audiences with
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overlapping perspectives—as a way of collectively thinking with the
region’s varied pasts, as a way of weaving new narratives and new
conversations. But this is, and only can be, a hope. It will take daring
readers—who are willing to remake the region’s histories—to turn




To help make sense of the chapters that follow, a few 
general remarks are in order. Remembrance of Pacific Pasts is 
divided into four sections. The first, this one, builds on 
themes developed in “An Invitation.” As its title suggests, it 
offers frames of reference for reading the volume as a 
whole. The second section considers the dynamics of 
Islander-Outlander contact. It examines how people on 
each side of these early encounters sought, in their dif-
ferent ways, to possess—to meaningfully order and control 
—these encounters in terms advantageous to themselves. 
The third explores the contours, concerns, contradictions, 
and controls of colonial engagements. Following the theme 
of section two, this section considers how Outlanders 
sought—with ambiguous success—to more formally possess 
Islanders and their Islands. The fourth discusses the 
cultural politics of the “postcolonial” period. Because it 
remains unclear how distinct the “postcolonial” is from the 
colonial, the word is given quotation marks. The section 
explores the multiple ways residents of the region today 
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strive to possess and/or repossess the region’s varied 
resources.
Each section contains its own introduction. The intro-
ductions offer framing remarks that allow readers to mean-
ingfully weave a section’s chapters together. Sections Two 
and Three also include dates for placing the chapters and 
the events they describe in chronological perspective. 
(References are included with the dates so interested 
readers can investigate them further.)
Since the background for this section has already been 
covered, I will add here three additional remarks regarding 
the book’s organization.
First, in focusing on Islander-Outlander interactions,
the volume may appear to fall prey to the problem Hau‘ofa 
critiques in his epilogue: the implication that before 
Western contact there was only “pre-history” (cf. Reilley 
1996:394.) I would stress, as I did in “An Invitation,” that 
Remembrance of Pacific Pasts is incomplete in the conversa-
tions it seeks to engender. Rather than spreading itself 
thinly across a broad range of times and topics, it focuses 
on a few central ones. The issues covered are those where 
historical conversations tend to be the most heated. The 
volume’s epigraph and the Preface’s creation story empha-
size there was (or perhaps better phrased, is) a beginning 
before this book’s beginning. Everdell in a review of 
Fromkin’s The Way of the World: From the Dawn of Civilization 
to the Eve of the Twenty-First Century (1999)—a book that 
covers its subject in 253 pages—observes that in history 
telling: “The art is in deciding how to cut . . . all the while 
facing the overwhelming odds that truth [he puts no quo-
tation marks around it] will be left on the cutting room 
floor. ‘Telling one story necessarily means not telling 
another,’ Fromkin writes” (1999:9). Focusing on one set of 
issues, I would add, does not necessarily mean others do 
not exist.
Second, in developing each section I collected seminal 
pieces that—when juxtaposed one to another—highlight 
central themes and debates regarding a period. If pieces 
were available, I chose those. If they were not, I commis-
sioned new ones. While all the pieces are written by impor-
tant authorities in the field, the stress is less on individual 
chapters than on how the chapters relate, one to another, 
in a particular section: how they collectively illuminate
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the seminal issues surrounding a particular topic or a 
particular period. In several cases, I did not assume new 
was necessarily better. Some pieces—such as Dening’s 
“Possessing Tahiti,” Wendt’s “Inside Us the Dead,” and 
Sahlins’ “Hawaii in the Early 19th Century: The Kingdom 
and the Kingship”—have retained their value through 
time. That is what makes them classics. They constitute 
enduring works of scholarship.
Third, three sections contain a concluding “A View from 
Afar” that seeks to broaden the frame of reference. Readers 
will find in them much food for thought. Presented often in 
the form of interviews, experts from beyond the region offer 
comparative perspectives regarding a period’s dynamics.
The Selections
“Frames of Reference” is divided into two parts. The
first involves four chapters under the heading “Making
Histories.”
Albert Wendt’s “Inside Us the Dead” affirms that Remem-
brance of Pacific Pasts seeks to do more than simply repro-
duce the status quo. Positioned first, it stresses—up front—
that history telling is not simply about facts and events, but 
about people. And history can be something within you—
something quite personal, something poetic. (History need 
not only be written in academic prose.) History telling 
charts identities. In framing the past in terms of the present, 
it adds meaning to life.
Peter Hempenstall’s “Releasing Voices” and Klaus 
Neumann’s “Starting from Trash” elaborate on issues relat-
ing to narration and objectivity. We see the politics of his-
tory making close up. For Hempenstall, releasing voices of 
participants—silenced in standard accounts—opens up a 
more multidimensional, richer, deeper (and yet more 
ambiguous) sense of events. We see Samoan history less in 
terms of simple oppositions, less in terms of individual 
heroes and villains. We gain instead a more complex, 
denser understanding of the dynamics at work. Neumann 
considers how one can write about the colonial past with-
out reproducing the colonial perspectives that were part 
and parcel of that past. He suggests paying more attention 
to history’s trash—to the seemingly irrelevant and mar-
ginal—that does not fit neatly into narratives of orderly 
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progression. The fissures, contradictions, and ambiguities 
—the trash silenced in standard accounts—presents tools 
for forging histories that subvert established frames of 
reference.
In “Indigenous Knowledge and Academic Imperialism,” 
Vilsoni Hereniko deals with the politics of representation. 
He comes at the same issue as Neumann but from a differ-
ent angle. The focus is on overcoming the frames of refer-
ence that restrict history telling to a coterie of Outlander 
academics. History telling, Hereniko emphasizes, involves 
more than theoretically inclined prose. It involves a range 
of performances, a range of activities. Hereniko also raises 
a pervading question of this volume: How can Islanders 
and Outlanders make a go of it together in rendering, 
interpreting, and finding meaning from their overlapping 
pasts?
The second part of this section, “Valuing the Pacific,” 
addresses the earlier noted concern regarding the Pacific’s 
marginal intellectual status vis-à-vis other areas of the 
globe. James Clifford highlights why readers, especially 
those interested in cultural studies, might take note of the 
Pacific. He perceives the region—with its cultural complex-
ities and interweaving of categories and spaces—as a repre-
sentation of the future.
A question readers might ponder in this section is:
•  How would you frame a narrative of the region’s pasts?
It is relatively easy to critique present forms of history tell-
ing. The more challenging task is to offer fuller, richer, 
more complex narratives that build, that improve, on those 




Inside Us the Dead
Albert Wendt
Prologue
Inside us the dead,
like sweet-honeyed tamarind pods
that will burst in tomorrow’s sun,
or plankton fossils in coral
alive at full moon dragging
virile tides over coy reefs
into yesterday’s lagoons.
1 Polynesians
Inside me the dead
woven into my flesh like the music
of bone flutes:
my polynesian fathers
who escaped the sun’s wars, seeking
these islands by prophetic stars,
emerged
from the sea’s eye like turtles
scuttling to beach their eggs
Reprinted from Lali: A Pacific Anthology, edited by Albert Wendt (Auckland: Long-
man Paul, 1980): 284–290.
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in fecund sand, smelling
of the sea—the stench of dead
anemone and starfish,
eyes
bare of the original vision, burnt
out by storm and paddles slapping
the hurricane waves on, blisters
bursting blood hibiscus
to gangrened wounds salt-stung.
These islands rising at wave’s edge—
blue myth brooding in orchid,
fern, and banyan; fearful gods
awaiting birth from blood clot
into stone image and chant—
to blind their wounds, bury
their journey’s dead, as I
watched from shadow root, ready
for birth generations after they
dug the first house-posts
and to forget, beside complacent fires—
the wild yam harvest safe in store houses—
the reason why they pierced the muscle
of the hurricane into reef’s retina,
beyond it the sky’s impregnable shell;
and slept, sleep waking to nightmare
of spear and club, their own young—
warriors long-haired with blood
cursed, the shrill cry
of children unborn, sacrificed.
No sanctuary
from the sun-black seed
inside the self’s cell—
coral lacerating the promise,
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self-inflicted wounds at the altar
of power will not heal.
2 Missionaries
Inside me
the Sky-Piercers terrible as moonlight
in black and winged ships breaking
from the sun’s yoke through
the turtle-shell of sky
into these reefs,
miraculous iron barking
the sermon of Light, in search
of souls in the palm-milk child.
My fathers’
gods, who had found voice
in wood. Lizard, and bird,
slid
into the dark like sleek eels
into sanctuary of bleeding coral,
but were exorcised
with silver Cross harnessing
the sun’s beauty, burning, burning.
And my fathers, in the pulpit’s
shadow bowed, slept
the new sleep, waking to men
of steel hide exuding
a phosphorescent fear, and learnt
to pray the litany of sin—
the Fall
in a woman’s thighs,
the papaya feel









on the white sand
of my breath.
Beads. Tobacco. Knives.
Nails for each palm cross.
Promises of eternity beyond
the reefs of the sun
to be paid for with the foul
bandages of Lazarus.
The new way is the Cross.
3 Traders
Inside me the dead: a German,
my great grandfather, booted
sea-captain in a child’s
book, in a schooner ploughing
the fables of Polynesia from
a cold Europe, his glass eye
focused on exploding stars, selling
exorbitant wares for copra
and women. Bearded with luxuriant
dreams of copra fortune
and the “noble savage,” but greying
with each fading horizon—
the next atoll holding only
“thieving natives and toothless
syphilitic women.” Too late
for a fortune, reaped a brood
of “half-castes” and then fled
for the last atoll and a whisky death.
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His crew tossed him to the sharks
and sent home only his blue glass
eye—crystal ball of Europe—which
my grandfather buried under
a palm, a fitting monument
to his father’s copra lust.
No prayers
were said for him I hope.
I want to imagine him
an atheist adventurer wormed
with the clap, dispersing snakes
into every missionary eden.
My grandfather—
and I can only describe him from
a photograph cobwebbed in my
father’s cupboard—died
too of whisky, at thirty-six.
“Tall, dark and handsome” is apt
for him. No glass eye for
this hollywood trader marooned.
Arrogant gleam in his eyes
with nowhere to sail
without a ship,
Straight junker nose inhaling
the bitter serenity
of failure,
Thick polynesian lips shaped
for wine, whisky
and fierce infidelities.
White-suited in a cane chair,
the kaiser—of whisky come-courting
the camera, in love with Bismarck,
burdened with the failure of Europe,
heir to the cold crystal eye.
4 Maternal myth
My mother, dead since
I was twelve, spider-high.
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Memories of her are flamboyant
blooms scattered across
pitted lava fields under
the moon’s scaffold, or fish
darting among fabulous seaweed.
Escape from the grasp of my tongue,
images shatter into dust
from which myth rises
to elixir air at the rim
of my skin:
In her years
of scarlet ginger flower snaring
bumble-bee, I remember
In her lilt fingers
in scent of moon,
plucking
my clumsy tongue to butterfly
hymn; my mind, white
as spider lily, to morning
pigeon in tavai, cooing;
my eyes to vision of her fatal
human face that knew
the bravery of tears.
She was the fabric of fairy tale,
the golden key to each child’s
quest for the giant’s castle.
Dead, she walks the miracle
of water-lily stars, more moonbeam
than flesh, the sinnet of myth
I weave into my veins.
5 The ball thrown up
An engineer, inspired like a juggler, derives
his essence from earth’s ores. Stone,
iron, lava, sale, fuel to construct
bridges between his nimble feet
and the angels:
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a mathematical universe wired
to his computer fingertips,
the planets tick to his vision
of designing, the ball thrown
up will not come down.
That’s what my brother wanted
to be—feet in iron, head
in the rainbow, rewinding
the moon.
The final time
I saw him, moon pouring up
from the sea, he was side-stepping
into a midnight plane,
albatross guitar round his neck.
With a roar, the silence
scattering, he was winging
off towards temperate sun
and snow, the darkness
falling on all paws
on the tarmac.
“The black dew,” said
my pastor uncle, the pulpit




My brother was brought
back from the snow in
an oak box polished to see
your face in, designed
to lock gravity in.
No spider’s-web bridge
to rainbow strung,
he had slipped off
an ordinary
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highway built
for ordinary mortals,
car buckling in, like




a cat uncurling to lap
the milk sky,
the wheel spinning
spun the white dew










Historians are doing it tough today. For the first thirty years after
World War II they were accustomed to dealing in empirical realities,
constructing typologies of empire, analyzing discrete processes of
social and political change, painting word portraits of the human
actors engaged in the great confrontational dramas of empire. Or they
were flexing ideological muscles, taking on imperialism as an eco-
nomic and political idea, tying Third World development into world
systems, and tracing the genealogies of national independence move-
ments. The field was seemingly theirs by common assent, cozy, and
not much contested.
But the 1980s began an unsettling period as a range of new, influ-
ential discourses percolated through an increasingly angst-ridden pro-
fession. Appropriation of the Other; discursive strategies of power;
hegemonial textualizations; the politics of representational practices
—these phrases have developed in the 1990s as the typical currency
of exchange in symposia and monographs about colonialism. Discus-
sion has left behind the study of colonialism as a clearly demarcated,
historical object, a “thing,” and moved into the realm of the mean-
ings embedded in texts about colonial relations. The work of histo-
rians has been overshadowed by historical anthropologists, literature
critics, and cultural studies scholars. Their highly theorized texts
delight in deconstructing the authority of traditional positivistic nar-
ratives of history.1 The politics of scholarship permeates everything
that is written and how it is written: the fear of continuing colonial-
isms in narratives built around Western power, always threatening to
reproduce relations of dominance, outsiders still controlling the pro-
duction of knowledge about the colonized world. Authors can no
longer escape the self-consciousness that goes with this incessant
demand for reflexive, self-critical history. They are pursued by post-
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modern philosophies that proclaim the flimsiness of reality, the “death
of the subject,” and the centrality of the text. All these developments
have taken their toll on the confident narrative writing that was the
hallmark of the historian.
The juggernaut has not proved totally irresistible. The newer dis-
courses are themselves charged through with internal debate about
their potential and their limitations. Dissenters point to the tendency
to generalize and homogenize colonialism, to see it and its agents as
“an abstract force, as a structure imposed on local practice. The terms
colonial state, colonial policy, foreign capital, and the white enclave
are often used interchangeably, as if they captured one and the same
thing” (Stoler 1989:135). It is all too easy to speak of the “Other,”
“settler societies,” “the German empire,” and so on without interro-
gating the diverse lineaments of each, where and when they operated.
A restricted range of evidence suffices in order to make sweeping state-
ments, so that theory triumphs over heterogeneity, interpretive who-
lism rides roughshod over empirical diversity. Another danger is that
the new theorizations about colonialism are composed of an interdis-
ciplinary hotchpotch, a wildly intersecting set of discourses claiming
equal validity, a situation that can lead to a “relativist permissiveness”
that is disabling in its failure to judge among their explanatory power
(Thomas 1994:19). At the end of the day, the historical experience of
colonial encounters “gets lost in the elegant new textualism of colo-
nial discourse studies” (Dirks 1992:175).
Historians of colonialism therefore need not be nervous about their
craft’s credibility. They remain in a position to reassert history’s par-
ticular forms of textualizing the human past, for it exerts a power to
story human lives that can be a form of critical action against con-
tinuing colonialisms. “Story” is the important concept here. For
though historians have traditionally clung to a belief that the texts they
create are bound, through the evidence they use, to a material world
that defies those texts, they are also sensitive to the power of the
texted narrative to make meaning for humans. They are generally
therefore loath to stray too far from linear narratives that constitute
the explanatory structures of their discourse upon the world. They
share Michael Taussig’s view that “people delineate their world . . .
in stories and storylike creations and very rarely, if ever, in ideologies”
(Taussig 1984:494).2
At the heart of these operations is the belief in what Richard Camp-
bell calls “the historicity of human being” (Campbell 1993:7). By this
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he means that humans constitute themselves through and by means
of their actions in finite, situated contexts. “Human being is a self-
making or self-constituting process” (8), not in the sense of self-
consciously creating an individual self or image (which is a modern,
Western concept), but as a dialectical—or better, dialogic—process in
which humans are challenged to realize freedom in their own un-
chosen contexts by engaging in a never-completed dialogue between
“finitude, naturally and historically given, and the potentially infinite
possibilities which can be entertained in thought.”3
This is the focus of the historian’s intellectual—and emotional—
activity: to attempt to describe this engagement in all its richness of
possibility and its poverty of failure. The knowledge produced is not
about empirical objectivity, but rather epiphanal in quality, disclosing,
as the Australian historian Charles Manning Clark puts it, answers
to the deeper questions of life by knowing more about the past, “the
mystery at the heart of things” (1976:44). By that very fact, it is per-
sonal to the historian’s sense of self and to the structures of condi-
tioning that shaped the values he or she puts upon the world. “For
history cannot be told without expressing the historian’s view of what
makes for human flourishing, its glories and its failures” (Campbell
1993:10).
Such a description of the historian’s task, though itself culturally sit-
uated, does not confine the legitimacy of historical analysis to one
culture only. It can deal with infinite varieties of human experience
because it proceeds from a notion of unfixed, dynamic human nature
(Campbell 1993:12). People act out their attempts at “radical self-
transcendence” (which may not have anything to do with the concept
of the autonomous self) in dialogue with their own historically situ-
ated cultural context. Of course, processes in self-understanding differ
from culture to culture and need to be taken into account. We must
“listen to the voices of those others, and try to hear them in their other-
ness,” writes Campbell, “if the ‘horizon of meaning’ within which they
speak is to extend and become fused with our own” (13).
For Pacific historians of colonialism, these possibilities built into the
discipline can mesh productively with the insights of the newer dis-
courses, with their changed angle of interrogation. The emphasis by
anthropologists, especially, on colonialism as a cultural process en-
coded with signs, metaphors, and narratives and powered by inter-
locking networks of knowledge and power is suggestive of a much
denser framework of interpretation. Nicholas Thomas has most re-
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cently summed up this approach by describing colonialism as a
“project,” a concept that “draws attention not towards a totality such
as a culture, nor to a period that can be defined independently of
people’s perceptions and strategies, but rather to a socially transfor-
mative endeavor that is localized, politicized and partial, yet also en-
gendered by longer historical developments and ways of narrating
them” (Thomas 1994:105).
History’s discourse is well placed to deal in this currency, for his-
tory has a refined power of storytelling about complex, contexted en-
counters between human beings and their situations. History recog-
nizes there are no neat boundaries defined by the will and intention
of colonizers on the one hand, and clear perspectives and actions of
the colonized on the other. Instead there are a series of “messy entan-
glements”4 within colonizing and indigenous communities and be-
tween them, back and forth, that encompass unities and cleavages,
alliances and conflicts, contradictions and adaptations, half-successes
and failures, willful action and misread responses. Colonial life was,
to paraphrase Henry James, all inclusion and confusion. It is art that
discriminates and selects.
History’s gift is, paradoxically through this art, to pluralize colo-
nialism’s existences and its meanings for both then and today. It avoids
reducing colonialism to totalizing formulas about the exact nature of
power relations and the systems of dominance and resistance that
constitute its operations. It describes and analyzes messy encounters,
highlighting moments of unpredictable, rolling drama and performa-
tive confrontations. For, as Dening argues, encounters with otherness
in the Pacific are occasions of theater, wherein language and gesture,
European charades, and Islander mimicry are played out in complex
and ambiguous relationships (Dening 1992:4).
Historians excel in exploiting the moment of greatest display. Once,
that meant fixing on the elite actors at the front of the stage, making
them bear the weight of explanation for the history of colonialism. If
older fashioned colonial history marched with the European procon-
suls and missionaries, the newer anticolonial history simply reversed
the polarities and raised up Islander chiefs and Big Men as the new,
empowered agents of history. But agency itself has been subverted
and converted into a much more “messy” concept. David Chappell
has shown how active agency and victimhood work together in over-
lapping ways that increase the messiness of historical encounters:
“Victims need not be passive, nor the passive weak, nor actors free
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agents, for history to happen” (Chappell 1994:10). The real challenge
for Pacific historians, says Chappell, is to be aware of the contradic-
tions of agency within our narrative histories, to work in a “ ‘middle
ground’ of interaction in cross-cultural situations, a contested but
functioning discourse of partial understandings that allows groups in
contact to negotiate their relationships” (11–12).
Of course, Pacific historians still have to choose and create their
narratives, which always run the risk of perpetuating vastly unequal
power relations with colonized communities. Representations of en-
counters with humans from other cultures that are constructed around
the passing of our Western kind of time are filled with power that
may unconsciously serve political ends. Outside accounts can control
knowledge, both there and here, by speaking for Islanders, by locking
them into value-laden categories as exotic if modern agents, func-
tioning on another plane of existence from rationalist, chronology-
plotting westerners. Historians may be seeking confirmation of their
ideological concerns or pursuing a more personal politics. Johannes
Fabian asserts that “our ways of making the Other are ways of making
Ourselves. The need to go there (to exotic places, be they far away or
around the corner) is really our desire to be here (to find or defend
our position in the world)” (1991:209).
We may wish to feel some kind of union with other cultures, search-
ing for it in island cultures today during fieldwork. But there is always
a gap between the sympathy that unites and the Western analytical
tendency to stand at a distance from the object to be known in order
to understand it. Barry Hill, speaking through a personal confronta-
tion with Australian Aboriginal society, argues that the history of colo-
nialism lies between these two poles (1993). So, I would argue, does
the historying of colonialism.
* * *
There are thousands of “stories” underpinning colonialism, thousands
of ways historians and others have constructed the native through
their texts. One of the most consistent historiographic examples in
the Pacific is the colonial history making that has gone on around the
Samoan people. Samoans have been appropriated by scholars as the
exemplary Pacific community caught up in the history of Western im-
perialism. Their islands drew the three Great Powers of the late nine-
teenth century—Britain, Germany, and the United States—into a con-
test for economic and diplomatic control that almost ended in war.
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Though the islands were partitioned in 1899 between Germany and
the United States, the Western Samoans never accepted the situation
and fought a sustained war of political resistance against the Germans
and then the New Zealanders, until their group gained independence
as the Pacific’s first modern nation-state in 1962 (Masterman 1934;
Keesing 1934; Davidson 1967; Kennedy 1974; Field 1984; Hempen-
stall and Rutherford 1984).
Traditionally, a central place in this story goes to the movement of
noncooperation and alternative government of the 1920s and 1930s
known as the mau. This struggle against the New Zealand colonial
administration, which involved large numbers of Samoans (though not
all), has become part of the myth of political nationhood, in particular
the events of Black Saturday, 28 December 1929. An unarmed
Samoan crowd was fired upon by New Zealand police, killing eleven
Samoans including Tupua Tamasese Lealofi III, a “royal” chief and
one of the leaders of the movement. In Tamasese’s dying words to
keep the peace, Samoans received the rallying cry of their indepen-
dence movement.
Tales of the mau usually have embedded within them, as part of the
movement’s genealogy, an earlier movement of resistance—Lauaki
Namulau‘ulu Mamoe’s mau e pule of 1908–1909. Lauaki was from
Safotulafai in Savai‘i and was generally acknowledged as Samoa’s
greatest orator chief of the nineteenth century. His organizational
skills and rhetoric were at the heart of campaigns to find a “royal”
leader for Samoa who would give the Samoan islands stability in the
face of encroaching European pressure for annexation. Historical
storytellers, both European and Samoan, have dwelt upon Lauaki as
a romantic rebel, the real mischief-maker of Samoa, a man of “a
thousand tongues” (Braisby 1932–1933:1:21) with no love for the
papalagi, the white-skinned strangers who burst from the clouds.
When the Germans annexed the western islands he would not submit.
He became the controlling figure of a resistance movement that was
the direct precursor of the national independence movement of the
interwar period. The mythic tale runs broadly as follows.
Lauaki, whose whole life revolved around political activity, was
not prepared to accept the role of spectator forced on him by the
German governor Wilhelm Solf. Lauaki resented Solf deeply for sup-
pressing the great cartels of orator chiefs, Tumua and Pule, which
had traditionally controlled the contest for the four highest titles be-
tween the leading “royal” families, Sa Malietoa and Sa Tupua. Pule
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was the confederation of talking chiefs based on Savai‘i districts and
the island of Manono; Tumua was based on Upolu districts. Though
his support had been crucial to Samoans’ acceptance of Mata‘afa
Josefo of the Tupua lineage as holder of the high titles in 1899–1900,
Lauaki was at heart a Malietoa man, and he looked to the day when
a Malietoan should succeed to the apex of Samoan politics. When
Solf was absent on leave in 1908, Lauaki took the opportunity to
construct a united front of chiefs to bring Tumua and Pule back to
the center and work for a Malietoa candidate to succeed Mata‘afa.
When Solf’s deputy, Schultz, learned that Lauaki wanted a crowd of
Samoans to meet Solf on his arrival back and put their requests
(mau) en masse for a restoration of the old power brokers, he for-
bade Lauaki to go to Apia.
Lauaki could not afford to lose such face and continued to mobi-
lize the most important political districts of Samoa by capitalizing on
his own status as the leading orator chief of Safotulafai in Savai‘i and
the virtual spokesman for Pule. He traveled anyway to the main island
but lodged himself outside Apia until Solf returned and ordered him
back to Savai‘i.
The first of two personal confrontations with Solf took place in
Safotulafai in November 1908, where Solf warned Lauaki of the ven-
geance of Germany. The second occurred in Vaiusu, not far from Apia,
where Solf and his aide de camp met Lauaki surrounded by hun-
dreds of his war-blackened supporters. In the trading of impassioned
speeches, Lauaki turned the tables on Solf, accusing Mata‘afa of
being the evil genius behind the movement and begging forgiveness
for his own ignorance. Solf could take no action without compromis-
ing his paramount chief and inflaming a war between Samoan parties.
A stalemate ensued, broken only when Solf lost hope he could con-
trol the situation and called on the German navy for help. Cruisers
arrived after six weeks of tension and only delicate negotiations pre-
vented Lauaki and his supporters taking to the bush to begin a guer-
rilla campaign. On 1 April 1909 they surrendered to the Germans and
some seventy Samoans—Lauaki, his closest supporters, and their
families—were promptly exiled to Saipan in the German Mariana
Islands in the North Pacific. There they remained until released by
Japan and New Zealand in 1915. Lauaki failed to see his home shores
again, dying of dysentery in Tarawa on the return journey.
This story is the product of a number of accounts controlled by
the colonizers. In each Lauaki is a device in a historiographical agenda
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driven by the political economy of contemporary questionings. Ger-
man governor Wilhelm Solf, Lauaki’s adversary in 1908–1909, began
the process in a running collection of reports, essays, and letters
stretching over several years. His explanation to Berlin in 1909 of
what the mau e pule was all about sets the tone (10.5.09, file 30, Solf
Papers; Braisby 1932–1933:2:123–220). This report creates a very
coherent account of a highly structured encounter. Lauaki is a formu-
laic creature of culture, locked into rebellion for reactionary ends. He
had Solf trapped in their two great confrontations. At Safotulafai,
Solf found “a large majority—alone nearly the whole of Fa‘asaleleaga
—taking Lauaki’s side and ready to follow him anywhere” (Braisby
2:130). Solf had the courage to call him a liar and an agitator, but it
was impossible without military assistance to arrest Lauaki from out
of the middle of his followers and bring him to Apia. Lauaki was
the great orator and statesman of Samoa, whispered to be gifted with
mana.
Vaiusu, according to Solf, was the climax of this personal trial of
strength. Again Lauaki controlled the situation, asking Solf to wait
for the people of Tuisamau to foregather, clearly drawing Solf’s atten-
tion to the number of his supporters. His speech on this occasion was,
Solf admitted, “a masterpiece of Samoan rhetoric and diplomacy”
(Braisby 2:136), painting himself as the unwilling tool of Mata‘afa’s
intrigues and daring Solf to humiliate the old chief in front of such an
emotionally charged audience. Solf’s reply, as he told a senior col-
league in the Colonial Department, could only take the high road of
gubernatorial authority in order to outmaneuver Lauaki. He accused
him of being “a contemptible coward” (Solf to Schnee 3.6.09, file
131, Solf Papers) and warned him that punishment was unavoidable.
He could, said Solf, hear the young men outside practicing their war
cries and chided Lauaki that such impoliteness was un-Samoan. Imme-
diately it was still and, observing the working of his speech, Solf seized
the moment melodramatically to tear up a letter from Lauaki that Solf
had interpreted as a declaration of war. It was, he implied, enough to
allow him to escape, and he made Lauaki swear his oath on the Bible
that he would send his followers back to Savai‘i and remain peaceful.
Solf’s report is a retrospective creation caught up in the self-justi-
ficatory discourse of Germany’s colonial politics, a weapon in Solf’s
hands against criticism in the German media and against pressure for
changes in Samoa coming from European settlers; Lauaki ironically
saves Solf’s governorship. It is also part of Solf’s mythmaking about
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himself. Solf is colonial superman, who beards the clever but inflexi-
ble native in his den and by skillful diplomacy escapes triumphant—a
more successful General Gordon of Khartoum. As such he is deserv-
ing of political reward, on which Solf, like all colonial governors,
always had one eye fixed. The reward came extravagantly in 1910,
when Solf was made minister for colonies in the kaiser’s Germany.
Contemporary colonial politics continued to determine the lines
that the Lauaki story would take from the past into the present. In
the struggle with the mau in the interwar period, it was imperative for
the New Zealand government to show the League of Nations—as well
as convince itself—that opposition to its colonial rule was wrong-
headed and illegitimate. That task was performed repeatedly, by blam-
ing the Samoans themselves for causing the devastating deaths that
the flu pandemic of 1919 wreaked among the population (Tomkins
1992), by punishing dissent through bannings, exile, and the stripping
of titles, and by dismissing the local complaints that emerged from
the hearings of the Royal Commission into the administration in 1927.
A particular prehistory of the mau was constructed by A. L. Braisby,
the New Zealand inspector of police during the time of the mau. In
1932–1933 he compiled a set of documents from German and New
Zealand sources to show the organic connection between Lauaki’s
movement of 1908 and the mau. This collection, and Braisby’s inter-
pretive comments, were designed to prove that New Zealand was
dealing with an irrational movement in the 1920s, driven by the same
stone age tendency that drove Lauaki—“the Samoan national trait to
periodically rise in political upheavals every 5 or 10 years” (Braisby
1:37). Because the Samoan was “petrified in his notions that are born
with him and die with him” (Braisby 3:336), Lauaki and those who
came after him were incapable of imagining a new stage of political
life. Braisby’s extraordinary three-volume effort is a clear exercise in
defense of New Zealand, and of himself as police chief, during the
clash in 1929 that led to Samoan deaths.
The most recent and detailed story of Lauaki’s movement is my own
(Hempenstall 1978:55–64). It presents Lauaki the resistance fighter
struggling to come to terms with a formidable new concentration of
colonial power under the Germans. He represented a tragically attrac-
tive figure for me, an echo of the kind of protests I had witnessed
during my student days, in an atmosphere of struggle over civil liber-
ties, of student revolution on the German campuses where I studied,
and of anti-Vietnam War protest generally. Lauaki appeared the per-
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fect parallel to the giants of West and East African resistance I was
made aware of during my studies in Commonwealth and African his-
tory. I went looking for him to demonstrate that a variety of resis-
tances to colonial rule—from everyday protests to formal movements
—ran like a thread through the history of German colonial empire,
and also that the Pacific Islands’ story of colonialism had its own
peculiar plotlines compared to Africa and Asia.
All these accounts characterize the mau e pule as a contest between
two giant protagonists in History, Lauaki and Solf. Both are stylized
figures representing their cultural groups. In the stories by papalagi,
Lauaki particularly emerges as a cardboard cutout, seemingly voice-
less representative of “the Samoan type” rather than a complex and
interesting human being. He must needs carry a heavy burden of
explanation for the mau e pule: confident, clever, slightly sinister, and
ultimately inflexible, Lauaki is the key sign of Samoan rebelliousness;
the whole event, the story.
The repetition of the story down the years in mainstream his-
tory making about Samoa has continued a tendency to colonize the
Samoans via the Western imagination. The mau e pule and Lauaki’s
role in it have been absorbed into History, which reduces colonialism
to a monolithic institution, a thing of blacks and whites. Entangle-
ments are straightforward, reducible to set-piece contests between elite
agents. Dramas are melodramas, the actors easily recognizable in their
cultural costumes. Any account of “radical self-transcendence” is
focused on Europeans, whom we “understand.” Lauaki’s “historicity
as human being” is veiled, his identity shrouded in whispers and
rumors, the nature and extent of his agency a constant riddle.
This may be ultimately the price we pay as Western tellers of stories
about complex intercultural encounters. As Albert Wendt asserts, the
papalagi [or Outlanders] can write about Samoans but not from inside
them (Wendt 1987:89). At best we can strain for that gap between
identification and distance wherein the history of the colonized can
be told. How to write in that gap is one of the problems with which
the waves of critical theory confront the historian of the 1990s, by
making us aware of the controlling power of representations derived
from generations of repeated interpretations. One answer to the prob-
lem—and it is only one of several—is to break down the History into
a plurality of ambiguous histories by rereading with a new self-con-
sciousness, and a renewed awareness of their embedded politics, the
evidences from which the dominant texts take their cue. Reexamine
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the moments of greatest display and look beyond the self-chosen elite
players. Strive to release the voices of others (in however a mediated
fashion), express their multiple dramas, and increase the density of
the historian’s contexted encounter.
When Solf and Braisby and Hempenstall—and their sources—are
reread in this spirit, they are seen to contain a series of puzzles about
Lauaki’s behavior and a multitude of other voices beside Solf’s and
Lauaki’s. These suggest a more baroque quality to their encounter and
an atmosphere of open possibilities not conceded in the seamless His-
tory. The efficient Germans lodged an array of enclosures with their
reports to Berlin, of diverse nature and origins, some of them letters
from Samoans, some the transcripts of interviews, even the occasional
photograph. A rereading of this documentation is capable of produc-
ing a cast of thousands who mute Lauaki’s strident tones.
But we must see them, or hear them. Historians and storytellers are
drawn to giant actors, easily identifiable personalities, those highly
individualized figures policed in community memory and in the
records. If we reread these records pretending that someone like
Lauaki does not exist, then we discover a much wider cross-section
of Samoan elites emerging from the pages to harass the German ad-
ministration and resist Solf’s plans to reshape the power structure
away from traditional Samoan groups toward German controlled
elites. The thousand tongues Lauaki was accused of possessing were
actually the uncontrollable, ambivalent voices of many Samoan chiefs
and the din of the villagers surrounding them.
Mata‘afa himself is clearly implicated. Though presented in History
(including my own) as a distant figure quickly growing irrelevant to
the colonial history of Samoa, Mata‘afa emerges strongly from a re-
reading, possessed of an active record of challenging German poli-
cies, even as they acknowledged him the paramount chief of their pro-
tectorate. In 1900 he ignored Solf’s instructions to balance the native
Samoan administration with chiefs from outside his own party. He
wrote what Solf termed “a series of improper letters” (Braisby 1:17),
trying to bully Solf into recognizing Mata‘afa’s victorious party (malo)
as the legitimate government cooperating with—not subordinate to
—the German Reich; he tried again in 1904, attempting to extract
financial information about the administration and higher salaries
from Solf. Mata‘afa was also the figurehead and active agent of the
attempt the same year to form an indigenous copra cooperative to
compete with the large companies. In January 1905 he and the chiefs
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of his malo dispatched a petition to the kaiser complaining that
Solf was discriminating against a legal Samoan venture (Hempenstall
1978:45).
The mau e pule appears matter-of-factly out of Mata‘afa’s sorrow
for the loss of his power and Solf’s downgrading of the “royal” title-
holders. And from the beginning it involved whole districts and the
ghosts of great chiefs. Lauaki was quite specific on this point and
even claimed to have rebuked the old Mata‘afa: “What are you cry-
ing about? Was it not you who were instrumental in breaking the
power of the old Government at Mulinu‘u? Of the Ta‘imua and Fai-
pule who have gone, none passed away satisfied with the manner in
which you had condemned the Government which sat here in former
times” (Braisby 3:281–282). It was on the strength of Mata‘afa’s
urging that Lauaki arranged for leading chiefs of many districts to
assemble in Apia to greet Solf with his new wife. The ostensible pur-
pose was to offer gifts, but—Lauaki was candid—they hoped to have
an opportunity to submit Mata‘afa’s proposal that his malo, banned
from Mulinu‘u since 1905, be returned there with full honors. “The
Governor was the father of Samoa,” said Lauaki, “and he might feel
disposed to accede to our wishes” (282).
When Lauaki learned from Schultz that he was not to proceed to
Apia, he found himself in a dangerous place. Lauaki had gone ahead
to plan with the permission of the district administrator on Savai‘i, the
Irishman Richard Williams. “If the matter were to fall through at
that stage, we would become the laughing-stock of all Samoa, and
our people would be made the subject of jests about ‘Savaii and the
presents’ ” (Braisby 3:286); if they were turned back now it would
look like they were planning a demonstration. The pressure on Lauaki
was collective, the dignity of his district’s people in the balance. It
was so great that he set off for Apia anyway, accompanied by long-
boats crowded with supporters.
The following account of proceedings by Lauaki himself lies quietly
among the European documents and has rarely found its way into
the dominant records of that event. It is the transcript of a statement
Lauaki made to Williams at Fagamalo, Savai‘i, a month before his
exile (file 30, Solf papers; copy in Braisby 3:274–303). Ostensibly it
is about the causes of Lauaki’s mau. Though the account begins with
Solf’s return to Samoa in November 1908, the first part deals not at
all with the mau e pule but with a ceremonial journey (malaga) by
Lauaki and people from his district to districts and villages on Upolu,
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explaining the malo’s actions and exhorting people not to think back
to olden times.
I then left for Siumu, on my way to Falealili. On arriving at
Siumu, I was asked by the people how the government was pro-
gressing, and to what extent our own methods of doing things had
been affected. I replied that the reason our own power had suf-
fered was that the Faipules agreed to whatever proposals the Gov-
ernor chose to make. At the same time, however, I said that I
thought we were fortunate, on account of the fact that the new
power had been so kind to the Samoans. The government was not
strongly established, and it was not too hard on the Samoans—
except in respect of those who committed offences; and that had
the effect of ensuring that offenders would be punished and
brought to realize the power of the law.
We left Siumu for Vaovai, Falealili, where the people laughed at
us and joked about the trifling things we had brought over from
Apia. The government was not discussed at all.
From Vaovai we went to Lotofaga, but no mention was made
of the laws of the government. (Braisby 3:278)
In Siumu the tour was caught up in crisis “as the result of a man from
our malaga party eloping with a married woman belonging to the vil-
lage” (278). Angry villagers damaged Lauaki’s canoes, which led to
repeated arbitration and the presentation of fine mats to a reluctant
Lauaki, who accepted responsibility for his party’s delinquency.
What emerges from this story is a dynamic local politics broader
and more complex than the issues between Samoans and the colonial
community, concerned more with village stability, relative status, and
ceremonial reciprocity than with the niceties of colonial power shar-
ing. Lauaki disappears into the background of this much denser en-
counter. Other voices share front of stage—those of Alipia, Toelupe,
Lelei, Ti‘a, Solia, and Faumuina, chiefs chosen as deputies (Faipules)
by Solf; Onofia, Talouega, and Tuatagaloa of Satale, Alapapa of Tafi-
toala, and Taoa and Lutu of Vaie‘e. Lauaki’s voice is just occasionally
the clearest in a choir of strong voices, dressed as victim as well as
agent. The story is about intervillage connections and traditional
relationships. The historical narrative that represents this historical
situation must needs be a fractured, twisting presentation of multiple
individual and group histories. It must take account of swirling, in-
complete adaptations.
Lauaki’s voice in this long document is a less hectic, less confi-
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dently self-assertive voice than Solf’s reports claim, more reflective in
its slightly puzzled account of a complex, unfolding situation, seen
through a glass darkly, with no clear beginning and uncertain ends.
The gradually deteriorating relationship with the German regime
emerges as a story of confusion and doubt on Lauaki’s part—confu-
sion at the contradictory signals from Mata‘afa and other chiefs,
doubt about how his actions would be interpreted by Solf. At every
turn other voices are advising Lauaki, searching for a way to fulfill
both traditional Samoan imperatives and remain within the borders
of the new colonial law. His explanations, mediated though they are
by Williams, remain plausible in our Western terms as well as in terms
of his self-understanding. He is a player caught in a trap, driven by
events, not driving them, limited in how far he could act as a free
agent against both the colonial machine and the diverse agency of
other Samoans. The pressure from Pule to go to Upolu and confront
Solf was intense. Lauaki was their emblem, their spokesman. To deny
Pule was difficult. “Death and exile in some foreign land is all alike
to me, but my fear towards Faasalaleaga and Pule is hard” (Braisby
2:168). The group rules, not the individual.
Likewise, the personal tussles with Solf are painted by Lauaki in a
wider palette of colors than the black and white chosen by Solf. Solf’s
visit with his wife to Safotulafai was surrounded with traditional
Samoan courtesies, feasts, and speeches of honor. Lauaki’s speech
was defensive, acknowledging that he had “committed adultery with
thy spouse which is the tulafono (the Law)” (Braisby 3:325), and if
he were to die it would be standing on the village malae, not in the
forest or the ocean. The same sense of in-betweenness is present at
Vaiusu, where—rather than aggressive challenges—the talk appears
more a three-way discussion between Lauaki, Mata‘afa, and Solf, with
both Lauaki and Solf swearing oaths to affirm their words. One senses
that Lauaki is under siege, as well he might have been because chiefs
from hostile districts in Upolu were baying for his blood. Pagoa of
Leulumoega and Molio‘o of Faleapuna wanted him hanged (293).
Even in his home district of Safotulafai, one of the most powerful
chiefs, Leilua Taumei, was his committed opponent and kept Lauaki
under virtual surveillance for Solf (Davidson 1976:296). In the end,
Lauaki begged not to be sent away, “because I am afraid about all
that. I will do everything that was stated. In your oath on the Bible
[you said] that I am pardoned and that all Pule also is pardoned. All
is at an end” (Braisby 3:338–340).
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Of course, a more attentive rereading of German and New Zealand
records will not automatically deliver a revolutionary postcolonial his-
tory. But an awareness of the politics that have constructed the His-
tory and an openness to multivocal storytelling and to the unresolv-
able ambiguity in colonial encounters will help to identify the
gaps and silences within “standard accounts.” Lauaki’s statement to
Williams contains its own suspicious uncertainties. It was, after all,
an interview in Samoan, transcribed and translated by Williams into
written English. Nothing of the relationship between Williams and
Lauaki inhabits the document, though Williams was known to have
good relations with the chiefs of Safotulafai. Nothing is known of the
place or the atmosphere or the dramatic performance that produced
Lauaki’s statement. Yet it is atypical of the documentation that sur-
rounds and creates the History of the mau e pule. It is a long, con-
versational piece with none of the structuring of one of Solf’s com-
pressed reports to Berlin; it does not appear to be edited. It contains
no easily identifiable rhythm, switching from event to person to place
to issue, but there is a remorseless attention to issues that moved
Samoans rather than those important to the German administration.
It is full of signs rather than clear directions. This very ambiguity and
disorder gives it a voice to challenge the confident analytical cer-
tainty of European judgements upon Lauaki and the movement iden-
tified with him.
And its construction of a Samoan story to rival the European is cor-
roborated by the one Samoan written account of the mau e pule that
has been carried down through the generations. In 1962, Tofa I‘iga
Pisa, Lauaki’s lieutenant in 1909 and the last of his chiefly comrades
left alive, wrote his own account of the mau e pule from the inside.
I‘iga Pisa’s history was a story of affirmation and pride in Samoa’s
national struggle on the morning of her birth as a nation-state. It was
designed to show how Samoans had always desired their indepen-
dence, an independence grounded firmly in traditional custom and
politics. Lauaki is the embodiment of that conservatism, his struggle
a natural link in a chain that stretched from the time before Euro-
peans arrived, all the way to 1962 (Pisa 1962; Hempenstall 1997).
To that extent, I‘iga Pisa’s politics match those of the dominant His-
tory, reinforcing a continuous line of political development, even if
his emphases are at the opposite end of the ideological spectrum. But
I‘iga Pisa’s story also departs substantially from the canons of signifi-
cance that European colonial and anticolonial tales adopt. His his-
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tory explores ancient district ties and family alliances stretching back
to Samoa’s “time of darkness” before the coming of Christianity.
Lauaki emerges out of complex cultural and political events that only
at points become enmeshed in European affairs. It is a history em-
broidered with poetry and powerful oratory, the elegies proclaimed
at the death of great ones, the bravery of warriors in war.
Lauaki’s lieutenant, with no guilt to exorcize half a century after
the events, continues to insist that Lauaki was not the cause of the
mau e pule. He was the servant of Mata‘afa Josefo and of his devo-
tion to the Malietoa line. He was the victim of new chiefly power
brokers collaborating with the German administration. Their names
are scattered throughout I‘iga Pisa’s account—Leilua Taumei, Tuala
Silivelio, Afamasaga Maua, Te‘o Tuvale, Tolo Sooalo, Laupu‘e, Moe-
faauo, Lelei Tavina. Lauaki is cornered by the onrush of events, his
obedience to the great chiefs dubbed rebellion, and he is cast into
exile as a sacrifice for the emerging Samoan nation.
Unfortunately, I‘iga Pisa’s rendition of events is not well known in
Samoa and has never been published. In any case, we would be naive
to accept his creation, or Lauaki’s blandishments to Williams, at face
value. Lauaki was not simply an honest broker between the districts
who realized that his behavior was rebellion only when the warships
arrived. There is evidence from Europeans and Samoans (Braisby 2:
174-88, 3:275; Solf 10.5.09; I‘iga Pisa) that his challenge to Solf’s
control over Samoan politics had its roots in a decade of resistance to
the pretensions of foreign powers and that he truly resented Solf’s
humiliation of Tumua and Pule since 1900. But if the stories of colo-
nial encounters are told with all their messy entanglements, then
agency and victimhood merge in the telling.
Samoans are not the only people whose stories need retelling. Wil-
helm Solf, too, was entangled in the webs of meaning connecting
Samoan district politics and the colonial culture that he embodied.
Though he presented himself to his Berlin masters as the keystone of
a successful, nonviolent “native policy,” Solf was not the master of
his own destiny in wrestling with Samoan aspirations. That his contest
with Lauaki and others lasted over more than three months of meet-
ings, letter writing, and tortuous maneuverings demonstrates that Solf
had to be careful. He could not simply pluck Lauaki from his
defenders but had to seek to keep the peace among many parties,
leaving Lauaki to keep the peace in his own domains. Solf admitted
to a friend that he and his aide had been genuinely terrified during
the meeting in Vaiusu. Memories flashed through both their minds of
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a German district officer in South-West Africa who in 1904 was shot
in the back in just such a gathering as he bargained to keep the peace
before the colonial war that decimated the Herero (Solf to Schnee
3.6.09, file 131, Solf papers). Solf’s rhetoric may have been effective
in Vaiusu, but it began in panic—not in the confident swagger that
went with the moral power of the colonizers. It was justified panic,
for Samoan witnesses testified that hostile chiefs were ready to kill
him, or let him be killed by the crowd, had they not perceived that he
gave in to Lauaki by swearing on the Bible (Braisby 2:193). And if
the threat of general insurrection were not enough to occupy him,
Solf had also to protect his back against the knives of settler colonials
in both Samoa and Germany.
Solf’s European colleagues were the third element of an already
complex equation, a roll call of businessmen, planters, and drifters
described in Solf’s jaundiced reports as slanderers, drunkards deranged
by tropical influences, morally degenerate and dangerous. Solf’s con-
viction that these people were seditious collaborators in Lauaki’s
movement was another simplicity. The Samoan community had shown
ample proof that it would use disaffected Europeans for its own
political and commercial ends (Hempenstall 1978: 49, 64–65).
The “messy” stories that complicate the histories of Samoa con-
tain equally ambivalent accounts of the settler community. The settler
community was riven by its own conflicts and contradictions, full of
accusation and counteraccusation about complicity with the Samoans
and attempts to discomfort Solf (Braisby 1:62, 75–80). A heart of
darkness shadowed their racist and moral feelings of superiority over
the “natives.” Like George Orwell’s protagonist, Flory, in Burmese
Days, the Europeans feared that they were living a lie, trapped in and
yet irrevocably part of an alien, hated land, pursued by their “slimy
white man’s burden humbug” (Orwell 1967:39). The potential to be
defiled by the savage was never far from the surface of their anxi-
eties, heightened in Samoa by the settlers’ ambivalence toward a large
and powerful mixed-race community that both repelled and attracted.
The colonizing community was haunted by the fear that “the colo-
nizer would not remake a colonized space but be remade himself as a
native” (Thomas 1994:167). Solf himself spoke these fears for him-
self and others in his reports on the small settlers (e.g., Solf to Reichs-
kolonialamt 1.11.07, RKA 2953). This anger with one another needs
its stories as well.
* * *
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Historicizing colonial encounters for the present demands not the
discovery of hidden caches of documents, but the releasing of voices
that were previously muted or ignored (including that of the author),
so that the storytelling that is history attains a fresh honesty and rich-
ness. The History of colonialism that has dominated renderings of
the Samoan past assigned definitive identities to selected individuals
and encompassed the history of colonialism within the boundaries of
their constructed conflicts, conflicts rehearsed and repeated through
generations of interpretation. Solf had indeed attempted to obliterate
from the discourse that he established about Lauaki any memory of
an alternative tale, not only by ignoring Lauaki’s own version in his
reports, but by buying up every negative of every photograph of
Lauaki and his exiled comrades and having them destroyed (Braisby
2:237, 3:377). This made it easier for an official account of the mau e
pule to triumph and for it to develop, with changes in the politics of
historiography on Samoa, into the history of Lauaki as the harbinger
of independence, the freedom fighter and protonationalist. And it
explains why Lauaki comes down to us in History as a series of
gestures only.
The creation of spaces where other voices can be heard creates alter-
native histories, more inclusive histories. Other individuals emerge and
the chosen protagonists of the History, like Lauaki, become less visible,
more tentative, always becoming caught in other people’s struggles
as much as fashioning their own world. Whole groups previously
invisible also claim an identity so that the story of intercultural en-
counters becomes more untidy and ambiguous. Was the mau e pule an
Olympian contest between two men or a mass movement, as is often
simply assumed by historians because of the number of faceless
Samoans who figure in the records as supporters of one side or an-
other? Were large groups really involved or just spectators of a drama
about colonial power that brought some interest into their lives? Was
it an anti-German independence struggle or a purely Samoan move-
ment that got out of hand, something that Braisby, under the pres-
sure of the 1920s mau, claimed could be explained via the Samoan
psyche and its tendency to recycle a limited stock of political ideas at
regular intervals (3:338)?
Why not all of these things in unequal measure? Conspiracy and
accident, the same people agents and bystanders, perpetrators and
victims. Perhaps no one could say ultimately how the drama would
turn out. The Germans had the power to map distinctive relationships
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of power with their subjects, to peg out claims to authority and
deference. But spaces remained in between for twists of the plot, for
resistance and autonomy, for traditional imperatives and assertions
of independence. The identity of the colonizers was a less confident
and more ambivalent thing than they would have us believe from their
stories, while the colonized did not adhere to the identities assigned
them by these same stories. As Johannes Fabian says, why not allow
human beings to be normal and crazy at the same time (1991:67)? A
critical storytelling history that recognizes its own politics can make
such allowances—and in the telling be both explanation and art.
Notes
1. Examples include Barker 1985; Biersack 1991; Fabian 1991; Gates
1985; Linnekin 1991b; O’Brien and Roseberry 1991; Pratt 1992; Roseberry
1989; Thomas 1994.
2. A crucial element of that storytelling on the part of historians is to
determine what happened, not just why it happened. It is in this context that
they must attend diligently, indeed obsessively, to the nature and range of
evidences available to the telling. Other considerations also lie heavily upon
the historian’s work, such as what makes some events, structures, and
people of historic significance and not others, the description and evaluation
of context around the events and persons under interrogation, the searching
for recurrent patterns as part of the narrative explanation, and the rhetorical
functions of presenting a tale that is persuasive to one’s audience. This is a
task more comprehensive than a mere analysis of cause and effect.
3. Campbell sees this engagement as a dialectical struggle, a phrase I de-
liberately wish to avoid because of its constrained, Western, binary assump-
tions about the human condition across cultures.
4. The phrase is taken from the title of a session at the 1994 Pacific His-
tory Association conference in Kiribati, which explored the ambiguities of
colonial encounters. The proceedings were published as Messy Entangle-






How to construct the colonial past of a Papua New Guinean people
without perpetuating that past by means of its very construction? I
must be careful about the first words, the first sentences I choose. If
anything, they provide me with an opportunity to catch my readers
unaware. They set the tone—I may not find it easy to override the
readers’ initial presumptions after having conditioned them with my
opening paragraphs. Novelists seem to be more consciously aware
that their enterprises hinge on how they establish first contact with
the readers and set them on a particular track. When reading, “I was
born in the city of Bombay . . . once upon a time” (Rushdie 1981:11),
only to be provided with the exact minute of the narrator’s birth a few
lines further down, we can expect to be in for some fairy-tale magic
and frequent leaps from the mystical to the mundane and vice versa.
“You are about to begin reading Italo Calvino’s new novel, If on a
Winter’s Night a Traveler,” begins Calvino’s novel of that title (1982:
9), and Out of the Line of Fire, a novel by Mark Henshaw, who is
thus foreshadowing his ample use of, and frequent reflections upon,
other people’s writings (1988:3).
How to begin a history of Papua New Guinea? By convention his-
torians often tie their accounts of the past securely to a “where-it-all-
started” point in time, so that from there they can spin their thread,
forward toward the present, providing the past with the coherence of
the linear time scale. Authors of “general histories” especially seem to
prefer starting their books and articles at the beginning of the chronol-
ogy they want to cover. Most of those who have written general his-
An earlier version of this chapter was published in Canberra Anthropology 15 (1).
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tories of Papua New Guinea agree that they need to render the past
chronologically but argue about the thread’s point of departure. In
1971, Robert Langdon chose the following beginning for his article
“A Short History” in Papua New Guinea: Prospero’s Other Island:
“When European voyagers first chanced upon New Guinea in the first
quarter of the sixteenth century, the natives of many parts of the
island, particularly in the west, were already familiar with travelers
from overseas. Indonesians, Malayans and Chinese had visited and
settled on the island from time to time—the first known reference
to the island in literature dating back to the eighth century a.d.”
(1971:42).
Three years earlier, Biskup, Jinks, and Nelson began their book A
Short History of New Guinea, designed for Papua New Guinean
teachers and tertiary students, quite differently: “Man has been in
New Guinea for a long time. More than 10,000 years ago and pos-
sibly up to 50,000 years ago the first men entered New Guinea. Dur-
ing this period the level of sea was lower than it is today and main-
land New Guinea, Australia and Tasmania were all part of the same
land area. However the main islands of Indonesia were already sepa-
rated and it was from here that early man came” (1968:1).
It has become a commonplace to say that history changes accord-
ing to who tells it when, where, and to which audience. It changes
according to whether it is told from a European’s or from (a) man’s
point of view. History is constantly altered to accommodate for present
needs and interests. Yet how often do historians self-critically probe
the contexts that make them come up with their very own construc-
tions of the past and choose particular styles and particular begin-
nings? How often do they manage not to take for granted the tech-
niques and styles employed in their narratives—styles and techniques
embedded in the murkiness of academic conventions and intellectual
traditions, and crucial for their identities as professional conveyers of
other pasts?
A Iangigu Iosep ToVetenge
I decided to start my history of the Tolai (Neumann 1992a)
with a Tolai man’s voice. “My name is Iosep ToVetenge. I will tell
you about this court case we had.”1
A iangigu Iosep ToVetenge. For ToVetenge, this is a most appro-
priate beginning. He asserts his knowledge of an aspect of the past
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that he regards to be important. This is not only a history, it is his
story. ToVetenge not only claims ownership. He also takes responsi-
bility. “I am Luelen Bernart” (Bernart 1977:7). “I, Herodotus of Hali-
carnassus, am here setting forth my history” (Herodotus 1987:33).
Why do today’s academically trained professional historians often shy
away from similar assertions? Why are so many of them afraid of the
first person singular?
“My name is Iosep ToVetenge. I will tell you about this court case
we had. I have forgotten which year it was. It was about the piece of
land called Tokota.”
He actually said: “A iangigu Iosep ToVetenge. Io, boina ma, gon
p’ina tur pa ra tinata nina dari ba ure go ra kot nina ave ga pait ia.
Bea, pa iau nunure go ra kilala—ure go ra pia Tokota” (“Well, thank
you, this is that I will start the talk which is about that court which
we did. I do not know that year—about the land Tokota”). Even this
is by no means a literal translation.
“We began it like this: we knew that when Mrs. Wolff was killed
at Tabaule, they confiscated this particular piece of land without pay-
ing for it. The land they paid for was Tabaule, where Mrs. Wolff lived.
Well, we killed Mrs. Wolff, that is ToKilang and ToVagira did.”
He is talking about a piece of well-established history. It happened
in 1902, on 3 April, to be precise, Hedwig Wolff her name was, and
they killed her baby son, too. It is all in the records of the German
colonial administration: letters Wolff to Foreign Affairs of 8 April;
report Wolff of 5 August 1902; letter Hahl to Eberlein of 11 August
1903; and so on (Neumann 1992:263n3).
“They had a meeting where they decided that they would kill Mrs.
Wolff. After they had killed her, boundary markers were planted to
mark out the land which was seized, that is Tokota, Toma I and
Toma II. We saw this happening and said: ‘Hey, wait a minute! They
had already killed those women, and they had killed those men, and
they had killed those pigs and chickens and they had burnt down
those houses.’ So we asked: ‘What does the law say about this? They
seized our land, and they killed women and they killed children and
they killed men and they burnt down houses and they killed pigs and
chickens—and all that as a payback for one woman, for one white
woman?’ That’s what we asked the court. We went to court, the first
time in Rabaul. . . . We argued that according to our knowledge of
the law, if one person were killed by two people, those two would be
killed in return. The ones who had killed would be killed, and that’s
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it. And in this case, many men were killed, and houses were burnt,
some women were killed and some children and so forth. We asked
the government and we asked the court: ‘How come there was only
one woman, just one white woman, but they have retaliated many
times?’ The court replied that in those days people were not enlight-
ened. ‘It was probably done in order to prevent them from taking up
arms again.’ We said: ‘If they had killed only ToVagira and ToKilang,
there would have been no more hostilities.’ That’s what we told the
court. There would not have been another war. Because the people
would have known. That is, we knew that our ancestors fought with
wood and Germany arrived with the rifle. They just took up position
in the distance, shot, and the man was dead. . . . The court heard our
arguments and put them into the right words. They ruled that this
particular piece of land, Tokota, be returned to us, because it had
been seized illegally as just another compensation for Mrs. Wolff.”
Is this an imprecise rendering of a ruling in which Chief Justice
Mann of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Papua and New
Guinea “on 17th June 1963 made an order setting aside the final
order of the Commissioner of Titles and directing that the certifi-
cate of title issued in pursuance thereof be rectified by restoring
the date that the Custodian’s original certificate bore and that it
should bear in addition an endorsement appropriate to the prac-
tice of the Registrar of Titles to signify that an encumbrance
created by the operation of the New Guinea Land Titles Restora-
tion Ordinance had arisen by virtue of this final order in favor
of the native community in question and constituted unrestricted
ownership and right to use and enjoy so much of the land as was
therein specified and that this be followed by a dealing appro-
priate to the practice of the Registrar of Titles recording that this
portion of the land had by operation of law and by the direction
of the Court become vested in the Director of Native Affairs as a
native reserve on behalf of the said communities entitled to the
land by law and by native custom”? (CLR 1964–1965:319–320)
“The payback for Mrs. Wolff was to have been ToVagira, ToKilang,
some men and women and some animals. . . . After the court admitted
that we were right, they announced it in the news, and we listened to
it, and we were happy, we were really happy. They broadcast in the
news . . . that the people of Tagitagi No. 1 would take possession of
the land Tokota and that the land Tabaule which had been bought
would remain with the masta. So far, so good. The masta, Tom Gar-
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rett, heard the verdict and appealed in Australia to the High Court.
We collected one hundred pounds to support me, or rather, to assist
the government which paid for my air fare, so that I could attend the
court case at the High Court in Australia.”
ToVetenge and I were sitting in front of his house at the Toma
Junction. He was casually telling me about his visit to Sydney in
1964. I knew little about this court case. I did not know that a
Tolai had attended the hearing. I was scandalized by what the old
man told me. I kept asking him for more details, which ToVetenge,
talking of the episode matter-of-factly and at times somewhat
amused by my curiosity, patiently tried to provide, guessing the
meaning of my questions perhaps as often as I was guessing the
meaning of his replies. I probably kept questioning him about it
the next time I went to see him, and one day asked him once more
for the whole story to tape it. Imagine two men sitting under a
shady tree, talking, trying to check each other out, laughing, fall-
ing silent, chewing betelnut, the younger of the two struggling to
overcome anxiety, tension, and nervousness, and grappling with a
foreign language. In order for me to introduce my history of the
Tolai in another voice I had to record ToVetenge’s words in a
staged repeat of our earlier conversation. I turned his talk into
written words, translated and edited it. Once history is written in
a language other than that of the oral accounts on which it is
based, it becomes even more difficult adequately to convey the
spoken word, and to resurrect what Walter Ong calls the transient
reality of the spoken as against the permanent unreality of the
written word. (1977:21)
“I arrived in Australia at night-time. They put me up in a hotel. I
slept. In the morning, a white man by the name of Mr. Brown met me
at the hotel and accompanied me to the court. I arrived at the court.
The court proceedings began. I sat there. I did not say anything. My
lawyer did the talking. I did not say anything. The court was ad-
journed. We rose, we knocked off. On the next day we went to the
court again. Only the lawyer spoke. I just sat there like an idiot. No-
body interpreted for me, so that I would know what was going on and
could say something. Nothing. I just sat there. I simply sat there.”
Talking on behalf of ToVetenge and others was a certain J. R.
Kerr, QC, whose fame stems from a controversial decision he took
at a later point in his career. He argued, albeit to no avail, that
“the position would appear to be that there was a code of law
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which did provide for the way in which the land could be
acquired from the natives. No one has suggested that there was
any law nor is there any indication of the existence of any law
which permitted confiscation, punitive expeditions or any expedi-
tions by way of reprisals.” (CLR 1964–1965:324)
“On the third day, a Friday, we went again to the court. I sat there
again and did not speak. I just sat there. Nobody interpreted for me
or asked me to speak. No, I just sat there until they wound up the
court proceedings. And they told us to get ready to return to Rabaul.
We rose. Mr. Brown, the white man who was taking care of me, told
me that I would return to Rabaul. His wife prepared something to
eat at their place. We had a farewell meal, and in the afternoon be-
tween five and six o’clock I boarded the plane. We traveled all night
and arrived in Moresby at daybreak, at six o’clock. We changed
planes for Rabaul. I arrived back in Rabaul and then went to my
village, to Tagitagi No. 1. The people asked me: ‘So what? Did we
win?’ ‘Oh, I was like a statue, I did not say anything. I just sat there
with my eyes wide open. Like a piece of wood I sat there. Just like a
statue. I did not speak.’ The people were furious, and they walked on
the plantation Toma I. They occupied it. They did not occupy Tokota.
They just did it out of anger, they just walked on the plantation here,
Toma I. Some kiaps came and calmed them down. And that was the
end of it.”
Trash and the Smooth Flow of Events
I could have started, in Langdon fashion, with Carteret or
Dampier sighting New Britain. I could have started, in Biskup, Jinks,
and Nelson fashion, with an account of Tolai man migrating to New
Britain. There are several reasons why ToVetenge’s account could be
unsettling to a reader’s expectations about how a history of the Tolai
should have begun: He is talking about personal experiences that
were not necessarily shared by many others, he is vague about dates
(whereas most Western-trained historians would strive for utmost
precision when it comes to relative chronology and absolute dates),
and relates seemingly irrelevant facts. The oral performance on which
the text you just read is based was probably governed by something
we may term Tolai aesthetics—aesthetics that are different from those
informing my writing of historical narratives. ToVetenge prevents me,
the author, for some time at least, from asserting my own authority
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vis-à-vis the audience I am addressing. Having seemingly been lured
into taking the reality behind his words for granted, I am enticing my
readers to accept ToVetenge’s recollections as pieces of hard evidence
in my roundabout representation of the so-called Varzin land case.
Whether to derive the present from the past, or whether because
historians empathized with the past from a victor’s point of view (as
nineteenth-century historicists did so convincingly), the dominant ap-
proaches in Western historiography over the past 150 years have,
however unintentionally, provided an explanation of the present by
means of an unraveling of the past. Many, if not most, have opted for
a representation of the past as some kind of linear progressive change.
“Trash of history”—that is a tag Walter Benjamin used in his Passa-
genwerk, the Arcades Project, apparently in an attempt to put in order
his notes on what Susan Buck-Morss called “a philosophy out of
history” (1989:55). “Carry the montage principle over into history”
and “detect the crystal of the total event in the analysis of the simple,
individual moment,” Benjamin demanded in one of the notes he
provided with this tag (1983–1984:6). “Trash of history”—that is a
tag that sprang to my mind when I listened to ToVetenge talking
about justice and the law and about the 1964 High Court hearing in
Sydney. Trash of history: that is, bits of the past that cannot possibly
be used to support the notion that the past leads inevitably to the
present or that the present could be fully deduced from the past. Trash
of history: that is the irrelevant, the insignificant, the marginal, and
the negligible.
ToVetenge’s statement could be used as a quarry for one-liners to
flavor the historian’s narrational rendering of the Varzin land case.
But do we really have to make other people’s histories into our own
history when constructing their (and our) pasts? ToVetenge’s narra-
tive does not require a dissecting analysis; neither does it call for a
probing into its deeper meaning. The analysis that Benjamin had in
mind need not necessarily come as a separate commentary. All that
may be required is listening to the story attentively and reading it
carefully to understand it as a history with its own explanatory value.
“Poetry is oral history and oral history is poetry,” Dennis Tedlock
says. For “conventional narratives themselves traditionally classified
as prose turn out, when listened to closely, to have poetical qualities
of their own” (1983:109). Hubert Fichte, who had a lot of wonderful
things to say about the professionals who represent and scrutinize
pasts and cultures, insisted: “Poetry is analytical” (1987:196; cf Neu-
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mann 1991). At least it can be, depending also on the historian’s com-
mitment and ability to listen to these narratives closely and to retain
their poetical qualities when translating them into a written text.
Taken as a piece of history (which needs to be complemented and
juxtaposed by other pieces, slivers, and splinters of history, by spillage,
by more trash), ToVetenge’s account is disturbing. Being so personal,
and being so insignificant for the dominant image of the present and
its coming-into-being, it disrupts the imagined flow of events by squat-
ting like a blot on pages reserved for a comprehensive and accurate
account that traces chronologically the history of the Varzin land case
from 1952 to 1964 and beyond; and for interpretations and analyses
that put into order and explain why Mrs. Wolff was murdered and
why the people of Tagitagi No. 1 were in a position to dispute the
masta’s claim that he (in this case, actually she, Nora Ellen Richards,
who inherited Tom Garrett’s, her late husband’s, property, the histo-
rian in me feels urged to point out) rightfully owned Tokota Planta-
tion; and how the successful High Court appeal contributed to the
Tolai’s disenchantment with the Australian administration and the
emergence of the Mataungan Association. Does ToVetenge attach
too much import to his nonimpact in Sydney? Do I attach too much
import to an old man’s recollection when making him tell my readers
about it?
When representing the flow of events, Ian Downs, commissioned
by the Australian government to write a history of the Australian
trusteeship in Papua New Guinea, notes in his account of the Varzin
land case: “Melanesians do not gracefully accept adverse decisions
by the courts on land matters” (1980:170)—as if there was not meant
to be any unexplained residue lingering on in the reader’s mind. You
might raise your eyebrows when reading such a blunt attempt at es-
tablishing a link between race and behavioral patterns, or be strongly
reminded of Downs’ earlier novelistic account of a Melanesian land
rights movement (Downs 1970). Yet have not this and similar state-
ments been appealing because their explanations are more comprehen-
sive and more assuring than the pairing of accounts of ToVetenge’s
silence in Sydney and the occupation of Toma I Plantation after his
return could ever be? It is tempting to go for an easy solution—that
is, for a history that has a commanding grasp of the past and puts it
into order and the present into perspective.
At times I have to make an effort to work against my desires to
control my subject matter (here: the colonial past of a non-European
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people) by way of writing about it. To what extent do I, too, long for
a predictable future that is to be the direct and smooth outcome of
the present? To what extent do I allow myself to be seduced by the
idea that the present could explain the past because the past—repre-
sented as a narrative chain of causes and effects—is needed only to
explain the present? To what extent am I disturbed by unexplained
residues?
Representations of the past fulfill useful functions in the present.
Histories can serve to critique the present by highlighting the legacies
of the past in the present: the skeletons in the closet. Alternatively, they
can serve to confirm positive streaks in the present. Here I am more
concerned with seemingly irrelevant pasts and useless histories: with
the trash of history. Trash of history, that is the stuff I should be look-
ing for when attempting to write about colonial pasts. I must avoid
invoking a linear time that proceeds seamlessly from the past to the
present to the future and shun the model of a future that is contained
in the present that is contained in the past. If I was writing a history
that merely explained the present, I would account for and legitimize
the present. However critical my explanations may be, such a writing
of history, where things happen only in order to make other things
happen, would amount to an apology of the present—it would sanc-
tion both the present and whatever made the present become the
present. The point here is not to distinguish between desirable and un-
desirable historical progress, but to construct a past that is, although
telescoped through the present, incompatible with it. Enter Walter
Benjamin:
The appreciation or apology strives to cover over the revolutionary
moments in the course of history. It aims at establishing conti-
nuity. It cares only for those elements of a particular work which
have already become part of its effect. [The apology] misses the
rough outcrops and jagged prongs which provide a hold to who-
ever wishes to get beyond [the work].(1974:154)
From what are phenomena rescued? Not just or not so much from
the illrepute and contempt into which they’ve fallen, but from the
catastrophic way in which they are very often portrayed by a cer-
tain form of transmission, by their “value as heritage”.—They are
rescued by the demonstration of the fissure in them. There is a
form of transmission that is catastrophe. (1983–1984:21)
I should be looking for a past that seems useless in the sense that it
cannot be used to delineate the present. Looking for trash—that means
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looking for fissures and contradictions. These fissures, breaking up
the continuity constructed between past and present (and that always
means, between present and future), enable us to glimpse the other-
ness of the past and the potential otherness of the future. By identify-
ing fissures and breaks in the past we may be able to envisage fissures
that prevent the present smoothly continuing into the future. By
zooming in on the trash of history we focus on the disturbing ambi-
guity of the past—that is, its irrelevance for the emergence of the
present and its potential relevance for images of a future not neces-
sarily contained in the present. So maybe history needs to be a shock-
ing assemblage of what supposedly was and of what supposedly never
can be—and of what is but must not be, of course. It needs to be
more than simply an explanation of the present and rummaging in a
past that has not become present. Yet such a history would bring the
past into an immediate relationship with the present.
ToVetenge’s account of his nonimpact in Sydney: trash of history.
I could have also begun my history of the Tolai colonial past by
borrowing IaOra’s voice: IaOra, putting into words her memories of
a visit to Kokopo in her childhood, must have been close to 100
years old when I met her in Ngunguna in 1987. She saw the head of
ToVagira, infamous instigator of the 1902 Wolff murder, nailed to
the wall of the colonial government offices. Were these the insignifi-
cant and unconfirmed ramblings of an old woman? You should not
include her picture in your book, my editor advised me, reminding
me of its doubtful relevance both for the events of 1902 and for their
reconstruction. Indeed, neither the picture nor her memory of an
image from her childhood could serve to sustain an argument related
to the progressive flow of Tolai history early this century. They con-
stitute unwelcome, unwieldy trash.
The trash of history can be found in everyday historical discourse
(which historians are often not trained to recognize): in histories pro-
duced not in form of written texts or oral traditions, but in form of
jokes, anecdotes, or gossip; in histories not produced in university
offices or in front of the ethnographers’ or historians’ tape recorders,
but casually, informally, by chance acquaintances when traveling on
a bus or queuing for the only functioning public phone for miles
around; in histories the European student of Papua New Guinean
history might pick up during a game of cards, when helping to make
copra, by listening to school children, or overhearing women chat-
ting at the market.
The trash of history is comprised of instants, of images flitting past,
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of the unspectacular and the nonmomentous. Historians are often
only too happy to ignore them, prone to identify grand historical
moments and to think of the past in terms of processes, develop-
ments, and courses. I would like to dwell on them, not the least
because they disrupt the continuous flow of history. As if they were
weightless for all their insignificance, they seem to float in mid-air,
unaffected by the suction the present exerts on the past in the usual
rendering of past into history. Let us dwell on an image of Iosep
ToVetenge, sitting like a statue in a Sydney court room, and on
IaOra’s childhood memory of a black man’s head nailed to the wall
of the buildings of the German colonial administration in Kokopo.
Timeless instants those pieces of trash appear to be, too—having no
time of their own that could be compatible to the historical time
we ascribe to progress. I believe Walter Benjamin was thinking of
this kind of trash when he demanded in his fifth thesis on the phil-
osophy of history to capture the past as an image that flashes up in
the moment of its discernability, only never to be seen again
(1968:257).
What kind of value do we need to assign to trash? When Benjamin
talks of detecting “the crystal of the total event in the analysis of the
simple, individual moment,” we must not let the metaphor he uses
irritate us. These crystals need not be glittering, precious fragments,
elegantly proportioned, but may be inconspicuous, or too ugly to be
noticed. I need to be open-minded and use all my senses when look-
ing for them. Let the historian sweep up the trash—certainly not dis-
pose of it quietly or recycle it beyond recognition into a historical
narrative. Let the historian imitate those workers employed by local
councils to pick up the litter in parks, diligently and skillfully apply-
ing a metal claw that extends the reach of their arms and storing
the trash in a bag as if they were collecting a treasure. Recalling Lévi-
Strauss’ intriguing portrayal of the bricoleur in La Pensée Sauvage
(1966:16–33), I am envisaging a “savage” history.
Looking for Anticolonial Histories of Sorts
Method of this work: literary montage. I need say nothing. Only
show. I won’t steal anything valuable or appropriate any witty
turns of phrase. But the trivia, the trash: this, I don’t want to take
stock of, but let it come into its own in the only way possible: use
it. (Benjamin 1983–1984:5)
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Many decades after trash-collecting Walter Benjamin and the artists
who inspired him, historians and ethnographers are rediscovering the
art of montage. They are experimenting with multivocal, montage-
like texts that try to juxtapose the author’s subjective observations
with bits of transcribed oral testimony, excerpts from archival records
with visual images of people and place, representations of the present
with representations of the past, statistical data with excursions into
the philosophy of history.
Writing anticolonial history is not simply a matter of deconstructing
the univocal historical narrative by adding more voices, more narra-
tive threads, and by breaking up linear chronology. Neither is it simply
a matter of empathizing with the oppressed other and focusing on
anticolonial resistance. In a talk on the Columbus Quincentenary,
Michael Taussig observed:
In focusing on violence and resistance in the Americas we do too
easily project onto others unproblematized notions of violence and
resistance that rightfully begin with us. Thus I want to ask what it
means to turn the question away from Others, especially poor and
powerless Others, and onto ourselves and our own quite violent
practices whereby we figure ourselves through the creation of
objects of study. Instead of making more knowledge industries
about violence and about resistance, what about the politics of
violence and resistance in the way we construct legacies and
thereby generate power from the great gamut of stories, official
and unofficial, of the violent American past? (1992:38)
This is not to deny the achievements of anticolonial historians of
Papua New Guinea who emphasized, and empathized with, Papua
New Guinean resistance to colonialism—at a time when such empa-
thetical emphasis challenged dominant colonial notions about the
colonial past and expectations about the colonial future of Papua New
Guinea, and when there was little chance of evading the Manichaean
dichotomies created and reproduced by colonialism. Turning my atten-
tion now to my own and my discipline’s intellectual traditions and to
my perceptions and representations of the colonial past may be one
step toward escaping the role of the anticolonial colonizer (cf. Neu-
mann 1994). Only by critically probing the texts produced by Pacific
Islands’ history and the “relations of production” that made these
texts possible, and in particular, the modes employed to represent the
past of Pacific Islanders, can I begin to identify narrative styles and
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lines of inquiry that might be worth trying out to overcome the colo-
nial legacy of academic history.
I shall pay particular attention to language. What do I do to oral
poetry when writing it down? What do I do to the transcription of a
Tolai or Binandere or Melpa narrative when translating it? Do I apply
only my aesthetics when editing transcribed oral statements? How do
I translate the informants’ discourse into my own academic discourse?
How often do I smother the meaning of a statement by wrapping it
tightly in my interpretations? Let us be more sensitive to the corrupt
nature of academic jargon: How do we actually go about taking con-
trol of our subject matter when we write about it? Needless to say,
perhaps, there is no innocent, uncorrupted language I could use in-
stead of the ones I make do with now. The best I could do is to expose
their colonialist, fascist, or male chauvinist undertones, and put into
words my longing for an uncorrupted language that has not been and
could not be used to colonize (cf. Neumann 1995).
In talking about working on the language of the center and about
the difficulties of transcribing and translating oral narratives, I am
not arguing for a purist solution, as if it was possible to keep alive the
aural propensities of oral narratives after they have been transcribed.
For me it is impossible not to corrupt ToVetenge’s voice, or to write
in English about Tagitagi, ToVetenge’s village, from a native Tolai
speaker’s point of view. Why should I strive to write in a “traditional”
“Tolai” style anyway (and here, clearly the second attribute, Tolai, is
at least as problematic as the first one, traditional)? Instead of pursu-
ing the mirage of authenticity, I want to focus my attention on the
nature of the hybridization involved when translating Pacific Islanders’
pasts into my narratives and make the processes of those very trans-
lations transparent.
Anticolonial history (or counterhegemonic history, to use a term
grander still) has been written against the current colonial (or domi-
nant) version of the past. In 1968, with independence for Papua New
Guinea barely yet in sight, Biskup, Jinks, and Nelson were successfully
writing anticolonial history. In 1971, Papua New Guineans taught by
Biskup, Jinks, and Nelson were in a position to denounce Langdon’s
account of their past as inadequate and as a typical expression of
some expatriates’ conviction that Papua New Guinean history began
at best with written records, but more likely with significant European
involvement. In the late 1960s, “anticolonial” came to equal “nation-
alist Papua New Guinean.” Biskup, Jinks, and Nelson’s nationalist
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assertion of a “historical” Papua New Guinean past pointed out the
long tradition of human settlement on the island of New Guinea and
the active role the inhabitants of New Guinea played in their encoun-
ters with Europeans. In 1971, when Eurocentric versions of the Papua
New Guinean past still abounded and were widely listened to, it
seemed to matter little that accounts emphasizing, for example, the
agency of Papua New Guineans, still fell back on a historical metho-
dology and adhered to an epistemology tried and tested by those
authors who were to be contradicted. Twenty-two years later, John
Waiko, the first Papua New Guinean to write a general history of his
country, subtly distanced himself from his predecessors and empha-
sized a new beginning when quoting the poet Kumalau Tawali in the
epigraph of his first chapter:
I have come from 50,000 years
So they think.
Others say I was born on 16 September, 1975.
Let my arrows fly another 50,000 years.2
It was inherent in the nature of the colonial project that there was
supposed to be an authoritative view of the colonized’s past. To
counter this notion it was useful for a while to assume that there was
a Papua New Guinean (or a Tolai, or a Vunamami) view of things
that needed to be pitched against the dominant Eurocentric interpre-
tation of the past. Rather than identifying the new masters that need
to be confronted, let alone the good cause that’s worth fighting for, I
wish to work on the forms and style of my supposedly anticolonial
histories. I need to realize that many of my knee-jerk responses to
colonialism are either indebted to the colonial discourse or very
much a part of it. Having become sensitive to the dangers of writing
for a postcolonial master by writing against the colonial masta, his-
torians (and historical ethnographers) may focus their attack on new
hegemonic constructions of the past, picking up trash as they career
in different directions, no longer sketching a grandiose alternative
History, but nagging at History, subverting the one capital H with
many lowercase h’s.
I propose to conceive of history as a container of histories, histo-
ries that do not always lead to the present and are not always told by
myself. I should be looking for Papua New Guinean constructions of
the past that contradict the flow of events that I have been brought
up to desire establishing. I should be looking for histories that cut the
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ground from under my feet. I propose to mistrust those bits of the
past that neatly fit into accounts of historical progress and to watch
carefully my own attempts to order and construct the past. By start-
ing my history of the Tolai with a Tolai man’s voice, I did not try to
deceive my readers by deflecting their attention. To the contrary: I
thereby hoped to be myself more conscious of, and alert the readers
to, the propensities of my voice. Starting my history with another
man’s voice was meant to put up a warning sign at the very begin-
ning, cautioning the reader to beware of and not to take for granted
the author’s voice, the historian’s emphasis on significance and rele-
vance, and the rendering of histories into History and of the past into
the pre-present. Breaking up the historical narrative perhaps provides
the reader with space to interject and admonish me, the author:
“Language!” The least I can do is to coax my readers into turning
their head now and then to adjust to whoever is talking. This time at
least they did not get a chance to follow the author hard on his heels
on a journey from man’s or the explorers’ arrival in New Guinea to
the present. “Take your time,” I want to tell them, “linger in the
past, dwell on the seemingly irrelevant, become addicted to the trash
of history, trivial and horrendous, which alone may portend redemp-
tion from the course of History.”
Postscript
The account of the Toma killings that became History owed
much to the viewpoint of the German colonial administration. It was
written down in history books and made the title that Tom Garrett
held over Tokota Plantation appear legitimate. The history of the High
Court case was established through transcripts and rulings. It seemed
appropriate to disturb these colonial histories by recording and then
publishing ToVetenge’s story. Several years after I talked to ToVetenge,
who is long dead, his narrative has taken on a life of its own. It has
appeared in my own writings (1992a, 1992b), in John Waiko’s his-
tory (1993), and now in this chapter. Recently two Tolai, one of
them a prominent former member of national parliament, have pro-
duced a ten-page document in which they recount my recounting of
ToVetenge’s recounting of the events in 1902. They thereby intend
“to remind the German government of its Human Rights Obligation
to respect the lives of our ancestors [and] to pay us (the descendants)
for the lost [sic] of their lives, their properties and the sufferings
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they encounted [sic]—and to support a massive compensation claim”
(ToLiman and ToVovore 1995:10). By now, ToVetenge’s narrative has
truly become History.
Notes
I am grateful to the late Iosep ToVetenge for generously sharing with me his
histories of the Varzin land case. This article is dedicated to his memory.
1. I recorded ToVetenge’s history on 22 October 1987 at Ravae in Tagi-
tagi No 1, East New Britain, Papua New Guinea, in the Tolai language; Paul
ToSinot and I made a transcript, which I translated into English. The version
I am reproducing here is slightly shorter than the one with which my Not the
Way It Really Was opens (cf. Neumann 1992a:1–4).
2. From a mural, created in 1984 at the University of Papua New Guinea,
quoted in Waiko 1993:1. Papua New Guinea became independent on Sep-
tember 16, 1975. Incidentally, Waiko deals extensively with the killing of Mrs.







Growing up in Rotuma, I was never taught Rotuman history from a
textbook. Nor was I ever tested on how much I had learned and
whether I could remember the facts and dates when important events
were supposed to have happened. When I reached secondary school
and later went to university, I found myself having to study history,
largely the history of the British Empire, and had a difficult time re-
membering historical information that did not seem to have any rele-
vance to me whatsoever. But I was good at “cramming” and some-
how always managed to pass these history tests, although if you had
asked me for the same information a month or so after the examina-
tion, I would have had a hard time remembering. None of my history
teachers knew how to make history come alive and I never did find
out why facts about who did what to whom and on what date were
so important.
This chapter examines my love-hate relationship with the discipline
of history as defined and taught by Western academics. My hope is
that such scrutiny will lead to a better understanding of some of my
reservations; I hope also to stimulate discussion that will enhance the
teaching and learning of Pacific history. I begin with the ways in which
Rotumans acquired knowledge of their past, followed by a critique
of academic practices that work against the emergence of an indige-
nous historiography. I conclude with some thoughts on how the disci-
pline of history could be made more meaningful and relevant to in-
digenous people. In a number of places where academic practices are
discussed, the term scholars refers to historians, anthropologists, and
other social scientists.
My earliest experience with Rotuman history came in the form of
fictional stories called hanuju that my father used to tell me when I
was growing up. Some of these stories have come to be labeled myths
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and legends by westerners, the implication being that they are not true
stories. Other stories, I learned later in life, were fairy tales that he
had picked up in Fiji where he spent some time. With hindsight, it
seems easy to tell by the setting of the stories, the images and symbols,
and the names of characters whether they were Rotuman or foreign.
Irrespective of their place of origin, these stories were used by my
father as avenues for teaching his children human values he wanted
us to embrace.
Dates were never important in my father’s stories; if they were men-
tioned at all, it was in the general category of “long ago.” Some of
these stories were based on historical events—such as battles fought
between religious factions in the 1870s—but the focus was always
specific to place and characters: where the action took place, who
were the main players, what was the order of events, and what were
the consequences of their actions. My father was a good storyteller
who knew how to engage my emotions, and I was often moved to
tears by his stories, many of which were about cruelty, kindness, fair-
ness, generosity, obedience, or tyranny. As I grew older, I realized
that some of his stories about ghosts and disobedient children were
intended to frighten his children so we would go to sleep or remain in
the house at night.
Then there were stories that could be labeled gossip. These were
about people who were living then: where their ancestors came from,
why they looked or behaved in a certain way, and the possible rea-
sons for their good or bad fortune. These stories were often told
when men or women got together to perform certain functions, such
as weaving mats, preparing food for a wedding, clearing plantations,
or sitting around waiting for arrivals or departures. Some stories were
malicious in intent, particularly if they were whispered in secret and
were about illicit affairs, real or imagined. Rotumans also reveled in
humorous tales, usually at other people’s expense, but sometimes at
their own.
More prevalent than oral narratives in day-to-day interaction were
dance and song. As repositories of the past and present, dance and
song were performed as part of rituals, ceremonies, or other public
events, and therefore were more reliable sources than stories that
were shared informally and confined mainly to families or small
groups. Songs could be about anything: migrations, the underworld,
genealogies, loved ones who had passed away, unrequited love, the
beauty of the island, or important people, events, and places. Some
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songs were nonsensical but reflected the Rotuman sense of humor.
Choreographed and performed, either as part of a tautoga (traditional
mass dance involving men and women) or part of a fara (singing and
dancing troupe) during the period Rotumans call av manea (time to
play), song and dance displays often occurred when young people
traveled around the island during the Christmas season (see Hereniko
1995). Many of these songs were well known, their lyrics reminding
Rotumans about the past; sometimes they dealt with the present and
imminent future.
Theatrical enactments were also arenas for communicating histor-
ical information. Dramatic sketches, usually no longer than thirty
minutes, were often performed by village or church groups. A danc-
ing troupe might perform a number of songs and dances, with a the-
atrical item added on at the end. Such a piece might be a retelling of
a myth or legend, or about a contemporary issue, or perhaps a scene
from the Bible. These performances were usually unscripted, rehearsed
beforehand, and intended to entertain. However, they often contained
valuable information about historical events that had shaped and
continue to influence the social and cultural life of the island and its
people.
The natural world had its own constellation of proverbs and say-
ings that captured the special natures of plants, animals, and birds,
some of which are extinct today. I heard these words of wisdom dur-
ing important speeches, sermons on Sundays, and sometimes in the
course of everyday conversations. The metaphors and allusions were
better known to the older and wiser folks, but by listening carefully
to the contexts in which they were used, I could often figure out the
meanings of these proverbs (see Howard and Rensel 1991).
Certain peculiarities in the physical environment, names of people,
places, birds, animals, genealogies of chiefly families, and anecdotes
of personal experiences gave credence to historical narratives in much
the same way that Western scholars use footnotes as evidence. Over
time historical narratives evolved into differing versions of the same
story, not all of which contained the same elements or emphasized the
same details. Some of these conflicting accounts resulted in disputes
that were usually resolved sooner or later. Rotumans understood com-
peting versions to be politically motivated but were usually prepared
to let the more persuasive orator win, believing that the ancestral
spirits would punish anyone who was dishonest.
The stars, the moon, the sunset, the behavior of birds and animals,
Vilsoni Hereniko 81
the blossoming of certain flowers, and the direction of the wind (to
mention only a few) communicated messages for human beings. No
doubt these messages were based on proven patterns over many years.
For example, very hot dry spells during December and January might
be interpreted as signs of a developing hurricane. When low-flying
frigate birds were seen flying toward the west, Rotumans would begin
reinforcing the roofs of their houses and preparing for a storm. Inci-
dents of rats devouring pillows were taken as a sign of imminent
death, a ring around the moon signaled the time for harvesting sea
urchins, and so on.
The early period of contact with Europeans is humorously cap-
tured in what Rotumans call te samuga. Each clan theoretically had a
te samuga that derived from a stupid or humorous act committed by
their ancestors. One clan, for example, was fun pan rau (tobacco
fryers) because on encountering tobacco for the first time, their an-
cestors thought it could be fried as food and did so. The hao peskete
(biscuit planters) clan was supposed to have planted biscuits, which
they wrongly assumed grew on trees. My clan’s te samuga is a rais
(rice eaters), because some Chinese blood from my mother’s side was
supposed to have made us impure. At weddings, the han maneak su
(woman who plays the wedding), who is chosen by the bride’s rela-
tives, may be heard announcing the te samuga of the groom’s relatives.
Occasionally I have heard an exchange of te samuga at an informal
gathering (such as during card games or a beach picnic) accompanied
by mock anger and peals of laughter. In this way, family history
was imparted and perpetuated. This social institution was also a cul-
tural way of deflating pomposity and ensuring humility among the
inhabitants.
Knowledge about custom and tradition was communicated during
ceremonies and rituals, such as during a wedding or a funeral. Ob-
servers carefully watched how things were done and stored the infor-
mation in their memory for future use. Sometimes there was contro-
versy over correct protocol or the accuracy of certain procedures or
customs. When conflict arose, the views of knowledgeable elders were
consulted and obeyed. Sometimes the parties concerned might simply
agree to disagree, because there was no uniform and compulsory form
that was enforceable for the whole island. At one time, the Rotuman
Council, the island’s governing body, tried to standardize procedures
for important ceremonies but was met with resistance and because
there was no consensus, the idea was abandoned.
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As in other parts of Polynesia, poetry contained historical infor-
mation that was not always understood by the general public, largely
because it used archaic expressions, metaphors, and figures of speech.
There were two forms, one, fakpeje, was performed during public
ceremonies when kava (piper methysticum) was presented. Like the
lyrics of songs, fakpeje often made references to historical events and
important chiefs or kings. The second kind of poetry, teme, was
chanted at secret gatherings held by male elders in the evenings. These
poems concealed special knowledge about the group’s history and
identity. Today, probably only a few individuals are left who can
remember snatches of teme; the nightly gatherings for recitation have
also ceased.
Dreams also played a more prominent part in Rotuman life when I
was growing up than they do now. When a relative said that a dead
ancestor came to him or her and imparted certain information about
the past (or present or future), it was taken seriously. The dead were
never far away, and it was common then to hear individuals talk
about having seen the ghost of a dead relative at such and such a
place. Certain haunting grounds were close to the village. Sometimes
the names of dead ancestors were invoked during rituals to act on
someone’s behalf. Of course, the missionaries frowned on practices
that honored the dead; nonetheless, dead ancestors were often seen as
more readily accessible than the Christian god, and many Rotumans
secretly courted their favors even as they publicly declared their Chris-
tian affiliation.
All the various contexts mentioned are important sources for know-
ing about the Rotuman past and present (see also Plant 1977b;
Churchward 1940; Gardiner 1898; Howard 1985). Although I have
focused on Rotuma, other Pacific societies share these sources (and
more) to varying degrees, depending on the extent of colonization and
missionary influence. Yet, when I read historical accounts by Western
scholars about the Pacific, I am often surprised by the lack of serious
analyses of these sources, particularly the oral narratives and perfor-
mance. There are some notable exceptions, but they are few in number
and unlikely to destabilize the status quo (for examples, see Howard
1985; White 1991; Nero 1992; Mitchell 1992).
Chief among the reasons for pushing indigenous sources of knowl-
edge to the margins is the process of colonization, particularly the
usurpation of oral narratives by the dominant culture’s narrative fic-
tion: fairy tales, myths and legends, short stories, novels, and biblical
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stories. The school and church are institutions that work hand in hand
to colonize the mind. As native people were taught to read and write,
they paid less and less attention to oratory. This process, which Rupe-
raki Petaia has likened to being kidnaped and Albert Wendt has
called “whitefication,” radically altered islanders’ perceptions of them-
selves. When I went to school and learned to read and write, I came
to value English fairy tales, Greek mythology, and biblical narratives
more than my father’s hanuju. Later in high school and university,
Hemingway, Steinbeck, Shakespeare, and Ibsen became my models
as the importance of Rotuman hanuju faded into the background.
Only in recent years have I been wise and brave enough to realize the
significance of these stories to my identity and well-being as a Rotu-
man. To have been able to write a dissertation that displaced the
stories of my colonizers and replaced them with those of my ancestors
has been the most gratifying experience for me as a scholar. Decolo-
nizing the mind, however, is not easy, and in my case has only just
begun. I know students, either in metropolitan universities or at the
University of the South Pacific in Suva, who are still struggling to
find their island voices.
When I was made head of the English Department of a Methodist
school in Fiji in 1984, I decided to introduce Pacific literature to my
students and encouraged other teachers to do likewise. I was excited
about this shift in orientation, and so were my students and some of
the staff, who found much that they could identify with in the poetry
of Konai Thaman (1980, 1981) or the short stories from the Pacific
published in Lali (Wendt 1980)—until one day, when the gatekeeper
of English literature in this school, an elderly teacher from England
with strong Christian convictions, marched into the library where I
was reading and shouted at me: “You are employed to teach English
literature, which means literature written by the English!”
Why was this well-meaning European so upset that I should teach
Pacific Island students the stories of their own people? I found this
difficult to understand until I read Edward Said. “The power to nar-
rate,” he wrote, “or to block other narratives from forming or emerg-
ing, is very important to culture and imperialism, and constitutes
one of the main connections between them” (1993:xiii). Fortunately,
progress is being made in the Pacific regarding the restoration of
indigenous stories to their proper place in the curriculum, although
the belief still lingers among many expatriates and some locals that
Pacific fiction or poetry is unworthy of the label “literature.”
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The ways in which schools, colleges, and universities value the
written word over and above oratory is another cause for concern.
When the mode of teaching or testing is primarily in the written form,
indigenous ways of being are marginalized. Many island students fail
not because they are stupid, but because the formal education system
works against indigenous ways of learning or evaluating knowledge.
I have often wondered why those students who excel at singing, danc-
ing, composing, telling stories, and so on are rarely given the option
of being tested in one or more of these modes. Does this have any-
thing to do with the fact that although Western education has been
operative in Fiji for more than a hundred years, the system has pro-
duced only a handful of Ph.D. graduates?
Furthermore, the written word has undermined the fluidity of in-
digenous history. Oratory allowed for debate and negotiation. On the
other hand, the written word fixes the truth. Genealogies, land titles,
customary practices, secret rituals, disputes, religious beliefs (and so
on) that were previously embedded in social relations are no longer
subject to change or modification. An example from Rotuma should
make this point clearer. For many years, a plot of land was under the
jurisdiction of a certain family (I shall call A). They would cut copra
from it, graze their cows on it, and plant on it. But recently, it was
discovered that according to the written records kept by the district
officer at the government station on the island, the land belonged to
a different clan (I shall call B). This knowledge came as a surprise to
both A and B. When I was on the island in 1992, I was told by B that
in spite of the written record, her clan does not feel that the land
belongs to them because it has been in A’s care for so long. On the
other hand, A feels bad that her family has “stolen” someone else’s
land all these years and does not want to have anything to do with it
anymore. Both sides are uncertain about the veracity of the written
record, although in Rotuma, as in most places around the world, it
carries more authority than the oral word. Rotumans, like many
other Polynesians, believe the land has “eyes and teeth” and is cap-
able of wreaking havoc in the lives of those who engage in deceitful
schemes. In this instance, the written word fixed the “truth,” and the
response of both parties was to leave the plot of land alone in order
to ward off any bad luck. If things had been left in the realm of ora-
tory, jurisdiction over the land in question could have been discussed
and resolved satisfactorily to both parties.
Besides undermining oratory, the written word encourages the view
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that there is but one truth, and this truth can be discovered through
rigorous research. Since the written word is more reliable than ora-
tory, so the argument goes, the historian who has access to all the
written sources and can interpret them accurately can find that one
truth. Anyone who thinks that “truth comes from a multiplicity of
sources and perspectives” (Katz 1993:366) is therefore a threat to this
school of thought, as evident in the next example.
In a speech given in 1993 by Eric Hobsbawm at the Central Euro-
pean University in Budapest, entitled “The New Threat to History,”
he made a number of points pertinent to the concerns of this chapter.
According to him, the ability to distinguish between fact and fiction
is fundamental for a historian (1993:63). He went on to say that
contemporary novelists who base their plots on recorded reality are
“fudging the border between historical fact and fiction” (62), imply-
ing that there is a difference between the two. He claimed that there
is nothing unambiguous about the fact that Elvis Presley is dead.
Maybe so, but this is dull history indeed if this is all that matters to
the historian.
By focusing on external reality, historians marginalized emotional
truth, which is the essence of literature, oral or written. A Fijian elder
has put it this way: “People [outside researchers] do not understand
the unseen, which is the reality of our lives; they do not realize its
power. They look only at the seen, which is illusion” (Katz 1993:
294). The more important question therefore is not whether Elvis
Presley is dead, but how he died, where he died, his motivations for
taking his life (if indeed it was a suicide), and the impact of his death
on his family and the music world. These are questions that history
texts do not answer because their focus is on when and how certain
events took place rather than the emotional landscape of the individ-
uals responsible for those events. On the other hand, novelists are
concerned with the unseen as well as the seen and, if they are good at
their craft, give better insights into history in its totality than social
scientific accounts in textbooks.
Hobsbawm also charged those engaged in identity politics with
“attempts to replace history by myth and invention” (1993:64). He
wrote that the responsibility of historians is to “stand aside from the
passions of identity politics” and to tell the truth even if it makes
them unpopular (63). The problem with his advice is the false premise
that there is only one truth. Like Epeli Hau‘ofa, I believe truth to be
“flexible and negotiable” (Hau‘ofa, this volume). Also, certain ques-
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tions must be asked before deciding whether one’s truth should be
made public. What kind of truth? Whose truth? Will the truth favor
the colonizer, the colonized, men, women, or perhaps an elite minority
among the natives? These are difficult questions that a “feeling” his-
torian must address.
Another thorny question that has to be considered is: Do outsiders
have the right to speak for and about Pacific Islanders? I was brought
up to believe that the right to speak in public is not God-given. In
certain contexts, only the chiefs or men could speak. In matters to do
with women, the men remained quiet. On the other hand, westerners
seem to think they have the right to express opinions (sometimes
labeled truths) about cultures that are not their own in such a way
that they appear to know it from the inside out. Most seem to think
they have the right to speak about anything and everything; many even
think they have the right to coerce natives to divulge secrets about
their cultures to them (see Osorio 1995:12). I have been in numerous
situations where natives sit and listen while white academics discuss
and analyze their cultures and people in an objectified fashion. Chal-
lenges have been made by incensed natives about the right of out-
siders to speak for them, yet the practice still continues, particularly
in institutions of higher learning. It is time for Western scholars to
realize that legitimacy, or the right to speak, has always been an
issue for Pacific Islanders, who do not necessarily believe in the First
Amendment. The least that outsiders can do, if they wish to speak as
though they were some authority on Pacific societies, is to invite in-
digenous Pacific Islanders, whenever possible, to share the space with
them, either as copresenters or as discussants or respondents. Not to
do so is to perpetuate unequal power relations between colonizer and
colonized.
Gone is the time when nonnative scholars can afford the luxury of
an intellectual debate with each other about native issues and ignore
the native perspectives. Yet recently we have the Sahlins (1995)-Obeye-
sekere (1992) squabble: an American from the University of Chicago
and a Sri Lankan from Princeton University, each claiming to own
the truth. The American claims that Native Hawaiians believed that
Captain Cook was the fertility God Lono; the Sri Lankan claims that
the Hawaiians were not that stupid; the American has written an-
other hefty tome to consolidate his original stance. What next, I won-
der. Native Hawaiians stand by and watch as two foreigners fight
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over “fodder” that does not even belong to them. This struggle for
the “truth” evokes the title of Kame‘eleihiwa’s book Native Land and
Foreign Desires (1992). Both Sahlins and Obeyesekere say their ulti-
mate desire is that native voices be heard, but how can we hear those
voices when they are screaming at each other so loudly?
In recent years, particularly in relation to scholarship about
Hawai‘i, native professors are challenging interpretations of their his-
tory and culture by non-Hawaiian scholars such as Marshall Sahlins,
Jocelyn Linnekin, and Roger Keesing. On the whole, the works of
these three scholars are highly regarded by their peers. The Keesing-
Trask controversy is well known, and I will merely refer readers to
the sources in the bibliography (Keesing 1989a, 1991; Trask 1991,
1993). A more recent example is the Sahlins-Kame‘eleihiwa-Dening
discord.
Marshall Sahlins is perhaps the best-known anthropologist in
Pacific studies, one whose writing and research I have valued in the
past. Greg Dening, author of that remarkable book Islands and
Beaches (and whose humble attitude to writing and research I ad-
mire), wrote in a review forum of Kirch and Sahlins’ Anahulu (1992),
that Sahlins’ contributions to Pacific studies are “brilliant” (1994:212)
and the man himself a “genius” (213). Dening sang of the “state-of-
the-art scholarship” of these two authors and asserted that they “make
a reference point by which all scholars who follow them in Pacific
studies must measure themselves” (212). His “review” was immedi-
ately followed by the remarks of Lilikala Kame‘eleihiwa, historian
and professor in the Center for Hawaiian Studies at the University of
Hawai‘i, who debunked a number of key points in Sahlins’ interpre-
tations (Kame‘eleihiwa 1994a). By the end of her review, Sahlins’
contribution was no longer the “reference point” that Dening claimed
it to be, but bad advice from a “knowledgeable” foreigner about a
culture not his own, and therefore to be rejected. How can two re-
sponses by two respected scholars—one an outsider, the other an
insider—be so different? How does one account for these opposing
reactions to the same work? Does the outsider have the right to en-
gage in and publish research that portrays native people in a negative
light? Do studies of Cook’s death, by their very nature and focus, in-
evitably objectify or reduce Hawaiians, thus perpetuating racism and
racial stereotypes?
Certain conventions in academia also foster an imperial approach
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to Pacific studies. First is the reverence given to theory and theorists
by some in the humanities and social sciences. Theory that is appro-
priate illuminates; when this happens, we are better informed and the
quest for knowledge is advanced. However, many scholars tend to use
theories that have originated in the West to understand the unfamiliar.
When this happens, the local situation is subsumed under mainstream
paradigms as academics who theorize in this manner end up talking
to each other rather than to the people about whom they are writ-
ing. Theory, in such instances, becomes an intellectual game that has
little bearing on the realities of the native lifestyles (see also Meleisea
1987:144).
Theory ought to be informed by practice, by which I mean a com-
mitment to the well-being of those being researched (see also Murphy
1992). Giroux and McLaren referred to this as a “struggle in the
interests of greater human freedom and emancipation” (1991:162).
Without such involvement with the concerns of the local population,
theory serves only the needs of the researcher, and sometimes the
dominant culture that he or she usually represents. It will no longer
do to claim “objectivity” or “impartiality” in the name of academic
integrity. The researcher in the Pacific who is not committed to em-
powering the native people as they struggle to transform social injus-
tices and inequalities is, ultimately, an agent of the status quo.
The scholarly practice that says that the first to publish certain facts
or information about a culture has “ownership” over that material
ensures that knowledge that belonged to indigenous people, like their
land in many cases, is slowly appropriated by the colonizers. It does
not matter that indigenous people have owned certain secrets or prin-
ciples about their cultures since time immemorial. If a native reveals
certain knowledge to a researcher, who publishes it in a book or
journal, the researcher is the one cited in the works of other aca-
demics. Until Western scholars are taught to cite their oral sources of
information in much the same way they acknowledge written sources,
and until academics are willing to admit that much of what they know
about Pacific societies is common knowledge to the elders of these
cultures, they will continue to pass off as their own what is really
native property (see Bennett 1987, who cites her oral sources).
The focus on written sources in academic research marginalized the
importance of performance to Pacific cultures. Dance, drama, public
rituals, and ceremonies communicate multiple messages about a cul-
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ture simultaneously. These messages, however, are not overt, and often
go unnoticed by academics, who are more adept at reading between
the lines on a page than reading the messages implicit in the kinds of
costumes being worn, the way space is negotiated, the arrangement
of dancers, the hand, feet, and facial movements, and other elements
of performance that embody a culture’s aesthetics and values. Now
that more and more Pacific Islanders are moving into film and video
to comment on their societies, scholars will need to learn how to
“read” nonprint media if they are to gain a better understanding of
the contemporary Pacific.
The tendency to write in an aloof, detached, and jargonistic style
is a smoke screen that disguises academic biases, ignorance, and in-
security. Many monographs or books specialize in sentences that are
long, polysyllabic, tangled, and obscure. The implication is that if the
author is not understood, then the reader cannot be smart enough.
Fortunately, native scholars—such as Hau‘ofa, Trask, and Wendt—
are secure enough not to play “protective camouflage.” If all Pacific
scholars pledged to write clearly about their research findings and
their motivations for doing research in the Pacific, Pacific studies
would no longer be the monopoly of a privileged elite minority.
Knowledgeable as they are, outsiders can never truly know what it
is like to be a Samoan, a Papua New Guinean, or a Marshallese (see
also Osorio 1995:13). As Wendt has written: “They [outsiders] must
not pretend they can write from inside us” (1987:89). This is good
advice, because history has shown that neither Margaret Mead nor
Derek Freeman really knew how the “natives” think. I would like to
see more books like De Vita’s The Humbled Anthropologist (1990),
where scholars may be encountered without their masks. Unfortu-
nately, most ethnographies and histories hide the biases and limitations
of the authors so well that they appear to contain “the truth, and
nothing but the truth.” Hau‘ofa astutely summed up the response of
Pacific Islanders when they come across this superior attitude by the
outsider, whether in personal encounters or in monographs: “We often
accede to things just to stop being bombarded, and then go ahead
and do what we want to do anyway” (in this volume).
Sometimes native scholars like to claim that they know their
people better than foreign scholars by mere virtue of their being in-
siders. I wish this were always the case. But common sense tells me
that if I have been away from Rotuma for a decade, then I must be a
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decade out of tune. The foreign anthropologist who has recently re-
turned from the “field” is likely to have a more accurate picture than
I of the present situation there. Yet there are certain matters, largely
to do with intuition, emotion, and sensibility, that the outsider may
never fully grasp, for these are things in the realm of the unseen, ac-
quired through early socialization in the formative years, and perhaps
inherent in the Rotuman gene pool. As a friend has said of the out-
sider who visits a place for a while: “Just because you went into a
garage, that doesn’t make you into a car!” The result of all this is a
complex picture of insiders and outsiders, depending on who we are
talking about, how well they are integrated into the native commu-
nity, and their ability to empathize with the native population.
Similarly, I cannot claim to know what happened in Rotuma on a
certain date a hundred years ago simply because I am a native Rotu-
man. On the other hand, Professor Alan Howard, an anthropologist
who has studied my culture for more than thirty years, and who has
a copy of just about everything published about Rotumans as well as
his field notes over the years, may be in a better position to answer
such a question. It all depends on the kind of research being carried
out. In most cases, however, there is much to be gained by collab-
oration, on equal terms, between the white scholar and the native
person.
In one of the few research projects on indigenous practices and
beliefs among Pacific Islanders that I find exemplary, Richard Katz
elaborated on the need for a collaborative approach between the re-
searcher and the researched: “The people who share their lives to
make research possible must exercise that power and control in these
areas. It is up to them to make known their wishes in regard to the
uses and goals of that research. As a precondition to hearing their
agenda, we must insist that the one-way ‘coercive’ process of research
change into a two-way process that is entered into freely. We can then
commit ourselves to devoting as much energy to giving as historically
has been devoted to taking—and more” (1993:367).
Katz rightly asserted that all research is political. Scholars—native
or otherwise—must therefore examine their motives every time they
publish their research findings, review or endorse a book by another
academic, or write or say things about Pacific peoples and cultures
that might be used to justify oppression, in whatever form, by those
in power. This is not a time for purely academic pursuits. Whenever
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those of us who teach or carry out research in the Pacific promote
and foster academic practices that are imperialistic in design, we be-
come agents of a power structure that is oppressive and lacking in a
social conscience.
Note
I am most grateful to Tom Farber, David Hanlon, and Rob Borofsky for cri-
tiques of an early draft of this chapter. To Linley Chapman, my gratitude for
her editorial suggestions.
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VALUING THE PACIFIC—AN INTER VIEW
WITH JAMES CLIFFORD
• Robert Borofsky: Can you explain the intellectual trajectory that
brought you into the Pacific? You have mentioned that it was almost
by accident that you became interested in the region.
• James Clifford: Initially, I had no intention of studying anything
connected with the Pacific. I was doing graduate work in Paris on
the history of French anthropology at the Musée de L'Homme, and I
stumbled on a little book of homages to Maurice Leenhardt. I was in-
trigued because Leenhardt was untypical: He was a French anthro-
pologist who did a lot of fieldwork and, moreover, had done it as a
missionary. At first I thought that he might constitute half a chapter
in my dissertation. But then I stumbled into his private papers and
never really came out. I wrote my dissertation on Leenhardt and later,
based on that, Person and Myth: Maurice Leenhardt in the Melanesian
World.
Writing about his life plunged me into the history of New Cale-
donia. I encountered a brutal colonial history and, at the same time,
a remarkable, exemplary history of cultural survival and transforma-
tion. Kanaks, the island’s indigenous inhabitants, were said to be dying
out. Yet they have persisted. And one of the ways they have survived
is by becoming Christian. But conversion, as Leenhardt put it, turned
out to be a complex process of acculturation in two directions.
Melanesian Christianity turned out to be a different, a new kind of
Christianity and, in fact, has been a way of continuing to be Kanak
in a new context. What I got was a remarkable sense of something
both very old and very modern cobbled together in a strategy of
survival.
I came to see Melanesia, in a certain sense, as the future—not as
the past. Because of the Kanaks’ resourcefulness and ability to work
with innovation, I gained a better sense of culture as interactive pro-
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cess, an understanding enhanced by reading Roy Wagner who, at the
time, was writing about the invention of culture in Papua New Guinea.
What I perceived among the Kanaks was the politics of culture in an
unequal colonial situation. While I developed and applied this pro-
cessual perspective in other contexts later on, this is really where I first
grappled with it.
After my encounter with Melanesian history, I passed through post-
structuralist critiques of ethnography to postcolonial theory and cul-
tural studies. The writing of Raymond Williams and E. P. Thompson
had been crucial to me in graduate school, and I was able to build on
that in transnational contexts through the work of Stuart Hall, Paul
Gilroy, Hazel Carby and many others. The evolving British tradition
of cultural studies, with its concern for post- (and neo-) colonial rela-
tions, for subaltern diaspora cultures, and for complex formations of
“identity” seemed another version, differently spatialized, of what I
saw in Melanesia.
Following the thinking of Stuart Hall, for example, I acquired
analytical tools that could have helped me with the interactive
self-fashioning of Leenhardt and his “converts,” and particularly with
the articulation of contemporary forms of “traditionalism,” with the
emergence of an islandwide “Kanak” cultural and political identity.
These are, of course, processes of cultural and political mobilization
that, in different settings, are active throughout the Pacific. But I
always had the sense that “Pacific cultural studies” would have to be
different in important ways from the North Atlantic varieties. So
now I am examining how various theories need to be adapted and re-
thought in contexts historically and culturally distinct from that which
generated the British and North American work.
• RB: Despite your own enthusiasm for the Pacific, the region
rarely seems to attract the same amount of intellectual attention as
do various other areas of the globe. What do you think accounts for
the region’s intellectual isolation?
• JC: It is something that puzzles me and has puzzled me for a
long time. In Euro-Atlantic contexts of intellectual work, I try to bring
up Pacific examples that I think are particularly provocative. But most
of the time people simply glaze over.
I’m something of a booster for the western Pacific—a deeply com-
plex and fascinating part of the contemporary world. For me it’s still
a mind-boggling place. For example, I often bring up the fact that the
island of New Guinea—Papua New Guinea and Irian Jaya—contains,
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by some counts, nearly 20 percent of the world’s total languages.
People let this astonishing news just slide past. They can’t see why it
would render an emerging “nation” like Papua New Guinea some-
thing incredible to imagine.
New Guinea presents a peculiarly “postmodern” image. It’s not just
a backward place catching up—moving “from the Stone Age to the
Modern World in a few generations,” as popular common sense has
it. Its overlaid temporalities are not captured by the familiar evolu-
tionist or developmentalist projections. Its cultural dynamics are cur-
rent in a peculiarly hybrid and broken yet connected way that needs
to be considered in analyzing cultural formations and conglomerations
today. In my view, places like Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, and New
Caledonia are exemplary contexts for thinking about the fractured,
sutured, overlaid, incredibly diverse and yet hooked-up complexes of
local, regional, national, and transnational forms, the articulated sites
of an unfinished (post)modernity.
One can, of course, find plenty of places in the world to do this
kind of thinking. But for me the Pacific has a special clarity. In a
strange way, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, and such places are in a
kind of time warp. Everyone knows the Pacific is out there. It has
never been seen as modern. I actually think that is one of its great
advantages, as it were, to think with. Once one takes it out of its past
tense and places it in a contemporary context, it becomes possible to
see its stories, its narratives, its history and historical change as only
tenuously linked to linear modernist histories of progress and devel-
opment. It becomes possible to see what I might call aprogressive nar-
ratives of modernity. It is both politically and empirically quite im-
portant to think about these types of narratives.
I think the way the Pacific comes into the contemporary, comes into
the postmodern—I use postmodern as a stopgap term here—without
the baggage and assumptions that came with the modernist vision of
liberal capitalism and anti-imperialism is important. It comes with-
out the notion that all histories must move through certain kinds of
national liberation struggles. The Pacific comes into the contemporary
from some other place, a place no one can locate because it is lost out
there in a timeless exoticism. Using the Pacific as a resource, we can
see the politics of cultural process in a more complex way.
• RB: One of the ways the Pacific remains distinctive is in how it
embraced decolonization, or perhaps more precisely phrased, how de-
colonization embraced it. It involved a more complex, ambiguous set
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of processes than occurred say in Africa or Asia. I know this intrigues
you. Why?
• JC: It really is the timing of decolonization in the Pacific that
interests me. Changes in political sovereignty mostly came in the
1970s and the 1980s or basically a full decade and a half or more
after the classical cases of African independence. Occurring later, de-
colonization in the Pacific took place in a different climate, in a dif-
ferent historical context. For one thing, the notion that political inde-
pendence under the leadership of nationalizing elites would lead to
certain kinds of liberation, certain kinds of social justice, was pretty
definitively exploded by then in many parts of the world.
And secondly, the world system, the capitalist world system, went
through some crucial mutations in the 1970s—in that period which
is variously called postmodernism, or post-Fordism, or whatever—so
that the very idea, the very word of “independence” began to have
quotation marks placed around it. The notion of sovereignty—that
sense of control over borders, over culture, over economy that the
word sovereignty implies—had been exploded. Perhaps “exploded” is
too strong a word. It became complicated by the fact that no nation
now has control over its economy, not even the most powerful ones.
The same holds true for borders. The movement of populations across
borders has been dramatic. Even ideas of citizenship and identity seem
now to be complexly divided between places. One can be born and
live in California, for instance, and still be connected to Samoa.
Such dynamics may well have existed previously. But it was not at
all clear to people in the 1960s. There remained a traditional notion
of nationhood, of drawing lines around a particular territory and
building an imagined community within it. Creating a national con-
sciousness, a national culture in Africa classically involved reducing or
opposing tribalism, which was depicted as reactionary. Nation build-
ing was portrayed as progressive.
But things are more ambiguous today. Pulling against such atti-
tudes now are strong notions of the tribal and the local. Indeed, we
have a capitalist world system that is involved, some have suggested,
in actively producing the local—in actively encouraging regional
articulation.
In this kind of context, political sovereignty in the Pacific is taking
all sorts of different forms. Stuart Firth’s essay [in the section on
“Postcolonial” Politics in this volume] is a very useful opening to
these sorts of questions. Because decolonization comes later to the
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Pacific, when sovereignty is a much more ambiguous and contested
concept, we are seeing worked out different forms of national identity.
The Pacific contains new and different sorts of negotiations among
the local, the regional, the national, and the global.
This makes the Pacific a very clear laboratory for looking at pro-
cesses now taking place in Europe and elsewhere. There are all sorts
of complex couplings and uncouplings going on. The Pacific has a
kind of clarity and exemplary nature in this regard.
• RB: One of the Pacific’s interesting aspects is its “Sea of Islands,”
to use Epeli Hau‘ofa’s phrase (discussed in the introduction to “Post-
colonial” Politics). What is your impression regarding this multiplex,
overlapping, interactive sense of “islands” as a way of conceptualizing
identity?
• JC: I am very taken with Hau‘ofa’s vision and his struggle to get
Islanders to see themselves and the spaces between them not as islands
in a distant ocean but as a sea of islands in which they themselves
participate. I am very struck by the way he is able to connect very old
and very new things—that temporal disjuncture has always interested
me about the Pacific. We are reaching back to voyaging canoes
and, at the same time, telling stories about mobility by jumbo jets.
It is an updating and reconnecting of very old traditions of inter-
island contact with now something very current. Tongans, Samoans,
and Hawaiians, for example, now go back and forth to Los Angeles
and Las Vegas.
It represents a kind of indigenous cosmopolitanism. More than
simply unmaking the concept of “the native,” it is complicating it. I
have learned a lot from Teresia Teaiwa regarding this. What is needed
is something more than the postcolonial theorizing of Appadurai or
even Gupta and Ferguson. The image in their writings is of a native
possessing an imprisoned, enclosed identity that is now being broken
out of and, as a result, generating a kind of multiple-located, contin-
uously de-centered, postcolonial structure. It seems to me, though,
that with the traveling native, if you can call him or her that, in the
Pacific this sort of categorization breaks down. Here—both in the past
and today—there is an inherent, indigenous cosmopolitanism. It has
been an ongoing process, an ongoing part of Islander identities, for
centuries.
• RB: In our conversations together, you have referred to the work
of Stuart Hall on the articulation of cultural elements. Could you
elaborate on what you find interesting about Hall’s concept and how
it relates to your comments here regarding the Pacific?
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• JC: The politics of articulation for Stuart Hall involves an up-
dating of Gramsci. It involves a sense of politics which does not
depict good and bad guys neatly lined up on one side or another of a
line. Rather, one sees a continuous struggle over a terrain, portions of
which are captured by different alliances, hooking up different ele-
ments in different ways. There is a lot of middle ground and a lot of
political and cultural positions which are not firmly anchored on one
side or the other but, instead, are up for grabs.
Articulation, of course, suggests discourse or speech. But more im-
portantly, it also suggests connections in the sense that a joint is an
articulation. Something that is articulated or hooked together can also
be unhooked, disarticulated. So that when you look at something like
a cultural formation, looking at it as an articulated ensemble does
not allow you to fall into an organic model—the notion of a living,
persistent body that is continuous and growing through time. Articu-
lation is more like a cyborg. The elements are more contingent; there
is no natural shape to it. A body could have three arms or one arm
depending on the context. It can hook elements of its structure onto
elements of another structure often in unexpected ways.
To me, that is a very useful way of thinking about conversion to
Christianity in the Pacific. The creation of these rather strange ensem-
bles is what first fascinated me about the region. There are elements
of Christianity to which people hooked on rather easily, and there
were other elements that they transformed.
In articulation theory, the whole question of authenticity or in-
authenticity is set aside. There is no problem in picking up and re-
hooking to your structure something that had either been blown off,
knocked off, or had been taken off for tactical reasons. You can
reconstruct yourself. This to me is a more historically contingent and
more historically precise way of talking about what is often termed
“invention.” It avoids the whole language of invention, in fact.
It also avoids the language of hybridity. Hybridity has an organic
sense built into it, even though it is about mixing differences, dif-
ferent forms. Articulation is more tactical and political. As people in
the Pacific know, the question of the invention of tradition is a highly
contested one. Much smoke has been generated as well as a certain
amount of light. But a lot of what is referred to as invention should
be rethought in terms of the politics of articulation, bypassing the
whole question of authenticity. It seems to me we are on much better,
firmer political grounds. The whole notion of custom looks quite
differently when seen this way. The question of what is authentic and
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what is inauthentic, what is borrowed from here or there, does not
matter as much.
Articulation theory does have problems; you can only go so far
with it. You can get to the point where every cultural form, every
structure or restructuration, every connection and disconnection has a
fundamental contingency as if, at any moment, anything is possible.
That is a misreading of Hall on articulation. He is quite clear
that these connections and disconnections are highly constrained at
any possible moment. It is more that various connections are never
guaranteed.
One of the constraints that needs to be brought into the picture,
and this is where the Pacific proves valuable in rethinking Hall’s
work, is in respect to the question of land. When one thinks about
articulated sites of indigenization, the appeal to land is more than sim-
ply a discursive one. There is a nondiscursive reality of attachment
and belonging as well. Even when expelled from certain land, it often
remains in one’s memory, is often part of one’s exiled condition. This
attachment to land, this grounding, adds a sense of continuity to the
diasporic hookings and unhookings that have occurred with Chris-
tianity, modern technology, commercial commodities, tourism, and so
on. There is a kind of nexus, a persistent and continuous nexus, that
Hall’s theory does not really leave space for.
In bringing Hall and Gilroy into the Pacific, one can see the Carib-
bean contexts underlying their versions of diaspora. With only minor
exceptions, the indigenous is destroyed in the Caribbean. It is gone.
Everyone’s roots are cut. As a result, everyone is more or less a recent
arrival. The space of the indigenous, that landed space, is not nearly
as salient as it must be in the Pacific.
• RB: You referred, before the interview, to an anecdote regard-
ing your fieldwork in the Pacific. Would you mind sharing it?
• JC: When I was writing the Leenhardt book, Person and Myth,
I traveled in New Caledonia. I was taken around by Jean-Marie
Tjibaou, who at that time (in 1978) was just coming into prominence
as an independence leader. He took me to the country up around
Hienghene in the north of the island, which was his home area. In
New Caledonia you have steep valleys and villages on small hill-
tops with symbolic trees, palms, and special plants all dispersed and
arranged in a very beautiful way.
We were in one of these villages lying around on a lawn talking
and just feeling comfortable. I had been in several of the houses in
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the village. They were concrete structures that were mostly bare with
only a few newspaper clippings here and there on the wall. So I asked
Tjibaou: “Look at this village in this valley—everything is so beauti-
fully laid out. And yet inside the houses, it remains bare and barren.”
“Yes, you are right,” he said. “But, of course, here people do not
spend much time indoors.” Then he looked around and made a sweep
with his hand that took in the village, the valley and the mountains.
“This is our house,” he said. I thought, yes, there is a particular sense
of space and centeredness in the land.
Thinking more about Tjibaou, reading his political writings, and
better understanding what his vision was for Kanak life at the village
level, at the valley level, at the islandwide level, and even beyond, be-
cause he was very much tied up with pan-Pacific kinds of cultural fes-
tivals as well as the United Nations, I gained a sense of what he meant.
The sweep of his hand—saying all this represented a Kanak’s house
—involved a grounding that was centered in that village and in that
valley, but it also went beyond them. It took in the whole Pacific and,
in a way, the whole planet. In that sweep of the hand was a kind of
inclusive ambiguity—but one still rooted, still based, in the land as a





For some, there is a certain romance in the “contact” expe-
rience—as Pacific Islanders and Western explorers (or 
Outlanders) meet for the first time, as each learns some-
thing about the other in their fullness, beyond the dreams 
and myths each had of those that dwelt beyond their own 
ken. One might term these liminal experiences—when 
both lost the security of past understandings and had to, in 
their own distinct ways, incorporate the differences they 
saw before them into new understandings of their worlds. 
Others view this contact in less rosy terms. With the help of 
historical hindsight, they perceive, in these encounters, a 
host of tragedies about to unfold. Dramatic changes 
followed contact on several archipelagoes. Regarding the 
Marianas, Oliver notes there was a drastic reduction in 
population from roughly sixty or seventy thousand to thir-
teen hundred in little more than a hundred years (1989: 
90–92; cf. Campbell 1996:152–154). Crosby writes regard-
ing New Zealand: “In 1870—one century after a British 
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citizen had first seen New Zealand . . . this land had 80,000 
horses, 400,000 cattle, and 9,000,000 sheep, and a pakeha 
[Outlander] population of a quarter million, as against 
one-fifth as many Maori” (1986:265). Clearly, there are 
different ways for interpreting first contact. First contact,
I would add, was a drawn out process in the Pacific—lasting 
from Magellan’s encounter with inhabitants of the 
Marianas in 1521 to Australian interactions with residents 
of the Papua New Guinea highlands in the 1930s.
General Texts and Themes
The most widely read general histories of the Pacific—
Oliver (1989), Howe (1984), Campbell (1996), Scarr 
(1990), and Denoon (1997b)—emphasize two themes 
regarding Islander-Outlander contact. The first concerns 
the movement of European explorers into the region. 
Imperial history—now out of vogue in specialized mono-
graphs—remains part of these panoramic accounts. In the 
roughest of terms, the sixteenth century in the Pacific is 
portrayed as dominated by Spain, the seventeenth by the 
Netherlands, and the eighteenth by England and France. 
Each nation sent out explorers who then claimed (or 
“possessed”) certain islands, certain people, for the Euro-
pean power sponsoring the voyage. (No explorers claimed 
the islands for themselves.) Each power is portrayed as 
focused on a particular mission (cf. Seed 1995): the 
Spanish on controlling and converting people; the Dutch 
on trade and profit; the British and French on expanding 
knowledge while, at the same time, probing for ways to 
expand commerce (especially if the fabled Southern 
Continent or a Northwest Passage between Europe and the 
Pacific could be found).
The second theme emphasizes the Davidson school’s 
concern with Island-centered history and Islander agency. 
Comparatively speaking, Oliver downplays this theme in 
relation to Howe, Campbell, Scarr, and Meleisea, and 
Schoeffel (in Denoon) and, again comparatively speaking, 
Meleisea and Schoeffel highlight Islander agency in rela-
tion to Howe, Campbell, and Scarr. In contrast to Oliver, 
for example, Howe examines Tahitian reactions to the 
successive visits of Wallis, Bougainville, and Cook. Drawing 
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on Pearson’s (1969) analysis of explorer’s log books,
Howe suggests that one explorer’s visit built on the next: 
“Tahitian chiefs, intimidated by English firepower [during 
Wallis’ visit], . . . discovered an effective way of placating 
the strangers [during Bougainville’s and Cook’s visits]. 
Tahitian . . . women of low birth were ordered to prostitute 
themselves as a political strategy. Not only did this ensure 
the goodwill of the . . . [Europeans], it also brought consid-
erable economic advantage [in trade goods] to the chiefs” 
(1984:88). Meleisea and Schoeffel (1997) use indigenous 
accounts of contact to place Western narratives in perspec-
tive. Building on Campbell (1994a), for example, they 
critique a view widely held by Western scholars (e.g., see 
Howe 1984:85): that Islanders took—or, for Europeans, 
“stole”—Western goods off ships because they lacked the 
general European sense of private property. Meleisea and 
Schoeffel point out “many (possibly all) Island societies 
had very clear ideas about property: thieves were often 
severely punished, which demonstrates that their actions 
were understood as thefts, whether from other Islanders or 
from strangers” (Meleisea and Schoeffel 1997:135, cf. 
Campbell 1994a:225–226).
One can perceive the progressive change from imperial-
istic to islander-centered views in the authors’ respective 
descriptions of Captain Cook, as well. Cook is deemed a 
humane and skilled navigator in Oliver’s accounting; for 
Howe, he is an important but somewhat tarnished hero. 
Campbell generally praises him. Scarr refers to Cook’s 
specific interactions with Islanders, side-stepping any assess-
ment of Cook himself. Meleisea and Schoeffel place Cook 
within a discussion of how various Pacific Islanders per-
ceived European explorers. Only a passing phrase affirms 
his qualities as a navigator.
Overlapping these general histories, one with another, 
not only illuminates key themes of contact, then, but also 
key trends in the historical writing about this contact. The 
imperial narrative remains in all five accounts though in an 
increasingly abridged form (from Oliver to Meleisea and 
Schoeffel), and while the Davidson island-centered per-
spective is emphasized in Howe, Campbell, and Scarr, it 
moves toward a more islander-centered focus with Meleisea 
and Schoeffel.
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Broadening Perspectives1
How might we build on these general works? We might 
begin, first, by learning more about the rituals and myths 
Islanders and Outlanders both brought to their encounters 
and how these influenced their respective actions and sub-
sequent accountings of them. One of the more interesting 
points regarding accounts of the contact period is how 
modern scholars generally assume the motives of European 
explorers are relatively transparent and comprehensible: 
They seem readily understandable. Many Islanders today 
hold the same view regarding past Islander actions. Yet 
both sides of the contact encounter—embedded in the past 
as they are—remain quite distinct from us today. We should 
be cautious in glibly jumping from one time frame to 
another without understanding the different contexts that 
surround them.
Few of the European “rituals of possession” brought
to the Pacific, I would note, have been systematically
examined. To gain a sense of their significance we might 
turn to Seed’s Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of 
the New World, 1492–1640. What Seed makes clear is that 
different European countries had different rituals for 
“possessing” those they encountered, rituals embedded in 
each nation’s past; a simple enough idea perhaps, but it 
1For further references see: the politics of describing others: Schwartz 1994:3–5,11–12;
Gutiérrez 1991:82; Yared 1996; Greenblatt 1991:124; Seed 1995:163; Lestringant
1993:135–136; Dening 1994b:478; Europeans describing others in European terms:
Greenblatt 1991:54, 95, 117, 134; Hulme 1994:173; Hanlon (in Howe, Kiste, and
Lal) 1994:93, 97; Pagden 1993:86; Cohn 1996:78; Gutiérrez 1991:44; Helgerson
1992:27; silences involved in accounts: Zamora 1993:2; early “conversations”: Coma-
roff and Comaroff 1991:231, 1992:245; Greenblatt 1991:93, 96–98; Seed 1995:58–
59, 66–67, 70; the politics of early exchanges: Gutiérrez 1991:51–52, 63–64, 300;
Greenblatt 1991:102, 110; Seed 1995:154; Hereniko (in Howe, Kiste, and Lal) 1994:
410; Hanlon 1988:26; Comaroff and Comaroff 1991:161; European “myths”: Smith
1960:1–116; Beilharz 1997:63–96; Clendinnen 1993:14, 24, 28–29, 35–36; variation
in European “rituals of possession”: general—Seed 1995:1–15, 179–193; English—
Seed 1995:16–40 (for Cook see 1995:35–36); French—Seed 1995:41–68; Spanish
—Seed 1995:69–99; Portuguese—Seed 1995:100–148; Dutch—Seed 1995:149–178;
credibility of explorers’ accounts: Greenblatt 1991:22, 94-95; Seed 1995:191; Fuller
1993:221, 223; Lestringant 1993:128.
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opens up important insights. “Unlike the English belief 
that fixing stationary objects such as fences, houses, and 
gardens transparently conveyed rights of possession, or that 
the actions of ordinary agriculture could do so, Frenchmen 
appear to have entertained the notion that a different set 
of actions—processions, cross-planting, and staging theatri-
cal performances—transparently conveyed possession. The 
reasons for the ceremonial character of French possession 
lay deep within the French political tradition [regarding 
the crowning of monarchs] and within the uniquely French 
meaning of the word ceremony” (Seed 1995:48).
Cook’s transporting of cows, sheep (and a peacock!) to 
Tahiti—and his concern that several Spanish priests had 
left livestock behind from their visit—takes on new mean-
ing within this context (as does Crosby’s statement above 
regarding New Zealand). Seed observes that the French, in 
the New World, repeatedly used the word joy in describing 
native responses to them (1995:60). It emphasized the 
indigenous populations’ appreciation of the French and 
their willingness to form alliances with them. Bougainville’s 
joyful account of Tahiti takes on new significance in this 
context: We perceive him following in the footsteps of 
other French explorers. (It also emphasizes he was orient-
ing his account very much to French audiences.) “While it 
may not have been possible to define what was distinctly 
English about political practices at home,” Seed adds, “it 
was possible to observe it overseas” (1995:11).
We can gain insight into Islander dynamics as well by 
examining their rituals at contact. In the case of Cook’s
visit to Kealakekua Bay (Hawai‘i), for instance, we see a 
Hawaiian “ritual of possession.” The priests of Lono were 
not simply addressing Cook when he visited their heiau 
(temple) at Hikiau, they were incorporating him into a 
Hawaiian religious/social hierarchy.
One might perceive Islander “theft” as another “ritual
of possession”—as an effort by Pacific Islanders to nego-
tiate out positions of power within indigenous hierarchies 
vis-à-vis European explorers (see Borofsky and Howard 
1989:250–260). Polynesians of high status were continually 
drawn into demonstrating their power, their potency,
to affirm (and retain) status. Challenges and counter-
challenges constituted a basic element of the political 
process. Theft can be seen as part of this—as an attempt to 
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challenge European potency, as affirming the position and 
power of chiefs vis-à-vis captains. (Much of the contact liter-
ature suggests Polynesian chiefs played a role in fostering 
the thefts.) In Hawai‘i and Tahiti, the more theft that went 
on, the more explorers relied on chiefs to stop it. Theft rein-
forced European dependence on chiefs, in other words; it 
facilitated a constant supply of gifts/tribute to them.
The literature indicates Europeans were drawn into 
Islander hierarchies in a variety of ways. Te Taniwha, 
describing his recollection of Maori reaction to Cook (on 
his first voyage), stated: “When the old men saw the ship 
they said it was an atua, a god, and the people on board 
were tupua, strange beings or ‘goblins’ ” (Salmond 1991: 
87). Among the Koiari of Papua New Guinea, Bolame 
remembers people’s first reactions to Hides and O’Malley 
as: “We had never seen such creatures before and thought 
they must be remo (ghosts). The first thing we noted was 
their strange smell” ( Josephides and Schiltz in Schieffelin 
and Crittenden 1991:208–209).
Analyzing European accounts of these encounters 
proves instructive. They are full of paeans to European 
technology. They stress European power: Repeated refer-
ences exist to both Islander desires for Western products 
and to Islander fears of Western weapons. Left under-
played, however, are the problems with Western shipbuild-
ing, food storage, and disease prevention that made visiting 
islands almost mandatory. Ships lacked the technology to 
store fresh food for lengthy periods of time. And while it is 
certainly true that Western weaponry could intimidate—
Boenchea (in Corney 1913:333) referred to the “terror
and dread in which . . . [the Tahitians] hold our weapons” 
—it should be stressed that this rarely prevented Pacific 
Islanders from indirectly challenging Europeans. Bougain-
ville (1772:226) observed: “Even in Europe itself, one 
cannot see more expert filchers than the people of this 
country.” (The longer Europeans stayed in port, I might 
add, the less value their goods tended to possess.)
The dates that Europeans emphasize in their contact—
that chronologically affirm their “possession” of an island 
vis-à-vis other European powers—ignore an important fact. 
Rarely, if ever, were the Europeans the first visitors to arrive. 
They were one among many visitors and, as Schieffelin and 
Crittenden note (in their chapter), they might not be 
remembered if they did not return again. Our whole orien-
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tation toward contact—suggesting that before contact little 
change occurred, after it much—affirms the importance of 
Europeans while downplaying the dynamic nature of island 
societies. European contact needs to be seen within a 
broader Islander context—involving other contact and 
other change (e.g., see Hanlon 1988:26; Campbell 
1996:47). We should also perceive European paeans to 
themselves as more than simply self-glorification. They con-
stituted myths that encouraged European exploration—
encouraged Europeans to explore, that is to say, despite the 
significant limitations of European technology.
Analyses of European encounters in the New World sug-
gest new ways for analyzing European encounters in the 
Pacific. New World contact accounts, for example, have 
been examined systematically as texts—as not simply record-
ings of what particular explorers saw but as statements 
regarding the explorers’ states of mind and the contexts 
that shaped them. Greenblatt notes what is “striking is how 
confident the early voyagers were . . . in their ability to 
make themselves understood and to comprehend unfamiliar 
signs” (1991:93). Columbus, for example, in giving the 
Requirement—the ritual summons asserting Spanish claims 
(that has Islamic roots, Seed 1995:88)—states he was not 
contradicted in his claims by the Arawaks. But how could 
he be? “The abyss between the two parties remains so over-
whelming,” Greenblatt observes, “that Columbus’s claim 
that he was not contradicted seems absurd” (1991:59). Nei-
ther spoke the other’s language. One perceives the self-
centeredness explorers often brought to their encounters. 
We need to remember that both parties in these encoun-
ters were orienting their interactions toward audiences they 
were not directly addressing. (European accounts of con-
tact were generally framed for audiences thousands of 
miles away.) They were reiterating their understandings of 
themselves to themselves in these interactions.
There was also much ambiguity and ambivalence on 
both sides of these encounters. Reading these early 
encounters—as individual events—is intensely compli-
cated: Cook is tolerant one moment, violent the next. 
Bougainville praises Tahitians while losing six anchors 
(forcing his early departure). We see in these encounters 
Outlander tolerance and praise for Islanders as long as they 
perform according to the European script—as long as they 
appreciate European power. This script, however, contains 
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its own ambivalences. The Europeans, Greenblatt notes, 
“oscillate between the motives of exploitation and conver-
sion: they have a simultaneous interest in preserving differ-
ence—hence maintaining the possibility of grossly unfair 
economic exchange—and in erasing difference—hence 
both Christianizing the natives and obtaining competent 
interpreters. They want the natives to be at once different 
and the same, others and brothers” (1991:108–109; see also 
Dening 1994b:476; Hulme 1994:173).
The way through these various problems, I would sug-
gest, is to move toward more processional perspectives 
(following Pearson’s and Howe’s lead)—seeing, that is to 
say, Islander-Outlander interactions through time as 
responses to one another. It is all too easy to overinterpret 
one event, one encounter. But as one encounter is placed 
next to another, we start to perceive certain trends. We 
begin to gain a reasonable picture of how both groups re-
affirmed themselves in their interactions with the other. 
But we also see something else: We see both groups being 
changed by their interactions. In comparing accounts of 
Columbus’ and Cook’s voyages, we see changes in how 
Europeans “possessed” those they encountered. We see 
Renaissance views remade during the Reformation and 
remade, again, during the Enlightenment (e.g., cf. 
Schwartz 1994:4–5; Lestringant 1993; McGrane 1989).
One example might intrigue readers: While Renaissance 
explorers routinely described “natives” as believing Euro-
peans were supernatural beings, Enlightenment explorers 
did not (see Hamlin 1994, 1996; Borofsky 1997:277).
The Selections
The chapters in this section are divided into two parts. The 
first, “Possessing Others,” explores how each side in their 
early encounters sought to “possess” the other (in Greg 
Dening’s phrasing)—the ways in which they sought to con-
trol, physically and symbolically, the strangers they dealt 
with. Focusing on each sides’ rituals and myths of posses-
sion subverts the old opposition of Outlander versus 
Islander agency. We gain a deeper, fuller sense of the actors 
involved in these encounters and how they constructed 
themselves in relation to one another. We see, that is to say, 
each group in action.
Greg Dening’s “Possessing Tahiti” and Edward Schief-
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felin and Robert Crittenden’s “Remembering First Con-
tact” form a pair. They lie at opposite ends of the contact’s 
continuum—almost two hundred years and an ocean apart. 
Examining them together, we perceive the similarities and 
differences in Islander and Outlander styles of possessing 
others. Dening explores how Tahitians and the British 
sought to conceptualize and control each other: Tahitians 
incorporated the British flag into their symbols of power. 
The British incorporated Purea into their stories about 
themselves as “civilizers” of others. “Possessing Tahiti was
a complicated affair,” Dening writes. “Indeed, who pos-
sessed whom? Native and Stranger each possessed the 
other in their interpretations of the other.” Schieffelin and 
Crittenden emphasize early contact encounters involved 
more than simply different individuals interacting. They 
also involved different cultural conceptions regarding 
“strangers” and, critically, rituals for controlling them. We 
should not forget that historical contingencies were 
involved as well. There was chance in how Hides and 
O’Malley encountered particular Highland Papuan groups 
and, as a result, how these groups responded to them. And 
there was also happenstance in the fact that, years later, the 
Strickland-Purari Patrol was recalled as a romantic, enno-
bling adventure by many Australians but barely remem-
bered by particular Papuans.
The documents that have come down to us today, on the 
Western side of these encounters, allow us to explore the 
politics of Western myth making. In “Constructing ‘Pacific’ 
Peoples,” Bernard Smith suggests Captain Cook was caught 
in a capitalist contradiction between nurturing trade and 
demonstrating control. As a result, he periodically used 
violence in ways that undermined his popular (and mythic) 
image as a nonviolent “civilizer” of others. Cook’s solution, 
reasonably enough, was to shape what was reported about 
him. Smith suggests Webber was directed to give Cook’s 
interactions with Islanders a “Pacific” slant.
The second part of this section, “A View from Afar” by 
Richard White, provides a comparative perspective from 
North America on these dynamics. White’s concept of a 
“Middle Ground” in North America is useful for exploring 
Pacific contact encounters. In both cases, the different 
sides sought to control each other and would have coerced 
the other if they could. But neither side was able to reach 
that level of control and so, by necessity, was forced into 
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negotiated resolutions of their conflicting interests. 
(Dorothy Shineberg made this point some years ago in 
respect to sandalwood traders.) This “middle ground” 
seems to have lasted for a much shorter period of time in 
the Pacific. We might wonder why. And it is certainly 
intriguing to hear that the Pacific seemed more con-
trolled—in its aggrandizing schemes and violence—than 
North America. Such comparative comments provide food 
for thought.
A question readers might ponder in this section is:
•  What do the ways these different groups sought to “possess” 
each other convey about the people involved and the cultural worlds 
they lived in?
Focusing on the dynamics by which each group sought to 
“possess” the other offers an opportunity to make sense of 
early contact in new ways. We see individuals on both sides 
of these encounters as active agents—as seeking to struc-
ture, to control, their relations with strangers.
Relevant Dates
1519–1521 Magellan's circumnavigation of the globe, first 
European crossing of the Pacific Ocean, visited 
Guam [Portuguese sailing under the Spanish 
flag] ([Magellan] 1874; Beaglehole 1966:15–38)
1567–1568 Medaña visited the Solomon Islands [Spanish] 
([Medaña] 1901; Beaglehole 1966:39–57)
1595 Medaña's second voyage, massacre of Mar-
quesans, revisited the Solomons [Spanish] 
([Medaña] 1901; [Quiros] 1904; Beaglehole 
1966:58–80)
1605–1606 Quiros visited the Tuamotus, Northern Cooks, 
Vanuatu. Torres, a lieutenant, visited Papua 
New Guinea and passed through the Torres 
Straits [Spanish] ([Quiros] 1904; Beaglehole 
1966:81–107)
1615–1616 LeMaire and Schouten visited Tuamotus, Tonga, 
New Ireland, Papua New Guinea [Dutch] ([Le 
Maire] 1906; Beaglehole 1966:127–137)
1642 Tasman visited Aotearoa/New Zealand, Tonga, 
Fiji, New Britain [Dutch] (Tasman 1898; Beagle-
hole 1966:138–164)
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1722 Roggeveen visited Rapanui/Easter Island, 
Samoa [Dutch] ([Roggeveen] 1919; Beagle-
hole 1966:180–184)
1767–1768 Wallis visited Taumotus, Tahiti, Marianas 
[British] (Robertson 1948, 1973; Hawkesworth 
1775; Beaglehole 1966:200–206)
1766–1769 Bougainville visited Tuamotus, Tahiti, Samoa, 
Vanuatu, Solomons, Papua New Guinea 
[French] (Bougainville 1772; Beaglehole 
1966:213–228; Brosse 1983:24–32)
1768–1771 Cook’s First Voyage of Exploration (among the 
islands visited: Tahiti, Aotearoa/New Zealand, 
Papua New Guinea) [British] (Beaglehole 
1955, 1962, 1966:229–260)
1772–1775 Cook’s Second Voyage of Exploration (among 
the islands visited: Aotearoa/New Zealand, 
Tahiti, Tonga, Rapanui/Easter Island, Mar-
quesas, Tonga, Vanuatu, New Caledonia) 
[British] (Beaglehole 1961, 1966:261–284)
1776–1780 Cook’s Third Voyage of Exploration (among 
the islands visited: Aotearoa/New Zealand, 
Tahiti, Tonga, Hawai‘i) [British] (Beaglehole 
1966:285–315, 1967)
1786–1788 La Pérouse’s voyage (among the islands visited 
prior to being shipwrecked: Rapanui/Easter 
Island, Hawai‘i, Samoa) [French] (La Pérouse 
1799; Beaglehole 1966:318–319; Brosse 
1983:77–92)
1789 Bligh visited Tahiti (his crew mutinied, set 
Bligh adrift, and returned to Tahiti before 
some eventually sailed on to Pitcairn) (Bligh 
1790, 1937; Dening 1992a)
1930 Leahy and Dwyer crossed Papua New Guinea 
from north to south [Australian] (Willis 1969; 
Schieffelin and Crittenden 1991:43)
1935 Hides and O’Malley expedition [Australian] 






There is a ceremony performed nowadays at Tahiti each year in the
Bastille Day holidays. At the marae Arahu Rahu, reconstructed for
tourists and “folkloric” celebrations, the “King” and “Queen” of
Tahiti are invested with a maro ura, a wrap or girdle of red feathers. It
is a symbol, like a crown and scepter, of their sovereignty for the time
of the celebrations. Thousands are there to see the ceremony.
These signs and symbolic actions enjoy some continuity with the
past, they have some cultural presence, yet they establish different
realities. They are “Tahitian” in character, but present distinct expres-
sions of what being “Tahitian” might be. In a metaphor of the Pacific,
the symbols of the past are cargo to the present. The present possesses
the relics of its past with all the invention and conservation with which
cultural artifacts out of time and out of place are received across a
beach. How does one write history as if that were true?
For that the maro ura is very pertinent. If young George III of
England needed a crown to be king in 1760 and to sit on the Corona-
tion Stone of Scotland and Ireland, then a twelve-year-old Pomare of
Tahiti needed the maro ura to be arii nui, chief, in 1791 and to stand
on the robing stone of his marae, that sacred preserve of his titles. His
maro ura was a feather wrap, 5 yards long and 15 inches broad. The
brilliant red head feathers of the parakeet and the whitish yellow
feathers of the dove were sewn to a woven backing. The black feathers
of the man-of-war bird bordered the wrap, top and bottom. The maro
ura has come to be called the “feather girdle” in the way archaic words
A longer version of this chapter was published in Archaeology in Oceania 21 (1):
103–118 and reprinted in Greg Dening’s Performances, 128–167.
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get some establishment in the history of things. The girdle was always
unfinished. The bone to sew it was left in the weave. The social
moments of chieftaincy, sacrifices, wars, and peace all found their reg-
ister on the girdle with added feathers and folds. In the feathers was a
history of sovereignty, more mnemonic than hieroglyphic, capable of
being read by priests who had the custody of the past (Rose 1978;
Oliver 1974:763).
Tahitian politics turned around the feather girdle. There are uncer-
tainties about the girdle. There were two of them; maybe Pomare’s
was a third; maybe there were more. The two we know from legend
and myth were the maro tea and the maro ura, the yellow and the red
girdle. Pomare’s girdle we know from a number of descriptions of
European visitors who saw it and from William Bligh who drew it.
The descriptions are all agreed that Pomare’s girdle was made of both
yellow and red feathers. That Pomare’s girdle might be a third sacred
maro and in concept be syncretic of both maro tea and maro ula
belongs to our later story. There were more syncretisms more immedi-
ately important. Its distinction from the traditional sacred maro of
Tahitian polity did not put it outside the paradigm of Tahitian politics.
That paradigm allowed a distinction between power and authority.
Power was recognized to rise and fall independent of authority. The
feather girdles were the currency of authority. They conferred title and
rank, which it was the consensus of powerful and weak alike to recog-
nize (Oliver 1974:1213–1216, 1279).
If the feather girdles were the sacraments of authority—in that they
signified authority and established it at the same time—it was because
they were the sign of the god ‘Oro. ‘Oro, the god of sacrifice, had
always been part of the Polynesian pantheon, but in the eighteenth
century ‘Oro had begun to play a special part in Tahitian politics. He
had begun to emerge from his island of Raiatea, first to Porapora
(Bora-Bora), then to Tahiti.
There was an element of mission or colony in ‘Oro’s expansion.
His priests would establish a new sacred place with some stone trans-
ported from an original temple. These places sacred to ‘Oro all
shared a common name: Taputapuatea, “Sacrifices from Abroad.”
They were all close to the sea and stood opposite some passage
through the reef to the open sea. The rituals at Taputapuatea always
focused on canoes and their arrival with sacrificial victims. Tahitians,
like all Polynesian peoples, had some preoccupation with the origins
and voyages of their ancestors and with strangers who came from
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beyond the sky. ‘Oro himself was incarnated in a log or a clublike
basket of sennit covered in feathers, more abstract in his representa-
tion than anthropomorphic. He himself was a voyager around their
islands in an ark or feather basket coffer set on a canoe called Rain-
bow. He had first come to the Tahitian islands on a rainbow that
joined sky and land. As the Maohi—the native islanders of the whole
Society group—saw it, the great celebration of ‘Oro at his birthplace
of Opoa on Raiatea was a time of commitment to alliances that
stretched beyond the bounds of their individual islands (Henry 1928:
157–177; Green 1968).
Under ‘Oro’s patronage functioned the only group in the islands
who called on loyalties wider than tribal and local divisions. They
were called arioi, a privileged group who traveled and played. “Come-
dians” was an old missionary word for them that caught the topsy-
turvy carnival that was structured in their role. They would play the
clown to established authority: they overturned the rules of proper
behavior and danced and played without responsibility. The masters
of the different arioi lodges wore their own maro ura of red-tinted
tapa cloth.
The Taputapuatea were places of sacrifice. They were also treasure
houses of the sacred paraphernalia of ‘Oro. The representations of
‘Oro were kept there in special feathered containers, as were the sacred
maro and the other accoutrements of priests and chiefs. Pomare kept
his maro in a sacred spot to the southeast of Matavai. Tarahoi, it was
called, and Taputapuatea. It stood opposite the passage in the reef
through which the European vessels first and subsequently entered
Matavai. Pomare’s maro had been brought there in 1791.
Bligh commented that the Tahitians had sewn into the feather gir-
dle a thatch of auburn hair belonging to Richard Skinner, one of the
Bounty mutineers who had elected to stay at Tahiti when Christian
went on to Pitcairn. Skinner was the ship’s barber. He had astounded
the Tahitians on the arrival of the Bounty by producing a barber’s
model head with its latest hair fashions from London. In Tahitian eyes,
Skinner was somebody special. As barber, he had a special power to
touch tapu places. And his own head was tapu red, as special as a
feather. One could wave it to catch ‘Oro’s attention in prayer; one
could sacrifice it to Pomare’s sovereignty (Bligh [1791] 1976:April 28;
Mackaness 1960:41).
Collected in this sacred place of ‘Oro where Bligh saw the girdle
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was other cargo. There was also a portrait of Captain James Cook
painted by John Webber. Like the maro ura, the portrait was an
unfinished document. The Tahitians would take it to each ship that
visited the island for the captain to sign a message on the back. The
portrait was wrapped in red cloth and all made bare-shouldered
deferences to it when it was uncovered. For years after Cook had
given them the portrait and a huge box with lock and key to keep it
in, the Pomares, fathers and sons, took it with them on important
expeditions, unveiled it on special ritual occasions, had it present
whenever they offered formal hospitality to Stranger captains (Mor-
rison [1785] 1935:85, 114–116).
Bligh saw something else in the maro ura besides Skinner’s auburn
hair. It was the most famous thing of all. He saw a British red
pennant sewn into the body of the girdle, as a lappet or fold of
its own. “Red Buntin” he calls it on his drawing. It was the pennant
that Samuel Wallis, captain of HMS Dolphin, had erected on a
pole on June 26, 1767, when he took possession of Tahiti for King
George III. The Tahitians had taken down the symbol of sovereignty
and incorporated it into a symbol of sovereignty of their own (Rose
1978:9–15).
Tarahoi was a Tahitian museum of their contact with the European
Stranger. The hair, Cook’s portrait, the red bunting were cargo. They
were Strangers’ things remade to Tahitian meanings and kept, as in
some archive, as documents of past experiences that were repeatedly
read for the history they displayed. They were products of the ethno-
graphic moments between Native and Stranger, interpretations trans-
formed into things and read for their meaning in ritual actions that
displayed them and preserved them.
Pomare’s maro ura was a parable in feathers and red bunting of
the translating process. Its expression was Tahitian, in the language
of ‘Oro, of sacrifice. Pomare was a boy of ten when the feather girdle
was wrapped around him for the first time in 1791, a year before
Bligh saw it. He took title at that moment to a status his father never
had and could never reach. His father with all the others became
bound to all the deferences owed Tahiti’s most sacred person—his
son. He was arii nui, “king,” because what he wore, his maro ura,
took him back to ‘Oro and the beginning of title, but what he wore
as well, the red bunting, took him back to the beginning of a new
time. This new time, the coming of the Stranger, was enclosed in the
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old times, the coming of ‘Oro. The feather girdle was as much
an invention of culture as an invention of the past (Green 1968:79;
Morrison [1785] 1935:114–116).
* * *
Captain Samuel Wallis of HMS Dolphin was in bed when he took
possession of what he was pleased to call King George’s Island in
honor of His Britannic Majesty. Wallis and many of his men were
sick—they thought deadly sick—of scurvy and its many complications.
In the scurvy’s painful lethargy, the island they stood off taunted them.
Its sweet smells wafted to them and they knew it to be more beautiful
than any island they had ever seen. For five days they had slowly
moved along its northern shore, probing the reefs for an entry and an
anchorage, looking for a beach where they might land without wet-
ting their muskets. Their contact with the islanders had been good
and bad. The islanders who had come to the ship were full of antics,
made speeches at the sailors, threw plantain branches into the sea,
made small gifts of food. But when the ship’s cutter went closer to
survey the bottom, the canoes crowded in threateningly. Already the
“Dolphins” had killed and wounded some islanders to show the force
of the musket and to drive off the great double-hulled vessels that
could easily overwhelm their cutter. In the wardroom the officers
deliberated whether they should risk a landing or hurry on to Tinian,
4,000 miles away, and let the Pacific do its worst to them in the
shortest possible time (Wallis 1776:June 19, 1767 ff.; Gore 1766:2
June 1767 ff.; Robertson 1948 [1766]:138 ff., Hawkesworth 1773:
2/213 ff.).
They really had no choice. Their bruised bodies, their suppurating
gums, their swollen faces told them that. They had to stop their own
rot with fresh food and get water in quantity before they went on.
Matavai was their saving. The bay lay calm and deep behind the reef.
A river curved behind the bend of the black sand beach.
“Port Royal” they called it, with half a dream for a British Pacific
Main that never was to be, but Matavai, its native name, in the end
held the day. They had a scare as they ran aground on a reef inside
the bay. Once off they were soon at anchor undamaged except for a
scrape on the Dolphin’s new and experimental copper sheathing.
Around them stretched a panorama engraved forever as paradise on
the European mind. The “Dolphins” saw the panorama more prag-
matically. Their cannon could sweep it all, from off the port bow at
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what was to be later known as “Point Venus,” for the planet ob-
served there, to “Skirmish” or “One Tree Hill” or Tahaara, two
miles around on the starboard side.
At Matavai the score of the first meeting of European Stranger
and Tahitian Native came to its counterpoint. The bits and pieces of
contact became dramatized, staged for the understanding it gave them
of one another. In the calm of the bay, the ship’s people and the land’s
people could organize their confrontation and in that sense make it
meaningful. Captain Wallis could have simply fed his men, watered
his ship, and gone on. But he needed to “make history” by “taking
possession” of the island he had “discovered.” For that, proprieties
needed some play. The Tahitians, to believe their later legendary mem-
ory, saw their prophecies of being visited by canoes without out-
riggers fulfilled, but they also began to collect themselves in Matavai
for a more dramatic reception that made more mythical sense to them
(Driessen 1982).
The “Dolphins” prepared their ship with the suspicion that they
might be attacked and the expectancy that if they were to get food
and water they must discover a trade. Their preparations for fighting
were well practiced. They divided into four watches, loaded the great
guns with shot and grape, armed every man with pistol and cutlass.
They varied in their count of the canoes around them, but they were
agreed these numbered between four and six hundred. Perhaps four
thousand natives manned them. No doubt the “Dolphins” were ap-
prehensive, but they had also smarted a little under the captain’s in-
structions to “test the temper” of the natives in the days before. They
had suffered the indignity of cuffs and rough treatment and uncom-
prehending exchanges and now were not averse to teaching the natives
a lesson.
There was, as well, an ambiguity in the situation. The “Dolphins”
had an etiquette for killing when they fought. They fought with rules
—about prisoners and prizes, about surrender and the niceties of
chivalry. But on the edge of this battle, the Natives were other. Their
otherness was nowhere so marked as in the wanton antics of the girls
who stood on the prows of most of the canoes. The girls lifted their
wraps and flaunted their nakedness. They made unmistakable gestures
and responded to the ribaldry of the seamen as if sex had its own lan-
guage of natural signs.
In the middle of this sea of sexuality, and in a canoe that every-
body noted for its magnificence and for the “awning” over the plat-
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forms that joined its double hull, was some sort of native director.
The “Dolphins” guessed he was one of the “principal inhabitance.”
He was wrapped in red-stained tapa cloth. He offered bunches of red
and yellow feathers. It was he, someone said, who gave the signal
with the wand in his hand. Thousands pulled pebbles from the ballast
of their canoes and showered the Dolphin with painful accuracy. The
Dolphin responded with awful effect. “It would require Milton to
describe,” her master wrote. The canoes were smashed with round
shot. When the natives rallied after the first shock and seemed to be
returning, the three-pounders were loaded with seventy musket balls
apiece and when the canoes were within 300 or 400 yards they
were sprayed with “considerable loss.” The great guns concentrated
on the large canoe. It was the “King of the Island,” the “Dolphins”
thought. They admired the courage of those in the five or six canoes
who stayed with the king even though he became the target of their
firing. They will think us gods, some of the crew said, and others
worried what revenge the natives might take if they came with fire-
brands. By nightfall the powder smoke had gone and the officers dis-
cussed whether it was spices they now smelled on the warm heavy
air. They would marvel later how little effect all this killing seemed to
have on the natives. It seemed to justify their own carelessness. The
realpolitik of discovery and possession meant the Native was not
owed the ordinary etiquettes of war. The “Dolphins” could think of
nothing better to do in the aftermath of the slaughter than to “act
haughty” to the Tahitians and teach them to trade more sensibly
(Robertson [1766] 1948:154–158).
How the natives saw the Strangers is, by any standard of objective
discourse, nothing more than informed guess. Yet to say that the
meeting on the part of the natives was a coordinated and dramatized
reception seems certain. That it was invented for the novelty of the
conditions also seems certain. Their invention was suffused with their
own old cosmological familiarities. It was not a “natural” scene just
because the Strangers saw it suffused with their own familiarities. The
coordination of the natives’ attack was not at the hands of the “king
of the island.” There was no “king of the island,” and later there was
a strange silence about this incident of violence among those who
had ambitions to be “king of the island” when the European visits
became more frequent.
It made no sense in the Tahitian way of things to see the “king
of the island” as a chief performing a political or territorial role, no
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matter how natural it seems that they should have been defensive
against an invading “other.” The “other” of their wars and battles
was always territorially specific—other alliances, other islands. The
“other” of this encounter was much more generic to their categories
of identity. The women performing “wanton tricks” in the canoes
were a clue that something other than battle or ambush was in their
minds. We know something of Tahitian war at sea. They had their
etiquettes of killing too. They had their ceremonies of engagement
and disengagement. In none of these were women performing “wanton
antics.” But in other circumstances, especially in the rituals of ‘Oro,
women’s dancing was a sacramental to the presence of the god. Like
the tufts of red and yellow feathers, women caught the eye of the
divine to focus it on prayer or an offering. Indeed, failing these, abuse
of and aggression toward the gods were not unknown. Tahitian gods
were not so distantly divine, even ‘Oro, that they could not be tested
and contested. There was no great contradiction seen in raising the
attention of the gods by arousing their lust or making them angry
(Oliver 1974:1221–1225, 93, 332 ff.).
No doubt it is commonsensical on our part to read the hurled
pebbles and the signaled attack as ordinary ambush. A keen percep-
tion by the Tahitians of the lust in the seamen’s eyes might have led to
a strategy of subterfuge in staging the women’s dancing. The Tahitians
had no experience of cannon and were not necessarily convinced of
the power of the musket. Native greed, Strangers’ callousness, mis-
read signs are thus the commonsensical history of the event. But they
are not, and it is commonsense that is the deceiver. Greed, callous-
ness, and misread signs have their play, but the “king of the island”
was likely to have been an arioi master of a lodge or a priest of ‘Oro.
His double canoe was no battleship. It was likely to have been Rain-
bow. The awning he stood under was likely to have covered the ark
of ‘Oro’s accoutrements, and who knows, the maro ura. What the
Tahitians saw on the Dolphin were Tahitian gods, divine in the Tahi-
tian way. Their agnosticism, their relativism was a long way off, long
after the Dolphin’s going, long after the supposedly humanizing effect
of the “Dolphins’ ” very ordinary behavior. Tahitians were adept at
seeing the divine in the human, whatever the contradictions. It is a
Stranger’s view, not a Native’s, that there is a necessary contradiction
between commonsense realism and mythical understanding. Mission-
aries would later be scandalized at idolaters’ irreverences to their idols,
as if reverential piety were a measure of belief. Cook, and later Bligh,
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was cynically convinced of the superficiality of Native beliefs because
each had seen the Natives’ distracted, formalistic behavior in rituals.
Natives as well as Strangers, ourselves as well as others, easily bridge
apparent contradictions between myth and commonsense. The insider
knows that myth and commonsense answer different questions.
What always embarrasses the Stranger’s effort to understand the
Native is the Stranger’s insistence that the Native perceptions should
be literal, while the Stranger’s own perceptions are allowed to be meta-
phoric. So the Tahitian Natives’ supposed belief that the European
Strangers were gods “from beyond the sky” is seen as a belief of literal
equivalence between man and god, easily dispelled by the very ordi-
nary behavior of lusty, cantankerous seamen—whereas the Stranger’s
more typical understanding of themselves is that they hold things in
their varied meaning, so that there is for the Stranger no difficulty in
taking “he is a god” into any number of metaphors about perfection
in physical beauty or intelligence or morality without any necessary
incarnational literalness. Thus if one argues that the Native Tahitians
received the Dolphin in a dramatic play that made sense to them out
of their cosmology of ‘Oro, there is a half expectancy that the illogi-
cality or contradiction in the experience should have destroyed the
literalness of their understanding. Their consequent make-believe in
the face of contradiction was either a sign of native simplicity or they
were by this forced into a cultural agnosticism that was the seed of
change.
History, myth, sacrament, ritual do not work that way. They all
colligate the past and make understandings that bring order to the
present. They do not prophesy what will happen or give a rubric for
future behavior. They make sense of what has happened by econo-
mizing the wealth of possible causes of events down to principal deter-
minants that really matter. To suggest, as I do, that the Tahitian
Natives put the arrival of the European Strangers into the context of
their beliefs about ‘Oro with all the resonances those beliefs had in
politics, religion, and society is not to write the history of their con-
tact. What “actually happened” is inevitably reduced in the story of
it to a finite mixture of infinite actions and meanings. What signifi-
cantly happened for the Tahitian Natives was much simpler. The
arrival of the Dolphin was the occasion of another ‘Oro incarnation or
materialization and all the Tahitian associations of sovereignty and
sacrifice, of colony and coming from “beyond the sky,” of alliance
and title, were at work. It did not matter that the Tahitians were soon
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to discover that the “Dolphins” were very much flesh and blood and
strange. We know, from later observation, that they coped fairly well
with the flesh and blood qualities of deified chiefs and the man-made
quality of deified things. Their transformations of their past and
present experience were about a much more real and immediate world
beneath the appearances of things.
The Dolphin sailed into Matavai by what might always have been
—but certainly by her entry became—a sacred passage off the marae
Tarahoi. She was, by any measure the Tahitians had, a special ship,
of the quality of Rainbow, even perhaps of the quality prophesied
when news of similar vessels that had visited other islands reached
Tahiti. She streamed with the magnificent decoration of white sail and
bunting and flag. The Tahitians offered her, from the moment they
saw her, ‘Oro’s token human sacrifice. The plantain branches they
offered her, the inducement of naked dance and sexual gesture by
which ‘Oro’s presence was attracted to his sacred marae, spoke the
metaphors by which they grasped the novelty of her arrival. Slain
pigs, the bunched red and yellow feathers, which no doubt meant
that at some Taputapuatea a human sacrifice was lying, made the
novelty familiar. If the tone and direction of myths of ‘Oro collected
later are any indication, the Dolphin came like the marvelous canoes
of old from afar, and Tahitian expectancy would be that she would
make a landing, be the center of sacrifice, be the occasion for rein-
statement and investiture of the arii rahi, be the circumstance for alli-
ance and treaty and the establishment in them of some hegemony.
The arrival at Matavai was true to the myth of how ‘Oro would
arrive to colonize a new place. It had happened at Taiarapu long ago
and more recently at Ata-Huru. The novelties did not matter, nor
even the contradictions. The Tahitians were entertained by its simple
meaning.
June 26 was the day for possession, the first of many such days for
Tahiti as it turned out. Wallis took possession of Tahiti in the name
of George III with a pennant and a pole, a turned sod, a toast to the
King’s good health, and three British cheers. Nine months later, Comte
Louis Antoine de Bougainville buried an oak plank inscribed with the
message that Tahiti belonged to the French. He left the names of all
his men in a bottle. Then the Spaniards, when they came, set up a
Holy Cross, processed to it with lighted candles, sang their litanies,
said a mass, fired their muskets and their guns, and wrote a solemn
little convention to themselves.
122 Dynamics of Contact—Possessing Others
Wallis, being in bed ill, sent Tobias Furneaux, his second lieutenant,
to take possession of Tahiti. When Furneaux lined up eighteen able
seamen, a sergeant with his twelve marines, and three “young gentle-
men” or midshipmen on the black sand of Matavai bay, he was mak-
ing ritual. He was making signs about authority and power, domi-
nance and proper order; authority, power, dominance, and proper
order were established in the making of the signs of them. Presum-
ably Captain Wallis could have shouted out from his sickbed, “This
island belongs to us,” but that was not “the right way of doing
things.” That did not contain the double-talk of straight lines, smart
appearances, silence in the ranks, snapped orders, reverences to the
flag. The ritual occasion is marked off from everyday actions by spe-
cial languages, formal postures, the slow motion of meaningful ges-
ture, the fancy dress of formal occasions, careful etiquette. There is
always a “priest” at ritual moments, someone who knows the estab-
lished ways of doing things, someone who plans and marshals the
actions. Or there is a book of rubrics, a permanent record of the
order of things. Of course in social actions of a symbolic kind, it is
always, in the phrase made famous about the thick description of
them, “wink upon wink upon wink.” The actions are a text in which
the abstract realities are mythically read, certainly, but the participants
are also observing many levels of meaning. A ritual about possession
might be at the same time a ritual about the hierarchy of authority
between seamen, midshipmen, sergeant and second lieutenant, or as
in the case of the possession of Tahiti, it might have been telling the
sailors about the wardroom divisions of their superiors. This was not
the first time that the first lieutenant of the Dolphin—“Mr. Growl”
they called him—was absent and the running of the ship and its occa-
sions had fallen to the young and willing Toby Furneaux. Standing at
attention, looking with a fixed gaze, feeling the ambience of sight
and sound, even perhaps sensing the irony between their bedraggled
condition and the solemnity of the symbols, they made ritual of
never-ending amplification in its meaning (Wallis 1776:June 26,
1767; Robertson [1766] 1948:162).
Tobias Furneaux marshaled his guard on the beach. Behind him in
the bay were three boats, Mr. Molyneux in charge. Their musquetoons
were trained on the small crowd of natives gathering on the far side
of the stream. Behind the boats was the Dolphin, cannons trained on
the same target. The guard set a pole and a pennant, or “pendant” as
was the navy’s word. The pole was nothing grand or permanent, a
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spare spar, but tall enough to let the tapering colors stand free, and
firm enough to hold them stiff in the breeze. The colors were red.
James Cook saw them years later and simply called them “British
Colors” and, as we have seen, William Bligh sketched them and called
them “red bunting.” Whether red, then why red, might seem idle ques-
tions, but being curious about symbolic action is more complicated
than idle. Furneaux would have asked his wardroom colleagues and
then his captain which was correct, or he would have known that
British colors were more appropriate than naval colors in acts of pos-
session. And if accidents affected proprieties—say that they had none
of the proper bunting to spare—its replacement would not have been
made because only the “Indians would see.” Who saw it was them-
selves and the proprieties observed were a currency in their own rela-
tionship, about being responsible, about being a good officer.
There is a phrase we use when we see other people doing some-
thing memorable or beating some record or doing things for the first
time. We say they are “making history.” Contained within the phrase
is a sense that what is remembered will change the environment in
which others will act. They will have to respond in some way to the
history that has been made. Samuel Wallis and Toby Furneaux were
“making history” in taking possession of Tahiti. They did not impose
any system of ownership on Tahitian land. They did, however, leave
a historical marker. They acted out events done with proprieties that
they expected others to recognize. That memory of an act of posses-
sion was meant to change the relations of other sovereignties to this
land now possessed. When James Cook came to Tahiti later and found
that the Spaniards had written Carolus Tertius Imperator on their
Holy Cross, he scratched it out and wrote Georgius Tertius Rex there
instead. The Spaniards were furious for years. The Viceroy of Peru
constantly tried to get another expedition together to scratch out
Cook’s inscription. It was not as if Wallis began British empire in the
Pacific: He left no delegates, he built no forts. He simply “made
history” with the presumption that the history he made would hold
others to the efficacy of his symbolic acts (Beaglehole 1967:1372;
Corney 1913:3:401).
Wallis left a concrete historical marker at Tahiti. He left his flag on
its pole. By the time Furneaux had read his proclamations and hauled
the pennant to its place, a crowd of four or five hundred Tahitians
had gathered on the bank of the river that divided them from the
beach. They each held a plantain branch, a forest of a crowd, a crowd
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of sacrifices. If a flag might stand for something else—for nation, for
legitimate power—if gestures around a flag might stir moods and
sentiments of loyalty and pride, then so might a plantain branch.
Cook remarked three years later how ever present was the symbol of
the plantain—and how effective. It was a sign of peace, of deference,
of sacrifice, Ta‘ata meia roa, “man long plantain” it was called when
a branch was offered to a god or to a chief as substitute for a human
offering. Pulled from its natural environment where it abounded in
rich variety, the plantain branch could calm an angry man, placate a
god, legitimate a chief—given the conditions in which the sign could
be read. As a flag could stir a manly bosom given martial music, a
solemn tread, and a supportive crowd, so a plantain branch might
raise reverential awe, given the smell of rotting sacrifices, the shade
of sacred trees, the beat and tone of a temple drum, the call of sacred
birds, and the deferences of bared torsos and averted faces. It was the
ambience of ritual action that made an environment in which the
symbols worked. This was not easily experienced by Strangers. Instead
of being entertained—held between the ordinary movements of social
experience in a space to read the meanings of actions—the Strangers
were the observers, catching the symbols but not the signs, translat-
ing the conventionalities of the Other’s signals but not their meaning.
To the Strangers, the forest of sacrifices looked like a Palm Sunday
procession and was depicted as such in Hawkesworth’s publication
of Wallis’ voyage (Hawkesworth 1773:1:243).
The Tahitians had their own layers of meanings, their own “wink
upon wink upon wink” to discern in the Strangers’ ceremonies on the
spit of land between sea and river. The Native Tahitians were intrigued
for more than twenty-five years at the symbols of the Strangers’ flags
and their ceremonies about them. During Cook’s stay at Tahiti as
well as Bligh’s, bored as the Tahitians became with the exotic behavior
of Strangers, they would collect nonetheless for their evening parades
and their ceremonies about the flag. Even the Bounty mutineers
erected their flagpole and on Sundays would have large crowds to see
them haul their flag. Before such fundamentalisms of authority, Tahi-
tians never ceased to have an anthropological wonder. On the occa-
sion of Dolphin’s arrival in 1767, whatever else the Tahitians saw, they
interpreted it as a moment in which sacrifices were owed and they
came with their forest of plantain branches to make them (Morrison
[1785] 1935:81).
When the “Dolphins” left the beach and returned to the ship, they
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saw the crowd of natives approach the flag tentatively. With many
gestures of deference, the islanders laid plantains at its foot and an
offering of pigs. They were startled at the movements of the flag in
the breeze. An old man came nearly all the way to the Dolphin in a
canoe and made a formal speech. The sailors did not know its mean-
ing, but it seemed to concern the flag. He threw a plantain branch
into the sea and made an offering of pigs to the people on the ship as
he had done to the flag. He would take nothing in return but went
back to the flag as if he had struck an agreement. With others he
took the flag down and carried it away. That night the “Dolphins”
saw many large fires along the shore and on the sides of the hill
(Robertson 1948:161).
Next morning early, a crowd of several thousand processed along
the coast. In the midst of them a young man held the flag aloft on a
pole. They seemed to be making for a cluster of canoes near the
marae Tarahoi. The “Dolphins,” worried that it augured a repetition
of the day before, broke up the crowd with a few cannon shots, then
harassed them with grape, and destroyed the canoes. When the rem-
nants of the crowd collected at Tahaara, “Skirmish Hill,” the “Dol-
phins” fired their cannon again so that the crowd could see the balls
bouncing across the landscape, ploughing through the trees. The cutter
was sent in to the canoes and the crew finished with axes what the
cannon had not done.
Perhaps the “Dolphins” were correct in surmising that the flag
was being taken to the canoes. We cannot know. It was unlikely that
there was to be another attack, however. Right-handed processions
like those of the makahiki, described by Sahlins for Hawai‘i, were
rituals for acknowledging sovereignty. Later, other British flags ac-
quired by the Pomares were carried at the head of these processions.
In all probability the Tahitians were making for some canoe, some
other Rainbow of ‘Oro. We know they were soon to take the flag to
the other side of the island, to the district of Papara, to a marae called
Mahaiatea then being built or about to be built by the chief of the
Landward Teva, Amo, and his wife, Purea. Amo and Purea were about
to make an invention. Amo’s name meant “Wink.” They were indeed
about to put “wink upon wink upon wink.”
Purea, or “Oberea” as a much wider English public began to know
her, was about to enter the stage of history. How they invented her
belongs to the story of how Native and Stranger became symbiotic to
one another, how they possessed one another. Indeed one has to say,
126 Dynamics of Contact—Possessing Others
even if the complications become confusing, the inventing of Purea
did not end with the eighteenth century. Inventing Purea has been
part of a long historical process and is illustrative not merely of the
ways Native and Stranger become environmental to one another but
also the ways the past becomes environmental to the present (Oliver
1974:1200).
Purea, for example, appeared as “Oberea the Sorcerer” in a panto-
mime at Covent Gardens in December 1785. The pantomime was
called “Omai, or a Trip around the World” and proved to be enter-
tainment in all the senses of the word that we have used. “Omai,”
wrote the critic in Rambler’s Magazine, was a “school for the history
of Man,” and the Times, which reviewed nearly every performance,
said:
The stage never exhibited such a combination of superb and vari-
ous scenery—enchanting music and sheer fun. The scenes, charac-
ters and dresses being, except a few, novel and foreign to this
country, contribute much to heighten the delight, for what can be
more delightful than an enchanting fascination that monopolizes
the mind to the scene before the eye, and leads the imagination
from country to country, from the frigid to the torrid zone, shew-
ing as in a mirror, prospects of different climates, with all the pro-
ductions of nature in the animal and vegetable worlds, and all the
efforts of man to attain nourishment, convenience and luxury, by
the world of arts. It is a spectacle worthy of the contemplation of
every rational being, from infant to the aged philosopher. A spec-
tacle that holds forth the wisdom and dispositions of Providence
in the strongest view.
The pantomime was a “beautiful illustration of Cook’s voyages.” It
was a translation in entertainment of an ethnographic moment (Jop-
pien 1979; Allen 1962, 1965, 1966; Huse 1936; Mayer 1969; Euro-
pean Magazine Dec. 1785; New London Magazine Dec. 1785; London
Chronicle Dec. 1785; Universal Daily Register (London Times) Dec.
1785).
The characters in the pantomime are names snatched from the
common records of the European encounter with the Tahitians. There
was Omai, the living curiosity who had come to England and re-
turned to Tahiti with Cook. But he had been transformed into the
son of “King” Otoo and made heir to the Tahitian throne. There was
Oedidee, known by successive visitors to Tahiti, but now transformed
into the rival of Omai and the protégé of Oberea. Oberea (Purea) was
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now a menacing sorceress bent on raising Oedidee to the throne of
Tahiti. She tried to foil the marriage of Londina to Omai. Yes, Lon-
dina, the daughter of Britannia, was promised by her mother to
Omai to join the two kingdoms of Britain and Tahiti. Omai’s rival to
Londina’s hand was the Spaniard Don Struttolando, and it was the
Don’s pursuit of the lovers that set up the helter-skelter trip around the
world: to Kamchatka, to the “Ice Islands”—Arctic or Antarctic does
not matter—to the Friendly Islands, to the Sandwich Islands, to Tahiti.
In Tahiti, the denouement took place. Omai was rescued from
Oberea’s evil spirit. Her famous palace was burned down. Omai was
installed as king. Then to Matavai, “the Great Bay of Otaheite,” came
a procession of all the peoples of the Pacific islands that Captain Cook
discovered or visited—Tahitians, New Zealanders, Tannans, Marque-
sans, Tongans, Hawaiians, Easter Islanders—and Tehutzki Tartars,
Kamchatkars, Eskimos, Indians of Nootka, Oonalaski, and Prince
William Sound. They acclaimed Omai as King. “Know all that Omai
is the master of fifty red feathers, master of four hundred fat hogs; he
can command a thousand fighting men and twenty strong handed
women to thump him to sleep!” An English captain steps forward and
gives a sword to Omai.
Captain: Accept from mighty George our Sovereign Lord
In sign of British love, this British sword.
Oberea: Oh joy! Away my useless spells and magic charms
A British sword is proof against the world in arms.
Captain: Ally of Joy! Owhyee’s (Footnote: The island where
Captain Cook was killed) fatal shore
Brave Cook, your great Orono (Footnote: A Demigod or
hero and distinguished title with which the natives hon-
ored Captain Cook) is no more.
Indians: Mourn, Owhyee’s fatal shore
For Cook, our great Orono, is no more! (O’Keeffe 1785)
At that moment the huge painting of the Apotheosis of Captain
Cook began to descend on the stage. Cook, looking a little anxious it
has to be admitted, was in the clouds over Kealakekua Bay where he
had been killed and was being crowned by Britannia and Fame. The
voices of the peoples welled into a great chorus:
Ye chiefs of the ocean your laurels throw by
Or cypress entwine with a wreath.
To prove your humanity, heave a soft sigh
128 Dynamics of Contact—Possessing Others
And a tear now let fall for his death!
Yet the Genius of Britain forbids us to grieve
Since Cook ever honour’d immortal shall live.
The hero of Macedon ran o’er the world
Yet nothing but death could he give
’Twas George’s command and the sail was unfurl’d
and Cook taught mankind how to live.
He came and he saw, not to conquer but to save
The Caesar of Britain was he:
Who scorn’d the conditions of making a slave
While Britons themselves are so free
Now the Genius of Britain forbids us to grieve
Since Cook ever honour’d immortal shall live
(O’Keeffe 1785)
It is a folly at such a distance and with such sparse evidence to say
what was happening, what social realities were being established by
these dramaturgies. Let me say what occurs to me. I think that, in the
ambience of entertainment, mood and meaning were reduced to sim-
plicities. In “Omai” the absurdities and make-believe of the panto-
mime were blown away by the reality of the truth of the last scene.
With music and chorused voices and staged solemnity to set the soul
aquiver, the humanism of Civilization was set beside the quaintness
of the Other. In that humanism was known the benignity of power,
the good intentions of the end that will justify the means. It was (as it
always is) the realisms of empire that properly bound Native and
Stranger together. On the other hand, the Natives were more quaint
than threateningly different. There was the quiet put-down of the new
“King” Omai’s power in fifty red feathers, four hundred hogs, and
twenty thumping women. But the unreal quaintness of kings-who-are-
not-really-kings was set in an entertainment in which the audience was
convinced it was watching a science of reality. Director Loutherbourg’s
talent was to make illusions realistic. The whole night long the audi-
ence saw the mildly make-believe and ahistorical persons—Omai,
Oberea, Otoo, Oedidee—clothed in the realisms of their environment
—their houses, their ornamentation, their sacred places, their exotic
customs, their language. And the realisms of this unfamiliar environ-
ment were made the more certain by the realism of more familiar
environment—of Kensington, of Margate, of Plymouth; that is why
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the audience could come away certain that they had been at a “school
for the history of man,” when in the history of men and women the
pantomime was an extravagant hocus-pocus.
* * *
I tell Purea’s story as if the events of the past are disconnected with
the present, as if our meeting with Purea was somehow direct. We
know that is not so, of course, but we are adept in seeing the past “as
if” it were unmediated by its relics. Like physicists who see through
the material qualities of the world around them to its nuclear struc-
ture, like botanists who see the classification of a tree, not the poetry
of it, we too, by tone and tense and supportive agreement make “as
if” we are in touch with the past. The ambiguities are too many, the
lateral pursuits too frequent, the operational judgments too complex
for us to be anything but pragmatic. It is the present with which we
are in touch. The past is mediated to us by all the inventions that have
happened in between.
Purea and the whole context of her life comes to us through a
chain of inventions and possessions by an infinite number of Strangers
and by Purea’s own Native descendants, who in time became Strangers
to her as well. The inventions of the Strangers came by way of their
own historical reconstruction and out of many references, direct and
indirect, made by later seamen and missionaries. Mostly these were a
jigsaw of references to Tahitian men and women connected to Purea
by marriage and descent. Much of it was in the way of reflections by
the likes of Cook, Forster, and Bligh, correcting the misinterpretations
of one another. Its history, like all history’s inventions, were made by
what has been called colligation—the drawing together of the bits and
pieces of many pasts of many discoveries (Oliver 1974; Beaglehole
1967; Gunson 1963; Newbury 1967a, 1967b, 1980; Rose 1978;
Green 1968).
Among the many little inventions of Purea, however, there has been
one large one. It came a hundred years after her death, and it came
from an unexpected pen, that of Henry Adams, American historian.
Wounded by his wife’s suicide, inspired by Robert Louis Stevenson’s
wanderings in the Pacific, Adams arrived in Tahiti in 1891. There he
was more bored than enchanted, but in his last days as he looked for
a ship to get away he met with an old woman of nearly seventy years,
Arii Taimai. He met her, as it chanced, at the ceremonial opening of a
bridge. The bridge had been built with the stones of the dismantled
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marae Mahaiatea, the sacred place that Amo and Purea had built for
their son in 1767–1768 in the days of their high ambitions. The old
woman was pleasantly garrulous, full of the legends her father had
taught her. Arii Taimai was of the Teva clan. Her great-grandfather
had been Amo’s brother. For days on end in 1891 Arii Taimai talked
to Henry Adams through the interpreter, her daughter Marau.
Later in America Henry Adams, speaking in Arii Taimai’s voice,
wrote of Purea: “If a family must be ruined by a woman, perhaps it
may as well be ruined thoroughly and brilliantly by a woman who
makes it famous.” As the Teva clan remembered her, Purea upset
proprieties by demanding acknowledgment of her social superiority
in symbolic ways. Her son, a boy of eight or nine in 1767, was the
most highly titled person in Tahiti, the possessor of both the maro
ura and maro tea. In their polity, Tahitians had no difficulty in distin-
guishing the deference they owed to higher titles and the deference
they owed to the politically dominant. Deference to high titles they
paid at the sacred places of these titles, at the Taputapuatea in the case
of titles that were owed sacrifice. Deference to political dominance
they showed in submissive ceremony to symbols of extended authority.
Submission ceremonies surrounded the acknowledgment of some sign
of dominance as it was processed around the island. Political power
was expressed not so much by the person and the presence of the arii
as by the extension of his person in his symbols and by his messengers.
It was acknowledged by gift and sacrifice. Purea’s downfall occurred
over her effort to equate the titled dominance of her son with the
political dominance of herself and Amo. As the Teva told it, it was an
affair of women. Purea in building the marae Mahaiatea imposed a
rahui—a prohibition on food and behavior that was the right of arii
rahi alone to impose. To obey it was to acknowledge superiority. Two
women, a sister and a brother’s wife to Purea, challenged the rahui by
paying formal visits to Purea. These formal visits demanded hospitality
and therefore the lifting of the rahui between equals. The rift that fol-
lowed Purea’s refusal to acknowledge the women’s equality and raise
the rahui was said to be the cause of battle and then of the defeat of
Purea that followed (Adams 1947:44).
Different sources put the matter differently. After the investiture of
Teri-i-reree at Mahaiatea, Amo and Purea were said to have demanded
the ceremonial submission that came with the procession of symbols
around the island. Submission by the Seaward Teva was refused and
in the battles that followed, Amo and Purea were defeated and the
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maro ura of Teri-i-reree moved to a new (but older) sacred place in
Ahuru. This attempt by Amo and Purea to establish political hege-
mony over the whole island of Tahiti followed the Tahitian possession
of the Wallis flag and its incorporation into a maro ura. The sources
say quite explicitly that it was not the British jack that was paraded
around the island but some other symbol. The most knowledgeable
of modern historians of ancient Tahiti, Douglas Oliver, says that he
favors the view that the British flag was incorporated in an already
existing maro ura. It is, let there be no doubt, a question of guess and
probability. Let me invent another sort of past out of what I see as a
different set of likelihoods (Oliver 1974:1221–1235).
The maro with the British colors was a new symbol. Descriptions
of those who saw it say it was made of both red and yellow feathers,
not just the red of the maro ura or the yellow white of the maro tea.
There is a logic in the combined colors that says that this maro had
the qualities of all the others. The drawing Bligh made of it showed
the bunting to be at one end. It seems finished. The rounded tassels
that were essential to the sacred wrap were attached to the bunting.
If the bunting had been added to an existing maro, one would expect
twenty years of sacrifices (1767–1788) to have enclosed the bunting
with lappets of feathers. Let us say that the British flag, possessed by
the Tahitians in the context of their ‘Oro beliefs and seen by them as
a symbol of political dominance and sovereignty after their violent
disaster, was taken by the people of Amo and Purea to Papara. There
it was constructed into a maro ura (the term is used generically by
the Tahitians as well as specifically) that symbolized a different sort
of title to a different sort of sovereignty.
Their translation was certainly some extension of the potentialities
of their own symbol system. It was neither a totally new nor a totally
old way of doing things. This new maro ura was in itself a history of
the first Native encounter with the Stranger. It was a document, a text
to be read by those with immediate knowledge of its meaning. It gave
institutional continuity with all the structures and roles of its preser-
vation and its ritual re-presentation. Perhaps Amo and Purea had al-
ready begun to build their new marae Mahaiatea before the Dolphin
had arrived. Perhaps the new maro demanded a special place. Cer-
tainly Mahaiatea was grander and more ambitious than any other
sacred site on Tahiti and could have been something new for some-
thing new. The procession around the island demanded submission
to a new sort of authority. That the Wallis flag itself was not processed
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is of little significance. They had only one flag. When they possessed
more than one flag they did process with it, as they did at Pomare II’s
investiture. When they had several flags they attached them as well to
their most sacred vessels, such as Rainbow, ‘Oro’s canoe. It makes
sense to see the British possessing Tahiti in their flag and their violence,
and Purea inventing an interpretive document of those events and
making it symbolic of the new hegemony she claimed.
Possessing Tahiti was a complicated affair. Indeed, who possessed
whom? Native and Stranger each possessed the other in their interpre-
tations of the other. They possessed one another in an ethnographic
moment that got transcribed into text and symbol. They each archived
that text and symbol in their respective cultural institutions. They each
made cargo of the things they collected from one another, put their
cargo in their respective museums, remade the things they collected
into new cultural artifacts. They entertained themselves with their his-
tories of their encounter. Because each reading of the text, each dis-
play of the symbol, each entertainment in the histories, each viewing
of the cargo enlarged the original encounter, made a process of it,
each possession of the other became a self-possession as well. Possess-







Stories of the first encounters between Europeans and the indigenous
peoples of Papua New Guinea have had a particular fascination for
both Europeans and Papua New Guineans alike. To the Western
popular imagination, these accounts are contained in stories of
exploratory expeditions moving into unknown regions beyond the
borders of “civilization.” In these tales, the explorers, after suffering
hardship and danger, come upon hidden valleys that hold promise of
wealth in valuable resources and are populated by exotic peoples who
have never seen Europeans before.
To the indigenous people of Papua New Guinea, on the other hand,
the arrival of the first outsiders is usually recalled as an exciting but
deeply unsettling event of apparently cosmological import: Strange
Beings broke into their world from outside its known horizons. Some-
times these Beings were thought to be the return of the ancestral dead
or of mythical heroes coming back to the lands of their origin (Con-
nolly and Anderson 1983; Wagner 1979a). The people were filled with
astonishment, fear, and wonder. Sometimes they decided that the
arrival of the strangers was the portent of dire world upheaval.
These encounters derive many of their special qualities from the
fact that they were not encounters between individuals but between
cultural systems. First contact in Papua New Guinea was always a
matter of comparatively large, complexly structured expeditions en-
countering organized communities of people living in their normal
region. Each expedition brings along its own cultural context, em-
This chapter is drawn from material in Chapters 1, 10, and 11 of Like People You
See in a Dream, edited by Edward Schieffelin and Robert Crittenden (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1991).
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bodied in its purposes and internal organization, and it is this that
comes to bear on the encounter. The group provides a reference point
and support system for its members and has a much greater capac-
ity to maintain its own perspectives and carry out its purposes in
the face of opposition. In effect, it is a community that confronts a
community.
These encounters, however dramatic, were in turn the outcome of
particular historical conditions. The exploratory journeys of Austra-
lian patrol officers into the interior of Papua during the 1920s and
1930s were motivated by the desire to locate undiscovered natural
resources (such as gold or petroleum), to open new regions to the
sphere of Western political and economic influence, and to bring
Western civilization and the rule of law to people generally regarded
at the time as primitive savages. The cultural-historical situations of
the Papuan peoples they encountered varied according to the nature
of their particular cultures and their local social and political circum-
stances. Although many Papuans regarded the first patrols in cosmo-
logical terms as coming from outside the human realm, what they
thought the encounter meant and how they reacted to it was also
conditioned by local history of alliances and animosities and the gen-
eral social and political situation among them at the time.
This chapter focuses on one of the last modern-day experiences of
first culture contact. The Strickland-Purari patrol was one of the final
great expeditions of tropical exploration in the Pacific. It was orga-
nized and dispatched by the Papuan colonial administration in 1935
to examine the vast, remote tract of unknown country between the
Strickland and Purari Rivers, now known as the Southern Highlands.
Headed by two Australian patrol officers, Jack Hides and Jim
O’Malley, the party consisted of forty Papuan carriers and police.
The expedition left Daru on the Gulf of Papua on January 1, 1935,
and headed inland up the Fly and Strickland Rivers by steam launch
and then canoe. Reaching the limits of navigation 650 km (385 mi)
inland in the middle of February, they abandoned the canoes and pro-
ceeded on eastward through the tropical forest on foot. Weeks later,
crossing a remote mountain barrier, they emerged into the grassland
valleys of the Papuan highlands. There they encountered a large and
hitherto unsuspected population—peoples who had never seen Euro-
peans before and who were still using a technology of stone. The first
groups they encountered received them warily. As the patrol proceeded
southeastward along the Waga Valley and the Nembi Plateau, the
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local people became increasingly unfriendly. The patrol ran out of
supplies near the site of present-day Nipa, and the local people refused
to sell them food. Shortly thereafter, patrol officer Hides became seri-
ously ill. Hungry and increasingly beleaguered by aggressive warriors,
the expedition eventually had to resort to rifle fire to force its way
through to the Erave River and the Samberigi Valley. There they found
a native trade route to the coast and finally emerged, exhausted and
starving, at the government station at Kikori on June 18, 1935.
During the journey the patrol suffered tremendous hardship. Forced
to fight for their survival, Hides and O’Malley reported that they and
their police killed at least thirty-two men in skirmishes along the way.
The patrol itself lost two carriers and a policeman to sickness and
starvation. In the four months since they had left the Strickland, they
had passed through more than 1,800 km (1,100 mi) of country un-
known to Europeans and discovered extensive populations whose cul-
tures were quite different from those of the peoples hitherto known
in Papua.
The Strickland-Purari Patrol
The killing of more than thirty people by a single patrol had
not been seen in Papua since the days of punitive expeditions under
the administrations of MacGregor and LeHunt back at the turn of
the century. Subsequent patrols into the Tari Basin and the Waga and
Nembi Valleys a few years later encountered difficulties from time to
time, but they never experienced the level of persistent harassment and
bloodshed involved in the Strickland-Purari patrol. In fact, violence
and treachery were unusual in most first-contact situations in Papua.
What, then, happened with this expedition?
Perhaps the single most significant factor affecting the Strickland-
Purari patrol was that, unlike subsequent patrols through the area,
Hides and O’Malley had to operate for the last month of their jour-
ney under conditions of near starvation. In part, this was the result of
two crucial miscalculations. The first was that Hides abandoned half
his supplies on the Papuan Plateau before he ever entered the high-
lands. At the time, this was a calculated risk. Following a hostile brush
with local Etoro warriors, Hides wished to reduce exposure of his
carriers to ambush as they relayed the rice through the tropical forest.
He expected on the basis of his experience that he would be able to
trade for food from local populations he met farther down the line.
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For various reasons, this expectation was not realized and the patrol
eventually had a severe shortage of food.2
The hunger of the patrol was aggravated by their physical exhaus-
tion. When Hides and O’Malley arrived in the highlands amidst the
Huli people, they and their men were worn out from three months of
hard travel. Their situation might be compared to that of Champion
and Adamson on the Bamu-Purari patrol a year later. Champion and
Adamson arrived on the southern portion of the Papuan Plateau after
three months of hard travel in about the same condition that Hides
arrived in the highlands: exhausted and with their men beginning to
show symptoms of beriberi. Unlike in the highlands, however, the
local population was sparse, and they preferred to hide in the forest
rather than confront the patrol. Though timid, they were familiar
with the use of steel and eventually proved willing to trade pigs and
garden produce for it. Under these circumstances, Champion was
able to rest his patrol for two weeks at the hamlet of Ewelo and
allow his men to recuperate. Hides and O’Malley did not have this
luxury. They emerged in the highlands to find themselves amidst a
heavy population of assertive and warlike people unfamiliar with
steel and unwilling to accept it as trade. The standoffish attitude of
the Hulis and their reluctance to sell any food meant that the patrol
had to keep moving.
Once in the highlands the Strickland-Purari patrol had so little rice
that it became almost entirely dependent on the local people for
food. Hides was an experienced officer and this was not the first time
he had faced this kind of situation, but the difficulty in obtaining sup-
plies for his men in this case was unusual. The most common expla-
nation for Hides’ difficulty points up his second miscalculation: The
patrol was carrying steel axes for trade rather than mother-of-pearl
shell, which was what the highlands people wanted. Indeed, some
highlands informants, recalling the lack of this item, thought the
patrol had brought no trade goods at all. The lack of pearl shell in
turn exacerbated the effects of other factors.
In the Huli region, people lived in dispersed farmsteads and many
who visited the patrol’s camps came from some distance away. They
did not own the gardens in the immediate vicinity of the camp and
could not sell food from them even if they had wished to. Further on,
the Nembi frequently suffered chronic food shortages because gardens
were often destroyed in their constant fighting; they may not have
had much food to eat themselves. In other places one gets the impres-
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sion that the people did not sell food to the patrol because they
feared it and wanted it to go away (Etoro, Onabasulu). Elsewhere,
when the patrol was manifesting clear signs of exhaustion, illness,
and starvation, the warriors may have refused to sell them food in
hopes of weakening them further (Wola, Nembi).
The absence of pearl shell had a further consequence for the
Strickland-Purari patrol. Without it, Hides and O’Malley had very
limited means of forming a common ground for friendly relations
with the local tribesmen, which undoubtedly contributed to the em-
battled nature of their passage through the highlands. No subsequent
patrol experienced this degree of harassment. In part this may be
because the warriors had learned about firearms from Hides and
O’Malley’s police and so were reluctant to enter an armed confronta-
tion with later patrols. But that is not the whole story.
Hides and O’Malley were attacked for several different reasons.
At least twice the patrol was mistaken for an enemy raiding party. At
other times hostility may have resulted from resentment over police
and carriers filching from gardens. Unlike any subsequent patrols,
however, Hides and O’Malley and their men were hungry and weak
and ill. Treachery is unusual (on first contact), O’Malley later ex-
plained, “but here it was different; here were sick and starving men.
[We] were just bait for the taking. . . . These people realized the posi-
tion we were in and although they had plenty of food, they did not
give it to us; . . . they waited for us to drop” (Sinclair, personal corre-
spondence). The Huli, Wola, and Nembi were, moreover, hardened
to violence and scornful of weakness. They were used to responding
aggressively to something they feared if they thought they could get
away with it. The weakened physical condition of the patrol seri-
ously compromised its ability to project the appearance of men who
could handle themselves competently in the face of force. It invited
harassment by warriors seeking to locate its vulnerable points. There
is no contradiction between informants’ recollections that they were
frightened of the patrol and the conviction of Hides and O’Malley
that the tribesmen perceived their weakness and deliberately attempted
to prey upon it.
Jack Hides had always found it natural and easy to form good
relations with Papuans he knew on the coast, and he was confident
he could do the same with Papuans he met anywhere. Handling first-
contact situations required a certain skill. An officer patrolling into
new country had to project a calm, confident, and reassuring manner
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in the presence of excited, frightened, and wary people—and be able
to stand his ground with restraint in the face of hostile demonstra-
tions. Jack Hides had these qualities. He knew that the people he met
had never seen Europeans before, that they sometimes thought he
and his men were not beings of this world.
Unfortunately, he seems not always to have been able to apply this
insight usefully. Hides liked Papuans and seems to have extended
himself to them with a real, personal warmth. And he expected,
assuming the patrol had done nothing provocative or threatening, that
once the immediate shock of surprise and fear had been allayed and
some gifts perhaps distributed, the local people would relax and offer
hospitality and friendly treatment in return. If, despite all this, war-
riors refused his friendly overtures and gifts; or if they first seemed
friendly and later turned hostile; or if they tried to direct the patrol
along impossible paths or lead it into ambush, Hides didn’t always
see this as a frightened people’s attempts to keep Strange Beings away
from their lands and families. Rather, he tended to take it as treachery
and deceit—a betrayal of his offers of friendship. It was as if, in
extending personal warmth to new peoples in the process of peaceful
contact, there was too little distance between his professional activity
and his romantic imagination: between the procedure for making
peaceful contact and the personal warmth and outgoingness that he
naturally extended in the effort. As a result, he often responded with
anger and resentment to what he saw as native perfidy rather than
with gestures aimed at calming and reassuring excited, fearful, and
uncertain people.
To add to the complications, the patrol often received strikingly
different receptions from one group to another, especially among the
Wola and Nembi peoples. Some groups greeted him with openness
and generosity, others with arrows and hostile demonstrations. The
fragmented political organization and constant warfare among neigh-
boring alliances inclined Nembi and Wola to be suspicious of or
alarmed by unknown parties approaching from adjacent territories,
especially if it was from the direction of present enemies. But these
social and political implications of the patrol’s movement do not seem
to have occurred to Hides.
Newly contacted people often didn’t know what the patrol was or
where it came from. Most believed that it was from the cosmological
peripheries of their worlds, such as the land of the dead, or that its
members were fierce and capricious spirits (Huli), sky people (Wola
and Nembi), or ancestral ghosts (Kewa). Most felt initial astonishment
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and fear toward the patrol. All felt it was a potentially dangerous un-
known to be approached warily. Beyond this they were also consumed
with curiosity, though they acted in different ways. The Etoro and
Onabasulu of the Papuan Plateau fled into the forest after a brief
confrontation and left the patrol largely alone to pass through their
countries unmolested. Among the Huli, the local politics of influence
played a significant part. Established leaders tried to head the dan-
gerous dama spirits away from their domains, while an ambitious
younger man following another traditional scenario attempted to form
an alliance with the dama to gain power for his own ends. A common
response from all the peoples the patrol encountered was to follow it
along the route partly out of curiosity, sometimes trying to offer it
gifts of food, at other times probing its vulnerabilities to see what it
would do, or simply harassing it to keep it moving along out of their
territory. Occasionally they attempted outright attack. Harassment
increased as the patrol passed through the Wola country and was
especially severe among the Nembi, who pressed harder as they per-
ceived the patrol to be increasingly debilitated and weak. Hides’
response was always to keep moving, to avoid areas of heavy popula-
tion, to fire warning shots if warriors approached too close, and to
shoot the warriors themselves if they attacked or seemed about to in
a dangerous situation.
The locals’ refusal to sell food likewise seemed to have several
sources. The Etoro and Onabasulu feared that accepting gifts in ex-
change from supernatural strangers would bring about some kind of
world disaster. Some Huli (mostly leaders) felt the same—that the
strange (metal) objects offered would be somehow harmful. Whether
or not they were short of food, the Wola and the Nembi charged out-
rageous prices. Like many peoples along a trade route, they were
experienced bargainers and exacted high prices even among them-
selves. But they may also have inflated the price because the patrol
seemed desperate and vulnerable and they thought they could get
away with it. They certainly did this to later patrols through the area
(see Lake Kutubu PR 9, 1938–1939). In any case, nothing the patrol
was carrying was perceived as sufficiently valuable for them to go
out of their way to trade for.
The Dynamics of Conflict
In the early part of its journey, when the patrol had just
arrived in the highlands, it presented the Huli people with a relatively
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confident, well-organized, and friendly aspect, consistent with the
guidelines for peaceful engagement laid down by the Australian
Papuan administration. The Huli, taken by surprise, frightened, and
uncertain as to how to handle the situation, presented themselves as
wary, standoffish warriors who tried to manipulate the patrol in vari-
ous ways to neutralize (or utilize) its powerful presence in their midst.
When the patrol arrived in the Kewa country several weeks later, how-
ever, it had been through nearly a month of starvation and hostility
among the Wola and Nembi and was expecting to deal with more of
the same. The Kewa, self-confident from recent success in war and
apparently curious and excited by the arrival of the patrol, presented
a relatively open and hospitable aspect to their visitors. They were
confronted with an exhausted, beleaguered group of men, reduced to
garden thievery, whose leaders, sapped by illness and hunger, were
now primarily focused on survival while a vengeful police contingent
were spoiling to take out their resentment on the local people. Hides
by this time was severely ill and the stress of weeks of constant travel
and harassment had impaired his judgement. His by now exaggerated
expectations of native treachery and attack and the desperate condi-
tion of the patrol led him to misperceive the Kewa’s intent and
allowed his police to open fire on them on two occasions, resulting in
seven or eight Kewa deaths.
This tragedy highlights the transformation in the relative position-
ing of the patrol in relation to the highlanders and demonstrates the
degree to which the encounter was more than a matter of structures
of cultural difference. The particular (culturally constituted) appear-
ance that the patrol presented in its encounters during the journey
was continually changing in relation to the events of the encounters
themselves. The expedition thus provides a perspective on first en-
counters that does not easily emerge from accounts in which histori-
cally the explorers always remain in control of the situation or in
which the events are seen too simply in terms of fixed cultural con-
trasts and relations of domination.
It is in fact partly because the Strickland-Purari patrol had such a
difficult time and so many things went wrong that it is so instructive
as an example of the process of exploration and first contact. When
things run smoothly, it is often harder to see important subtleties and
subplots of the process going on beneath the government officer’s
projection of supreme competence.
Patrols in the Papuan Service always tried to assume the upper
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hand in dealing with the Papuans wherever they went, by never allow-
ing Papuans to think a patrol was vulnerable. Patrols were better
armed than local Papuans, had more disciplined organization, and
were under the command of experienced leaders drawn from a power-
ful, complex society bent on expanding its hegemony. Their purposes,
methods, and goals were precisely spelled out. Patrols that followed
Hides and O’Malley in later years always carried sufficient food and
the right trade to ensure that they would never be in a position of
dependency in relation to the people they encountered. This situation
of power and dependency was inverted for Hides and represented an
anomalous situation for the highlanders he met. The Beings they
feared were clearly hungry and weak. It was a situation calculated to
bring out the most arrogant and abrasive aspects of the local war-
riors. At the same time, the patrol was still powerfully armed, and
this could potentially bring out the worst in the officers or police. Al-
though it is a tribute to Hides’ leadership that the patrol was able to
maintain restraint as well as it did, the situation reveals how the
stresses (as well as strengths) inherent in the organization of adminis-
tration patrols affected their behavior and illustrates the kinds of
ambiguities local highlanders felt they faced (and that they also pro-
jected) in their own attempts to gain control of the situation and deal
with the intruders into their domain.
Australian Reactions
After the expedition, while Hides and O’Malley were still in
Port Moresby writing up their report, news of the Strickland-Purari
patrol arrived in Australia. The discovery of an unknown land of
carefully cultivated valleys hidden in the interior vastness of the
Papuan mountains—peopled by allegedly light-skinned men wearing
flower-bedecked wigs—naturally intrigued the popular imagination.
The newspapers lost no time in picturing this as a new Arcadia and
lighting it with a blaze of publicity.
It was not only the Australian newspapers that romanticized
Hides’ and O’Malley’s expedition. Hides contributed to the process
himself. During his hectic schedule of appearances and lectures in
Australia after the expedition,3 he was hard at work editing his patrol
report into the book Papuan Wonderland. With some pruning of
events here, some heightening of the drama there, a paragraph or
two of philosophical reflection in appropriate places, he molded the
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overall effect of the narrative more cleanly to the genre of romantic
adventure story that he thought it represented.
In the process, Hides couldn’t resist mythologizing himself a bit.
He downplayed his feelings of exasperation at the people he encoun-
tered and presented himself as rather more high-minded than he actu-
ally had been on patrol. In a favorite image that appears several times
in the book, Hides pictured himself standing on some high promon-
tory gazing out over newly discovered country and reflecting on its
beauty, thinking of other great “outside men” who had gone before
him to such regions as these or envisioning a future when the tropical
forest would be tamed and planted in grain. In Papuan Wonderland
(no less than in the newspapers), Jack Hides, patrol officer, becomes
Jack Hides, Hero of the Quest.
Compared to most Australians in Papua at the time, Hides would
have been labeled a “liberal.” Although brought up largely in a nar-
row colonial milieu, his imagination had been inspired by Papua’s un-
explored wilderness and exotic peoples. He loved Papua and its
peoples deeply. His writings are remarkable for their ability to com-
municate an intimate feeling for Papuan life, to evoke a sympathetic
interest in its character and concerns. He genuinely liked Papuans and
wrote with appreciation of Papuan men of courageous, generous, and
straightforward character whom he met, whether members of the
constabulary or warriors from the interior.
Nevertheless, Hides clearly shared the Australian administration’s
view of the inferiority of traditional Papuan culture (though he did
think it had value), and he felt a liberal colonialist’s paternalistic con-
cern toward Papuans themselves. Like many of Australian administra-
tion’s “outside men,” he believed in the essential moral and civilizing
mission of the Australian colonial administration to the people of
Papua.
In a notably racist colonial society, Hides’ attitudes were remark-
ably moderate. He paid some attention to skin color in his writings
and sometimes seemed to correlate it with levels of cultural advance-
ment. In an intriguing passage in Papuan Wonderland, he reflects
upon “the light-skinned people of the Tari Furoro” (the Huli), pictur-
ing them as representatives of an enlightened culture once dominant
over a wider region to the southeast, but now being driven back by
darker others, forced to retreat.
The finely woven wigs of human hair [throughout the Wola and
Nembi country]; the beautiful axes of stone; the extraordinary
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method of advanced cultivation; all, I am sure, originated with the
intelligent and artistic people of the Tari Furoro (the Huli). Possibly
at one time they inhabited the whole of this gigantic tableland [the
Waga Valley and Nembi Plateau] . . . and possibly the big Black
Papuans [the Wola, Nembi, and Kewa], better fighters and a more
virile type, entered somewhere from the east, to drive them contin-
ually back westwards across their roads and cultivations until today
we can only find them in their sanctuary up against Mt. Jubilee,
the Victor Emmanuel Range, and the great forbidding limestone
barrier that all form the sides of their Papuan Wonderland. Whence
came these pretty, light-skinned men is something that is not for
me to answer. (Hides 1936:154)
Like many of Hides’ ethnological speculations, this picture was
largely imaginary. The Huli are not noticeably lighter skinned than
other highlanders, are not relatively more artistic, and are certainly
not inferior fighters. Yet in this passage are gathered in a single roman-
ticized image all the contrasts—light- vs. dark-skinned, “civilized” vs.
barbaric, artistic vs. warlike, superior vs. inferior—that formed the
terms of racist discourse that preoccupied colonial Australians in
Port Moresby. Here, however, it was the Huli that played the white
man’s role in the colonial Australians’ worst fantasy: a light-skinned
community increasingly beleaguered by threatening blacks.
With Hides’ lecture tours and the impending publication of his
book, the publicity that surrounded him began to concern the Aus-
tralian Papuan administration. It was not good for the morale of the
Papuan Service, it was thought, to have one man singled out for undue
celebrity when many others could equally well have undertaken the
expedition—or had already done similar exemplary work and re-
mained unsung. According to Hides’ biographer, a number of officers
openly resented the attention Hides was getting. Some accused him
of deliberately seeking the limelight. Others said that theirs had always
been a “silent service.” The great patrols had always been carried out
with no fuss and no publicity, and Hides was transgressing this grand
tradition. Others perceptively noted, however, that the publicity sur-
rounding the Strickland-Purari patrol had finally put Papua on the
map by drawing world attention to this otherwise neglected corner of
empire. But clearly, the amount of publicity Hides had received was
becoming a source of embarrassment to the administration.
This was the general climate of feeling in Port Moresby to which
Hides returned in January 1936 after his leave in Australia and the
writing of Papuan Wonderland. Hides was a sensitive man, and he
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was deeply wounded by the cool reception given to him by many
officers he knew and respected in the Papuan Service. He became
moody and depressed (Sinclair 1969:185). He was posted to Misima
as assistant resident magistrate. On the way there, he learned that the
administration had passed a regulation prohibiting officers of the
Papuan Service from privately publishing any information gained
about the country gathered in the course of their official duties (see
Sinclair 1988:196). Hides felt this regulation had been aimed specifi-
cally at him. He plunged deeper into depression and began drinking
so heavily that after a few weeks he was sent “in” for medical atten-
tion. He was given three months’ sick leave in Australia.
In the next few months, although he recovered his physical health,
Hides’ spirits remained very low. Despite praise heaped by reviewers
upon Papuan Wonderland, which came out at this time, he remained
unhappy and resentful about his treatment by the administration.
When his leave drew to an end, he resigned from the Papuan Service.
In June 1938, his health still not recovered from the effects of
various hardships subsequent to the expedition, now exacerbated by
alcohol, Hides contracted a severe case of pneumonia. Three days later
he was dead. He was just short of thirty-two years old.
His companion on the Strickland-Purari patrol, Jim O’Malley, con-
tinued to serve as an officer in the Australian colonial administration
until he retired at the rank of district officer. He died in 1975, the same
year Papua New Guinea became an independent nation.
Papuan Reactions
The dramatic and often uncanny quality first contact seems
to have had for many Papuans—and the challenge it potentially offers
to their traditional assumptions and beliefs about the nature of the
world—raises the question of what kind of lasting impact it may have
had on their social experience. Objectively, of course, first contact was
the harbinger of the (often extensive) social, political, and economic
changes that followed as tribal peoples were brought under adminis-
tration control. However, we are focusing on a different issue: To what
extent did the experience of first contact itself affect the worldview of
the Papuans who encountered the patrol, influence their understand-
ing of their subsequent history, or affect their self-perception?
Of all the groups the Strickland-Purari patrol encountered, the most
profound effects of first contact for subsequent revaluation of self and
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history are exemplified among the Huli. Here, however, it was not
Hides’ and O’Malley’s patrol but another expedition that had visited
the region a few months before that had the major impact. The Fox
brothers were gold prospectors who first appeared in Huli country
near a Huli sacred site called Gelote. The Huli regarded their passage
across the Tari Basin as the escape of capricious dama spirits from
Gelote into the world and regarded the event as the cause of the
plague of troubles that subsequently descended upon them. (Hides
and O’Malley were themselves seen as such damas.) These ideas were
incorporated within the perspective of overall world decline already
present in traditional Huli ritual (dindi gamu) lore, which was in part
geared to restoring a legendary past prosperity. Thus reinforced, dindi
gamu lore continued to shape Huli perspectives on events throughout
the time of increasing contact, government consolidation, and expan-
sion of missionary efforts. Although missionary efforts eventually suc-
ceeded in destroying the dindi gamu ritual complex, they have not
deeply affected the dindi gamu outlook on life—which continues to
contribute nostalgia and fuel dissatisfaction in the Huli understand-
ing of the changes in their political and economic situation up to the
present.
The cultural understandings and historical reverberations of first
contact experience were far reaching for the Huli. What is interesting,
however, is that the first-contact situation among many of the people
Hides and O’Malley encountered seems to have had hardly any
historical reverberation at all. If we look at the reasons for this, it
seems that there is a positive dynamic involved in the failure of cul-
tural assimilation of experience and that the social disorganization of
knowledge may play an important part with historical memory and
its effectiveness in a nonliterate culture.
One set of complexities has to do with the processes involved
when historical activities and cultural structures do not easily articu-
late with one another. If we focus on the cultural aspects, it is clear
that while a people’s cultural views shape their perceptions of histor-
ical situations, the events of first contact may not always fit as easily
into every people’s key cosmological understandings as they did for
the Huli. In other words, how resonant the events of first contact are
likely to be for a people’s postcontact history and self-perception
depends to some degree on the centrality and importance of the cul-
tural or cosmological ideas in terms of which they are understood.
The situation may be illustrated by the example of the Bosavi en-
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counter with Champion and Adamson’s Bamu-Purari patrol of 1936.
The Bosavis regarded Champion and Adamson as beings from Helebe,
the mysterious source of steel axes beyond the peripheries of their
known world to the south. They principally remember the patrol for
how frightened they were of it and for the large number of steel axes
and pearl shells it distributed. But the significance of the story seems
to go little further than that. They do not link it with the passage of
Hides and O’Malley through the Onabasulu country nearby only a
year before. Indeed, even though Bosavis now realize that Helebe
was the first government patrol into their area, they do not associate
it closely with the later patrols that explored and consolidated the
region from the east (from Lake Kutubu). Rather, they tend to recall
the arrival of Helebe as a separate, dramatic, but rather isolated
event, a harbinger of things to come, perhaps, but not a precipitating
force. The point is that little in the story seems to have revalued later
thinking or action in regard to Europeans or the arrival of other large
distributions of wealth (the first mission airdrop, the money for the
second airstrip). This seems to be partly because, whereas the sacred
sites and damas were central to Huli cosmology, ritual activity, and
understanding of themselves, the notion of Helebe was peripheral to
Bosavi worldview and social concern.
The Bosavi encounter with Helebe suggested few implications for
new understandings of further historical developments or changing
worldview because Helebe itself played so little part in their ordinary
lives. Nor did subsequent historical events accomplish a significant
revaluation in the idea of Helebe itself in Bosavi cosmology. The
Bamu-Purari patrol was the only patrol that ever approached the
Bosavi region from the south, the direction of Helebe. If subsequent
patrols had continued to come from this direction and had continued
to be associated with Helebe, the idea of Helebe might gradually have
come to assume more importance in Bosavi thinking. Such historically
inspired changes in their worldview might then have more readily
affected their understanding of events of their postcontact history.
(For an example of this for the Wiru people near Pangia, see Clark,
forthcoming.)
If we shift our focus to the historical aspects of the first-contact
situation, we note that, even when the first-contact events are assimi-
lated by central ideas in the worldview, the eventual outcome of the
situation is subject to uncertainties of historical contingency. That is,
although a people’s central cosmological ideas may be involved in
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framing their perceptions of the experience, it may also happen that
subsequent historical events are so constituted that they disrupt or
displace this understanding or reframe it under another set of ideas.
This may bring about a new revaluation of the original contact expe-
rience or reduce its relevance to later historical perception.
This seems to be in part what happened among the Etoro and
Onabasulu. These people thought the Strickland-Purari patrol repre-
sented Spirit Beings approaching from the direction of the Road of
the Dead (Etoro) or returning to the Origin Place at Malaiya (Onaba-
sulu), both places of central importance in their cosmological land-
scape. Some feared that contact with these beings or acceptance of
their gifts would precipitate a world catastrophe. The Etoro in the
first instance tried to avert this disaster by confronting the patrol
and, when that failed, by avoiding it altogether. The Onabasulu of
Ogesiya, on the other hand, believed the Beings had been drawn to
the area following the trail of their wayward “children” (i.e., steel
axes and bushknives that had begun to filter into the area over the
previous decade). They gathered all the steel implements in the area
at Ogesiya with the intent of returning them so that the Beings would
leave before disaster struck. The patrol, however, far from reclaiming
its “children,” seemed inexplicably bent in leaving more of them
around. In general, the Etoro and Onabasulu attempted to neutralize
the impact of the patrol by their own activity. During its presence in
the area, no one came out to greet it, no gifts were accepted, no food
was offered or shared, and hence no obligations or connections were
left outstanding. There was little left that might (at least from the
Etoro/Onabasulu point of view) positively impel a connection between
this set of events and any later ones.
The next patrol to approach the region came from the south, the
direction of the Bosavi country, and was seen (by the Onabasulu) to
embody quite a different problem: It was accompanied by their tradi-
tional enemies the Namabolo (Fasu), bent on obtaining restitution
for a death. This was not a cosmological problem and the Onabasulu
fled for fear of being killed by their enemies or “taken away” by their
enemies’ strange allies from the government. This reaction had little
to do with their previous experience with Hides and O’Malley, and
no continuity was established between the two experiences. Later
patrols (also from a southerly direction) established peaceful relations,
and the Onabasulu, during the early contact period, came to view the
government as principally concerned with the forbidding of violence.
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Another factor determining whether the experience of first contact
changed local self-perception or gave particular direction to Papuan
understanding of subsequent historical developments was whether or
not the arrival of the newcomers engaged in any important scenario
of traditional action that incorporated them into the local cosmolog-
ical framework.
Among the Huli, dealing with fearsome and capricious dama in-
volved important ritual activities. The arrival of the “dama” required
them to do something, and the Fox Brothers became the reasons for
committed ritual action (i.e., pigs sacrificed) rather than simply re-
garded as subjects of amazement and speculation. It was precisely
through this ritual action that Hulis committed themselves to a par-
ticular version of what the events meant and set the direction of their
thinking for the course of their subsequent history.
On the Papuan Plateau, by contrast, there were no significant rit-
uals associated with such important features of the cosmological
geography as the downstream direction of the Road of the Dead (for
the Etoro) or the Onabasulu Origin Place at Malaiya. Consequently,
when the patrol passed through the area, it engaged no significant
ritual scenario that would positively commit the local people to one
understanding of the events over another. In the end, they didn’t
know what to think of it.
These examples might be taken to imply that the assimilating
scenarios must take the form of ritual activity, but there was no
necessity for this. In other places in the highlands the same cosmolog-
ical assimilation of the newcomers seems to have been accomplished
simply by trading with pearl shell. Among the people of the Waghi
Valley in the 1930s, trade in pearl shells was so bound up with
people’s sense of self and the constitution of social relationships that
trade in them by itself humanized the Leahy brothers and drew them
into the Waghi world (Strathern 1988). The same might have been
the case for the Strickland-Purari expedition had Hides been carrying
pearl shell.
Another set of factors affecting the impact of first contact on sub-
sequent history involves the perception of causal and temporal conti-
nuity between events and the way memories are preserved in the
local sociology of knowledge. One of the reasons peoples of the
Papuan Plateau see such a discontinuity between first contact and
subsequent government patrols is undoubtedly due to the long hiatus
that occurred between them. After first contact, the Bosavi and
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Onabasulu did not see another government patrol for sixteen and
eighteen years, respectively, whereas for the Etoro it was twenty-nine
years (1964), fully a generation: long enough for the initial experi-
ence to have faded into story. By comparison, the Huli received visits
from patrols every two or three years following first contact, keeping
the experience alive and relevant and developing its cosmological
implications and ideas. Today the Onabasulu speak of their experi-
ence with the Strickland-Purari patrol as a frightening, uncanny event
but not as a watershed one. The period of important changes for their
perception started with the second patrol to their area in 1953.
Finally, the impact of the experience of first contact on a people’s
understandings of their lives depends on the integrity of the social
distribution of knowledge. This complicates our Etoro/Onabasulu
example somewhat. Clearly, if a people’s perception of a set of events
is to continue to affect their understanding of their circumstances or
of themselves, the community of people who know about it or shared
the experience or for whom it is salient must remain to some degree
intact. If, through various circumstances, the group suffers serious
social disruption, becomes geographically dispersed, or is severely de-
populated, the salience of their shared experience becomes question-
able at the same time as the social distribution of their knowledge
becomes disorganized.
Both the Onabasulu and the Etoro have suffered significant de-
population due to epidemics in the early 1950s, and the remnants of
their populations have had to regroup in smaller, more mixed com-
munities. The result has been a social fragmentation of the memory
of the past and a reduced salience of such remembered events as first
contact as referring to a collective condition. Among the Etoro, there
was apparently no one living in 1970 who remembered anything in
detail about the Strickland-Purari patrol (Kelly 1977:26), and there
were only a few among the Onabasulu in 1976. The social disorgani-
zation of the memory of this event provides another reason why the
Etoro and Onabasulu experience with the Strickland-Purari patrol has
not had a more profound impact on their later perspective on their
history or themselves.
The Impact of First Contact
In the final analysis, the experience of the Strickland-Purari
patrol does not seem, by itself, to have had much lasting impact on
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the worldview of most of the Papuans it encountered. However, it
could arguably be said to have had one on the Euro-Australian civil-
ization from which it originated. Papuan Wonderland and Hides’
other books sold roughly twenty thousand copies—probably a greater
number than Papuan individuals who actually saw the patrol—and
were fairly widely read in England and America (Sinclair 1969:260).
Hides’ story of the patrol retains a respectable place in the mytho-
graphic literature of exploration and adventure. The images of hardy
explorers, tropical forests, cannibal warriors, and lost mountain
valleys fits comfortably into a familiar genre of real and romanticized
writing. Hides had been a patrol officer in part because he could not
get this sort of story out of his blood. Neither could his young readers.
His books inspired a generation of young Australians to sign up for
service as patrol officers in the colonial territories after World War II.
Beneath the adventurous surfaces of the story, Papuan Wonderland
resonated with favorite images and scenarios of the time and the
amour propre of Western culture generally. Hides’ wonder and excite-
ment over the discovery of the highlands populations evoked Western
nostalgia for an unspoiled primeval world beyond the peripheries of
civilization (cf. Rosaldo 1989). His general sympathy for Papuans
(despite frustration and exasperation with them) suggested an appeal-
ing nobility of character and a responsible legitimacy for the mission
of bringing Western civilization to the hinterland. His battles with
the Wola and Nembi suggested the suffering and sacrifice necessary
to bring this about—as well as confirming colonial stereotypes of
Papuans as dangerous savages requiring government control (a mes-
sage that was harder to draw from Champion and Adamson’s experi-
ence, as they had always remained in firm control of their situation).
All of this, in turn, drew its appeal from a still more fundamental
level. Through vicissitudes and narrow escapes, Hides (and O’Malley
as well) played out a scenario that is ever deeply enchanting to the
Western imagination: the Quest of the Hero. From this perspective,
the patrol is a version of an archetypal drama: the story of discovery
and achievement through journey into the unknown, the affirmation
of manly character through overcoming of formidable obstacles, the
goal achieved or the treasure won through courageous struggle. Hides
was himself captivated by these images, acted them out with creative
energy for most of his career, and ultimately fell victim to them.
It was Hides’ tragedy that his romantic imagination ultimately be-
trayed him. The tension between his romanticism and the expediencies
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that he was forced to play out on his patrol exemplifies the problems
posed by the Hero Quest as political practice. It was a tension that
Hides felt keenly and that made it difficult for him to accept emo-
tionally and to understand fully some of the situations he had to con-
front. As Hero he started out with the best of intentions but found
himself increasingly faced with frustration and a sense of betrayal
when the targets of his romantic embracement did not embrace back.
The Papuan Others repeatedly refused to play the role he assigned to
them, stubbornly retained their own agenda, and did not always share
his assumption of the possibility of friendly openness or expectation
of reciprocal good will.
Notes
1. For a fuller analysis of the Strickland-Purari patrol and an in-depth dis-
cussion of the narratological and historiographic problems this kind of recon-
struction entails, the reader is referred to Schieffelin and Crittenden (1991).
2. It is a simple exercise to estimate what difference it would have made if
the patrol had not abandoned half its food. Traveling at half ration and sup-
plementing with whatever they could obtain along the way, they could have
made it most of the way to the Erave River before running out of rice. This
would have brought them through the worst of the journey without undue
privation, to the threshold of the less hostile Kewa country.





It is generally agreed that Cook’s three voyages greatly enhanced the
economic and political power of Europe in the Pacific. But before
such power could be fully exercised, certain basic sciences and tech-
nologies, the efficient maidservants of power, had themselves to be
enhanced. Cook’s voyages advanced astronomy, navigation, and car-
tography or, as he might have put it, geographical science. But there
were other sciences of less direct concern to the Admiralty enhanced
by his voyages, and these contributed also in their time to European
domination in the Pacific—namely natural history, meteorology, and
the emergent science of ethnography.
Important advances were made in all these sciences continually
throughout the three voyages, but there were differences in emphasis.
The first voyage is the botanical voyage, par excellence, the second is
the meteorological voyage, and the third is the ethnographic voyage.
These changing emphases were owing largely, though not entirely,
to contingent factors. On the Endeavour voyage, Banks, Solander, and
Parkinson, with their interests centered on botany, made a powerful
team. On the second voyage, Cook himself, his astronomers Wales
and Bayly, the two Forsters, and William Hodges were all deeply inter-
ested in the changing conditions of wind and weather, light, and atmo-
sphere as they traversed vast sections of the southern oceans. By the
third voyage Cook had come to realize that both scientific and popular
A longer version of this chapter was published in Imagining the Pacific: In the Wake
of the Cook Voyages, by Bernard Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992),
193–221. Readers are encouraged to refer to this piece for its rich set of plates from
Cook’s third voyage.
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interest had shifted to the native peoples of the Pacific; to the nascent
science of ethnography.
All these sciences were descriptive sciences and depended greatly
upon the production of visual records. Historians, dazzled by the abil-
ities of men like Cook and Banks, have not done full justice to the
abilities of their supporting artists. Yet it was their work, in engraved
reproduction, that fashioned the images of the Pacific that etched
themselves deeply into the European mind. Words are often forgotten,
but images remain.
Yet none of the three professional artists—Parkinson, Hodges, nor
Webber—who traveled with Cook was trained for the enormous task
that confronted them. To have found and enlisted the versatility that
the portrayal of the Pacific and its peoples required would have been
impossible. Eighteenth-century art students were trained to fulfill spe-
cial requirements: to draw plants and animals for natural historians;
to draw maps and charts and topographic views for the army and the
navy; or, higher up the social ladder, to paint landscapes and por-
traits or even history paintings of memorable deeds from scripture or
the classics for Royal Academy audiences. But no one was trained to
do all these things.
So the demands the voyages placed on their artists were quite un-
precedented. It is surprising they coped as well as they did. The young
Sydney Parkinson was probably as good a botanical draftsman as any-
one practicing in England at that time. But with the death of the un-
fortunate Alexander Buchan, he had to cope with figure drawings as
well, something in which he had obviously no training. Hodges had
been trained superbly by Richard Wilson as a landscape painter, but
on the voyage he had to train himself to produce portraits.
John Webber never succeeded in reaching the kinds of aesthetic
quality that we find in the best of Hodges’ work, but he was better
trained for the job ahead of him than any of the others. He could put
his hand to anything. Navigational views, plants and animals, por-
traits, landscapes, and something rather new, a sequence of drawings
depicting historical events of the voyage. “We should be nowhere
without Webber,” John Beaglehole rightly observed, yet managed to
do him less than justice.
They were all quite young men when they enlisted with Cook: Par-
kinson, twenty-three; Hodges, twenty-eight; Webber, twenty-four; and
all in poor circumstances. One gains the impression that the Admiralty
was not greatly interested in the appointment of professional artists
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to its ships. Had it not been for the continuing influence of men like
Banks and Solander, professionals like Hodges and Webber might
never have been employed.
In our catalog of the artwork of the third voyage, Rüdiger Joppien
and I have itemized and described over four hundred drawings made
by Webber that relate to the voyage. What I should like to do here is
consider that body of work as a whole. What kinds of drawings were
made? Is there a consistent program of work being followed? Were
there constraints on Webber, and how did they operate?
As to Webber himself there was the hope, innocent enough, that
he would eventually be able to distinguish himself with “images of
novelties.” But he was in Cook’s service, and it is to Cook’s percep-
tion of the uses that he could make of Webber’s skills that we must
turn if we are to understand the visual program of work undertaken.
Cook was forty-eight when he embarked on his third voyage in
1776. He had just completed preparing the text of his second voyage
for Dr. Douglas. His portrait had been painted by Nathaniel Dance.
He was already the most famous navigator in the world, and he must
have been aware of it, knew that he had already made history, that
on the present voyage he would be making more history, and that he
had in John Webber an artist capable of recording it.
It would also seem that he had developed a fairly clear idea how
that history, the history of the third voyage, should be presented in
publication. While at the Cape, returning to England on the second
voyage, he had been mortified and distressed by the many inaccura-
cies in Hawkesworth’s account of his first voyage and by the attitudes
attributed to him that were not his (see Beaglehole 1974:439–440).
Nor did he appreciate the controversies that had arisen from Hawkes-
worth’s discussion of the sexual practices and freedoms of Tahitian
society. On that issue he had written to Douglas in quite unequivocal
terms, concerning the second voyage: “In short my desire is that
nothing indecent may appear in the whole book, and you cannot
oblige me more than by pointing out whatever may appear to you as
such” (Egerton Ms. 2180, f. 3, British Library, quoted by Beaglehole
1961:cxlvi). This implies that Webber would not be expected to spend
much time drawing naked savages in the Pacific, even though he may
have spent time drawing nude men and women in his life class of the
Ecole des Beaux-Arts as a student. The test came early. From 24 to
30 January 1777, the Resolution and the Discovery havened in Ad-
venture Bay, Van Diemen’s Land, to wood and water. Twice a party of
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Tasmanians came out of the woods to greet the woodcutters, “with-
out,” Cook recorded, “showing the least mark of fear and with the
greatest confidence imaginable, for none of them had any weapons,
except one who had in his hand a stick about 2 feet long and pointed
at one end. They were quite naked & wore no ornaments, except the
large punctures or ridges raised on the skin” (Beaglehole 1967:52).
Webber appears to have made a drawing to record the second meet-
ing on 29 January:
We had not be[en] long landed before about twenty of them men
and boys joined us without expressing the least fear or distrust,
some of them were the same as had been with us the day before,
but the greater part were strangers. There was one who was much
deformed, being humpbacked, he was no less distinguishable by
his wit and humour, which he showed on all occasions and we
regretted much that we could not understand him for their lan-
guage was wholly unintelligible to us. . . . Some of these men wore
loose round the neck 3 or 4 folds of small Cord which was made
of the fur of some animal, and others wore a narrow slip of the
kangaroo skin tied around the ankle. I gave them a string of Beads
and a Medal, which I thought they received with some satisfac-
tion. (Beaglehole 1967:54)
This was the first occasion on which native peoples had been
encountered on the third voyage, and Webber’s little-known draw-
ing, now in the Naval Library of the Ministry of Defense, London,
provides an insight into the subsequent visual program that was
closely followed during the whole third voyage. It is quite an ambi-
tious composition for Webber to have begun so early in the voyage,
but is obviously unfinished, and I suspect that it is unfinished because
Cook felt that it would not be a suitable subject to be engraved in the
official account. There seems to be little doubt that it was drawn on
the voyage, because Webber included a drawing, under the heading
“New Holland Van Diemen’s Land,” in his catalog of works submitted
to the Admiralty on his return, entitled An Interview between Captain
Cook and the Natives. What it would seem Cook did approve of was
a drawing of a man and another of a woman of Van Diemen’s Land
that would indicate nudity without actually representing it.
Although the Interview drawing was never completed or engraved,
it does foreshadow what might be described as the official Cook/
Webber visual art program for the voyage. Cook is shown meeting the
local people in an atmosphere of peace and potential understanding,
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offering them gifts and the hope of friendship. And as he began, so he
continued. All of Webber’s developed compositions constructed on
the voyage and for the official publication seem to be saying the same
thing: The people of the Pacific are indeed pacific people.2
They had not always been depicted as being so peaceful. In Hawkes-
worth’s Account, for example, the first engraving ever to depict Tahi-
tians, though it renders them looking like orientals, shows them en-
gaged in a violent conflict with Captain Wallis’ ships, and his guns
reducing them to submission. In Parkinson’s Journal, two Australian
Aborigines are depicted “advancing to combat” as Cook landed in
Botany Bay (Parkinson 1773:pl xxvii, fp. 134) and in the official
account of Cook’s second voyage, Hodges had published his painting
depicting the violent reception Cook received when he attempted to
land at Eromanga in Vanuatu in 1774.
Illustrations of this kind were bound to create controversy, and they
did. On the second voyage the Forsters, father and son, had both
been critical of the way in which native peoples were frequently treated
by the members of Cook’s crews. They saw themselves as independent,
scientific witnesses who, though they greatly respected Cook’s abilities,
were not prepared to turn a blind eye to everything that happened.
This itself caused resentment. Some of the tensions that developed on
the voyage are implicitly revealed in George Forster’s A Voyage round
the World. After providing a detailed account of Cook’s attempted
landing at Eromanga, he wrote:
From his [i.e., Cook’s] account of this unhappy dispute, Mr.
Hodges has invented a drawing, which is meant as a representation
of his interview with the natives. For my own part, I cannot
entirely persuade myself that these people had any hostile inten-
tions in detaining our boat. The leveling of a musket at them, or
rather at their chief, provoked them to attack our crew. On our
part this manoeuver was equally necessary; but it is much to be
lamented that the voyages of Europeans cannot be performed
without being fatal to the nations whom they visit. (Forster 1777,
2:257–258)
Comments of this kind aroused the anger of William Wales, who felt
deeply loyal to Cook whatever the circumstance and was also Hodges’
friend. In his Remarks on Mr. Forster’s Account of Captain Cook’s
Last Voyage round the World, he described Forster’s description of
the affair at Eromanga as “one of the most singular pieces of misrep-
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resentation and detraction that ever dropped from a pen” (Wales
1778:71). This was characteristic of the vitriolic attack that Wales
launched on the book as a whole. It caused Forster in turn to publish
his Reply to Mr. Wales’s Remarks (1778). Concerning Eromanga he
wrote in defense:
I had my information of this transaction from the mouth of Cap-
tain Cook and those who accompanied him, within an hour or two
after the affair had happened. Suppose it disagreed with Captain
Cook’s written journal, and printed narrative, and contained some
particulars not advantageous to seaman;—what then? What rea-
sonable man will not believe that Captain Cook would exactly
relate the matter in the same order as he meant to write it after-
wards; or that he would not, upon cool reflection, suppress in
writing the mention of such facts as were unfavorable to his own
character, even tho’ they could at most be construed into effects of
unguarded heat. . . . The officer’s orders [i.e., to shoot] appeared
to me unjust and cruel. Let every man judge for himself. So much
I know, that the matter was discussed in my hearing, with much
warmth, between the officers and Captain Cook, who by no means
approved of their conduct at that time. (Forster 1778:34)
Cook had sailed on the third voyage before Forster’s Voyage and the
resulting controversy was in print. But the heat that had arisen on his
own ship over the affair at Eromanga may well have discouraged him
from permitting Webber to portray violent confrontations with native
peoples on the third voyage.
Cook had good practical reasons to suppress images of conflict.
Not only did his instructions require him to cultivate friendship with
native people, but the representation of conflict with natives could
have had at that time the most unpredictable results. For the contem-
porary political situation in England was volatile. A week before Cook
sailed out of Plymouth, the American colonies had declared their inde-
pendence. Radical opinion seized upon Cook’s voyages as yet another
attempt by England to dominate weaker societies. Cook had been in-
structed to return Omai to the Society Islands; the social lion had
become something of an embarrassment.3 Satirists had seized upon
his presence to lampoon the condition of English society. It would be
surprising if Cook had not seen and read the most virulent of these
satirical broadsides, entitled An Historical Epistle, from Omiah to the
Queen of Otaheite; being his Remarks on the English Nation, which
appeared in 1775 while he was resident in London between his second
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and third voyages. Omai is presented as a critic of European culture
and attacks trenchantly those nations who
. . . in cool blood premeditately go
To murder wretches whom they cannot know.
Urg’d by no injury, prompted by no ill
In forms they butcher, and by systems kill;
Cross o’er the seas, to ravage distant realms,
And ruin thousands worthier than themselves.
As a man of Empire, the representative of George III and the Admi-
ralty in the South Seas, Cook, it may be assumed, was reluctant to
allow anything to occur in the visual record of the voyage that could
give credence to these kinds of sentiments.
* * *
Let us turn to Webber’s second major set piece of the voyage, Cap-
tain Cook in Ship Cove, Queen Charlotte Sound. Cook is presented
shaking a Maori chief by the hand, a European mode of greeting that
it is unlikely he would have proffered since he knew well enough that
pressing noses was the traditional Maori greeting. Nor does the scene
confirm the written evidence of any of the journals. For, on entering
Ship Cove on this occasion, Cook found the Maori afraid to come
aboard, though many of them knew him well from his previous visits.
They were afraid he had come to avenge the massacre of Furneaux’s
men, eight of whom had been killed and eaten at Grass Cove nearby,
on the previous voyage. With Omai as interpreter, however, friendly
relations were quickly established with the parties visiting the ships.
Yet there is no evidence that the obvious reading of this composi-
tion records an actual event. That is to say, Cook did not on this occa-
sion come off his landing boat and go up and shake a Maori chief by
the hand. By all accounts the portion of the beach they landed on
was unoccupied—a natural precaution in any case—and it was not
until a little later that a party of Maori came and set up some tempo-
rary habitations nearby. It is indeed true that friendly relations were
established on this occasion quickly enough, and this may be credited
to Cook’s practical good sense; true, too, that all we should expect
from a record of a historical event rendered in the mode of a history
painting is the general spirit of the occasion, not evidence as to what
actually occurred. But my point is that in staging the event in this
way, Webber is addressing a British—indeed a European—audience.
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Ethnographical information of great interest is being conveyed about
the nature of the temporary habitations, the dress and adornment of
Maori, but it is conveyed within the framework of a potentially polit-
ical message: Cook the friendly voyager meeting his old friends the
Maori.
A few months later in Lifuka, Tonga, Webber began another large
history set piece. Cook and his men intermingle freely with a great
crowd of Tongans as they mutually enjoy the boxing and other enter-
tainments prepared for them. The painting may be identified with the
work in Webber’s catalog entitled The manner of receiving, entertain-
ing and making Captain Cook a present of the productions of the
Island, on his Arrival at the Happi.
So it continued throughout the voyage. Everywhere Cook goes in
the Pacific his arrival is celebrated by Webber in scenes of joyful
reception, in dancing, boxing entertainments, gifting, trading. Nothing
must disturb this sense of peacefulness. Even Cook’s own death, the
great trauma of the voyage, is not drawn, nor will it be included in
the official publication.
Webber got better at it as the voyage progressed. One of the finest
of all his drawings surely must be his record of Cook’s meeting with
Chuckchi in northern Siberia. They were only on that icy peninsula for
between two and three hours, yet Webber managed to make a number
of delightful drawings on the spot (see Joppien and Smith, 1985–1987:
3:catalogue 3.272, 3.273, 3.274). Naturally suspicious of the new-
comers, the Chuckchi refused to put down their arms—except upon
one occasion, when a few of them laid them down and danced for
Cook and his men. It was that moment of friendship that Webber
chose to record in a beautifully balanced composition.
This then is the implicit message of the Cook/ Webber program.
Cook is the peacemaker, the philanthropist who is bringing the gifts of
civilization and the values of an exchange economy to the savage
peoples of the Pacific. Later, after Cook’s death, the same message is
spelled out to all Europe, in the sixty-odd plates, upon which enor-
mous care and attention were spent, that were included in the Atlas to
the official account.
True, these grand peaceful ceremonies and occasions did occur,
they were high points in a long voyage and, we might agree, deserved
to be recorded for posterity. They were, moreover, the kinds of events
that suited Webber’s medium. Watercolor drawing and painting with
its broad washes of transparent color, its feeling of amplitude for the
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breadth and depth of space, is an art surely suited to rendering peace-
ful scenes. Thus in this instance we might want to conclude, with
Marshall McLuhan, that the medium is indeed the message (McLuhan
1967:15–30). Webber portrayed the truth, but it was a highly selective
truth, from which all sense of violence and tension had been removed.
Consider for a moment what a modern television camera crew, with
the right to film whatever they chose, might have selected, to send by
satellite to Europe. They might have selected different events than the
boxing and dancing receptions at Tonga for Europeans to remember
the visit by. Consider, for example, these incidents recorded by the
young midshipman on the Resolution, George Gilbert, concerning the
stay at Tonga:
These Indians are very dexterous at thieving and as they were per-
mitted to come on board the ships in great numbers, they stole
several things from us. This vice which is very pervilent [prevalent]
here, Captain Cook punished in a manner rather unbecoming of
an European viz: by cutting off their ears; fireing at them with
small shot, or ball, as they were swimming or paddling to the
shore and suffering the people (as he rowed after them) to beat
them with the oars, and stick the boat hook into them where ever
they could hit them; one in particular he punished by ordering one
of our people to make two cuts upon his arm to the bone one
across the other close below the shoulder; which was an act that I
cannot account for otherways than to have proceeded from a
momentary fit of anger as it certainly was not in the least premedi-
tated. (Gilbert 1982:33–34)
It was Cook himself who on the previous voyage had named Tonga
the “Friendly Islands.”
Nothing delights a camera crew so much as a conflagration; so they
would have been very busy on Moorea on 9 and 10 October 1777.
When the Resolution had left the Cape it must have seemed like, as
David Samwell described it, a “second Noah’s ark” (Beaglehole 1967:
995). Cook had on board “two Horses, two Mares, three Bulls, four
Cows, two Calves, fifteen Goats, 30 Sheep, a peacock and a hen, Tur-
keys, Rabbits, Geese, Ducks and Fowls in great plenty . . . for the pur-
pose of distributing them among the Islands visited” (Gilbert 1982:
20). This was Cook in the role of philanthropist of the Enlightenment
bringing the blessings of civilization to the Pacific. The livestock was
to be distributed to the islanders, either as gifts to appropriate chief-
tains or in the process of trade.
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Not every Pacific person understood the conventions of hierarchical
gifting or of a market economy. So when one of the Resolution’s fif-
teen goats was stolen in Moorea, Cook went on a violent punitive
mission for two days, burning the local’s houses and destroying all
the canoes his party came in contact with, and he did not cease until
the goat was returned. “The Losses these poor People must have suf-
fer’d would affect them for years to come,” wrote Thomas Edgar, the
master of the Discovery (Edgar in Beaglehole 1967:231, n. 5). “I can’t
well account for Capt Cooks proceedings on this occasion; as they
were so very different from his conduct in like cases in his former
voyages,” wrote young George Gilbert (Gilbert 1982:47).
Others since Gilbert have attempted to explain Cook’s markedly
changed behavior on the third voyage. The best is that given by Sir
James Watt in his masterly essay on the “Medical Aspects and Conse-
quences of Cook’s Voyages” (Watt in Fisher and Johnston 1979:129–
157). Watt brings strong evidence to show that Cook on the third
voyage was a sick man and suggests that it may well have had the
effect of changing his normal pattern of behavior. I would not ques-
tion this, but it must be said that his illness did not curb his aggres-
sion when his authority was threatened.
It is not my intention here to address the whole question of Cook’s
changed behavior on the third voyage. I do not feel adequately
equipped as a historian to attempt it. But I would suggest that those
historians who feel they are might address themselves, without wish-
ing to minimize the significance of Watt’s findings (because historical
causation is notoriously multiple rather than singular) to wider, more
general, more countervailing forces acting upon Cook’s behavior and
personality during the later months of his life. What I am getting at
might be summarized in such phrases as “the loss of hope,” “an
increased cynicism,” “familiarity breeds contempt,” “power tends to
corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” By comparison with
his contemporaries there need be no doubt that Cook was a wise,
extraordinarily gifted, and humane commander. But his first duty was
the survival of his crew and the success of his expeditions. That
meant that his word must not be questioned, even when it could not
be properly understood. When words were not understood, only brute
action remained.
On setting out on his first voyage in the Endeavour, Cook had
been given written advice by Lord Morton, president to the Royal
Society. The Society, you will recall, had sponsored the voyage and
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Cook gave to Morton’s Hints a respect second only to his Admiralty
instructions. They contained the most detailed set of instructions he
ever received on how to treat native peoples encountered. Morton’s
Hints enshrined the high hopes of the philosophers of the Enlight-
enment for an eventual universal brotherhood of mankind under the
leadership, it need hardly be said, of European man. Allow me to
quote:
Have it still in view that sheding the blood of those people is a
crime of the highest nature:—They are human creatures, the work
of the same omnipotent Author, equally under his care with the
most polished European; perhaps being less offensive, more entitled
to his favour.
They are natural, and in the strictest sense of the word, the
legal possessors of the several Regions they inhabit. No European
Nation has a right to occupy any part of their country, or settle
among them without their voluntary consent.
Conquest over such people can give no just title; because they
could never be the Agressors.
They may naturally and justly attempt to repell intruders, whom
they may apprehend are come to disturb them in the quiet posses-
sion of their country, whether that apprehension be well or ill
founded.
Therefore should they in a hostile manner oppose a landing, and
kill some men in the attempt, even this would hardly justify firing
among them, till every other gentle method had been tried.
There are many ways to convince them of the Superiority of
Europeans. (Quoted in Beaglehole 1955:514)
That, indeed, was an Enlightenment vision of hope. But by 1777
Cook was an old Pacific hand who seems to have grown tired in the
use of the many subtle ways in which indigenous people could be
convinced of the superiority of Europeans. By 1777 he could cut
corners brutally if the occasion arose. There is a sense of disillusion,
of a loss of hope. On the first voyage, rather in the spirit of Morton’s
Hints, he had expressed an admiration for the simple life of the
Australian Aborigines, “far . . . happier than we Europeans” (Beagle-
hole 1955:399). And on the second, in Queen Charlotte Sound, he
expressed a fear that his very contact with Maori, since his first voy-
age, had degraded them: “Such are the consequences of commerce
with Europeans and what is still more to our Shame civilized Chris-
tians, we debauch their Morals already too prone to vice and we
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interduce among them wants and perhaps diseases which they never
before knew and which serves only to disturb that happy tranquillity
they and their fore Fathers had injoy’d” (Beaglehole 1961:174-175).
Yet on his third voyage, with his horses, cows, bulls, and goats, he
was still playing the role of an official philanthropist of the Enlight-
enment, seeking to raise Pacific people from their savage state to a
higher level of civilization. Did the growing realization of the contra-
diction between the philanthropist role he was required to play and
his actual experience make him increasingly cynical and brutalize his
behavior? By the third voyage he had become convinced that he and
other European voyagers were bringing venereal and other diseases
to the Pacific. In such cases of guilt it is not unusual to blame the
victims. In Queen Charlotte Sound he wrote in his journal, “A con-
nection with Women I allow because I cannot prevent it . . . more
men are betrayed than saved by having connection with their women,
and how can it be otherwise since all their Views are selfish without
the least mixture of regard or attachment whatever” (Beaglehole 1967:
61–62).
The point I wish to make is this: Cook, in his lifetime, had ab-
sorbed enough of the hopes and expectancies of the Enlightenment to
become aware by his third voyage that his mission to the Pacific in-
volved him in a profound and unresolvable contradiction. In order to
treat native peoples in the enlightened way that Morton had exhorted
and in order to survive, he had to establish markets among people
who possessed little if any notions of a market economy. The alterna-
tive was to use force from the beginning as the Spaniards and Portu-
guese had done, and eighteenth-century Englishmen prided themselves
that they could behave more humanely than Spaniards.
There was nothing new about the working methods used for estab-
lishing more or less humane contact with primitive people, even when
they were, as the ancient Greeks said, stubborn. The Greeks had borne
gifts all the way down the Red Sea Coast to the fish eaters and others
of the Arabian Sea (see Huntingford 1980). It was the acknowledged
way of expanding a commercial empire. And if you wanted wood,
water, and fresh food at each new landfall on a long voyage without
immediately resorting to violence, there was no other way. So you
had to establish markets, at the side of the ship, or on the beaches, as
in Webber’s fine paintings of the market Cook established at Nomuka,
in Tonga.
To establish one’s peaceful intentions one began by gifting. The
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nature of gifting was more deeply embedded in primitive survival
economies than the nature of property or the nature of a free market.
So Cook took with him on his third voyage thousands of articles
from Matthew Boulton’s factory, Soho, in Birmingham—axes, chisels,
saws, metal buttons, beads, mirrors, and so on—as presents and for
trading (Beaglehole 1967:1492). The year Cook sailed (1776) was
the year in which the principle of free trade, of the universal benefits
of an international market economy, was given its classic expression
in Adam Smith’s Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations. Cook was Adam Smith’s first and perhaps greatest global
agent. He opened a new third of the world to free enterprise.
Smith, the theorist of perfect competition, argued that market prices
established themselves by the natural laws of supply and demand;
if there was any control at all exercised by this beautifully delicate
mechanism, it was best described as wrought by “an invisible hand.”4
But Smith drew his conclusions primarily from a study of developed
market economies that had been in existence in Europe from ancient
times. Cook, the practical man, had the grave problem of insisting
upon the rules and conventions where they did not exist or existed at
the fringes rather than the center of the primitive polity. There were,
of course, markets in the Pacific before Cook, but at various stages of
development, from the complete nonexistence of the concept among
the natives of Van Diemen’s Land5 to the astute Indians of Nootka
Sound, of whom Cook wrote in chagrin on one occasion that it
seemed that “there was not a blade of grass that did not possess a
separate owner” (Beaglehole 1967:306).
So in the Pacific Cook had to play at being, as best he could,
Adam Smith’s god. If the laws of property essential to a free market
economy were transgressed and a goat stolen, an act of the god must
descend upon the whole community. If a law is not understood as a
natural law, the best thing to do, if you possess the power of a god, is
to make it seem like one.
What I would suggest, then, is that Cook on his third voyage grew
more and more aware in his grand role as Enlightenment Man that
he was involved in contradictions that he could not resolve. He had
come to the Pacific to spread the blessings and advantages of civilized
Europe. What the locals most wanted was the ironware that for so
many centuries had made Europe powerful; what Cook’s young sailors
wanted even more than they wanted fresh food was the bodies of the
island women, and it was the one universal product most often
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offered, most readily available. So Cook increasingly realized that
wherever he went he was spreading the curses much more liberally
than the benefits of European civilization. The third voyage records
not only his death but, before that, his loss of hope. For what Adam
Smith’s free market economy offered the South Seas was not really
the difference between civilization and savagery, but the difference
between exploitation and extermination. Those peoples who were
sufficiently advanced to grasp the potential advantages of a market
economy survived to become the colonial servants of their European
masters; those who could not, because of the primitive nature of their
societies, like the inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego and Van Diemen’s
Land, in the fullness of the time of Adam Smith’s invisible god, were
exterminated—though in a few cases their part-European descendants
lived on to cherish the sad tale.
The art of John Webber cannot, of course, speak to us of such
things except by its very silences. And for what he does give us we
should be grateful. It is an Arcadian Pacific and, for the most part, a
pacific Pacific; a new region of the world to be desired by Europeans,
sought out, converted to the true, Christian religion, rendered subser-
vient, exploited. It is epitomized in Webber’s portrait of Poedua, the
daughter of Orio, chief of Raiatea. Here Webber builds upon that
image of the Pacific that the preceding voyages had so rapidly and so
successfully fashioned. The Pacific as young, feminine, desirable, and
vulnerable, an ocean of desire. To her, during the next century, all the
nations of Europe will come.
Now in all probability, though it cannot be established entirely be-
yond doubt, Webber painted Poedua’s portrait during the five days
during which she was held hostage in the Discovery. Raiatea was
Cook’s last port of call in the Society Islands before he sailed for the
cold waters of the north Pacific. Two of the crew, enchanted by the
island life, decided to desert. Cook, by now well versed in the art of
taking hostages, had Orio, his daughter Poedua, and his son-in-law
lured into Captain Clerke’s cabin and a guard mounted, holding them
prisoner. They should not be released but taken to Europe, old Orio
was informed, unless he activated himself in getting the deserters back
to Cook. It took five days.
Captain Clerke, who like William Anderson also secretly longed to
stay in the Society Islands instead of going, as they did, to their
deaths from tuberculosis in the cold northern seas,6 describes what
occurred:
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I order’d some Centinels at the Cabin Door, and the Windows to
be strongly barred, then told them, we would certainly all go to
England together, if their friends did not procure their release by
bringing back the 2 Deserters. My poor Friends at first were a
good deal struck with surprise and fear, but they soon recollected
themselves, got the better of their apprehensions & were perfectly
reconciled to their Situation. . . . The News of their Confinement
of course was blaz’d instantaneously throughout the Isle; old
Oreo was half mad, and within an hour afterwards we had a most
numerous congregation of Women under the Stern, cutting their
Heads with Sharks Teeth and lamenting the Fate of the Prisoners,
in so melancholy a howl, as render’d the Ship while it lasted,
which was 2 or 3 Hours, a most wretched Habitation; nobody
cou’d help in some measure being affected by it; it destroyed the
spirits of the Prisoners altogether, who lost all their Chearfulness
and joined in this cursed dismal Howl, I made use of every
method I cou’d suggest to get them away, but all to no pur-
pose, there they wou’d stand and bleed and cry, till their Strength
was exhausted and they cou’d act the farce no longer. When we
got rid of these Tragedians, I soon recover’d my Friends and we
set down to Dinner together very chearfully. (Beaglehole 1967:
1317–1318).
Whether you view the affair as a Pacific farce or as a Greek tragedy,
it is not difficult to imagine how the camera crew of a not particularly
friendly nation might have recorded the scene.
Everything points to the fact that so far as the visual events of the
voyage were concerned, Webber was setting out quite deliberately to
construct a peaceful image of the Pacific and of the peaceable relations
of its peoples with the voyagers. Even when he drew portraits—for
example, just as they left the Society Islands Webber drew a portrait
of a chief of Bora-Bora with his lance, but when he made the finished
drawing he removed the lance.
After Cook’s death, the apparent desire for a suppression of all
scenes of violence and conflict continues in the engraving of scenes of
the voyages published in the Atlas of the official account. Even a face
that might recall a scene of great violence is not included. We know
that Webber painted a portrait in oils of Kahura,7 a Maori chieftain
who was responsible for the killing and eating of Captain Furneaux’s
men at Grass Cove on the second voyage. Cook established beyond
any reasonable doubt that Kahura was responsible for the massacre,
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but instead of taking revenge, he developed a respect for his courage
and the confidence Kahura placed in him (Beaglehole 1967:69). Dr
Joppien has succeeded in identifying one of the portraits now in the
Dixson Library, Sydney, as a portrait of Kahura (Joppien and Smith
1985–1987:3:19, 285). It is of interest that a portrait of Kahura was
among those omitted in the list selected for publication in the Atlas.
Perhaps the portrait of a notorious cannibal, however much admired
by Cook, was not considered suitable for the official account of the
voyage.
Nor was a representation of Cook’s own death. And when Webber
made his famous drawing, which was later engraved by Bartolozzi
and published separately in 1784, the great navigator was presented
in the role of a peacemaker, holding out a hand gesturing to his men
in the Resolution pinnace to stop firing at the enraged Hawaiians.
If my analysis is correct, Cook on his third voyage, at least so far
as the visual record was concerned, was constructing an image of
himself as a man of peace in the Pacific, a man universally welcomed
there by peaceable people. Representations of violent encounters were
suppressed or ignored. He could not have known as he left the island
of Bora-Bora that he would discover another great Polynesian society
in the North Pacific unknown to Europeans, and that there he would
be received as the very incarnation of a god of peace, as the returning
god Lono, the god of carnival, of the makahiki festival.8 So it was
that Cook was received, as few men have been, into an alien culture
in a fashion that accorded with his own personal and most innermost
desire; and the myth of Cook as the hero of peace and the harbinger
of civilization in the Pacific was sustained in Europe and the Pacific
long after his death. But it was myth, not reality. The reality lay in the
hidden contradictions latent in establishing a free-market economy in
the Pacific. To do that Cook had taken with him iron from a Birming-
ham factory that, when fashioned into daggers, was used to cut
him down on Kealakekua beach. For when Cook, this man of peace,
attempted for the last time to take a Pacific chieftain hostage—deal-
ing once again in the coercive market in which captives are exchanged
for stolen goods—the hidden hand of Kûkâ‘ilimoku, the Hawaiian
god of war, struck him down and four of his marines. Cook had
committed the fatal error of returning to the island when peace no
longer reigned there, not even in myth. The course of history is lit-
tered with such ironies.
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Notes
1. In this chapter, I have drawn heavily upon the combined research of
Dr. Rüdiger Joppien and me from volume 3 of The Art of Captain Cook’s
Voyages (1987) for many of the facts presented. I am particularly indebted
to Dr. Joppien for his recent research on the early life and training of John
Webber. In other cases where I have drawn directly on Dr. Joppien’s per-
sonal research, this is mentioned in the notes. Apart from that, the opinions
expressed are my own.
2. See Joppien in Joppien and Smith (1985–1987:3:193 et al.). The re-
mainder of this chapter develops the implication of this initial insight of Dr.
Joppien.
3. On Omai in general, see McCormick (1977).
4. “He intends only his own gain and he is in this, as in many other cases,
led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his inten-
tion” (Smith 1976:1:456).
5. “They received everything we gave them without the least appearance
of satisfaction . . . they either retrieved it or threw it away without so much
as tasting it” (Beaglehole 1967:52).
6. The story is told by James Burney, first lieutenant on the Discovery,
who had it from Anderson. It is recounted in Burney’s Chronological His-
tory of North-Eastern Voyages of Discovery, London (1819:233–234) and
quoted in Beaglehole (1974:568–569).
7. See his manuscript “Catalogue of Drawing and Paintings on Oyl by Mr.
Webber” under “Portraits in Oyl Colour. New Zealand. Kahowre a Chief.”
National Library of Australia, Canberra.
8. On these dark and profound matters of ethnohistory, see Sahlins (1980)
and Dening (1982).
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A VIEW FROM AFAR (NORTH AMERICA)
—A COMMENTAR Y BY RICHARD WHITE
A few years ago Patricia Limerick, who writes about the American
West, suggested that historians of the American West join with histo-
rians of the Pacific to form a Peripheral Studies Association. Historians
of the Pacific have a wider and vastly wetter domain, but historians
of the American West, like the historians of the Pacific whom Rob
Borofsky quotes, have often felt marginalized within their disciplines.
Other historians regard their subjects as exotic backwaters, periph-
eral to the wider concerns of the profession. In part, both groups had
brought this on themselves, but whatever their provinciality, it was
more than matched by the provinciality of the historical discipline as
a whole whenever Europe faced the “people without history,” as Eric
Wolf mockingly said in the title of one of his books (1982).
Central to the regional experience of the American West and the
transnational experience of the Pacific has been a contact experience:
a meeting between peoples already present and powerful strangers
who have traveled vast distances. Although the consequences were far
from inevitable, colonialism and the destruction and creation of land,
peoples, and cultures all flowed from contact. In the wake of contact
there arose a shared conviction among virtually all concerned of the
importance of that experience, as well as bitter disputes over repre-
sentations of that experience. No moment in this whole experience has
been more contested than that of contact itself: the sense that the
participants made of each other, how they understood each other, and
how and if we could recover and represent that experience and all
that flowed from it.
In many ways the shift from imperial to Islander-centered histories
has paralleled the evolving focus of studies in the American West in
particular and North America in general. Studies of imperial or
national policy have given way to studies of Indian peoples and how
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they attempted to shape the context and direction of contact. Such
studies, like those in the Pacific, suffer from a major deficiency: Vir-
tually all the written records in this experience come from one side—
the Europeans and their descendants.
In North America and, as Greg Dening has made brilliantly clear,
in the Pacific, these records are neither simple nor transparent. Per-
haps no scholar’s work conveys the tentativeness, the invention, and
the complexity involved in narrating contact than Dening, and no
one conveys the elusive sense of it more brilliantly. The remnants, the
documents and artifacts that survive from the past into the present,
do not yield meanings easily; or rather they can often sustain multiple
meanings and interpretations. Descendants of Europeans cannot claim
a special knowledge of what their ancestors thought centuries ago
simply because their ancestors in some collective sense created these
documents, nor, I think, can descendants of native peoples claim privi-
leged knowledge because of accounts of contact that survive among
them.
We are left with guesses built on scattered, partial, and difficult to
decipher evidence. Greg Dening’s famous governing metaphor of
Islands and Beaches (1980), as a way of understanding contact, has
had immense influence on work in North America, particularly my
own. European records give us an insight into what happened on the
beaches, where people from different worlds first met. This account
can be remarkably full and revealing in ways that I will explain, but
it tells us far less about the islands, the interior of indigenous cultures
and societies.
In these kinds of contact studies, the trick is to work with what
you have. The sources tell you far more about the meeting, the
process of making sense, than they do of the interior world of either
group. In the evolution of contact, in the changing power relations,
you see each side desperately trying to find versions of the other that
will work. The “Stranger’s things remade to Tahitian meanings” of
which Dening writes had their parallels all across North America in
what I have called the “middle ground.” In my own formulation of
the middle ground, I began with an epigram from another piece of
Pacific history, Marshall Sahlins’ Islands of History: “In action,
people put their concepts and categories into ostensive relations to the
world. Such referential uses bring into play other determinations of
the signs, besides their received sense, namely the actual world and the
people concerned” (1985:149). The middle ground as I formulated it
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was a process of mutual invention among Indians and Europeans. It
is a product of beaches. It depended on the inability of both sides to
gain their ends through force. Those who operated on the middle
ground tried to understand the world and reasoning of others in order
to assimilate enough of that reasoning to put it to their own purposes.
That they often got this exotic reasoning terribly wrong mattered less
than that the other side, for similar reasons, reciprocated. Each side
would gladly have coerced others into obeying their rules if they
could, but they could not, and so instead they built surprisingly
durable worlds from mutual misunderstandings. Both the Pacific and
North America sustained rough balances of power long enough for
such worlds to arise (White 1991).
The best example of such a rough balance of power in North
America was the pays d’en haut, the upper country, which included
the lands draining into the Great Lakes as well as lands stretching west
to the Mississippi and south to the Ohio. Here, from the late seven-
teenth century until the early nineteenth century, Indian peoples re-
mained strong enough to force Europeans to regard them as allies
and trading partners rather than as subjects (White 1991).
The parallels of contact experience, of course, go only so far. The
mutual invention, the impact of disease, the susceptibility of parts of
the Pacific and North America to what Alfred Crosby has called “eco-
logical imperialism,” the substitution of a largely European biota for
the native biota present at contact—all of these transcend the Pacific
and North America and allow fruitful comparison, even if Alfred
Crosby (1986) is one of the very few to connect even part of them in
any detail. The very scale of the colonial encounter in North America
creates differences. There are many natives and many strangers crowd-
ing onto the historical stage at a given moment. The more discrete and
sequential and smaller scale contacts of the Pacific seem different. The
imperial wars, which arrayed different combinations of Indian peoples
and Europeans against other combinations of Indian peoples and
Europeans, had few parallels that I know of in the Pacific.
Taking the histories together, what seems commonplace for impe-
rialism in North America fails to hold in the Pacific, while much of
the peculiarity of American history claimed by historians as unique
seems far less so in light of the Pacific. These shadings emerge only
when the two experiences are overlaid, one with the other. In North
America, for example, the ability of first empires and then states to
control the actions of their settlers seems initially far more circum-
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scribed than in the Pacific. In the Pacific, certainly, whaling captains
could indulge in freelance violence and sailors could settle among
Islanders, but the filibustering expeditions, private arrangements for
land cessions, and large-scale unauthorized movements into the inte-
rior typical of colonial settlement in North America appear more
rarely. In the United States, historians tend to see the treaty relation-
ship between the federal government and Indian peoples as unique. It
appears far less so when compared to New Zealand. Similarly, the
American combination of ecological invasion, rapid capitalist transfor-
mation of the landscape, and, nearly simultaneously, moves toward
conservation and preservation seem simply a variant on British settler
societies when compared to New Zealand.
I know that I would have looked at North America and the Amer-
ican West far differently if I had not read Pacific history. This volume
makes clear both that I still have much to learn and that sometimes




At first glance, colonialism may appear a fairly straight-
forward historical process: a matter of outside domination 
backed by outside force. On closer analysis, however, things 
are more murky. When, for example, should one delineate 
colonialism as beginning—in the formal annexation of an 
archipelago by an outside power or, instead, in the varied 
interactions, over several decades, leading up to that 
annexation? As Thomas observes, “It is important to rec-
ognize that a variety of colonial representations and 
encounters both precede and succeed periods of actual 
possession and rule” (1994:16). Why should one limit 
“colonialism,” then, to only its most overt stage?
Nor should we be too quick to view colonialism as the 
sole or primary form of dominance directed at non-
Western peoples. Klor de Alva notes in regard to South 
America: “The experience of colonialism, with the senses it 
has come to have today, primarily as a process of exploita-
tion and dependent subordination to nonlocals, escaped 
those mestizos who came to form the majority of the popu-
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lation of preindependence Americas, although these were 
nonetheless subjugated, abused, exploited, and often killed 
by other mestizo, mulatto, Indian, and criollo locals. . . . 
One does not have to be colonized to suffer” (1995:270).
And, critically, we need to consider how colonial control 
was carried out. It is particularly striking how few “colo-
nials” there were in most colonial settings. In Tahiti in 
1848, for example—following a failed revolt against the 
French—the ratio was approximately 1 to 17 (Newbury 
1980:128). By way of comparison, in the Spanish Kingdom 
of New Mexico, the ratio of those capable of bearing arms 
was 1 to 50 (Gutiérrez 1991:133); in the British Raj of India, 
more generally, there were rarely more than a hundred 
thousand Europeans scattered among the indigenous pop-
ulation of 250 million (Meyer 1999:16). How were so few 
able to “rule” so many? The closer we look at colonialism, 
the more subtle, complex, and varied a phenomenon it 
appears to be.
A word of framing before proceeding further: Histories 
of the period make clear that focusing solely on the annex-
ation period of colonialism misses central concerns of 
interest to Islanders and Outlanders alike. It makes colo-
nialism seem to jump “full born” from the past, when in 
fact a range of complex, subtle, and violent events critically 
preceded formal annexation. We need to examine these 
events, as well, to understand colonialism as a process.
General Texts and Themes
Oliver (1989) and Howe (1984) portray the period’s 
dynamics in different ways. Oliver examines the Western 
“invaders” who followed the explorers into the Pacific: 
whalers, traders, missionaries, planters, labor recruiters, 
merchants, miners, and administrators. One cannot help 
note the diversity of the “invaders” and their apparent 
agendas. Still a general trend can be discerned—the 
whalers, traders, and missionaries preceded and, to some 
degree, set the foundation for these other groups. By the 
mid-nineteenth century, Oliver notes that the era of the 
missionary “kingdoms” (Islander kingdoms markedly influ-
enced by missionaries) and warship diplomacy (in which 
European warships enforced debt payments claimed by 
Western traders) “was about over, and a new era of more 
Robert Borofsky 175
pervasive colonialism and more officially approved annex-
ation was ushered in. The haphazard plunder of Island 
resources by whalers and itinerant traders began to be 
supplanted by the more systematic exploitation of planter 
and resident merchant” (1989:59). What one perceives in 
Oliver are the processes by which the Pacific is drawn into a 
larger economic system with Islander land, labor, and 
authority becoming increasingly organized for others’ 
profit.
Howe lays more emphasis on Islander agency than 
Oliver. In respect to the establishment of island kingdoms 
in Tahiti, Hawai‘i, and Tonga during this period, he sug-
gests: “Their monarchs were men who exploited customary 
status and authority structures within their own societies 
and the presence, techniques, and ideas of Europeans. 
Ambitious chiefs and Westerners both had vested interests 
in the aggrandizement and centralization of political 
power. Chiefs sought status, power, and wealth, mission-
aries desired dutiful Christian populations obeying [their] 
law and order, and traders wanted security, a reliable supply 
of produce, and labor, all of which could come from an 
entrenched monarchical government” (1984:125).
It is interesting to note that neither Oliver nor Howe 
directly explores the politics of colonial control. Oliver 
talks repeatedly about the transformations wrought. But 
while touching on colonial concerns, he does not assess the 
overall role of the colonial powers— preferring to focus 
instead on specific European organizations and events. 
Howe ends his history before formal colonialization. Still, 
colonialism remains there in the background: He ends 
several chapters with a “Denouement” that forebodingly 
suggests the colonial events yet to come.
Four other books, building on these narratives, explore 
the complexities of the period. Scarr (1990) highlights 
dynamics in particular locales as a way of suggesting 
broader generalizations: “The plantation vision [i.e., plant-
ing cash crops such as sugar or coconuts] was seen on 
pretty well every Island with suitable land where Europeans 
came ashore with capital or credit,” he notes. “Hawaii, the 
model . . . contains the essential ingredients: ample fertile 
land, a biddable or buyable élite, a quiescent if complain-
ing people, and proximity to a market” (1990:159).
Tides of History, edited by Howe, Kiste, and Lal (1994), 
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focuses on the twentieth century. Several chapters deal with 
“colonialism.” Hempenstall, for example, discusses general 
factors behind the formal annexation of many Pacific 
islands: “The geopolitical changes that occurred globally as 
British domination of trade and industry began to decline 
and other countries began to catch up . . . internal eco-
nomic and political developments within metropolitan 
powers themselves . . . [and] relations between Europeans 
and Pacific Islanders” (in Howe, Kiste, and Lal 1994:30). 
Regarding Dutch, British, and German rule in Melanesia, 
Bennett observes that “the colonial ‘development’ goals . . .  
were ‘pacification’ for areas of economic potential, and 
marginal but controlled involvement in the cash economy” 
(64). In respect to colonial control in Micronesia, Hanlon 
notes, “as with religion and education, efforts at economic 
development were another vehicle through which colonial 
powers sought to direct Micronesian people and their 
resources towards the service of larger metropolitan 
interests” (103).
Campbell provides a general overview of the period. 
“Broadly speaking,” he asserts, “colonial policy was a con-
tinuation of pre-colonial policy. . . . France, which acquired 
part of its empire in indifference, governed it the same way; 
Germany, which was frankly concerned with exploiting and 
developing resources, got on with the job expeditiously; 
Britain, having lacked a positive policy previously, contin-
ued to be guided by ad hoc principles; [and] the United 
States of America created an environment for business” 
(1996:156).
Denoon (1997b) moves away from a chronological/
regional ordering of colonialism’s dynamics to focus on 
how land, labor, and political authority gradually, and at 
times violently, moved from Islander to Outlander control. 
Chapters written by different authors explore the dynamics 
of the process; for example, how control over land and 
labor often became increasingly centralized, initially in 
indigenous hands and then, later, in foreign hands. 
Denoon states: “Only a few Islands bore the full brunt of 
mines, plantations, or depopulation; but at the other 
extremity, few retained control over their own land and 
labor. . . . The initiative was seized by colonial powers, 
seeking to reorder affairs in different ways to those which 
Islanders themselves developed” (183).
Robert Borofsky 177
Oliver (1989), Howe, Kiste, and Lal (1994), Campbell 
(1996), Scarr (1990), and Denoon (1997b) all discuss 
World War II’s role in transforming the Pacific. A colonial 
backwater of the 1930s, the region became, with the “War 
in the Pacific,” a major focus of world attention. Money, 
technology, and change poured in as never before. Old 
shibboleths of colonial invulnerability evaporated in the 
battles, lost and won, between the Allies and the Japanese. 
The region, still colonial in 1950, was nonetheless a 
dramatically transformed colonial world. Firth writes: 
“Everything governments did after the war was on a vastly 
greater scale, and some of what they did was meant to 
prepare Islanders for independence in the remote future. 
The war heralded the coming of developmental coloniza-
tion” (Denoon 1997b:322).
What is intriguing in these accounts is how a refined 
sense of imperial history—the history of imperial powers 
interacting with Islanders—has again become a central 
concern of Pacific historians. Once out of fashion, it is now 
very much in fashion.
Broadening Perspectives1
Where should we go from here? Drawing on literature 
from beyond the region, I would suggest four areas for 
further refinement.
1For further references see: ambiguity in defining colonialism: Klor de Alva 1995:241,
248, 269; Denoon 1997b:411; Apter 1995:315; Thomas 1994:97, 171; Cooper
1997:409; Doyle 1986:45; silences of colonialism: Said 1993:xiii, 50; Pels 1997:166,
178; Stoler and Cooper 1997:21; Cohn 1996:10; Trouillot 1995:83; Guha 1988a:40;
Guha 1988b:45, 84; Guha 1989:299; Steedly 1993:134; Said 1995:34; complexities
of collaboration: Hempenstall 1978; Memmi 1965:45–76; Bhabha 1984:85–122;
Chatterjee 1993:197; Comaroff and Comaroff 1991:244–245; Prakash 1990:397;
Fox 1985:140–184; Stoler and Cooper 1997:20; “tensions of empire”: Pels 1997:
163, 173, 176; Stoler 1992b:323; Stoler and Cooper 1997:7, 19, 24; Cooper 1997:
406, 409; Steedly 1993:52; Gutiérrez 1991:96, 306, 336; Comaroff and Comaroff
1992:183, 198–205, 212; Dirks 1996:xvi–xvii; Taussig 1987:134; Bhabha 1984; Pratt
1992:57; Stoler 1992a:183; the culture of colonialism, more generally: Hempenstall
1992:72; Belich 1996:278–450; Belich 1986:311–335; Said 1993:159; Thomas 1994:
167; Stoler and Cooper 1997:6, 9, 31; Dirks 1992:21; Gutiérrez 1991:102, 177–179,
198, 226; Greenblatt 1991:139; Stoler 1997:226; colonialism in the metropole: Cohn
when
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First, we need to be sensitive to the implicit and explicit 
silences that pervade many accounts of the period. “We 
cannot just do colonial history based on our given sources,” 
Stoler and Cooper suggest. “What constitutes the archive 
itself, what is excluded from it, what nomenclatures signal 
at certain times are themselves internal to, and the very 
substance of, colonialism’s cultural politics” (1997:18). 
Following Chakrabarty, we might note that the gaps in 
history have their own history (1988:230). Spivak develops 
this point in her famous piece, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 
It is not simply that few records exist regarding those of 
subordinate, or subaltern, status, especially those doubly 
subordinate—subordinated within indigenous hierarchies 
and, then, subordinated again within the colonial hier-
archy. Often there are few vehicles for subaltern expression 
(cf. Thompson 1963:55). In the case of subaltern women, 
for example, Spivak notes that “both as object of colonialist 
historiography and as subject of insurgency the ideological 
construction of gender keeps the male dominant. If, in the 
context of colonial production, the subaltern has no his-
tory and cannot speak, the subaltern as female is even more 
deeply in shadow” (1988:287). One is left to infer her 
“voice” from a close, contextual analysis of particular 
actions. In “The Prose of Counter-Insurgency,” Guha 
explores the coded words that framed colonial records—
“insurgents” became “peasants,” “defying the authority of 
1996:3, 11; Thompson 1963:19, 42, 60, 177, 191, 212, 401–402, 685–687; Pandey
1994:198; Comaroff and Comaroff 1992:285, 290, 293; Cooper 1992:210–211;
Thomas 1994:66; Thorne 1997:238–239; colonialism provides insight into the West
and its dynamics: Pratt 1992:6, 34, 36; Dirks 1996:xi, xvii; Stoler and Cooper 1997:
1; Wright 1997:326; Comaroff and Comaroff 1992:267, 293; Young 1990:119, 139–
140; Phillips 1995:105; Stoler 1995:3–12 ff.; colonial control through structuring of
knowledge: Cohn 1966:8, 55, 61, 75, 162; Dirks 1996:x, xiii, xv, xvi–xvii; Said 1993:
100, 237; Guha 1988:70; Seed 1992:10; Spivak 1988:281; Thomas 1994:108; Pratt
1992:9, 30; Gascoigne 1996:107–108, 111; Comaroff and Comaroff 1991:310; Chat-
terjee 1993:9, 56, 168, 223; other means of relatively nonviolent colonial control:
Pels 1997:174; Thomas 1994:116, 119, 122; Comaroff and Comaroff 1992:215–216;
Hunt 1997:308; Colonna 1997:352–353; perspectives on colonial resistance: Hempen-
stall and Rutherford 1984; Chatterjee 1993:6, 26, 55, 132; Said 1993:223; Spivak
1987:97; Bhabha 1984, 1985; Comaroff and Comaroff 1992:260; Sahlins 1994a:384;
Silverblatt 1995:291–292.
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the State” became “revolt against zamindari,” indigenous 
taxation officials (see 1988b:59). Resistance was softened, 
in other words; direct challenges to the State became 
reframed.
One of the categories often suppressed today is that of 
colonial collaborators. Collaborators played a critical role 
in maintaining colonial authority by acting as intermedi-
aries in the ruling process. They allowed a colonial few to 
rule a colonized many. Robinson suggests that finding 
successful collaborators was often the key to imperial rule: 
Every stage of the imperial process from initial intrusion to 
decolonization “was determined by the indigenous collabo-
rative systems connecting its European and Afro-Asian 
components” (1972:138–139). Today, the presence of such 
collaboration tends to be softened or silenced as an embar-
rassment—much as happened in France following World 
War II. The presence of colonial collaborators disrupts 
national narratives of resistance to outside domination.
Second, we should explore further the whole culture of 
colonialism: how it operated, what its tensions, conflicts, 
and ambiguities were. That metropolitan aims were imper-
fectly carried out along the colonial periphery is well 
known. But what is less stressed is that colonialism itself was 
full of ambiguities and contradictions that made it, even at 
its best, an imperfect project. Stoler, for example, explores 
one “tension of empire”: “the relationship among the dis-
courses of inclusion, humanitarianism, and equality that 
informed liberal policy at the turn of the century in colo-
nial Southeast Asia and the exclusionary, discriminatory 
practices that were reactive to, coexistent with, and perhaps 
inherent in liberalism itself” (1997:198; see also Mehta 
1997). In a similar vein, colonial efforts at development 
and “progress” could either extend or limit colonial 
authority. Concerns over Fijian health became a way for 
extending colonial authority into traditional Fijian village 
life. “The British colonizing effort in Fiji,” Thomas observes, 
“proceeded through social engineering rather than violent 
repression, and appeared essentially as an operation of 
welfare rather than conquest” (1994:124). But the educa-
tion system in French colonies such as Algeria, in affirming 
Western liberal ideals of shared equality, tended to encour-
age challenges to colonial hierarchies because they were 
inconsistent with French republican beliefs (cf. Colonna 
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1997). The working out of metropole ideals in the colonial 
periphery was a complex, contradictory process then. As 
Bhabha points out: “In ‘normalizing’ the colonial state or 
subject, the dream of post-Enlightenment civility alienates 
its own language of liberty and produces another knowl-
edge of its norms” (1994:86). One can perceive this same 
ambivalence in the “anti-conquest” travel narratives dis-
cussed by Pratt: “European bourgeois . . . seek to secure 
their innocence [regarding conquest] in the same moment 
as they assert European hegemony” (1992:7). Thomas sug-
gests that colonialism was “a fractured [project] . . . riddled 
with contradictions and exhausted as much by its own 
internal debates as by the resistance of the colonized” 
(1994:51).
Third, we need to consider broadening the unit of colo-
nial analysis. It is important to realize “colonialism” oper-
ated at home as well as abroad, in the West as well as the 
Rest. Working-class Europeans were subjected to similar 
regimes of control, partial inclusion, and partial exclusion 
that were prevalent in the colonies (cf. Thomas 1994:66). 
Fascism, Young suggests, citing Fanon and Césaire, “was 
simply colonialism brought home to Europe” (1990:125). 
E. P. Thompson’s The Making of the English Working Class 
makes clear colonialism was at work in Europe long before 
that. In the late 1700s and early 1800s, the English working 
class “were subjected simultaneously to an intensification of 
two intolerable forms of relationship: those of economic 
exploitation and of political oppression” (1963:198–199). 
What Thompson describes for the metropole held, as well, 
for colonies: “The pressures towards discipline and order 
extended from the factory, on the one hand, the Sunday 
school, on the other, into every aspect of life” (1963:401;
cf. Cooper 1992). (For an example of what it means to 
come out on the losing side of history—to have one’s 
history written by the winning side—refer to accounts of 
the Luddites; see Thompson 1963:484, 534, 552.)
We need to look at the colonies and the metropole, 
then, as a single analytical unit—comparing the dynamics 
in one with the dynamics in the other (cf. Said 1993:191). 
Often colonies constituted experimental theaters for 
projects at home. Wright (1997) discusses how the French, 
in the early part of the twentieth century, used their colo-
nies for experimenting with architectural and urban 
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renewal relevant to France itself. (One might also note 
here that missionaries were often encouraged to initially 
attempt their “civilizing” efforts abroad rather than at 
home; Comaroff 1997:175, Thorne 1997:245, 248.) Cohn 
observes: “It is not just that the personnel who governed 
Indians were British, but the projects of state building in 
both countries—documentation, legitimation, classifica-
tion, and bounding, and the institutions therewith—often 
reflected theories, experiences, and practices worked out 
originally in India and then applied in Great Britain” (1996: 
3–4). We might view the colonies as a lens for understand-
ing the metropole. Comaroff and Comaroff observe that 
Africa “was like a camera obscura of British civilization, a 
virtual portrait of all that bourgeois refinement was not” 
(1992:290). Many Europeans perceived India, Cohn notes, 
“not only as exotic and bizarre but as a kind of living 
museum of the European past” (1996:78).
Finally, we should explore further the varieties of colo-
nial control. Threats (and the realities) of violence often 
lay behind colonial authority. There was certainly violence 
in the Pacific—such as in the New Zealand wars of 1845–
1872 and in the New Caledonia war of 1878–1879. But a 
host of strategies were often employed to move control 
from coercion toward consent. Without denying the vio-
lence in colonial rule, these need elucidation as well. Dirks 
observes: “Colonialism was made possible, and then sus-
tained and strengthened, as much by cultural technologies 
of rule as it was by the more obvious and brutal modes of 
conquest” (1996:ix). Cohn’s (1996) Colonialism and Its 
Forms of Knowledge (regarding India), is one of the preemi-
nent works in this regard (though also note Pratt 1992 and 
Miller and Reill 1996). In seeking to establish laws based on 
Indian traditions, Cohn observes, the British ended up mak-
ing Indian laws sound very much like British laws because 
of how the British reinterpreted ambiguous Indian tradi-
tions (1996:75). And in the construction of censuses, social 
categories were established that the British thought reflected 
sociological categories but that, in fact, generated them. 
What had been ambiguously fluid and abstract categories 
now became concrete in a double sense. History was an-
other field made over by the British. What is intriguing 
about the colonial histories constructed, Guha notes, is that 
“the appropriated past came to serve . . . not only for the 
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colonizers, but ironically for the colonized as well” (1989: 
212). (One is reminded here of how the British, in alliance 
with Fijian chiefs, constructed a set of Fijian “traditions”; 
see France 1969.) And yet, in drawing on British colonial 
renditions of the Indian past, many Indian elite reframed 
them to justify opposing Britain (cf. Fox 1985). Colonial 
control is more than a matter of resistance and accommo-
dation, then. There are degrees of resistance, degrees of 
accommodation, with a host of subtle complications in 
between.
The Selections
The following chapters consider the central dynamics of 
the colonial worlds that dominated the Pacific for more 
than a century. These dynamics are framed in terms of four 
overlapping themes.
“Colonial Entanglements,” the first theme, addresses the 
question of Outlander vs. Islander agency (discussed by 
Oliver and Howe). We see the dynamics of the era as more 
than a formulaic framing of Islander accommodation and/
or resistance, Islander-Outlander opposition, or simply 
Islander agency. Matters are more complex. The collabora-
tions and conflicts of the period cross and recross these 
framings. Marshall Sahlins’ “Hawai‘i in the Early Nine-
teenth Century” discusses how the ruling chiefs used for-
eign missionaries to deal with foreign merchants and gun-
boats. All the while, merchants fought with missionaries and 
the Hawaiian “powers-that-be” struggled among themselves. 
There was agency all around. As the Hawaiian monarchy 
contended with multiple demands, it drew on traditional 
resources. But in reproducing earlier cultural structures, 
such as the makahiki, Kauikeaouli also transformed his posi-
tion. By 1840 the king reigned but did not govern. The 
royal rebellions failed—as much through Hawaiian as for-
eign resistance. In “Deaths on the Mountain,” August 
Kituai discusses the violence that helped perpetuate colo-
nial rule. What is critical here is that at least some of the 
violence was carried out by Papua New Guineans on other 
Papua New Guineans. He observes that the native police 
were, in certain respects, “more colonial than the colonial-
ists.” We catch a glimpse of the politics and pragmatics 
involved in working at the edge of colonial control.
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“Tensions of Empire,” the second theme, explores the 
contradictions and conflicts that made colonialism an 
imperfect project at best—a project that often undermined 
its own objectives. (We also perceive the subtle ways colo-
nies and metropoles, or centers of imperial power, were 
intertwined.) Nicholas Thomas’ “Colonial Conversion” dis-
cusses the contradictory structures by which missionaries 
incorporated Solomon Islanders into their Christian world. 
Islanders were seen as children within a family unit—a 
frame of reference that allowed for distancing, hierarchiz-
ing, and incorporating all at the same time. To attract sup-
port from the metropole, missionaries drew on narrative 
structures that demonized the pre-Christian era, praised 
the new Christian order, and stressed their “civilizing” role 
(in comparison to other European groups). We can see, in 
retrospect, that they rather overstated their case. Michel 
Panoff’s “The French Way in Plantation Systems” observes 
that colonial systems were not all alike nor, importantly, 
were they equally effective in carrying out their stated 
objectives. The French colonial “way,” Panoff suggests, fos-
tered a certain degree of incompetency and dependency. 
One also sees that success was not a sure thing for many 
plantation owners. Failure was a real possibility. Without 
exploitation of islanders’ land and labor, many could not 
make a go of it.
“Styles of Dominance,” the third theme, deals with the 
ambiguities and contradictions of colonial control. Vio-
lence was certainly an important element (as Kituai and 
Belich demonstrate). But there were subtler forms as well. 
One was an ethnocentric way of dealing with difference 
that encouraged colonists to persist, even in the face of 
contradictory evidence, with a sense of their own superior-
ity. James Belich’s “The New Zealand Wars and the Myth of 
Conquest” offers an important case study in this regard. 
Many Maori held their own against British troops. This fact 
was repeatedly denied, however, by the British. It would 
have brought into question their belief in their own racial 
superiority. Intriguingly, this faith in themselves constituted 
a contributing factor in their eventual success. The British 
persisted, adding more and more troops, until they won. 
Myth became reality. “Theorizing Maori Women’s Lives,” by 
Patricia Grimshaw and Helen Morton, explores the politics 
of representing others from a different angle. Europeans 
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depicted Maori women in evaluative terms that, again, 
tended to affirm European perspectives. But in giving free 
reign to their ethnocentric biases, there arose numerous 
contradictions in the accounts regarding the power of Maori 
women, their effectiveness as mothers, and their physical 
beauty. Such contradictions prove valuable today in open-
ing up alternative—new—possibilities for representing 
Maori women. W. S. Merwin’s poem “Conqueror” considers 
a central question of colonialism: To what degree are the 
colonized transformed by colonialism? This question leads 
to others: If the colonized become just like the colonizers, 
are the latter then needed? Or phrased differently: Might 
we not wonder if many colonists had an investment in the 
colonized remaining different? Otherwise, what purpose 
would they, and the colonial system they operated, have?
World War II was a pivotal event in the region. Rather 
than summarizing the scores of battles that took place, this 
final theme considers what the war meant for particular 
participants in it. Sam Highland’s “World War II in Kiribati” 
discusses the war’s violence and destruction from an indige-
nous perspective. As in Belich’s chapter, we perceive victors 
described more positively than losers. This raises an intrigu-
ing question. If the allies had lost the war in Kiribati, would 
the Betio villagers have depicted them in such rosy terms, 
the Japanese in such negative terms? Hisafumi Saito‘s 
“Barefoot Benefactors” makes clear the Japanese did not 
see themselves as villains. They affirmed a shared bond with 
Islanders—a relation of intimacy and concern founded on 
their common opposition to the West. There are, in other 
words, silences, myths, and contradictions in this colonial 
conflict that bear examining.
Gyan Prakash’s “A View from Afar” offers a subaltern 
perspective on the colonial process. His remarks regarding 
colonialism’s ambiguities and contradictions in South Asia 
are valuable for making sense of similar processes in the 
Pacific. And his remarks indicate the negative side of how 
Europeans exoticized Pacific Islanders. Europeans devel-
oped the impression that the region’s populations were a 
cultural tabula rasa to be inscribed upon by the West. That 
did not occur, to the same degree, in South Asia.
A question readers might ponder in this section is:
•  How did the dynamics—the collaborations, conflicts, contra-
dictions, and controls—of the colonial period support and/or 
impede colonial domination?
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Clearly, colonialism was a conflicted process. Outlanders 
and Islanders came together in a range of complex combi-
nations. Some dynamics without doubt reinforced colonial 
authority. What is intriguing to ponder, however, is the 
degree to which the colonists, in the very way they prac-
ticed colonialism, created contradictions that undermined 
the colonial projects in which they claimed to be engaged.
Relevant Dates
Hawai‘i
1786 Beginning of American Northwest Coast–China 
fur trade with Hawai‘i used as a stopover (Sahlins 
1992:3; Oliver 1989:51)
1810 Kamehameha’s unification of the Hawaiian 
islands (Howe 1984:158)
1810–1830 Prime period of China sandalwood trade 
(Sahlins 1992:3, 58 ff.; Oliver 1989:49, 51–53; 
Howe 1984:161)
1820 Arrival of missionaries belonging to the Amer-
ican Board of Commissioners for Foreign 
Missions (Oliver 1989:55)
1848 Mahele division of titles between the chiefs and 
the king leading to foreign ownership of land 
(Sahlins 1992:132–137; Oliver 1989:183)
1850s Peak period of whaling in the Pacific (Hawai‘i 
often used as a major stopover) (Oliver 1989:49)
1893 Overthrow of Queen Lili‘uokalani by a “Provi-
sional Government” of American businessmen 
(Denoon 1997:232–237)
1898 Hawai‘i annexed by the United States (Denoon 
1997:236; Howe, Kiste, and Lal 1994:249)
Papua New Guinea
1872 First recorded British trade station established 
in the area, followed soon thereafter by a 
German trade station (Oliver 1989:162)
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1880s Development of coconut plantations in coastal 
New Guinea (Oliver 1989:163)
1884 Partitioned into the German protectorate of 
New Guinea and the British protectorate of 
Papua (Howe 1984:343)
1884–1845 New Guinea Company commissioned by 
German government to govern New Guinea 
(Denoon 1997:220; Howe, Kiste, and Lal 
1994:53)
1899 New Guinea Company surrendered its man-
date and New Guinea became a regular 
German colony (Denoon 1997:220; Howe, 
Kiste, and Lal 1994:53)
1906 Papua passed to Australian control (Denoon 
1997:164)
1921 New Guinea became a mandate of Australia 
(following Germany’s defeat in World War I) 
(Howe, Kiste, and Lal 1994:56)
1926 Gold discovered on Mount Kaindi (Denoon 
1997:266)
Solomon Islands
1840–1850s Peak period of whaling (with use of area for 
stopovers) (Bennett 1987:24–26)
1845–1847 Unsuccessful effort to establish a Catholic 
Marist mission (Howe 1984:290–291)
1850s Regular trading for tortoise and pearl shell 
(Bennet 1987:46)
1860s Beginning of “labor trade” (or “blackbirding”) 
involving transport of islanders to plantations 
in Queensland, Fiji, and New Caledonia as 
laborers (Howe, Kiste, and Lal 1994:60; Howe 
1984:329–330, 333–334)
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1893 Became British protectorate (Howe 1984:343)
1898 Return of Catholic missionaries (Bennett 
1987:61; Howe 1984:292)
1902 Establishment of missionaries belonging to the 
Australian branch of the Methodists (Thomas 
1994:125–126; Bennet 1987:61, Howe, Kiste, 
and Lal 1994:60)
Vanuatu
1829–1830 Largely unsuccessful efforts to harvest sandal-
wood due to conflicts with Eromangans and 
disease (though efforts more effective in the 
ensuing two decades) (Oliver 1989:170–171; 
Howe 1984:285, 329)
1839 Murder of the missionary John Williams (Howe 
1984:286–287)
1839 Arrival of Polynesian missionaries belonging to 
the London Missionary Society (Howe 1984:287)
1860s Beginning of “labor trade” (or “blackbirding”) 
involving transport of islanders to plantations 
in Queensland, Fiji, and New Caledonia as 
laborers (Oliver 1989:171–172; Howe 
1984:329–333)
1887 Establishment of a joint British-French naval 
commission to safeguard the interests of both 
nationals (Oliver 1989:172)
1906 Establishment of joint British and French colo-
nial rule in the form of a “Condominium” 
(Howe 1984:343)
Tahiti
1793 Start of regular Sydney trade (Oliver 1989:51; 
Howe 1984:92)
1795 Arrival of missionaries belonging to the London 
Missionary Society (Oliver 1989:54–55; Howe 
1984:117)
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1815 Pomare II’s unification of Tahiti under his rule 
(Howe 1984:138–140)
1842–1843 France declared a protectorate over the Mar-
quesas and Tahiti (Oliver 1989:142; Howe 
1984:151)
1880 French annexation of “Tahiti and dependen-
cies” (Newbury 1980:201)
New Zealand
1790s Whaling in New Zealand waters (Belich 1996: 
127)
1814 Arrival of missionaries belonging to the British 
Church Missionary Society (Oliver 1989:55; 
Howe 1984:118)
1840 Treaty of Waitangi signed between roughly five 
hundred Maori chiefs and representatives of 
the British Crown regarding an ambiguously 
defined “transfer of sovereignty” from the 
former to the latter (Oliver 1989:109–110; 
Scarr 1990:187–190; Denoon 1997:166)
1845–1872 New Zealand Maori Wars (Belich 1986:15 ff.; 




Hawai‘i in the Early Nineteenth 
Century
The Kingdom and the Kingship
Marshall Sahlins
In a series of letters describing conditions in the Islands in the
mid-1840s to an American correspondent, the missionary Richard
Armstrong observes again and again, and with a certain contempt
for the “native character,” that the government of the kingdom by
Hawaiians is doomed. The chiefs simply cannot cope with the growth
of haole [or foreign] business. “The idea that this floating, restless,
moneymaking, go-ahead white population can be governed by natives
only, is out of the question” (AC: 11 Nov 1847). In fact, says Arm-
strong, the government is already out of Hawaiians’ hands. Since
1843,
the government has been going more and more into the hands of
naturalized foreigners. . . . Some of these hold important offices
under the good Dr. Judd. . . . Besides these we have pilots, harbor
masters, collectors of imports, sheriff & constables, all naturalized
foreigners, who act in conjunction with the native authorities. But
such is the native character, so deficient in point of intelligence,
faithfulness & enterprise in business, that the more important
affairs, indeed I may say all the important affairs of the govern-
ment, are now administered by these adopted foreigners. . . . The
time has gone by for the native rulers to have the management of
affairs, though the business may be done in their name. (AC: 18
Sept 1844)1
This chapter is a slightly edited version of the last part of Chapter 5, entitled “Levia-
than: Whaling and the State,” in Anahulu: The Anthropology of History in the King-
dom of Hawaii, vol. 1, by Patrick Kirch and Marshall Sahlins (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1992). Bracketed comments are the editor’s.
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Armstrong proved his point in 1848 by accepting the position
of minister of public instruction, succeeding the veteran missionary
William Richards. Richards had framed the Constitution of 1840—
while holding an official appointment as adviser to the chiefs—and in
1843 he secured diplomatic recognition of the kingdom’s independence
from the governments of Britain, France, and the United States.2 Yet
neither of these two reverend gentlemen, nor others such as the mis-
sionary-turned-judge Lorrin Andrews, would match the influence of
“the good Dr. Judd” in the affairs of the Hawaiian state (cf. G. P. Judd
1960).
Likewise originally attached to the American mission, and greatly
favored by the chiefs, Judd for eleven years (1842–1853) held a variety
of commanding portfolios in the government, including the presidency
of the Treasury Board and, in succession, the ministries of Foreign
Affairs, the Interior, and Finance. “King Judd,” the merchant Stephen
Reynolds called him, voicing common sentiments of the foreign-com-
mercial community, “he rides us down to the dust. The king is nothing
—nobody. Judd orders him as you would a boy” (G. P. Judd 1960:
109). Feelings against the “meddling missionaries” still ran high
among the merchants. The sentiment was shared by a number of
passing visitors, including Herman Melville, who was in the Islands
in 1843. In an appendix to Typee, Melville described Judd as a
“sanctimonious apothecary-adventurer” and castigated the mission-
aries collectively as “a junta of ignorant and designing Methodist
[sic] elders in the councils of a half-civilized king, ruling with absolute
sway over a nation just poised between barbarism and civilization”
(1922:343–344).
The continuing antagonism of the merchants and the Protestant-
cum-government ministers proves that the Hawaiian state was not
yet the sleeping partner of the foreign bourgeoisie. Indeed by their own
economic privileges and dispositions the ruling chiefs were opposed
as a class to the oncoming capitalist interests. More and more they
were being put at a disadvantage by enterprising Whites, who made
no attempt either to conceal their sense of the “natives’ ” moral and
intellectual inferiority. In the circumstances the official co-optation of
members of the ABCFM by the chiefs was a kind of political defense.
Nor was their strategy novel, except for these official trappings, inas-
much as the Ka‘ahumanu crowd [i.e., the effective ruling coterie of
chiefs, led by the “queen-regent” and adopted mother of the king,
Ka‘ahumanu] for upwards of two decades had been involving Hiram
Bingham and his colleagues in the councils of the Hawaiian state.
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This was a persisting “structure of the conjuncture,” allying the
Protestant “brethren” with the ali‘i against the Honolulu business
community. As one historian put it: “Developments since 1820 had
tended to polarize Honolulu, and by 1838 both the mission’s detrac-
tors and its champions exhibited true dedication to their opposite
aims” (Greer 1977:8). And if in the 1840s Stephen Reynolds referred
to Gerrit Judd as “King Judd,” for his part Judd, upon assuming high
office in the kingdom, wrote to Henry Peirce in Boston: “You must
know that I am at present the King Bingham of the Sandwich Islands”
(F.O. and Ex: 1 Jan 1845).3
No doubt Peirce appreciated the allusion since in 1831, when he
was in business in Honolulu, he wrote to his partner in Boston, James
Hunnewell, complaining bitterly about the political machinations of
the rival firm of “Hiram Bingham & Co.”: “From what has taken
place and what is expected to come, I am now convinced that Hiram
Bingham & Co. govern the religious and political part of this govern-
ment; they are the jugglers behind the curtain, by whom the govern-
ment persons or puppets are set in motion. The joining of ‘Church
and State’ is the dearest wish of their hearts, and a religious despo-
tism will be the consequence” (HC: Peirce to Hunnewell, 7 July 1831).
Of course one can say that the missionaries, preaching hard work,
private property, honesty, and other such Protestant virtues, facili-
tated the reign of capital in the long run (cf. Gulick and Gulick 1918:
187–188). But for the moment, the ruling chiefs consciously and
explicitly called in the Protestant missionaries to keep the merchants
at bay.4 And on their part, Bingham and his colleagues were con-
sciously and explicitly opposed to the reign of foreign capital. In a
memorial to the ABCFM, the missionaries warned that if “foreign
speculators” were allowed to exploit the economic advantages of the
islands, they would lay waste to the people along with the country,
“and at no distant period the mere moldering remnants of the nation
only could be pointed out to the voyager” (AB: Memorial of Bing-
ham et al., July 1836). Some years later Judd wrote that “the encour-
agement recommended to be given to capitalists, however much it
might benefit the country, would, I fear, at no distant period, be
the subversion of the present dynasty”—“unless,” he added, “their
affairs could be directed by experienced foreigners” (letter of 3 Aug
1842, in The Polynesian, 26 Dec 1846). Led by the likes of Bingham
and Judd, the American missionaries thus impeded and resisted
attempts of foreigners to gain private titles to Hawaiian lands (Bradley
1968:279–282).
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Yet at the same time the clergymen thus opposed the businessmen
on economic grounds, the latter were convinced that they were pro-
mulgating the superior method of salvation. A hot and heavy ideo-
logical argument was going on between Christianity and commerce
over which was the better means to the other—and to the higher end
of the mission civilisatrice which they held in common. Hence the
frequent complaint of the merchants that the missionaries, with their
strange puritanical obsessions, were simply out of date. “They seem
to be more fit to have lived a century and a half ago,” wrote Henry
Peirce, “when the world was not so enlightened as it is at present”
(HC: Peirce to Hunnewell, 10 Aug 1833). The bourgeois traders saw
themselves as the modern successors of these outmoded priests in the
great work of spiritual improvement. If, as Weber taught, Protestant-
ism transposed redemption to a this-worldly, material plane, it fol-
lowed that the capitalists were now the ordained ministers of human
salvation. In their view, as Sir George Simpson observed, commerce
was “the modern instrument of Providence for the moral and reli-
gious amelioration of mankind” (1847:2:101).5
Hence Sir George’s corollary observation about the missionaries
and the merchants: “one half the strangers in this strange land are
not on speaking terms with each other” (1847:2:158). Yet he notes
how volatile is this structure of the conjuncture in which every now
and then something happens to make friends of former enemies and
enemies of former friends. For Simpson’s perceptive portrayal of cur-
rent politics represents the culmination of relationships on the verge
of change (158). Soon a kind of truce would be concluded between
the residents [how the foreign merchants referred to themselves] and
the missionaries—over the prostrate bodies of the chiefs and the
people. As of the early 1840s, however, the mishes6 still lived in their
own part of town, “a Goshen in the midst of Egypt,” hardly having
anything to do with the merchants, who for their part “have not yet
forgotten certain clerical proceedings directed against their amuse-
ments.” Between the merchants and the government there was like-
wise “some ground of difference or other,” since the “authorities [the
chiefs] are always more or less identified with the missionaries.”
Meanwhile, crosscutting alliances and discords in the mercantile com-
munity were sometimes pitting the Americans against the British,
sometimes joining the two against the French in a disagreement that
was correlated to the opposition of Calvinists and Catholics (see
Wilkes 1845:3:389). Simpson concludes by showing himself a social
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scientist of the classic Western functionalist persuasion: “In many
cases, however, politics and religion are merely a cloak thrown over
more sordid and unworthy motives. Rivalry in trade often lurks at
the root of evil” (1847:2:157).7
Simpson does not discuss the international presence in this con-
juncture—of which evil, trade was also at the root. The ruling chiefs
had to call in the missionaries to deal not only with the haole resi-
dents but with the gunboats that came in these merchants’ wake. The
political problems attending Hawai‘i’s position in the transpacific
commerce are indicated by the direct relationship between the volume
of mercantile shipping (including whalers) and the visits of so-called
national ships, principally men-of-war. The flag was following trade
—specifically, the American, British, and French flags, flying from
the masts of warships come to protect the interests of their citizens in
the Islands and their countries in the Pacific Ocean.8
Gunboat diplomacy had begun in 1826 when the U.S. ships
Dolphin (Lt. John Percival) and Peacock (Capt. Thomas ap Catesby
Jones) forced a settlement of commercial debts on the Hawaiian chiefs.
The debts were still a common subject of the negotiations opened by
naval vessels in the ensuing decades. But so were a variety of other
issues: the protection of foreigners’ legal and property rights; demands
for extension of haole rights in land; adjudications of commercial
disputes between foreign merchants; demands (of the French on
behalf of Catholic missionaries) for religious toleration; demands of
monetary reparations for damages allegedly suffered by foreigners at
Hawaiians’ hands; and demands for the trading privileges of the
most favored nation, including abrogation of customs duties. All these
negotiations effectively took place at the point of a gun. They bodied
forth the violence of the European expansion, whether quietly or by
the explicit threat of bombarding Honolulu—usually accompanied by
advice, solicited or unsolicited, on the part of the foreign naval offi-
cer to the Hawaiian king and chiefs about how they should run their
affairs. Often the negotiations resulted in treaties or conventions, the
enforcement of which could well become the object of subsequent
naval visits. For by an interesting dialectic of nationalism and imperi-
alism, practically any private grievance of a resident haole could be
magnified into an international incident. “Sir,” writes the British con-
sul Richard Charlton in 1841 to Governor Kekûanaò‘a, “I have the
honor to inform you that some person or persons are building a wall
near the end of the bowling alley belonging to Mrs. Mary Dowsett,
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thereby injuring her property and violating the treaty between Great
Britain and the Sandwich Islands” (BCP: 8 Feb 1841).9
The most spectacular foreign interventions were those of Captain
LaPlace of the French warship L’Artemise in 1839 and Lord Paulet of
HMS Carysfort in 1843 (see Kuykendall 1968). The first exacted
$20,000 from King Kauikeaouli as a guarantee of good conduct
toward the French and several other important concessions. LaPlace
secured freedom of practice for Catholics, ending the battle of the
chiefs and Protestant missionaries against “papism” that had been
going on for twelve years. He also ended the temperance movement
of the Protestants by securing French wines and brandies against pro-
hibition and high import duties. Lord Paulet came to enforce the sup-
posed legal rights of British subjects, including a vexed land claim of
the cantankerous Charlton—or else, said his Lordship, “I shall be
obliged to take coercive steps to obtain these measures for my country-
men” (Kuykendall 1968:214). The negotiations failed to the extent
that Paulet, without official authorization, obtained the cession of the
Islands to Britain. Four months later, however, the sovereignty was
restored to His Hawaiian Majesty by Paulet’s superior, Rear Admiral
Richard Thomas. Meanwhile, William Richards was negotiating rec-
ognition of the kingdom by the British as well as the French and the
Americans. As much as anything else, the rivalries of these powers
gave the ali‘i and their missionaries some room to politically organize
what was happening to them—for a while.
The effect was a mixed state, dominated at the highest levels by
haole—and increasingly by haole interests—but at the middle and
local levels by the Hawaiian aristocracy. The ali‘i were able to detain
control of the chiefships of the districts and governorships of the
Islands: an authority that was not distinguished from their pro-
prietary rights and allowed them the continued disposition of Hawai-
ian lands, labor, and the surplus product. The kingship was also
Hawaiian, but as an institution it could provide the common ground
of the mixed state, legitimating at once the indigenous and the haole
sectors. In the latter capacity it was increasingly decked out by white
officialdom in the ritual trappings of a European monarchy. But the
king was all the while losing his sovereign powers even as the king-
ship lost its Hawaiianness. By 1845, a passing Methodist tourist ob-
served, a handful of high white functionaries constituted the govern-
ment of the Sandwich Islands, whereas “the king in reality has no
more power than one of his inferior chiefs. He says himself that he is
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a mere ‘paper king,’ that his foreign ministers do the business, and
bring him the papers to sign, and he has to obey them” (Hines 1851:
225–226). Still, the Hawaiian system of sovereignty did not go out
without some spectacular moments of struggle, including certain rit-
uals of rebellion, experiments in incest, and improvisations of dual
kingship that owed more to the indigenous cosmology than to the
political imports of the World System.
The diarchy actually began at Kamehameha’s death in 1819, when
Ka‘ahumanu proclaimed herself coruler with the young king Liholiho,
the child of her royal husband and her own foster son (cf. Kuykendall
1968:63–64) (see genealogy in Figure 1). Ka‘ahumanu assumed the
office of kuhina nui, so-called premier, but the haole knew her as “the
regent,” “the queen regent,” or “the old woman.” Liholiho took the
title Kamehameha II, just as Kauikeaouli became Kamehameha III in
1825. But so also was Ka‘ahumanu succeeded by closely related
women, Kîna‘u (1832–1839) and Kekâuluohi (1839–1845), who ac-
quired her name, her office as kuhina nui, and her relation of
“mother” to the king. Known respectively as Ka‘ahumanu II and
Ka‘ahumanu III, Kîna‘u and Kekâuluohi had succeeded to the social
person of Ka‘ahumanu—who had also been, not to forget, “that noble
mother in Israel” (Anderson 1870:134). (Kekâuluohi was in principle
acting in this capacity on behalf of the true heiress, Kamâmalu, the
infant daughter of Kîna‘u, who was kuhina nui during 1857–1862.)10
In sum, everything happened as if the kingship system had been frozen
at Kamehameha’s death, as if ever afterward the successors of the
principal royals would take on the personal names and relationships
then in effect. This practice of “positional succession” created a dual
kingship of a kind best known in East Africa. The leading royal woman
Fig. 1. Relation of kings and women rulers
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is the king’s “mother,” despite that on genealogical grounds the attri-
bution appears quite arbitrary: Kîna‘u (Ka‘ahumanu II) was the pater-
nal half sister of the kings Liholiho and Kauikeaouli, while Kekâuluohi
(Ka‘ahumanu III) was their father’s brother’s daughter, thus a (classi-
ficatory) “sister” (fig. 1).11 On the other hand, the designation of king’s
“mother,” by its sense of genealogical ascendancy and by the implied
control over the ruler, who was thereby maintained in his minority,
perhaps better than “premier” expresses the share of royal power
these women had acquired. Levi Chamberlain relates a conversation
between Ka‘ahumanu and one Capt. Hinckley, who had been given
some land by the governing chief of Kaua‘i, Kaikio‘ewa, which land
Ka‘ahumanu ordered returned:
“Who is King?” [asked Hinckley]. She said, “Owau [I am]. The
King is the head; but it is with me to direct.” He then turned to
Kaikioewa and asked, “Who is he?” She replied, “he kanaka
malalo iho o’u [a man under me].” (L. Chamberlain, journal, 3 Oct
1831)
The king and the Ka‘ahumanu chiefess were corulers: Neither could
act officially without the concurrence of the other, an arrangement
written into the constitution of 1840 (Bingham 1969:564–565). But
the real political fact was that the ruling woman had taken over the
royal land privileges, hence authority over the island governors—
whose own political status had evolved from the sovereign’s redistri-
bution of lands and was incompletely distinguished therefrom—and
control too of the kingdom’s tributes. In 1836, the king referred to
Kîna‘u as the ali‘i mâlama ‘âina, the “chief in charge of land” (L.
Chamberlain, journal, 16 Nov 1836).12 Commenting that her powers
were greater than the king’s, the French captain Vaillant confirmed
that she had the exclusive charge of executing his orders, collecting
tributes of all the lands, overseeing the governors, and presiding over
the chiefs’ councils. Moreover, “for anyone who knows the character
of the king and that of the princess [Kîna‘u], it is easy to judge that
the latter is in fact the true sovereign of the country” (in De La Salle
1845:2:338–339; Vaillant, report). The historic kingship thus repro-
duced an ancient form of dyarchy, the distinction between an active
executive chief and a gravitas ruler (cf. Valeri 1982), but only by
means of a series of structural inversions that marked out for the
king the traditional destiny of the deposed god.
The relation between the king and the royal woman reversed the
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normal gender distinction between an active and public masculinity,
a stable and domestic femininity. Andrews describes Kîna‘u as “his
[the king’s] agent for transacting business” (AB: Andrews, 1 July
1833).13 “Business,” moreover, linked the female ruler to foreign
powers, although classically the royal affines and maternal kin such
as the Ka‘ahumanu people represented indigenous ruling lines, to
which the king was stranger and usurper (cf. Sahlins 1981, 1985a).
The transformations are consistent with Valeri’s argument that after
1819 and the overthrow of the sacrificial system in which women
had been ritually disadvantaged, hierarchy came to depend primarily
on genealogical-reproductive principles, wherein women figure deci-
sively. “It is no accident,” Valeri concludes, “that female, not male,
chiefs played the most important political roles after the abolition of
the Old Regime” (1985:128). One only need add that, in the ultimate
inversion, these women had taken charge of the ritual tabus—namely,
the Protestant tabus through which Ka‘ahumanu and her successors
ruled. It follows logically, as it now would historically, that the king
represents the party of disorder—which is, paradoxically, the defense
of the indigenous order. The king periodically revolts.
In the event, King Kauikeaouli brought the Hawaiian system full
circle. In curious historical details, he lived the part of the superseded
god Lono: the one who in the old saturnalian rituals of the New Year,
the makahiki, came to reclaim the land, which was also to possess
(or fertilize) it sexually. In another parallel register, Lono came for his
abandoned wife, the sacred chiefly woman. But at the end of the cele-
brations, Lono was defeated and banished again by the ruling ali‘i,
who thus appropriated the god’s generative progress for humankind
(Sahlins 1985a; Valeri 1985). So in 1833–1834, King Kauikeaouli
attempted to seize control of the kingdom and the lands from Kîna‘u
and the pious chiefs, setting off a carnivalesque rebellion that proved
to be the last hurrah of the ancient monarchy.14
This “commotion” (haunâele) was the final one in the series of
royal revolts that had developed periodically since 1826–1827. Like
the previous crises, the “commotion” broke out at the turn of the year,
the ancient makahiki period.15 We have seen that in the earlier strug-
gles of Boki and Liliha against the Ka‘ahumanu mâ, the young king
was as much the prize as he was the main protagonist. The events of
1833–1834 were distinctive for the leadership taken by Kauikeaouli
and for his explicit claim on the sovereignty. Still, the decisive issue in
all the revolts had been the restoration of royal privilege, focusing on
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the right to redistribute the lands throughout the kingdom. The mark
of the royalists’ defeat would be the surrender of this right—and of
some or all of their personal estates. In the meantime the festive dimen-
sions of the old makahiki were revived. There was hula dancing in
the streets of Honolulu and the return of the old games and amuse-
ments, including the sexual license that once heralded the return of
Lono. In 1833 all this took place under the king’s aegis—as ritually
improved by the white man’s rum.16
Clearly the makahiki is a structure of the long run, an enduring
organizing principle of Hawaiian history. The expression of a total
cultural order projected on the calendrical plane, it continued to in-
habit the rhythms and content of Hawaiian social life long after 1819
when the old gods had been consigned to the flames. There it was: a
recurrent cycle of meaning and affect, popular as well as priestly, that
could be drawn on to represent forces of the conjuncture never
dreamed of in the ancient philosophy. Not surprisingly, in the first
years after the abolition of the tabus, the makahiki returned in barely
disguised form. An outbreak of games of boxing in October 1820,
followed by prolonged dancing in December presided over by the
image of the hula god (probably Laka, sister and wife of Lono), gave
the newly arrived missionaries some second thoughts about the sup-
posed overthrow of the old religion.17 During Liholiho’s reign, how-
ever, the attempt was made to transfer the celebration of the kingship
to the annual memorial of Kamehameha’s death. The anniversary was
honored with considerable festivities on April 26, 1820, May 16,
1821, May 5, 1822, and April 24, 1823.18 But after Liholiho’s funeral
and the institution of a Christian polity by the Ka‘ahumanu mâ, the
issue of kingship was again associated with the makahiki—and thus
with a certain unruliness. By the same transformation that made the
ruling woman Ka‘ahumanu the keeper of the faith, Kauikeaouli
(Kamehameha III) would be the prince of misrule. The truly Hawaiian
sovereignty was now represented by the suspension of the tabu—that
is, by outrages against the Protestant restrictions in the form of tradi-
tional practices. The king’s rebellion of 1833 began with a popular
epidemic of kite flying and was climaxed by a quasi-public act of
royal incest, events that evoked the ideology of the ancient regime at
the same time they defied the morality of the Protestant chiefs.
The makahiki was not simply royal doings, however. As a general
and popular ceremony of carnivalesque dimensions, it was celebrated
spontaneously by the people. This helps explain, on the one hand,
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the efficacy of the king’s ritual rebellions and, on the other, certain
kinds of popular resistance of the later 1830s also linked to the maka-
hiki but not directly connected with the kingship. Indeed, at the same
time as the “commotion” of 1833 was gathering force in Honolulu,
report comes from the remote district of Waimea, Hawai‘i, of an
unrelated celebration of the traditional festival: “January, 1833. Last
week the people having heard it was some where near the beginning
of a new year thought that they must pay some regard to a feast held
formerly on this occasion which was to eat abundantly of all such
things as they chanced to have & pray to Lono (Captain Cook). They
did not observe it exactly in the same way now—some of them col-
lected together & read & prayed—when told we had no such thing
they were quite astonished” (AB: Lyons, 6 Sept 1833).
The makahiki period of 1833 turned into a practical-historical
attempt on the part of the king to restore the kingship created by his
father, Kamehameha I. Ka‘ahumanu’s death the previous June had
opened the possibility. Kauikeaouli now proposed to free himself of
her successor Kîna‘u and the oligarchy of Christian chiefs. One of the
proximate causes of the rebellion, appreciated as such by contempo-
rary observers, was Kîna‘u’s refusal to pay for the ship the king had
contracted to buy, the schooner Bolivar Liberator, for which he had
promised $12,000 (Bingham 1969:447; Reynolds, journal, 12 and 14
Jan 1833; L. Chamberlain, journal, 4 Feb 1833). Hence the contem-
porary issue in the king’s demand for the land: He would thus take
control of the main source of income from his royal “mother.” Or as
Bingham put it, the king wanted to establish “an absolute despotism”
in place of what the missionary was pleased to call “the limited mon-
archy of his predecessors” (AB:ABCFM to Anderson, 20 Mar 1833).
Bingham did not wish to characterize the kind of domination Ka‘ahu-
manu had exercised since 1825. Yet it was relevant; indeed the mis-
sionaries had been anticipating some such coup on the king’s part
from the time of Ka‘ahumanu’s death. As late as November 1832
they were still congratulating themselves that nothing of the sort had
happened (HC: Chamberlain to Hunnewell, 12 Nov 1832; Judd to
Hunnewell, 29 Oct 1832). They were premature.
In December there seemed to be an unusual amount of hula and
intoxication in Honolulu. But the rebellion effectively began in late
January when, in a display such as had not been seen for years, a
hundred kites were set flying over the town. The missionaries were
scandalized by this frivolous—or was it intentionally seditious?—
200 Colonial Engagements—Colonial Entanglements
mediation between earth and heaven (Reynolds, journal, 25 Jan 1833).
“Report said Mr. Bingham told the Natives [at Sunday services] the
king was Hewa [wicked], and it was good to bring him to the
Church. Clark told them all who play with kites would die, etc. etc.”
(3 Feb 1833). By the eighteenth of February, Levi Chamberlain was
convinced that what he had feared from Ka‘ahumanu’s death was
now coming to pass. “It is very certain,” he wrote, “that the steps of
the king are in direct opposition to the cause of religion & morality
and it is probable that he has adopted this course because he thinks
his cause will be promoted by it” (Journal, 18 Feb 1833). Having
heard from a Hawaiian informant some days later that the king
planned to make a tour of O‘ahu with a company of hula dancers—
another echo of the makahiki, perceived by Chamberlain as an
“amusement of the wa naaupo [time of darkness]”—there was little
left for a Christian to do but pray: “Oh that the Lord would lift up a
standard against this and all works of darkness that are perpetrated
by the King and his adherents” (L. Chamberlain, journal, 28 Feb
1833).
On the other side of the haole fence, many of the foreign residents
were taking delight in the missionaries’ disarray. In the developing cor-
relation of forces, they were in sympathy with and sometimes direct
support of the king, if they did not always join in his revels. What the
pious chiefs called “commotion” and the missionaries a “return to
darkness,” Henry Peirce appreciated as a glorious “vacation from the
ecclesiastical tyranny.” It all had been brought about by Ka‘ahumanu’s
“rule of iron” and the missionaries’ “unbridled influence over that old
woman” (HC: Peirce to Hunnewell, 10 Aug 1833). Another of Peirce’s
epistles to this effect provides a fair description of the heady atmo-
sphere of Honolulu during the early weeks of the revolt:
The king and his party have thrown off all ecclesiastical restraint
which they have been under for so long a time. All their ancient
games & customs are revived again. We see the natives everywhere
about the Village [of Honolulu] playing the games of the stone
[ulumaika], the spear, etc., etc. Every evening large companys
assemble to sing, & dance—all in their ancient way. Nothing has
resulted from it yet except a few of the lower class of Natives
spending their time in carousing & drinking to excess. But these
and like excesses may be expected for a time after such a “Revolu-
tion.” They are no longer a priest-ridden people. The King has
assumed that authority which naturally belongs to him. (HC: Peirce
to Hunnewell, 11 Mar 1833)
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Certain aspects of the attempted coup are not sufficiently conveyed
in Peirce’s report, let alone in the ill-humored chronicles of the mis-
sionaries: the several interrelated dimensions of collective jouissance,
including the sexuality and the second historic declaration of the abo-
lition of the tabus. “The utmost Satisfaction appeared to light the
Countenances of the Spectators,” Stephen Reynolds said about one
of the early dances held in the compound next door to his. “The old
people’s Countenances wore such marks of Joy & Satisfaction at wit-
nessing the Pastimes of their youthful days!” (Reynolds, journal, 28
Feb 1833; cf. AB: Andrews, 1 July 1833). Soon after, all the Christian-
inspired laws except those prohibiting murder and theft were declared
void by the king. Most notably the marriage laws and sexual inter-
dictions were off. A crier was sent through Honolulu with the news
that husbands and wives were free to leave each other (L. Chamber-
lain, journal, 9 Mar 1833). A summons was made on all the prosti-
tutes of the town: They were to pay court to the king’s mistress, to be
her “inheritance” (12 Mar 1833). Freely lubricated by the rum pur-
chased on the royal account from the king’s merchant friends, all this
“moral vacation,” “commotion,” or “return to darkness” was known
to the participants as le‘ale‘a, “pleasure,” and especially noa, “freedom
from tabu.”19 No characterization could better confirm than the last,
noa, the people’s perceptions of the Christian order from which they
were thus freeing themselves.
The core of the king’s followers were the young men he had been
raised with and who were customarily expected to form the support
of his reign. They were called Hulumanu, “Bird Feathers”—as it were,
the living form of the glorious feather mantle that decorated and pro-
tected the royal person. A prominent role in the events was played by
the king’s special favorite, Kaomi (Ka Hae Hawaii, 11 Sept 1861;
Kamakau 1961:335). Born in Hawai‘i of a Tahitian father and a
Hawaiian woman, Kaomi had been an early and brilliant convert of
Bingham’s and a personal teacher to Ka‘ahumanu. He turned to sin
after the latter’s death and thereby achieved a certain secular power.
For the king spurned Ka‘ahumanu II (Kîna‘u) by introducing an ironic
form of the dual monarchy in which Kaomi was appointed the “en-
grafted king” (ke li‘i kui). On March 15, 1833, the latter, in full-dress
Windsor uniform, delivered a letter to Kîna‘u informing her that “The
King takes for himself all the lands conquered by Kamehameha his
father, granting to all others the lands by their fathers taken in con-
quest; with him is life and death, right and wrong, the amusements,
the laws and all doings, with him only” (L. Chamberlain, journal, 15
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Mar 1833). Later in the same day, however, in a moment of weak-
ness that effectively doomed the restoration of the kingship, Kaui-
keaouli publicly acknowledged Kîna‘u as the kuhina nui, the active
coruler.
The royal rebellion then seemed to subside through April and early
May. It was revived, however, when the king demanded that Kîna‘u
give up the commission of her husband Kekûanaò‘a, who as com-
mander of the royal guard and the fort detained the main means of
violence. War was bruited (L. Chamberlain, journal, 29 May 1833).
Again Kîna‘u was able to maintain control and the revolt resumed its
theatrical mode. “So much intoxication and disorder I have not wit-
nessed since the early days of my residence in the Islands” (7 June
1833). The king evidently did manage to appropriate and redistribute
certain lands (Kamakau 1961:335; AB: Bishop and Thurston to
Anderson, 5 Nov 1834). But time and again he failed to establish the
principle of sovereignty, which was the supreme right to the totality,
all the lands. In the latter part of June 1833, for example,
he addressed the Chiefs in substance as follows: I have told you
Chiefs, I want licensed Houses. I want the Lands, all the Lands.
The Fort. That these I must have. Smaller things, we will settle bye
and bye. Say you will give me these and I will go to Maui [where
the chiefs were trying to put him out of the way]. Say you Aye?
No one answered! Then I do not go. If you do not give me these, I
am a poor man. I am King only in name. . . . Kinau spoke with
warmth, and said I am in possession of the Lands and all the
property. You do bad. When I see you do good, then I shall give
you something. He said, then I am a poor man. (Reynolds, journal,
24 June 1833)
Perhaps the greatest political success of the king’s party was the
dismantling of the Christian apparatus of schools and churches. Early
on reports came in from O‘ahu and the other islands that church
attendance on Sundays had fallen off markedly and the schools were
being abandoned wholesale by students and teachers alike. The “pecu-
liar school system,” wrote Rev. Dibble, “crumbled into ruins,” yet
what could be expected of teachers who “were ignorant and already
taught about all they knew” (1909: 249)? The peculiarity of the school
system, as we know, was its direct link in organization and personnel
to the konohiki system.20 [Konohiki refers to the chiefs’ men in charge
of their local lands.] In the same way, the local grandees had spon-
sored the construction of “meetinghouses” in the out districts, often
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before there were any haole missionaries. Hence the declining curve
of school and church attendance was an index of the weakening hold
of the ruling chiefs on the local people.
In 1833–1834, half of the mission stations failed to report any so-
called readers for the reason that school attendance was derisory to
nonexistent.21 The reflections of several of the clergy on this alarming
state of affairs evoke an argument we have made here: The people’s
conversion had been infirmly founded on the chiefs’ coercion. Rever-
ends Dibble, Lyman, and Goodrich report to the secretary of the
ABCFM from Hilo, Hawai‘i in October 1834:
The reception of Christianity by the people of these islands was
not strictly a voluntary act. They embraced Christianity not be-
cause they had any conception of its nature or the least evidence
of its heavenly origin, but in obedience to the commands of their
chiefs. . . . The present condition of affairs at this station: the native
schools depending more than any other of our operations upon the
favors of the chiefs & the popularity of religion were the first to
fail. Many of them soon became entirely deserted. . . . The congre-
gations both at our center & out stations are very diminished.
(AB: Dibble et al., 14 Oct 1833)
From the scale of the disaffection one may reasonably judge that the
king’s party—the party of the old order—was the more popular one.
A missionary in Waimea, Hawai‘i (Baldwin), observing an “increase
in inequity” in the latter half of 1834, especially the heavy drinking,
was told the reason by the people themselves: “It is through their
anger at heavy taxes, oppression, etc to avoid Koeles [forced labor],
etc” (SR: Waimea, 1835). Yet if the people were for the king and
against the ruling chiefs, how many bayonets had this Lono? And
perhaps even more important, Kauikeaouli did not have the stomach
(na‘au) for it—he had never been a god of war.
Through the latter part of 1833 and well into 1834, the royal
rebellion more and more took on the air of symbolic gesture, and to
the same extent it was becoming more desperate. The Kîna‘u crowd
gained firm control of kingdom affairs in Honolulu, though the dis-
order continued in many parts of the provinces. The king made a
riotous left circuit of O‘ahu in August and September of 1833,
accompanied by a large and dissolute train of followers—“harpies”
in the missionary discourse. In direction, character, and timing—
before rather than after the makahiki—the circuit was the opposite
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of that taken annually by the king in olden times, when he reopened
the local temples with the appropriate ritual solemnities (Valeri 1985).
The situation during the following makahiki months was quieter than
the previous year, at least judging from reports out of Honolulu. And
from March of 1834 the king took to putting some distance between
himself and the ali‘i at Honolulu by traveling often to Pu‘uloa in ‘Ewa.
Here, however, his “vile conduct” continued (L. Chamberlain, journal,
29 Mar 1834). Worst of all from the Christians’ viewpoint, he
renewed a sexual cohabitation with his sister Nahi‘ena‘ena.
A critical conflict developed between Kauikeaouli and the sancti-
monious ali‘i over Nahi‘ena‘ena that almost cost the king his life and
in any case amounted to the agony of the traditional kingship. Again
it was a historically translated version of struggles of mythical mem-
ory, the issue being the disposition of the sacred woman and thus the
distribution of power between the king and his chiefs—or the legiti-
mate ruler and the usurper (cf. Sahlins 1985a). The king would marry
his sister, keep the royal woman to himself, which was a legendary
way of refusing to share power, as indeed it would endow the off-
spring of the so-called royal incest with unmatchable sanctity (cf.
Valeri 1972). Certain of the king’s followers, notably Boki [classifica-
tory younger brother and political rival of Ka‘ahumanu, official guar-
dian of Kauikeaouli], had been promoting this marriage for a long
time, in the intention of bolstering the kingship against the Ka‘ahu-
manu mâ. In fact the king loved his sister and had been sleeping with
her periodically for some years. So the governor of Maui, Hoapili,
and the good Dr. Judd kept close watch on her when she came to
O‘ahu from Lahaina in the beginning of 1834 (Sinclair 1976:133 ff.).
Especially the Christians were on guard when Nahi‘ena‘ena set off on
tour of the island, accompanied also by Kauikeaouli and his Hulu-
manu companions as far as ‘Ewa.22 After Nahi‘ena‘ena had completed
her circuit of O‘ahu, the king sent for her but she refused—because
of her fear of Hoapili, according to Reynolds (Journal, 8 June 1834).
The next day King Kauikeaouli, Kamehameha III, twice attempted
suicide, first by drowning and later by trying to slit his throat.23 Some
weeks later, however, in a final gesture of royal defiance, which could
also be taken as the ultimate reference to the tradition of the deposed
god-king’s search for his sacred wife, “the King took his Sister last
Evening in a Public Manner before the chiefs at Pearl River” (Rey-
nolds, journal, 22 July 1834). “This is indeed wickedness in high
places,” harrumphed Levi Chamberlain when he heard the news from
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Kîna‘u (journal, 22 July 1834). It was also the effective end of the
king’s rebellion.24
Not long after, the visiting French diplomat Théodore Adolphe
Barrot made an interesting assessment of Kauikeaouli’s relations to
Kîna‘u mâ and Bingham mâ that also helps make intelligible his con-
duct in the recent events [mâ is suffixed to a personal name to indi-
cate the followers of the person concerned]:
giving himself up entirely to his capricious passions, he relin-
quishes the care of the government to . . . Kinau. She . . . is com-
pletely under the influence of the missionaries, and they govern in
her name. . . . The king and his court are in open enmity with them.
It is with reluctance that the King submits outwardly to their reli-
gious and police [i.e., political] regulations, and often does he
shake off this yoke; but his desires for independence reach not to
the determination of seeing clearly into the affairs of state, and it
is his personal conduct only that he strives to withdraw from the
investigation and censure of the missionaries. Thus there exists at
present [1836], a sort of tacit agreement between the missionaries
and himself; an agreement, so to speak, has been entered into
between them, that he will not interfere with the government, on
condition that no evangelical censure shall ever cross the threshold
of his palace. (1978:67)
True that for years after the events of 1833–1834, the king contin-
ued to celebrate the New Year in an abridged form of the old maka-
hiki festival. On January 1, 1838, for instance, the Reverend Baldwin
reported to Chamberlain: “The King’s awfully wicked feast is now in
progress. This is the third day of the doings. Sab[bath] was the 2d.
. . . Whose hogs were the 800 to be eaten at this feast? All the coco-
nuts of Lahaina were lawe wale [requisitioned without compensation]
for it” (MsL: Baldwin, 1 Jan 1838).
Or again, on New Year’s Day four years later, Lorrin Andrews
wrote to Levi Chamberlain: “The King is now holding his annual feast
(Bacchanalian revel)—evil may be expected to follow, as before”
(MsL: Andrews, 1 Jan 1842). However, Kauikeaouli was fast becom-
ing a “civilized king.” After the death of his beloved sister in 1837, he
had retired to Lahaina. Here he lived for eight years, watched (and
worked) over by William Richards and the governing chiefs, while
the Ka‘ahumanus (Kîna‘u and Kekâuluohi) and their haole ran the
kingdom out of Honolulu. Periodically the docile king was summoned
back to Honolulu to sign some agreement with the commander of a
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passing ship of war, to return immediately thereafter to Lahaina where
he was building a palace (never completed for lack of funds).25 These
were the years that evoked the reports that the king “was almost a
myth” (L. F. Judd 1966:137).
Defeat and seclusion, however, were working a change in Kaui-
keaouli’s public character. Before 1837, he had been a king of billiards,
a habitué of the game rooms and grog shops of Honolulu, a sovereign
“without presence,” treated with familiarity as a good-time crony by
his white drinking partners (Ruschenberger 1970:2:327–328).26 But
when he returned from Lahaina in 1845, he seemed fairly metamor-
phosed. Periodically taking “the pledge” and more-or-less regularly
attending church services, he threw brilliant (if nonalcoholic) soirées
at his newly refurbished palace, attended by le tout Honolulu.27 Under
the eye of the “Palace Chamberlain,” access to the king was restricted
to certain personages and conducted according to the protocol estab-
lished in 1815 by the Congress of Vienna (The Polynesian, 29 June,
20 July 1844). Formally enacted as a code of etiquette, the protocol
gave the kingdom a pretentious roster of officials to go with its elab-
orate distinctions of conduct. Some years later, when all this was on
public display at the funeral of Victoria Kamâmalu, Mark Twain was
moved to comment that “In our country children play ‘keep house’
and in the same high-sounding but immature way the grown folk here,
with the poor material of slender territory and meagre population,
play ‘empire’ ” (1904:243). Indeed, since the establishment of the
Royal School in 1840, the potential heirs to the Crown and the future
high nobility had been well educated in the airs of European dignity.
Kauikeaouli’s successor, Alexander Liholiho (reign 1854–1863), was
as polished as any royalty of his day—and probably more intelligent.
But the ancient Hawaiian kingship was dead. In its place a “civi-
lized” king reigned—but did not govern. From 1840, Hawai‘i offi-
cially became a constitutional monarchy. In principle, the king shared
power with a Privy Council, increasingly dominated by whites, and a
bicameral legislature composed of a House of Nobles and a Chamber
of the People’s Representatives. The representatives proved ineffectual.
Nor apparently did the common people put much stock in the demo-
cratic process, as witness the following report to the legislature of an
election of popular representatives in Kaua‘i:
The Governor of Kauai then reported of the election of three dis-
tricts in his Island as follows:
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The First District said: “There is no use electing a Representa-
tive as the one we elected to the Legislature last time went there
and passed a law making us pay $1.00 tax on our dogs.”
The Second District said: “There is no use electing a Represen-
tative because the lands are being sold.”
The Third District said, “There is no use electing a Representa-
tive as he will get a swallow-tail coat.” (AH/HN: May 1847)
By now the common people had accumulated a considerable con-
sciousness of their affliction, as well as a considerable history of re-
sistance, that alienated them as much from the existing “civilized”
state as the state was alien to things Hawaiian. In this connection, the
royal rebellion of 1833–1834 can be reckoned as the first of a series
of social movements by which the people-in-general demonstrated
their disenchantment with the powers-that-be.
Notes
1. “The prejudices of White men against the natives, on account of their
color is very strong; and most of the foreigners unconnected with the Mis-
sion, seem to have little charity or sympathy for any who wears a copper-
colored skin” (Lee/Letters: to Simon Greenleaf, 3 Mar 1849).
2. “He [Richards] is a grave, sanctified looking person of fair abilities and
although an American I believe means well” (Simpson 1973:158).
3. Judd was referring to the aforementioned Hiram Bingham, the domi-
nant and domineering figure among the American Protestant missionaries
from 1821 to 1844.
4. Armstrong wrote that “unless things went to please foreigners there
was trouble. Hence they called for help. The former premier Kinau told me
10 years ago, they were under the feet of foreigners & must have help. She
said, ‘our people we can easily manage, but foreigners are too much for us’ ”
(AC: 11 Oct 1847).
5. For a contemporary view from Hawai‘i of the complementarity of com-
merce and Christianity in promoting spiritual progress, see Jarves’ article
(1943) in Hunt’s Merchants’ Magazine.
6. The text adopts Mark Twain’s characterization of the missionaries as
“the mishes.”
7. Simpson also had a theory of Hawaiian ritual and religion that could
have—indeed recently has—graced the pages of a modern anthropological
journal: “The ancient religion was as unmeaning as it was bloodthirsty.
Whatever its origin, it had practically degenerated into a mere instrument of
the oppressive policy of the privileged class. The absurd and arbitrary taboos,
which were venerated as oracles of the gods, had in effect, no other general
end in view than that of schooling the bodies and souls of the people in an
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unfaltering course of passive obedience. . . . In all probability, however, the
pretended organs of the Hawaiian Molochs, at least down to the days of the
discovery, were the dupes of their own impostures” (1847:(2)97).
8. “Property is much safer here now than formerly. The visits of the
American, English & French Men of War during the last 16 months have
established the inviolably [sic] of property & persons—& the natives taught
& made to fear the ‘Laws of Nations’ & that a Sovereign & government
came under the bans of laws as well [as] subjects of individuals” (HC: Peirce
to Hunnewell, 6 Aug 1837).
9. During this time, Mrs. Gerrit Judd said of Charlton, “The English
Consul boasted of a list of grievances long enough to reach around the
palace” (L. F. Judd 1966:138). The U.S. commissioner likewise sent a list of
grievances to Washington that was 208 feet long, or as Daws calculated, one
foot of grievance for every eight haole in the kingdom (1968:111).
10. While in office, Kekâuluohi was called Ka‘ahumanu (see LC/NR
11:29; or the petition to her so addressed in F.0. and Ex 17, Oct 1842). After
her death in 1845, Keoni Ana (or John Young II), the son of John Young
(Kamehameha’s most important ali’i haole), was appointed kuhina nui. But
Keoni Ana was more importantly the minister of the interior. The co-kingship
effectively lapsed after Kekâuluohi, and when Kamâmalu became kuhina nui
in 1857, it was a moribund institution. For a legendary example of
mother-son dyarchy, see Kamakau (1961:34). Valeri (1990) provides a gen-
eral discussion of dyarchic tendencies in Hawaiian history.
11. Nonetheless, Chamberlain reported to Hunnewell in 1832 that Kaui-
keaouli had acknowledged Kîna‘u as “makuawahine” (makuahine, “mother”),
meaning she was recognized as coruler (HC: Chamberlain to Hunnewell, 12
Nov 1832). Similarly, Bingham refers to both Kîna‘u and Kekâuluohi as the
king’s mothers (1969:436, 533). At the death of Kîna‘u the king issued a
proclamation announcing that “the authority hitherto possessed by my
mother [ku‘u makuahine] is now transferred to my other mother (Miriam
Kekâuluohi)” (USCD: Brinsmade, 1 July 1839; see Gilman 1909:49; Kekâu-
luohi, journal, 5 Feb 1840). The only way we can contrive a genealogical
explication would be from Kamehameha’s occasional reference to his son
Liholiho as his grandson, tracing to him through his mother Keopuolani,
who was Kamehameha’s sister’s daughter as well as his wife. This mode of
reckoning would also connect Liholiho with Maui ruling line and give him
higher rank than Kamehameha could bestow. On such grounds, Kîna‘u and
Kekâuluohi would be a generation superior to Kamehameha’s sons, thus
their “mothers.”
12. Alternately, but to the same effect, the king once said that Kîna‘u was
noho hale to him—meaning the “occupier of the house,” the one who has
the charge for the “owner of the house” (mea hale)—and that she was ‘imi
hale as concerns the chiefs, the “seeker (or gatherer) of property” (L. Cham-
berlain, journal, 15 Mar 1833).
13. Although Ka‘ahumanu, Kîna‘u, and Kekâuluohi took active part in
kingdom affairs, the gravitas:celeritas distinction, more normally correspond-
ing to female:male, was recursively reproduced by the woman usually hav-
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ing a junior male doing the business, as Ka‘ahumanu had Kalaimoku and
Kîna‘u had Kekûanaò‘a.
14. The course of events can be followed from numerous accounts of the
period, including Bingham’s memoirs (1969; see Dibble 1909:244 ff.), but
on a detailed day-to-day basis they are best described in the journals of Rey-
nolds and Levi Chamberlain. Andrews wrote an interesting account to the
ABCFM (AB: Andrews, 1 July 1833), only the uninteresting end of which
was published in the Missionary Herald (MH 30 (1834):286–287). However,
the story can be read from the statistics of church and church-school atten-
dance and the accompanying complaints, published in the Missionary
Herald for relevant dates, or from local missionary letters and station reports
(AB, MsL, and SR). See also Kamakau (1961:334 ff.).
15. The period in question is from about November through February,
give or take a month on either end. See, for example, L. Chamberlain (jour-
nal, 20 Dec 1826–13 Feb 1827, various dates in Mar 1829, Jan–Feb 1831);
Hunnewell (HC/Journal: various dates in Jan 1831), the Missionary Herald
(various dates, 37–39 (1833–1835); or the pertinent dates in Reynolds (jour-
nal) and Bingham (1969). It should be noted that the makahiki festival had
been celebrated in modified form since the 1820s, that is, after the abolition
of the tabus. Indeed, the king’s New Year celebrations through the 1840s, at
least, continued to include elements and sentiments of the ancient rites.
16. Richards early in 1832 was able to foresee the events. “It seems to
me,” he wrote to Chamberlain, “the chiefs [Ka‘ahumanu mâ] are giving up
their authority, that the king will at no distant period have a powerful party,
though he appears to me to be very weak at present” (MsL: Richards, 20
Feb 1832).
17. On October 21, 1820, the O‘ahu missionaries observed in their col-
lective journal that “This is the season of the grand taboo, which has some-
times continued 40 days, and heretofore been celebrated by special sacrifices
to the gods, and by games of boxing” (MH 18 1822:279). Interestingly
enough, October 21, 1820 is calculably the fourteenth day (night) of the
Hawaiian month Ikuwa, which in the traditional makahiki calendar opens
the season of popular amusements (see Sahlins, ms). The missionaries indeed
noted that boxing had commenced two days previously, though a game of
boxing for the twenty-first was canceled. The hula, reported by the mission-
aries from about December 10 to 20 (MH 18 1822:203, 207), seems to have
been going on for some time earlier. For December 3, Marin’s journal reads,
“All the people drunk”; and the next day, “The people dancing” (Gast and
Conrad 1973:244–245; see HC/Journal: 14 and 19 Dec 1820). There was
also a feast on December 14 (Gast and Conrad 1973:245). All this would
fall in late Welehu and early Makali‘i by the Hawaiian calendar, the time of
the circuit of Lono and of the people’s dancing and feasting. Governor Boki’s
preparations of houses and tributes for the king on November 22–23, more-
over, would correspond to the traditional offering (ho‘okupu) of Welehu 17
(= November 23, 1820; HC/Journal: 22 and 23 Nov 1820).
18. The memorial rites may be followed in the Missionary Herald (MH
17 1821:133; 20 1824:208–209); Gast and Conrad (1973:234, 264, 277–
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278); Tyerman and Bennet (1831:1:441, 445); Haskell (journal, 15 May
1821); LMS Letters (Ellis to Bruder, 25 Apr 1823); and Stewart’s Residence
(1970:114 ff.). All these days fall on the fourteenth or the fifteenth night of
the moon, corresponding to death day of Kamehameha in May 1819; the
1823 date indicates that an intercalation was made that year in the Hawai-
ian lunar calendar.
19. On noa, see HC (Peirce to Hunnewell, 11 Mar 1833); on le‘ale‘a,
Kamakau (1961:337), Hawaiian text, Ke Au ‘Oko‘a (7 Jan 1869).
20. The connection between local schools and local konohiki begun in
1825–1826 continued into the 1830s. Lyons in 1837 describes what he calls
“an amusing adult school” in Waimea, Hawai‘i, consisting of 120 konohiki,
some of whom were women, since Paul’s injunctions were not observed in
the Sandwich Islands; on the contrary, says the missionary, women “often
usurp authority over the men & hold the reins of government over large
districts.” Lyons apparently found this school amusing because half the
students could not read and only one-fourth knew any writing (SR: Waimea,
1837).
21. Waialua was a partial exception, as we shall see. Kamakau confirms
this while noting that “in other places all over Oahu there were no religious
meetings held, and the schools were dead” (1961:338).
22. “Hear from ‘Ewa by Dr. Judd that the King’s conduct is very vile &
unbecoming. . . . In returning from bathing he seized upon women & chased
them. He called for awa [kava] and used to excess a preparation of that
root. Dr. Judd feels it his duty to keep close to the Princess [Nahi‘ena‘ena] &
to attend her through the whole course of her tour around the island” (L.
Chamberlain, journal, 29 Mar 1834).
23. This is from Stephen Reynolds (journal, 9 June 1834), who had the
report from Dr. Rooke in ‘Ewa. Reynolds also mentions various specula-
tions current about the cause of the king’s attempt, ranging from despair
over the deaths of certain chiefs to “the chiefs refusing to give up the lands.”
“All guessed,” said Reynolds, “none knew.” Levi Chamberlain says nothing
directly about the king’s attempted suicide, only that Judd and Bingham
went to ‘Ewa to see him, and from inquiries there Judd “satisfied himself
that the king had been at least for a time in a state of mental derangement.
The cause was probably excessive use of strong drink. This perhaps in con-
nection with other things” (Journal, 11 June 1834).
24. I have given a detailed narration of the events in part to correct a
lamentably inaccurate and oversimplified account—arising in a bizarre col-
lation of archival notes—of the sequence and relationship of Kauikeaouli’s
suicide attempt, his union with Nahi‘ena‘ena, and their respective tours of
O‘ahu, in Sahlins (1981:61).
25. In 1841, Lt. Wilkes noted that the king had storehouses in Lahaina to
hold his revenues, consisting largely of heaps of tapa cloth. The king com-
plained of being short of money, as his revenues were in tapa and produce of
little value; and as he had so many hangers-on to feed and clothe, he was
rendered “quite as poor as many of his subjects” (Wilkes 1845:4:237–238).
26. The king, said Vaillant in 1836 (report), “has so little tenue and
Marshall Sahlins 211
allows the chiefs and whites such familiarity with himself, that in Honolulu
he is considered rather as a simple individual than as the sovereign of the
Sandwich Islands” (see L. Chamberlain, journal, 27 Oct 1828). Likewise,
according to Barrot, “Kauikeaouli spends all his evenings in a public billiard
room, playing and drinking with the first one that comes” (1978:68).
27. “This evening his Majesty gave a ‘soirée’ at his palace which was bril-
liantly illuminated throughout for the occasion. It was more of a formal
display, after civilised fashion, than I have ever before witnessed” (L. Cham-
berlain, journal, 6 Feb 1845). However, a European visitor at midcentury
could still write that the king “was entirely conquered by the spirit—partly
that of religion through the missionaries, partly that of cognac through the
French” (Gerstaecker 1855:280). Meanwhile, the missionaries were some-
times congratulating themselves on the king’s apparent piety, sometimes griev-
ing at his relapses (e.g., ABM: Armstrong, 31 Jan, 4 May 1848).
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Deaths on the Mountain
An Account of Police Violence in
the Highlands of Papua New Guinea1
August Kituai
In 1930 nearly a thousand Papua New Guinean men served as police,
just over three hundred in Papua and twice that number in New
Guinea (Kituai, 1993). A major part of their task involved exploring
the country and “pacifying” the people. And it was from this patrol
work that the police won praise from their officers, the government
generally, and a wider public (Lett, 1935; Murray, 1931:571–582;
Hides, 1938). The policemen with their rucksacks, .303 Lee-Enfield
carbines, close-shaven hair, fine physique, and their police uniforms
walked into thousands of villages: They were the most numerous of
the government’s agents. They were engaged in cultural exchanges
and they brought to the villages aspects of their own and European
culture. They took away with them the villagers’ songs, dances, house-
building styles, magic, and fishing techniques (Panoff 1969:111–125).
They interpreted what they could of the masta’s2 ways to the villagers,
and they demonstrated the value of some of the material benefits of
the nupela pasin,3 the kerosene lanterns, fishing lines and hooks, and
steel stools. All that was expected, but the police were also aggressive
and enthusiastic agents of change. In other words, Papua New Guinea
policemen did in fact act as civilizing agents, as interpreters and as
middlemen of the colonial governments in particular and of Western
influence generally to the villagers; yet, their excellent records were
tainted because they used force and intimidation to expedite social
change and government control.
It is this latter part of police work in Papua New Guinea that I
wish to discuss in this chapter by analyzing one bloody shooting inci-
dent in Papua New Guinea’s central highlands in the late 1940s. But,
first, it is essential to explain under what circumstances Papua New
Guinea policemen were allowed to use force.
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The Official Position
Sir Hubert Murray on October 1,1909, issued a set of offi-
cial instructions on how officers of the Papuan Armed Constabulary
and their contingent of policemen should conduct themselves in the
execution of their duties. His official directive was specific and con-
demned the use of unnecessary force. He conceded, however, that
some force could be used under special circumstances:
1. Officers in command of Armed Constabulary are reminded
that they can never, under any circumstances, be justified in firing
upon natives by way of punishment. Without attempting an ex-
haustive statement of the law of homicide it may be taken that
there are three, and, so far as officers of the Constabulary are con-
cerned, only three cases in which life may lawfully be taken:
(i) In self-defence, including the defence of police, carriers
and others.
(ii) For the purpose of preventing the escape of a person who
has been arrested, or whom it is sought to arrest, upon reason-
able suspicion of having committed certain offenses (including
murder and manslaughter).
(iii) In overcoming a forcible resistance to the execution of
process or to an arrest.
2. The sections referred to do not justify the taking of life except
in cases of necessity—that is where there is no other way of pro-
tecting the life of the person attacked, or of preventing the escape,
or of overcoming the forcible resistance. The section should be
studied carefully.
3. It should be borne in mind that these sections lay down the
conditions under which life may, in extreme instances, be taken
without incurring criminal liability; they should not be taken for
guides as a matter of general practice, but should rather be re-
garded as danger signals marking the extreme limits of legality.
Further, officers should never forget that it is the settled policy of
the Government not to resort to force except in cases of necessity
when all other means have failed, and that it by no means follows
because an officer may have a good defence on a charge of man-
slaughter that his conduct will, therefore, escape censure.
4. Questions of the capture of fugitive offenders and of overcom-
ing resistance to arrest arise less frequently than that of self-
defence, and officers may take it that they will not be justified in
opening fire, by way of self-defence, unless they have been actually
attacked that is, unless arrows have been discharged or spears
thrown. Even then they will not be justified unless their own lives
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or the lives of others are actually endangered. Threats of attacks
can rarely amount to a sufficient justification.4
Kiaps5 and cadets6 of the New Guinea Service were issued with a
similar set of “Standing Instructions” in 1925.7 Officially, officers
from both territories were instructed to use force only under special
circumstances.
The Situation on the Frontier
To delve into the circumstances surrounding each case of
coercion by officers and men during the colonial period would prove
too difficult, time consuming and, in the end, perhaps futile given the
documentary data at hand. It can be stated generally, however, that
many Papua New Guinean men and women were shot dead, or suf-
fered other forms of atrocities (hanging, flogging, whipping, imprison-
ment, etc.) at the hands of private persons as well as from colonial
officers during the whole period of colonial rule. Nelson, in “The
Swinging Index,” has an excellent treatise on the subject, revealing the
nature of the crimes committed by Papua New Guineans, the types of
punishments incurred, the frequency of their occurrence, and the
extent to which officers and men encouraged severe forms of punish-
ment for particular types of offenses during the period between 1888
and 1945 (1978:130–152). More recently, Connolly and Anderson
calculated on the basis of documents that for the highlands region,
“total casualties to gunfire directed by white prospectors and patrol
officers [and their band of policemen] throughout the 1930s might con-
ceivably have amounted to a thousand men, women and children.”8
Essentially, this was caused by the colonial government’s determi-
nation to establish its authority over tribesmen. They were imbued
with the determination to spread the Pax Britannica, Australiana, and
Germanica and impose their conception of law. That a few lives were
lost was, in their view, a reasonable cost for the general advancement
they eventually hoped to bring to the villagers.
Following is one example of police and officer violence. It is from
the highlands region—by the 1960s the remaining major frontier of
contact. I would like to describe this particular incident in detail be-
cause it allows us, firstly, to become aware of the extent of police and
officer violence on the frontier and, secondly, to understand the pecu-
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liarities and ambivalence of official laws/instructions to officials work-
ing on the edge of government control.
In July 1947, five innocent men from the Kouno area of the Cen-
tral Highlands District were shot dead by a company of eleven police-
men. The circumstances of the presence of the patrol party at Dika,
the shooting of the warriors, an investigation by the Department of
District Services and Native Affairs into the causes, and the resultant
exoneration of those concerned is now told from available primary
documents.
In early July 1947, the assistant district officer of Chimbu, John
Amery Costelloe, received a complaint from Geru, leader of a sub-
clan of the tribe of Karap in the general area of Kouno in the Chimbu
subdistrict, that two women from the village, while attending to their
gardens, had been chopped to pieces by men of their enemy tribe—
the Dika. All previous attempts to settle the matter peacefully and to
get the Dika to compensate the aggrieved families had failed. Instead,
the Dika became more aggressive and challenged the Karap warriors
to a duel to settle the score whenever compensation demands were
raised. It had been a drawn-out affair and Geru, wishing to avoid an-
other bloody confrontation,9 sought the protection of officer Costelloe.
Consequently, a patrol party consisting of Costelloe, kiap Craig
Andrew John Symons, and eleven policemen gathered at Kerowagi
and set off for Karap village on July 11, 1947, intending to arrange a
peace settlement to the conflict between the two warring factions.
While Costelloe was an experienced officer, Symons was new to Papua
New Guinea and the Central Highlands. In fact he had only recently
arrived from Sydney, after completing a program of instructions at
ASOPA on February 17, 1947, and being posted to Chimbu District
“for duty and further training” soon after.10 By July 11, 1947, he had
been in the country for a little less than five months. It could there-
fore be said that Symons was young, inexperienced, and incompetent
with tok pisin, “which is so essential when giving instructions to the
police,” it being the lingua franca of most New Guinean policemen.11
After receiving an urgent telegram message on the night of July 12,
1947, at Dimbin, Costelloe left for Moresby the following morning.
He left Symons in charge with a strong warning that he could pro-
ceed slowly as far as Karap village but to go no farther until he re-
turned.12 In fact, he was warned in no uncertain terms of the “extreme
danger to be expected” beyond that point.13 Symons was advised that
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if he had to have an audience with the tribal leader of the hostile group
he could do so only if Mek, the leader, came to Karap. At some stage
after reaching the Kouno area, and before his departure, Costelloe
issued fifty-five rounds of .303 ammunition to eleven policemen, but
forty-four were returned, “leaving eleven rounds to be accounted for
by Symons’ party.”14
On July 17, 1947, Symons and his entourage finally arrived at
Karap village and for the next three days he tried in vain, through the
assistance of messengers, to inveigle Mek of Dika to come to Karap.
Mek continued to maintain his defiant stance and refused to come to
Symons for a peaceful settlement with his enemy. Instead, he returned
Symons’ messengers with loads of insult and the occasional present.
Mek’s arrogance and his persistent refusal to obey orders from a gov-
ernment officer taunted Symons in no small measure. This is manifest
in the correspondence, some of which is quoted below, that followed
after the event, but more so with regard to his next move.
On July 21,1947, against the strong advice of his superior officer
and a suggested bravado (Costelloe’s letter quoted below), he walked
to Dika “looking for trouble,”15 accompanied by his party of police-
men and villagers from the aggrieved tribe. Consequently, five inno-
cent Dikans lost their lives from gunshot wounds along the hillside of
their once familiar territory.
Costelloe was understandably shocked when Symons told him of
the tragedy after his return from Port Moresby on July 27, 1947. At
least his letter to James Taylor soon after reflected this frame of mind:
I am sorry to advise that young Symons mucked things in Kouno
and became involved in a totally unwarranted shooting affray, kill-
ing five men. . . . I instructed him to proceed as far as Karap, there
to remain until I got back.
For some reason or other he disobeyed my orders. The usual in-
sulting messages were brought to him and I guess that he took them
to mean a reflection on his own courage—anyway he went looking
for trouble. As he approached the hostile people, they laid down
their arms and shields and fled. He had told the police to open fire
if that happened and they immediately did so, shooting five men
in the backs and killing them. Most unfortunate and unjustified.
There was no attack at all and the fact of them laying down their
arms indicated their desire to parley. He then permitted his party
to lay waste some banana patches—totally unjustified [author’s
emphasis].16
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Taylor’s reply to Costelloe was prompt. The reasons were contained
in his letter forwarded two days later from Goroka on August 13,
1947. The relevant parts read:
Please advise a/Patrol Officer Symons:—
1. To submit a confidential report to you (pass to me).
2. That I shall not order an inquest; that if I were to do so and
that the evidence produced indicated that natives were shot when
his or the lives of his police were not in real and imminent danger
and that he gave the order to fire, the coroner would have no
alternative but to commit him and such police who fired, for trial
upon a charge of unlawful killing.
5. Not to discuss the subject with anyone except yourself or write
about it to his friends or other members of the service. Publicity
may cause legal action with possible disastrous results to himself.
6. Not to worry. His error is one of youth and I shall protect
him, but he is to obey lawful orders implicitly.17
Advised hence by Costelloe, Symons, with the incident fresh in his
memory, bared it all, as he had done to Costelloe, and wrote down
the facts as they had occurred at Dika. The thrust of his written
admission was that, although the men had not contravened any offi-
cial regulation, he had actually ordered his policemen to shoot the flee-
ing men in the back, under what turned out to be a false impression,
that their actions were a “trick” to ambush his party.18 The in-
discriminate shooting killed five men, namely: Denimp, Du, Kum,
Manimp, and Waim.19 The report, written on September 7, 1947,
was forwarded to Costelloe, as suggested in Taylor’s letter of August
13, which was then delivered to Taylor in Goroka.
Strange as it might seem, after this correspondence the tragic fate
of the five Dikans would have rested, if Taylor’s letter to Costelloe of
August 13 is any indication, had it not been for an unsubstantiated
report of subinspector Bernard’s inquiry into the Kouno deaths that
triggered an official inquiry.20 The probing of Australian newspapers
the following year into the secrecy surrounding the whole affair also
helped publicize the tragedy to an international audience.21 We do not
know how the Australian newspapers came by their story, or who
commissioned the little-known Bernard inquiry. What we do know is
that Taylor’s attempted cover-up of the Kouno deaths failed, resulting
in the somewhat mysterious inquiry conducted by Bernard. This short-
lived inquiry is important in one respect: Taylor got to know about it.
That the inquiry avoided him as a point of reference is no real sur-
prise, but he acted swiftly, it seems, to get a head start on Bernard’s
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inquiry, and further to discourage what in his view might involve un-
necessary and protracted court proceedings. He wrote to his most
senior officer—the director of the Department of District Services and
Native Affairs, Mr. J. H. Jones,—and enclosed the correspondence be-
tween himself, Costelloe, and Symons regarding the deaths at Dika.
His letter ended with a strong plea not to reveal the contents of
Symons’ report to anyone who might be ill-disposed to use it as a
vendetta against Symons in the future: “I draw your attention to the
fact that Mr. Symons’ report is a confidential one, perhaps induced
by my memorandum to the Assistant District Officer, Chimbu, of
13th August 1947 (attached), and I submit that its contents should
not be allowed to become known to any persons who might be con-
cerned in a prosecution of that officer and who might use it in evi-
dence should such a prosecution eventuate.”22
Fortunately, Taylor’s enclosed correspondence between himself and
his two subordinates was not swept under the carpet as he would
have liked by the acting director of the Department of District Services
and Native Affairs. Instead, he circulated the three documents among
the relevant authorities—the administrator, J. K. Murray, the govern-
ment secretary, the acting Crown law officer, Mr. E. B. Bignold, and,
through the advice of the administrator, the minister for External Ter-
ritories, Mr. E. J. (Eddie) Ward, in Canberra. These authorities there-
fore reviewed the documents and, on prima facie evidence, agreed that
neither Taylor nor Symons could not be let off lightly. In other words,
their initial reactions agreed with the gravity of the situation—that five
lives had been lost, and from the available evidence someone ought
to be held responsible. For example, the reaction of the acting director
of DDSNA on receipt of Taylor’s earnest plea in his subsequent mem-
orandum to the acting government secretary reads as follows:
It will be noted that the District Officer’s letter to Mr. Costelloe is
dated the 13th August 1947 whereas the report to this Department
is dated the 10th October 1947. From this, and the general trend
of the correspondence, it would appear that Mr. Taylor’s original
intention was not to report the case to this Headquarters, but deal
with it as an administrative matter, taking the responsibility for
such action upon his own shoulders. Maybe Mr. Bernard’s enquiry
caused the District Officer to change his mind [emphasis added].
If it had been an ambush affair, or a clash in uncontrolled terri-
tory against armed warriors, I would be inclined to support Mr.
Taylor, but the reports make it quite clear that there was no
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ambush, the natives shot were unarmed and in face of the fact that
Mek voluntarily reported to the Assistant District Officer at the
Government station Chimbu shortly after, no doubt to complain,
it cannot be claimed that the area is uncontrolled.
Both Mr. Symons and Mr. Taylor were suspended from active duty
pending the outcome of the official police inquiry headed by the newly
appointed police inspector, Mr. J. H. McDonald.23 He submitted the
completed report to Mr. J. S. Grimshaw, the superintendent, Royal
Papuan Constabulary, by December 11, 1947, and subsequently cir-
culated it through his office to the appropriate authorities in Port
Moresby and the minister for External Territories in Canberra. On the
basis of this investigation, and the support it received from the various
authorities, Symons and his policemen were exonerated from any
charge.24
This position was, of course, a dramatic reversal of their earlier
decision that someone be held responsible for the deaths. In other
words, when confronted with the raw evidence before the investiga-
tion, there was little doubt left in their minds as to who was respon-
sible—but later, with the lapse of time, further reflection, and addi-
tional information, the guilty verdict was overruled.
What changed their minds?
This question necessitates a review of the various viewpoints aris-
ing from the inquiry; namely, those of McDonald, Grimshaw, the ad-
ministrator, and the minister for External Territories. First comes the
report of the inquiry. As his terms of reference, McDonald interviewed
Assistant District Officer Costelloe, kiap Symons, four policemen,
including Sergeant Bus of Manus, Constable Numibi of Heganofi
(E.H.P.), Constable Waim of Chimbu, and Constable Gande of West-
ern Highlands; and, with the aid of interpreters, three villagers, two
of whom were Dikans, one being Mek, the Dikan leader. Claiming
agonizing muscle pains, McDonald did not visit Dika, “but viewed it
from some distance off.” In his report to the director of District Ser-
vices and Native Affairs, he made known his position:
I have given this matter a great deal of thought and consideration
and I desire to suggest that this Department take all possible steps
to prevent this unfortunate young man being brought before the
Court. If he is to face a charge of unlawful killing, I have no doubt
that there would be no conviction, but as people are so prime to
talk of such cases, he would probably carry this stigma for many
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years in peoples minds, especially those who do not know the facts,
and probably ruin the life of a very promising man, who was
endeavoring to please his superiors.
The law says that all cases where the loss of life is involved are
to be decided by the court, but conditions in the uncontrolled areas
are such that our present staff of young Patrol Officers are in
danger of these war like tribes every time they enter these areas.
It is my hope that this case and others of a similar nature, which
are bound to follow, be kept an Administrative one, and prevent it
becoming a legal action. If officers are to face charges of unlawful
killing or other court action, young men of the type that this Ad-
ministration desires to employ would not be forthcoming and
parents would dissuade their sons from doing so.
One would have thought that McDonald’s responsibility was to con-
duct an impartial inquiry, but this quotation reads as if his mind had
already been made up well before it.
A good number of the policemen I interviewed indicated that there
were times, in the absence of their kiap, when they abused the
authority vested in them, but they never did this when their kiap was
a member of the patrol party. Three of the four policemen—Sgt. Bus,
Constable Numibi, Constable Waim—told McDonald during the in-
quiry that, as far as they could remember, Symons had in fact advised
them, on the night before their trip to Dika, to do one of two things:
either to make friends with the Dikans if they stood still and accepted
Symons’ appeasement speech on behalf of Karap villagers, or to start
shooting if the Dikans did anything else—ran away; hurled or were
in the process of hurling spears; or attacked them in some other
way.25 If the policemen had reacted to the situation following the pre-
vious night’s orders, then, the killing of the five men was nothing less
than premeditated murder. When one considers that a war of nerves
had raged between Symons and Mek for three long days with Mek
seeming to have the upper hand, it would not be beyond the realm of
probability to assume that an inexperienced officer of the frontier sit-
uation would want to teach a lesson to the recalcitrants.
On December 24, 1947, the administrator, J. K. Murray, wrote to
the minister for External Territories and aired similar opinions to
those of Mr. McDonald. Two significant parts of his letter read:
It is my advice that the suspension of Messrs. Taylor and Symons
be lifted, and that they should be returned to their duties in their
respective posts. For this advice I accept the fullest possible
responsibility.
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I consider that Mr. Taylor should be severely reprimanded in
connection with his confidential memorandum to the Assistant Dis-
trict Officer and which I quoted at the bottom of page 2 of my letter
of November 8; and that Mr. Symons should be reprimanded for
disobeying an order given by the Assistant District Officer, Mr.
Costelloe.26
Advised hence, the minister for External Territories gave the final
official nod and approved the administrator’s recommendations on
January 2, 1948:
1. That Mr. Symons should be reprimanded for disobeying an
order given by the Assistant District Officer, Mr. Costelloe;
2. That Mr. Taylor be reprimanded in connection with his mem-
orandum to the Assistant District Officer dated August 13, 1947;
3. That in accordance with the Administrator’s advice the suspen-
sion of Messrs. Taylor and Symons be lifted immediately and that
they be returned to their duties in their respective posts.27
Soon after, both these officers’ suspensions were lifted and they were
reinstated to their former substantive posts.
There are two final considerations. First, the result of McDonald’s
inquiry was the basis on which all subsequent decisions were made.
In this inquiry, Symons substantially altered his earlier testimony of
the incident to Costelloe. In September he wrote that he had actually
ordered his policemen to shoot the fleeing men in the back. During
the recorded interview with McDonald, however, he altered his ear-
lier account and said instead that he did not order his policemen to
shoot the fleeing tribesmen, nor did he know who ordered them to
do so, or who fired the first shot.
Yet none of the authorities seriously questioned why there was a
fundamental change in his account of the story from the original
written version. Symons himself does not provide an explanation in
the inquiry because McDonald, it appears from the content of the
document, conveniently failed to ask him the most relevant question.
The administrator took it upon himself to ask the relevant question
and Symons denied any involvement—and the administrator accepted
his denial: “I have read through the statements taken by Mr.
McDonald from various witnesses and it does not appear from the
statements that an order was given by Mr. Symons to fire. In order to
clear this matter for myself, I saw Mr. Symons in my office and he
denies that he gave an order to fire or that he was in a position to
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give that order. I accept his denial because it agrees with the evidence
as adduced by Mr. McDonald.”
The second conclusion reached then reflected the feeling of senior
colonial officials, in particular McDonald and Taylor, that in the work
of exploration and pacification the violent clash of two cultures was
inevitable, particularly in “uncontrolled areas,” but the work must
continue regardless of the shortage of staff or the intolerance of the
people. Taylor, as his correspondence shows, remained adamant from
the beginning that his junior officer had only committed an “admin-
istrative error,” which, under the circumstances of his work on the
frontier of government influence, did not warrant an inquiry. In the
opinion of the acting Crown law officer, Mr. E. B. Bignold, however,
the Kouno tragedy should have gone beyond the McDonald inquiry:
The results of Mr. J. H. McDonald’s enquiry have been carefully
examined by me and it is clear, unfortunately, that the account
now given by Mr. Symons differs in very material respects from
that originally given by him when less time had elapsed since the
shooting which resulted in the death of the five natives.
It is believed by me that the unchallenged fact that the five
natives who lost their lives were shot in the back is a vital factor in
considering what should be done. I feel no doubt that the proper
course is to charge this officer with manslaughter and further, in
my view, there can be no legal justification for departing from this
course on the information available.
In regard to Mr. Taylor, whilst I believe him to be an accessory,
I incline to the view that it would be preferable not to charge him
as such but to charge him with attempting to defeat the course of
justice. This is a charge which in no way depends upon the prose-
cution or the result of the prosecution of Mr. Symons.
If these two officers were not [to] be charged it would seem to
be a failure to administer the criminal law in force in that part of
the Territory of New Guinea designated the Central Highlands.28
In his final submission to the minister for External Territories in
December 24, 1947, the administrator chose to overlook the acting
Crown law officer’s advice, preferring instead opinions outside of the
legal fraternity. In Symons’ case, he wrote:
I do not agree with the opinion of the Crown Law officer that
Symons should be charged with manslaughter in view of the fact
that it is the opinion of experienced officers that there would be
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no conviction. I do not consider that a desire to find out details
concerning an affray in which five natives were killed in July last
would warrant placing a man on a charge of manslaughter if the
charge is not likely to be sustained. Such a procedure might serve
as a precedent whereby officers connected with fatalities resulting
from measures taken to protect the safety of patrols will automati-
cally be charged with homicide. Such a procedure might well be
calculated to seriously interfere with the morale of the Directorate
of District Services and Native Affairs.29
Henceforth, after the second round of considerations, the matter of
the fate of the five Dikans was closed.
The above then is an example of deaths resulting from government
intervention in a tribal dispute. It also illustrates the extent to which
Papua New Guinean communities (often the weaker ones) sought the
support of the colonial governments to settle grievances against enemy
tribes (Downs, 1986; Connolly and Anderson, 1987:250; Kituai,
1994). What is important for our purposes is—did these deaths occur
within the framework of the cardinal principles of 1908 and 1925?
I interviewed twenty-eight ex-policemen between 1985, 1986, and
1989 and most shared the official view that a little force was neces-
sary to keep belligerent individuals and groups under control.30 Like
their officers they were convinced that the people they dealt with were
“primitives” who would only respond to stringent measures. Most
also admitted that they used some form of force against carriers,
laborers on stations, prisoners, and the communities they visited from
time to time. Of the twenty-eight men interviewed, eleven admitted to
having shot and killed one or more people. For instance, Amero Bega,
a policeman from West New Britain, claimed to have shot dead four-
teen people in Kainantu (Eastern Highlands) and Chimbu during his
four years in the highlands, including one woman shot through the
vagina in the Bena Bena area of Eastern Highlands, during an early
morning raid.31 Many of these deaths seem to have taken place in the
highlands region and during the period before the 1960s. Obviously
this was because much of the highlands area was still considered an
“uncontrolled area” prior to 1960.
The course of action the policemen took depended on the instruc-
tions they received from the kiap as relayed to them by the senior
noncommissioned officer (NCO). In the policemen’s experiences, there
were two kinds of officers. Some officers were older men with many
years of experience. They were conversant with official regulations
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and ensured rigid observation. If a policeman was found to have ex-
ceeded his legal powers, he was either punished in the field or a rec-
ommendation was sent to the administrative center for his demotion
or dismissal. Any policeman who worked under this kind of officer
was careful not to go beyond the bounds of his given responsibility.
At the other extreme, there were inexperienced officers who demon-
strated a clear lack of understanding of the general government poli-
cies and the nature of their own duties. These officers depended on
the expertise of the policemen to guide them through their early years
in the field. In appreciation of their assistance and loyalty, the officers
tended to overlook the errors of their policemen, which, in many in-
stances, encouraged them to use their own discretion and act indepen-
dently of their observation and guidance. If, for instance, a policeman
had killed someone or committed other acts of violence without the
officer’s knowledge and the offended persons brought the complaint
before him, the officer would invariably deny or excuse these allega-
tions against his policeman. In almost all cases, the reasons the officers
advanced for the untoward behavior of their men was that they had
acted in self-defense. Villagers rarely questioned the kiap or challenged
his decisions.
This might also suggest the sense of camaraderie and esprit de
corps that existed among the kiaps and policemen.
The Source of Police Power: The Gun
One experienced policeman told me, “Under the circum-
stances in which we worked, the gun proved useful, it became our
most important security. Without it the colonial government would
have crumbled, and the policemen would have been virtually use-
less.”32 The value of the gun became abundantly clear to the police-
men before and after they joined the Police Forces. They were
recruited to work for an alien power whose standing army (meta-
phorically speaking) consisted of a few aging administrators and
equally few field staff officers, some of whom were inexperienced in
dealing with people of other races. The policemen could see that
numerically their employers were clearly in the minority. Surround-
ing them was a horde of people with alien customs and traditions. In
the main, the people were suspicious of the intruders, regarding many
of them as enemies who should be fought, as they had fought other
strangers in the past, in order for a warrior to establish his position
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in his society.33 The policemen knew, from the knowledge they had of
their own societies, that the village warrior was a fierce fighter who
would struggle to the end to protect the honor of his tribe, family,
and territory. That being the case, the policemen had to be prepared
to confront the village warrior with an equivalent force, or with a
more lethal weapon, in case the villager decided to attack.
Therefore, when a new recruit was introduced to the power and
effectiveness of the rifle as a weapon during training, he was deter-
mined to become proficient at its use. He could see that the .303
carbine rifle34 was more than a match for spears, clubs, and bows
and arrows. And every day during training the recruits were encour-
aged to strive to be the best marksman, even if they were not always
successful at first.35 Needless to say, training was serious business in
Papua New Guinea from the perspective of both the trainer and the
trained. Only then were they to be considered valuable employees of
the government. The colonial governments introduced this weapon,
knowing it to be lethal and knowing that the people did not possess
an equivalent weapon, and they demanded that the policemen be
proficient at its use so that they could go among the people and dem-
onstrate the might of the colonial government. It was hoped that the
demonstration of the government’s power would frighten people into
submission. But, if the people did not submit and instead retaliated
against the intrusion, then the rifle-carrying police force patrolled the
bush to ensure that they did.
The gun served many useful purposes for the policemen. It gave
them prestige, honor, and power over the village communities. It
gave them confidence and a source of power that seemed to radiate
from the rifle. It raised their status above those of their peers in the
village. It gave them the strength, courage, and determination to
“Suvim het igo insait long ples bilong ol kanaka. Ol kanaka save pret
long mipela polisman igat gun. Ol i suruk tru” (“Force our way into
the people’s villages. The people were afraid of us policemen with
guns. They were really and truly scared”).36 On their own admission,
without the rifle and the impressive image it gave them, many of the
policemen would not have been brave enough to work for the gov-
ernment, particularly on patrols. In the end, the rifle became one of
their most valued possessions: They cleaned it every day, slept with it,
and never let it out of their sight.37 It became the policeman’s insepa-
rable “companion.” Tigavu, a policeman of Gende (Bundi), in the
present day Madang Province, said it eloquently:
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When the gun was issued to me I was told that it symbolically rep-
resented my big brother back in the village. If I took good care of
it and did not let it out of my sight, I would be saved and would
be able to return home to see those people whom I loved. When I
was armed with the rifle I felt big and strong. People jumped at
my command. They got scared of me, not because I threatened
them with it but because they had seen how dangerous it could be
when used. Naturally, they held its owner in awe. So much so that
in the areas that I worked, people held me in such a high esteem
that my reputation and popularity as a policeman grew quickly. In
the end I had the same reputation as some of my traditional fight
leaders back home.38
Summary
In the tragic shooting incident described, five warriors from
the Dika clan died from police violence. Their death was not an iso-
lated case. Many other Papua New Guineans had died in similar cir-
cumstances in the highlands as well as the coastal regions from 1884.39
The context in which these tragic events took place can be explained
in the following way. The kiap system and the colonial system in
general required the police to be tough, dictatorial, and sometimes
brutal. The kiaps may not have known about the details of how their
policemen acted, but some of them created a general context in which
the police were expected to be tough. The kiaps shouted at people,
occasionally hit someone, and generally behaved as though they ex-
pected immediate compliance with orders. Also, the system was one
of frequent surveillance by an armed party—sometimes with a kiap
present, and at times with a senior noncommissioned officer and con-
stables. Usually it was a brief inspection by a small group of superior
officers.
In their methods the police shifted a long way from the proclaimed
ideals of their officers, ideals generally known to the police. But their
actions were in conformity with a general toughness practiced by
many of their officers and inherent in the system itself. Researchers
have been right to see the police as intermediaries, but in doing so
they have underestimated the power wielded by the police and the
extent to which the colonial state was imposed by violence and
intimidation.40
In the final analysis, then, only one short and unreserved conclusion
can be drawn about the Papua New Guinean policemen of the time.
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Despite all the hardships, traumatic experiences, humiliations of a
master-servant relationship, disparity in wages and more, they lifted
their heads high and performed with unquestioning loyalty and obe-
dience. They were proud and possessive of wearing the government’s
uniform. As far as these men were concerned, some fanatical force
seems to have radiated from the uniforms that drove them to perform
sometimes beyond normal behavior to achieve results expected of
them by the government. The uniforms were, of course, symbols of
colonialism in Papua New Guinea. As such, policemen, by deeds and
attitudes, acted more colonial than the colonialists, if not in intent
then perhaps through ignorance or blind loyalty.
Notes
1. I would like to acknowledge the helpful comments and observations of
Ronald Huch, professor of history and chairman of the History Department
of the University of Papua New Guinea, on a draft of this paper.
2. Tok Pisin: white men’s ways.
3. Tok Pisin: New ways, innovation.
4. Quoted in E. B. Bignold, A/Crown Law Officer, “Shooting of five
natives by an administration patrol near Kouno central highlands on 21st
July, 1947” (Territory of Papua New Guinea, Australian Archives, ACT, CRS
A518, Item W 841/1, 28 October, 1947).
5. According to James Sinclair, the word kiap is the pidgin (tok pisin)
term for the patrol officers, districts officers, and district commissioners of
the department of the old Papua New Guinea Public Service (1981:7). Al-
though kiap was not a term used in Papua before World War II, it is now a
convenient way of encompassing various ranks and designations, whether
they were resident magistrates, assistant district officers, or kiaps. Kiap and
patrol officers are both used in the article.
6. A cadet was considered an “apprentice” kiap who worked with a kiap
for a number of years until he familiarized himself with the responsibilities
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Difference, Hierarchy, and History in 
Early Twentieth-Century Evangelical 
Propaganda
Nicholas Thomas
This chapter sketches out the paradigmatic features of missionary rep-
resentations of human difference and of the missionary endeavor, with
reference to Methodist propaganda concerning the western Solomon
Islands. I do not deal with missionaries’ private understandings of
Pacific Islanders, nor do I attempt here to move beyond the propa-
ganda to reconstruct the actual dynamics of conversion in the Pacific.
Rather, I use the example of missionary imagery to establish that
colonial culture was significantly differentiated and suggest that vis-
ual sources—here photographs and a film—enable historians to work
toward a deeper understanding of colonial imaginings in the Pacific.
The central feature of mission discourse is the conversion narrative.
Former savagery is dramatized and juxtaposed with a subsequently
elevated and purified Christian state. This is not just a matter of reli-
gious change but of wider social transformation. The characteriza-
tion of indigenous society as barbaric thus depends on general social
markers, such as the low status of women and their treatment as
beasts of burden and on practices directly associated with heathen
religion: “All the filthy and degrading customs associated with idol-
worship obtained. Sorcery and witchcraft flourished. . . . None died a
natural death; all sickness was attributed to witchcraft; and the most
A longer version of this chapter was published in Comparative Studies in Society and
History 34 (1992):366–389. The original may be consulted for more extensive docu-
mentation and a wider range of photographs.
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revolting and horrible cruelty was practised to extort confessions from
the unfortunate women charged with the offence” (Goldie 1915:563).
Narratives concerning particular mission fields tended to dramatize
one or two key practices with which the state of savagery or heathen-
ism was identified: In Fiji, it was cannibalism and widow-strangling.
In the western Solomons, headhunting was rendered emblematic, as it
was in some official literature and in travelers’ accounts; but the
manner in which this form of violence related to the characterization
of a savage race differed crucially between these genres. Although
staged photographs of warfare or cannibalism among Pacific Islanders
are common, such practices are generally set at temporal distance in
missionary collections. The viewer is not supposed to be titillated by
the actuality of these horrific practices but interested in the work to
abolish them. The missionary representation thus entails temporal
marking and tends to convey a narrative of barbarism as past rather
than as an immediate and persisting condition, which is often signaled
by the presence of indigenous weapons in photographs of persons
who are obviously converted inhabitants of a Christian order. Clubs,
hatchets, and shields—intricately made and thus open to being aes-
theticized—are tendered as curios or specimens of native craft. But
their inclusion is obviously not a matter of simple ornamentation.
What stands out is that these things are no longer used: Their context
of use has been abolished. Such articles are now instead the pictures-
que products of ingenuity and—more significantly—the tokens of a
former order. The larger story of rebirth thus condensed is conveyed
more fully in the film produced from the Solomons mission, The
Transformed Isle.1 The long opening sequence representing a head-
hunting raid explicitly offers a fictional reconstruction of horrific
events supposedly typical of the time before the missionary arrived.
In contribution to a centennial review of Methodist work in the
Pacific, John Francis Goldie, the head of the Solomons mission,
predictably alluded to the horrors of the past and contrasted them
with “brighter, happier days,” rhetorically asking, “Was it worth the
while?” (Goldie 1915:573, 574). However, he distinguished the former
state of the Solomons from that of certain other Pacific Islanders:
One navigator, who visited the group many years ago, avers that
the natives of New Georgia “were the most treacherous and
bloodthirsty race in the Western Pacific” and that “human flesh
formed their chief article of diet.” This may have been true fifty
years ago, but I much doubt the latter part of the statement. The
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people of the New Georgia group were cannibals, but not in the
same sense as the Fijians, who loved human flesh as an article of
diet. Those who have taken part in these cannibal feasts tell me
that in connection with human sacrifices and the great religious
festivals human flesh was partaken of, but few liked it; to many it
was so obnoxious it made them ill. The New Georgians were
crafty and cruel; but they were also remarkably clever and intelli-
gent. (Goldie 1915:563)
The last qualification makes it clear that the point of the passage is
not ethnological discrimination but the separation of the subjects of
conversion from the most extreme expression of barbarism. If sav-
ages are quintessentially and irreducibly savage, the project of con-
verting them to Christianity and introducing civilization is both
hopeless and worthless. The prospect of failure would be matched by
the undeserving character of the barbarians, which is why mission
discourse must at once emphasize savagery yet signal the essential
humanity of the islanders to be evangelized. For writers such as
Goldie, it was important to be able to differentiate one’s own people
from some other “real savages” at a convenient geographic remove
and to suggest ambiguity by qualifying the image of barbarism and
depiction of other dimensions of indigenous life.
The film has a parallel interest in the production of various types
of artifacts among other aspects of the creativity and humanity of the
Solomons people, who are seen engaged in ordinary work, playing,
traveling in canoes, and fishing. This is the other side of the mode of
constructing savagery on the basis of particular forms of barbaric
practice: Missionaries did not suggest that in some sense part of the
racial constitution of the Vella Lavellan or the Fijian was essentially
savage, a cannibal at heart. The humanity of Solomon Islanders was
in parts: Some parts were condemned to the past, while others were
drawn into creating a new Christian Islander.
Because the depiction of artifacts is part of a project to convey a
rounded, though obviously selective, image of native life, objects are
often represented in association with people rather than as stable and
symmetrical arrays in the manner of ethnologists or official publica-
tions. The point is not to display the weapons and implements of some
bounded tribe or ethnic group, making a social geography visible for
the state, but to prompt reactions of sympathy and empathy to coexist
with those of horror and revulsion. Common human appreciation of
artistry is clearest in the film, in which the maker of the tortoise-
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shell ornament holds it up for his own regard as well as that of the
audience.
The Story of Children
A few photographs that include both white and black chil-
dren (such as Plate 1) most directly express the islanders’ humanity.
The remarkable “Study in Black and White,” published as a postcard,
differentiates the white girl, shown fully clothed, with a hat, from her
two native friends, who are wearing only loincloths. Because all three
appear to be barefoot, holding hands, and in the same basic group,
the photograph seems to convey that they are all on the same level and
in some sense have the same potential. This impression is strengthened
by the fact that the picture shows only three children of more or less
the same age and size. A similar message emerges from some larger,
differentiated groups; but because these contain hierarchal differences
based on age, the suggestions of friendship, voluntary association, and
equality are submerged. It is, of course, difficult to see the picture in
the way that a purchaser of the postcard in 1910 would have, but—
Plate 1. A Study in Black and White (Crown Studios, Sydney,
c. 1908).
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to put the proposition negatively—nothing in the image implies that
the boys are in any way unsuitable playmates for the girl or that there
is anything disturbing in the conjunction. The conclusion that the
photograph essentially equates the three children represented in
human worth seems inescapable.
Children carry a specific burden in the before and after narrative
that dominates the understanding of change in a particular mission
field. Another sympathetic photograph of a small boy appeared in the
magazine (on a children’s page) with the following text:
This picture is a photograph of a little boy born in a heathen land
—the Solomon Islands. Until ten years ago, no missionary had
been to the part where this boy’s home is, and the people there
were dark and cruel and wicked. But to-day, hundreds of them
know all about Jesus, and many of them love Him. This little boy
is now in one of our Mission Schools, and he, with scores of other
children, is being taught the way of truth and purity. But there are
thousands upon thousands of children in the islands of the Pacific
still in heathen darkness. Their homes are full of evil, their lot is
very sad, for they are surrounded by wicked people. We want you
to help to make known to them the joys of the Christian faith
(AMMR April 4, 1912).2
These stronger statements about native life before conversion have
tensions and contradictions with the more positive side of native life
shown, for instance, at length in the film. The above passage attempts
to negotiate the disjunction between the imagining of native humanity
and the evil nature of the past by focusing upon children, who seem
to be naturally innocent: Under heathenism they might live among the
wicked, in “homes full of evil,” but it is not suggested that they are
wicked themselves or even degraded. Rather “their lot is very sad”
because of surrounding circumstances. The projected child reader is
invited to identify with these thousands of children who happen to
inhabit the heathen darkness. The category of children is stretched
beyond any particular culture, and the plight of those who (as it were
contingently) live with “wicked people” is stressed. If the social cir-
cumstances change, these children can grow up being no less Christian
than any others.
In an important sense the before and after story is thus generation-
ally staged, a theme expressed with considerable redundancy. It is em-
phasized at many points that every school student is “the son of a
head-hunter” (Goldie 1915:573); the image even provides the title for
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R. C. Nicholson’s biography of Daniel Bula, a prominent native
teacher, The Son of a Savage (1924). Older people (and particularly
young adults) are frequently assimilated into the category of children
growing out of heathenism because all are referred to as “mission
boys” or “girls,” irrespective of age. A Roviana preacher, Boaz Suga,
who was probably in his twenties, is described as “a Solomon Island
boy. . . . Once a heathen . . . now a happy Christian lad” (AMMR
April 4, 1912). The odd conjuncture of the temporal structure and
the negative imagery of savagery is encapsulated in lines quoted by
Goldie in order to stress the need for a broad civilizing project: “We
are not dealing with people of the older civilizations of India and
China, but ‘Your new-caught sullen peoples / Half devil and half
child’ ” (Goldie July 4, 1912:2).3
This tendency to regard indigenous people as infantile also, of
course, contained a statement about the missionaries’ relationship with
them. This was clearly manifested in the various photographs in which
the combination of the indigenous people and the missionaries (Plate
2) or their wives conveys the hierarchy and order of a family group.
In this context, the sharp contrasts between this discourse and those
Plate 2. J. F. Goldie and some school boys (Crown Studios, Sydney, c. 1908).
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which use sexual difference to understand racial difference is most ap-
parent. Much other colonial discourse sees the difference between the
civilized man and the savage as being as clear and irreducible as that
between man and woman, grounding both kinds of physical difference
in nature: A process of conversion is thus likely to have repugnant or
dangerous results—hence the threatening parody of the native who is
a “bad imitation” of a European.
Racial typification frequently operated through gender imagery:
Asiatics and particularly Hindus were effete or effeminate; Polynesian
women were voluptuous and licentious; Polynesian men were passive,
idle, and languorous; Melanesians, on the other hand, were stereotyp-
ically cannibal warriors with clubs and axes. The evangelical project of
incorporation relied less on such fixed race-sex categories than on a
transformative familial metaphor. The mission postulates neither mas-
culinity nor feminity but infancy, a protosocial condition from which
Christian manhood and womanhood are imagined to emerge.
Shared Metaphors and Familial Practice
Missionary propaganda thus located the indigenous condi-
tion above all in the absence of enlightenment, rather than through
positive markers thought to be characteristic of a particular stage of
social development. In practice, of course, both missionary and official
colonial interventions had to take existing institutions and relations
into account, and Christian notions of underlying human equality
were often placed in the background by hierarchizing practices or sub-
merged by more specific ethnological discourses about the nature of
particular societies and peoples. Although missionary propaganda is
a distinct genre produced and circulated through visual media and
publications that made a series of assumptions about their constitu-
ency, individual missionaries, especially from the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury on, often wrote for geographical and anthropological audiences
as well and were thus authors whose practical reactions and actions
in the field reflected a diverse range of assumptions and influences.
This brings into focus a necessary qualification and elaboration of
the argument developed thus far. I have argued that infantilization is
a crucial feature of missionary culture, but it is apparent that such
constructions of indigenous peoples as children or as immature
have great generality. To refer merely to the approximate contempo-
raries of the missionaries discussed here, Dudley Kidd observed that
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“one would no more think of giving the native a vote on European
matters than one would think of giving fourth-form boys at school a
vote in the management of lessons” (Kidd 1904:407). Neatly encom-
passing a series of unsocialized others, the administrator, M. V. Port-
man, said that he “often likened [the Andamanese] to English coun-
try schoolboys of the laboring classes” (Portman 1899:1:33). In evok-
ing the half-infancy of the savage, Goldie was after all quoting not a
theorist of missions but Kipling’s famous poem, “The White Man’s
Burden.”
The distinctiveness of evangelical colonialism arises not from the
terms or metaphors of its propaganda, if these are taken in isolation,
but from narratives in which these tropes have specific meanings and
from practices that were inflected, at least, by the terms of missionary
rhetoric. Missionary work employed and enacted the notions of in-
fantilization and quasifamilial hierarchy in a far more thorough way
than any other colonial project: The construction of difference in terms
of a familial relation was not a static condition but articulated with an
attempt to implement a social change on the colonial periphery in a
particular way. In several sequences of the film and in the literature in
general, there is a great emphasis upon schooling and more generally
upon the novel creation of a social order. It is as if these children are
being brought up and socialized for the first time.
The mission, much more than “a house in the bush,” is a whole
structure of institutions that reorganizes work and social life, ideally
creating a novel order. Missionary postcards convey group images of
various kinds of domestic and institutional order, with a particular
emphasis upon the islanders at work, such as the hard labor of clear-
ing a new plantation and “discharging Timber for Mission House at
Vella Lavella.” These images are linked with the doctrine of the in-
dustrial mission that seems to have become the dominant view of how
missions should be run among the Australasian Methodists in the early
twentieth century. (This approach had its antecedents in Moravian
missions and earlier in the nonconformist societies of the nineteenth
century, including the Wesleyan Methodist Mission, from which the
Australasian Methodist Church inherited the Pacific circuits. Moffat
and Livingstone, among others, had closely identified the civilizing
process and the promotion of commerce.) Goldie argued in a 1916
article that in other, unnamed missions, natives were allegedly Chris-
tians in name but lazy and dishonest in behavior; therefore, a broad
approach to morality, work, and commerce was called for.
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Is the Christianity we ask [“these savage islanders”] to accept
merely a creed, and the nominal membership of a human society
called the Church, or is it a new vision, new aspirations, and a
new power to will and to do—in other words, a new life? . . . All
Missionary workers will agree that the real objective in Mission
work is certainly not the successful running of a commercial under-
taking, however profitable, or merely the turning out of carpenters
and boat-builders, however skillful. The chief business of the Mis-
sionary is not to make boats and plantations but to make men—
Christian men. Not to build houses, but to build character. (Goldie
1912:2–3)
Despite the androcentric language, it should be added that this
program definitely included women; and great emphasis was placed
especially on sewing and garment making, which was directly linked
to conversion because those who attended church necessarily did so
attired in fabric skirts and blouses or sarongs, rather than in heathen
dress. These activities, moreover, were regularized: Rather than being
conducted individually or with friends at home in the interstices of a
working day, mats and other such articles were prepared by groups
working around the mission station during regular hours. The Trans-
formed Isle presents the industrial mission in considerable detail, open-
ing a segment with the claim that “a healthy vigorous young life is
springing up because they are taught that there is no such thing as a
lazy Christian”; we then see roads, a substantial wharf built by mis-
sion labor, and copra cutting.
The statements made through the film and photographs about this
process of social growth and transformation do not relate merely to
the story of the horrors of the past and the happiness of the Christian
present. They also make claims about the mission’s role in the civiliz-
ing process: The mission, in fact, is identified as the sole author of
positive social change in the islands, a point about which Goldie was
quite explicit: “They are making model villages and improving the
conditions under which they live. They are learning how to utilize
their idle lands, and are making plantations of food and coco-nuts.
We began this work amongst a purely savage people in May 1902. No
track had been blazed, and we were the pioneers. We have not
laboured in vain” (Goldie 1915:584).
But so far as commercially oriented native industry is concerned,
many groups in the western Solomons had extensive experience of
casual trading with ships before 1850, and in the second half of the
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nineteenth century more systematic relationships with white resident
traders developed, usually involving the production of copra and ivory
nuts; barter of ordinary food for guns and various other articles; and
the collecting of bêche-de-mer, pearl shell, and tortoiseshell. The plan-
tations represented in the Methodist photographs circa 1910 were by
no means the only ones then operated in the region. More signifi-
cantly, given its prominence in mission rhetoric, the notion that the
mission put an end to headhunting is totally misleading: This in fact
resulted entirely from the work of the government, which had virtually
pacified all the tribes of what became the Western Province several
years before the mission entered the area.
Although the government’s activities are invisible in The Trans-
formed Isle, white traders do appear and are represented exclusively
as criminal exploiters of the natives. The film creates a subnarrative
around incidents supposedly typical of recruiting for the Pacific
Islander labor trade and reflects the wider controversy between those
engaged in the trade and their liberal opponents, principally the mis-
sions and bodies such as the Anti-Slavery Society. The critics used the
term blackbirding and insisted that recruiting usually amounted to
nothing other than kidnaping. The film shows us gullible islanders
being lured onto a vessel’s deck by unattractive thuggish-looking
traders proffering strings of trinkets and hatchets. Despite their igno-
rance, the native people, wary and hesitant, are nevertheless enticed
on board and below decks. After a certain number have gone below,
the treacherous Europeans smartly bolt the hatch and chase the others
overboard, using rifle fire to drive away the substantial crowd borne
in canoes: “The brutal kidnappers weigh anchor and make for the
open sea with their human freight.” This scenario is rather out of place
in the western Solomons, where the number of Melanesians who were
ever indentured was minuscule. In any case, it ignores the point that
once the trade had been going on for a few years, returned laborers
were telling stories at home; and indigenous men thus almost always
understood what sort of work they would be engaging in on what
terms and had various reasons for voluntarily participating. Cases of
kidnaping certainly occurred but were not typical of a system that
entailed thousands of recruits and lasted for decades.
Although the larger inequalities of these relationships are quite in-
escapable, it is apparent that the missionary view seizes upon victim-
ization by certain whites and ignores the active and collaborative char-
acter of the indigenous peoples’ role in these exploitative relations.
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This is not surprising, given the construction of natives as children,
but underspecifies the motivation of the image. The characterization
of white traders in exclusively negative terms is curious, for in prac-
tice these missionaries got on moderately well with most other white
residents, but this is simply the correlate of the mission’s attempt to
construct itself as the only civilizing agent in the heathen land. The
missionaries’ industry derives purely from their endeavors in a place
that was savage to start with. It is implied that there are no other
plantations than the industrial mission’s, but since it can hardly be
pretended that there had been absolutely no other contact between
Solomon Islanders and whites, this is represented as purely destructive.
Not only was the mission as an entity the key actor in a larger his-
torical drama, but individual missionaries were presented not merely
as adult parents who cared for and naturally supervised their native
children but also as singularly transcendent and historically empow-
ered figures in a different way. The head of the mission, John Francis
Goldie, is seen in two intriguing pictures with a group of “mission
boys” in one case, and what is evidently a school class in another.
Everyone looks directly into the camera—except him. Perhaps Goldie
merely had a personal aversion to watching the photographer, but
the results convey a kind of wider engagement with and wider vision
of the world that is not limited to the immediate circumstances. This
implication is particularly strong in the picture of the school group,
because we see a globe through the window directly behind and above
the missionary.
The social process of conversion and the development of a new
Christian society in the native land is thus represented as a dyadic
affair: The missionaries on one side show the light and provide guid-
ance, while on the other the islanders respond to the dawn and hap-
pily learn and work within the new order. The immediate reasons for
this rather extravagant distortion of the actual situation are trans-
parent: The mission had a constituency, so it needed to advertise its
work, needed to raise funds, needed to convey satisfaction to those
who had already made donations, and—not least—needed to engage
in rivalry with other denominations, such as the Seventh-Day Adven-
tists. The emphasis on the industrial nature of the mission was signif-
icant in the context of intermission competition because it could be
claimed, perhaps accurately, that certain denominations did little more
than secure nominal adherence.
At the same time there is clearly more to the project than differen-
242 Colonial Engagements—Tensions of Empire
tiation for the purposes of advertisement. It is quite crucial to the
whole structure of this discourse that the mission was not simply a
religious instrument but rather a total social fact. The mission created
an entire social geography of stations and circuits, which in some
cases reflected indigenous political divisions or trade routes but gave
even these entirely new functions. It sought to impose a new temporal
regime of work, leisure, celebration, and worship; and through edu-
cation it offered a new global and local history marked by the life of
Wesley, the foundation of the mission society, the opening of Pacific
mission fields, major events of conversion, and the commemoration
of martyrs. The mission produced not just a population of Christians
but a people engaged in periodic plantation work who were notion-
ally subject to rigorous behavioral codes and who had notionally
brought their social and domestic habits into conformity with Chris-
tian norms. Within this effort, ideas of the location and transforma-
tion of familial life are projected in a number of ways that are not
entirely consistent; in one context native existence may be deplorably
nonfamilial; elsewhere indigenous families are shown to be imperfect
but in the process of change; and in other cases, and particularly in
the materials I have presented here, actual indigenous families seem
almost dissolved within the mission station, which takes the form of
a sort of macrofamilial institution.
The white missionaries are parents to native boys and girls, who are
instructed and brought up not in specifically religious or technical
training but in the whole field of practical, recreational, and spiritual
living. The notion that the mission thus encompassed indigenous life
was clearly to some extent a fantasy, but it is true that in many in-
stances boarding schools and orphanages were created that did in fact
give missionaries an enormous amount of control over children; and
it is also the case that individual missionaries or missionary wives
often formed close attachments with converts, especially privileged
converts such as mission teachers, which the whites understood in
familial terms. Needless to say, the indigenous views of these friend-
ships are usually not accessible; most of the available recollections
bearing on the question were compiled or edited by missionaries and
are thus constrained in a predictable manner.4
Incorporation and Difference
In this case the attitude in missionary rhetoric toward savage
peoples conforms with Fabian’s depiction of premodern alterity: The
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canonical other is not the primitive man or woman understood as an
exemplar of a race that can be characterized in an essentialist manner
but the heathen or pagan marked fundamentally by his or her lack of
Christianity, a lack that can be remedied. The dominant movement
of colonial history in this imagination is not the establishment of a
fixed hierarchical relationship but a process of conversion that ab-
stracts infants from the social milieu of savages and socializes them
under the guidance of white missionaries.
Though the case considered here has its own peculiarity, it permits
certain general claims to be made about evangelical discourse. In the
eighteenth as well and the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, mis-
sionary propaganda never displayed much interest in the project of
differentiating and ranking various native populations—Hottentots
and Kaffirs, Melanesians, and Polynesians—that so preoccupied eth-
nology and the secular discourses of evolutionism. Although the mis-
sionaries no doubt regarded Australian Aborigines and tribal peoples
elsewhere as baser or more degraded than the heathens of Asiatic
civilizations, the fundamental premise of the missionaries’ efforts was
an ethic of potential human equality in Christendom, which was par-
ticularly conspicuous in missions directing their efforts among slaves
or other oppressed peoples. The Methodists’ interest in children was
replicated in many publications of the same period from the Religious
Tract Society and other bodies dealing with India, Africa, East Asia,
and elsewhere. There are broad similarities in ideas between all of
these endeavors, but these are perhaps less significant than the recur-
rent conflicts between colonizing projects. Just as the Methodists in
the Solomons were extraordinarily hostile to the white traders and
labor recruiters, the Boers saw the Moravians (in the late eighteenth
century) and the London Missionary Society (in the nineteenth) as
entirely subversive forces that aimed to transform the native world in
a revolutionary manner than would deprive them of their labor force:
“The Boers firmly believed that the LMS harbored the ‘Utopian idea
of laying the foundation, under their own special priestly guidance,
of a model kingdom of regenerated natives.’ Not Moffat nor Philip
nor Livingstone, for all the clarity with which they envisaged an Eden
of the Spirit, could have better phrased the charter for their civilizing
colonialism” (Comaroff 1989:678).5
The point is not that there was some intrinsic missionary hostility
toward slave ownership or colonial servitude. If one is seeking an ele-
mentary structure of colonial discourse, it is not to be found at the
level of a particular idea or metaphor but rather in the contradictory
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character of the colonial objectives of distancing, hierarchizing, and
incorporating: It is problematic to assimilate the other through the
disavowal of hierarchy while implicitly sustaining the inequality that
all colonialism presupposes. Hierarchizing and assimilating colonial-
isms are, on the surface, radically opposed; and this contradiction
emerges practically in the struggles between missionaries and those
whose models of colonization presuppose essential difference and
fixed relations of dominance. But these models also each have internal
contradictions, partly arising from the fact that each operation pre-
supposes something of the other. The analysis here has not explored
the full range of problems but does suggest that the missionaries had
to confront a contradiction between the desirability of postulating
human equality in certain contexts and their will to control the pro-
cess of conversion and the localized theocracies that were occasionally
effectively established. By imagining that others were part of a family,
the mission was able to reconcile common humanity and hierarchy in
a manner that was as natural and intelligible in the short term as it
was insecure in the long term: After all, children grow up. That is also
why this metaphor was part of the common ground of colonial dis-
course, yet also a resource to be valorized in a specific way in evan-
gelical propaganda.
Although this inclusiveness and ambiguous egalitarianism might be
attributed to missionary discourse in general, some features of the
Methodist representation, such as the preoccupation with industry,
are obviously not characteristic of all evangelical bodies or all periods.
Some missions, such as Seventh-Day Adventists, made health and
medical work central and presented the missionary as the healer of
diseased and degraded native bodies. In other cases, as in the early-
nineteenth-century London Missionary Society accounts of Polynesia
and India, idolatry was the hallmark of heathenism, and the destruc-
tion of idols conveniently marked conversion. The implication of these
figures of difference and forms of change was clearly different but
shared a key feature with the case discussed: Savagery was a contin-
gent state of heathenism, illness, or adherence to false doctrine, not
an immutable character of a distinct kind of human being. The con-
tent and emphases of particular forms of missionary propaganda are
thus variable; more important, the Methodist mission in the Solomons
was peculiarly situated in relation to other forms of colonialism.
Though the islands had been made a British protectorate, administra-
tive intervention was very limited; the combination of indigenous dis-
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inclination to engage in migrant labor and the fact that white settle-
ment and expropriation were very limited made the mission a conse-
quential player with much greater scope for implementing its projects
than was possible in most other colonized areas, in which capitalists
and the colonial state had a much higher profile. In comparison with
the experience in Asia, where evangelists were mostly ineffective and
marginal, missionaries gained acquiescence and compliance from the
people; in Africa, conversion of course took place on a large scale on
much of that continent, but missionaries there also had to confront
and contest settler states and huge proletarianizing forces, such as the
South African mines. From the perspective of these global patterns,
the case of the Solomons seems marginal and idiosyncratic, but this
very peculiarity enabled the mission to express itself more compre-
hensively—to understand the “transformed isle” as the outcome of
its own work—even if the missionaries themselves inevitably over-
estimated the real effect of the missionary project.
This analysis has confined itself to the frame of European discourse
and has attempted to delineate what is specific about one kind of
colonial representation. The partial perspective of this sort of discus-
sion must avoid recapitulating one central assumption of the dis-
courses that it criticizes: that indigenous and colonized peoples are pri-
marily passive recipients of Western impositions, rather than agents
empowered to represent things in different terms and in some cases
turn them to their own purposes. Hence, what I have analyzed does
not specify what Christianity was or became for Solomon Islanders;
it does not specify that what was given was the same as what was
received; and although Goldie does seem to have been understood
paternalistically as a big man by his Roviana boys, the hierarchical
relations that the mission imagined were not necessarily those that
the western Solomons people were prepared to collaborate with. More
significantly, Methodism—and to a varying extent other forms of
Pacific Christianity—has now been appropriated by Pacific Islanders
and in Fiji is interwoven with the chiefly hierarchy and traditionalist
nationalism. In the western Solomons, a substantial section of the
Methodist population on New Georgia was captured in the early
1960s by the Christian Fellowship Church, an independent local
charismatic sect led by the “Holy Father,” a man who claimed to be
Goldie’s true successor (Harwood 1978:241). Although these devel-
opments cannot be explored here, the discourse that I have described
needs to be understood as something imposed by Europeans upon
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themselves. It was contingently related and practically mediated as a
real imposition upon Solomon Islanders, and even when the restruc-
turing of indigenous sociality was most effectively conducted, it never
encompassed indigenous consciousness or indigenous understandings
of colonial change.
Although this is thus a partial and incomplete analysis, I would
affirm the importance and value of studies that restrict themselves to
the European side of colonial culture. After all, popular and scholarly
representations of the Pacific today may owe a good deal to their reli-
gious and secular antecedents. Don’t we persist in seeing other societies
in terms of what they lack—they are less developed? Doesn’t applied
anthropological and development research often embody a kind of
assimilationism, seeking to give peripheral economies, if not pagan
souls, the same cast as our own? I’m not suggesting that an echo of
conformity with the enduring structures of imperialism makes anthro-
pological or economic consultants into insincere conspirators who
seek to subordinate rather than elevate those whose future they can
influence; but I don’t doubt either that John Francis Goldie was, in
his own way, a good and sincere man.
Notes
1. The forty-minute film was made under the direction of R. C. Nicholson,
the missionary based on Vella Lavella from 1907. Some footage appears to
have been shot during that year, but the version available to me incorporates
later footage and appears not to have been put together until 1917 or 1918.
2. Australian Methodist Missionary Review (hereinafter AMMR).
3. Goldie is quoting from Kipling, “The White Man’s Burden” (see Rud-
yard Kipling’s Verse—Definitive Edition [London: Hodder and Stoughton,
1940 and reprints], 323–324).
4. See, for instance, George G. Carter, Tie Varane: Stories about People of
Courage from Solomon Islands (Rabaul/Auckland: Unichurch Publishing,
1981), which includes interesting if constrained life histories of a number of
local teachers.
5. Comaroff is quoting George W. Stow, The Native Races of South Africa






On his conversion to kolonialpolitik [colonial politics] after being hos-
tile to overseas expansion, Bismarck took care to emphasize that Ger-
many would never adopt what he called the French system (Moses
1968:46). According to him the main features of this system were: tak-
ing action to occupy territories where no previous economic interests
could have been an incentive; establishing garrisons or some sort of
military bases; expatriate officers ruling the occupied territory with a
view to attracting a sizeable national emigration.
In other words he held the view that France would have preferred
or, at least, had resigned herself to a tabula rasa policy, giving priority
to political sovereignty and military presence and aiming at peopling
a conquered land rather than pursuing economic rewards. On the
whole, in the alleged French schedule, trade and the development of
local resources were to follow the flag, not the reverse.
While taking all circumstances into account and realizing that this
simplistic picture was not offered without ulterior motive, one has to
acknowledge that the so-called French system historically answered
Bismarck’s description well. That is not to say that the Paris govern-
ment had willingly planned it from the outset or that actual events did
nothing in shaping it in the end. The way in which the French started
settling in Vanuatu (or the New Hebrides, as it was called prior to
independence) is a case in point, as their first efforts in the 1880s
were devoted to establishing army posts and enticing a few would-be
settlers to the group, whereas John Higginson’s grand design had so
far yielded nothing much but large claims on paper. Ironically, though,
This chapter is reprinted with slight revisions from Journal of Pacific History 26,
2:206–212.
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even the Germans changed their minds as regards New Guinea in spite
of their strong official statements to the contrary. In effect, they had
begun by launching a project of colonization by numerous small
settlers, an idea that, incidentally, Governor Hahl took up and
attempted to work out in 1906–1907 by enlisting “farmers” from
Australia and subsidizing them in the Baining area (see Hahl 1907;
Sack and Clark 1980:113–114, 118). But, as is well known, nothing
significant came out of those plans and only the Neuguinea Kom-
pagnie with its huge capital and its large-scale plantation system
allowed Germany to claim the country as a possession.
Looking at the balance of power in the South Pacific over the last
few decades of the nineteenth century, it is hardly surprising that
France adopted the course of action considered so typical of her. She
had to thread her way between the British, who had been dominat-
ing the region for so long and had all necessary supplies nearby in
Australia and New Zealand, and the Germans, who had great ambi-
tions and strong determination although they were newcomers. Little
wonder then that French nationals in the Pacific felt they were in a
tight corner and lacked self-confidence, especially as they were few,
not wealthy, and not very enterprising (Scarr 1967:184). That is why
they inevitably had to turn to state authorities in order to secure finan-
cial help, transportation, and protection against foreign economic
competition. This was how contemporary witnesses saw them, an
opinion to be widely endorsed by historians later. Among French resi-
dents, only the Catholic missionaries were likely to be taken seriously
by both British and German nationals, especially in the rather limited
province of multifarious influence over local peoples. But since these
priests and lay brothers usually enjoyed more support from their
fellow countrymen in the navy or the colonial service than did their
Methodist and Presbyterian counterparts, they hardly represent an
exception to the rule: namely that the French government distin-
guished itself by assisting its nationals continuously in the Pacific.
How far, then, can a certain style specific to France be detected in
the plantation system as it was operating in the Pacific with its vari-
ous aspects such as labor recruiting, land acquisitions, and planters’
way of life? I submit here that there did exist a French way in this
respect and that plantations resulted in intensifying many features of
the national character.
The four decades 1880–1920 seem to me to call for this kind of
exercise, despite the widely held idea that only the early 80s were
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truly typical of the Pacific labor recruiting and labor trade in its full-
fledged state. Parnaby, for one, made this point clearly (1972). Be-
tween these two dates the whole history of German colonization in
Melanesia took place, together with effective control and planned
exploitation of Vanuatu and the irresistible ascendancy of ‘afa tahiti
people (Euro-Tahitians) in the rural sector of French Polynesia (New-
bury 1980:250–251). And 1890, 1905, 1913, and 1920 are the years
when prices were highest for copra, a commodity that had become
the main export of New Guinea, Vanuatu, and French Polynesia and
had therefore given local plantation enterprises their ground rules.
In order to operate without going bankrupt immediately, a planta-
tion had to be established on land acquired free of charge, or almost
so (Panoff 1986). Whatever their citizenship, all planters started by
resorting to the same devices: For an absurdly low consideration and
through deception, they managed to be granted a permission to settle,
which may have been certified by a cross marked on a piece of paper
in lieu of signature. From the Bismarck Archipelago to Vanuatu, this
was the way in which the first pieces of land were secured from Mela-
nesian “sellers,” many of whom had no capacity to dispose of them.
On the other hand, at a later stage when handling the registration of
land transactions and issuing land titles in accordance with European
law, the three colonial powers considered here behaved differently
from one another. French authorities seem to have taken less care than
their German and British counterparts to prevent the most serious mal-
practices. After examining all the testimonies of the time, one gets the
impression that French officials were concerned first and foremost
with facilitating the settling of their fellow countrymen by turning a
blind eye to their abuses. Moreover, this was not to be the only occa-
sion on which British nationals had grounds for envying their French
neighbors in Vanuatu (Guiart 1986; Scarr 1967:176–251).
By the end of the period under review, a similar obligingness ap-
peared under German rule, although circumstances were quite differ-
ent—and so also was the scale of the favor involved. It was not a
matter of a permissive attitude toward abuses in the French way, but
a highly official proposal of land acquisitions on such profitable terms
that Burns Philp hastened to purchase 5,000 hectares on Bougainville
and transferred their subsidiary from the British Solomon Islands to
the German Territory (Firth 1982:167). One cannot overlook how dif-
ferent Germany and France were as regards state interference in fur-
thering colonization: The former resorted to means that resembled a
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tender for an economic venture, while the latter was organizing a
sort of implicit general pardon intended to protect everything past. In
other words, the former aimed at going ahead and the latter was
anxious to consolidate.
In respect of labor, another source of costs to be cut down by any
means in order to achieve profitability, it is beyond doubt that French
authorities had a specific policy. Whereas all British recruiting vessels
had to get official licenses, to comply with strict hygiene and safety
regulations, and were inspected at random by navy ships displaying
their own flag, French recruiters enjoyed full freedom of action, a
freedom that was limited only when Marquesas or Tuamotu Islanders
—that is, French subjects—had been kidnaped (Maude 1981). But the
most scandalous difference in British eyes related to the typically
French tolerance of the trade in firearms and the recruiting of Mela-
nesian women as prostitutes to be used on plantations (Scarr 1967:
139). Since only the British had to refrain from offering muskets to
the relatives of their recruits and sex to their laborers on the com-
pounds, they felt at a disadvantage. On many occasions these were
two strong inducements for youths to move from their island com-
munities to distant plantations. As a result, French recruiters were
charged with unfair competition and with moral turpitude, the latter
point being especially conducive to strong paternalistic action by
Protestant missionaries on behalf of their indigenous flock. In Vanu-
atu it even happened that British planters asked to be looked after by
the French government. This unexpected move to join and support
France as the protecting power in the region sounds very much like
the eager acceptance given by the first British settlers to Higginson
when buying as many land titles or land claims as possible. Once
again, France proved to be the lucky profiteer from her own neglect
and unprincipled behavior.
As for the Germans in New Guinea, they could hardly be re-
proached for neglect. Despite Governor Hahl’s belated endeavors at
making all the planters realize that it was in their own interest to
spare the Melanesian population in the same way a veterinary would
treat livestock, German authorities constantly did their best to make
labor recruiting more and more effective. Almost any means was con-
sidered good enough, from such planned action as outright kidnap-
ing of reluctant recruits by certain kiaps, or through indirect pressure
exerted by the head tax, up to the point of tolerating the uninter-
rupted efforts by planters to attract women from New Ireland to serve
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as prostitutes on their premises. And if need be, the most brutal
behavior was accepted. But in contradistinction to the French way,
all such practices seem to have resulted from premeditation and often
followed long and bitter discussions between officials and entrepre-
neurs. So it was something like social and economic engineering. If
recruiters in New Guinea happened to be convicted of serious offenses,
they were punished in the mildest possible way; usually a fine of a
few marks was deemed sufficient. As Colonial Secretary Bernhard
Dernburg plainly declared in 1907, the Germans were in the country
to make money, and the aim of those government services on the spot
was mercantilism pure and simple (Moses 1968:53; Firth 1982:90).
Colonial officers and planters may have been at variance on the means
to be resorted to in the local situation, but at bottom the former were
always expected to serve the latter. That is why a comparison with
the average French attitude is obviously appropriate here: On the one
hand there was indifference to any long-term policy for economic de-
velopment in Vanuatu—though there used to be one in Tahiti, thanks
to William Stewart, twenty-five years earlier—while on the other, New
Guinea had been provided almost from the outset with a lucid and
indeed cynical project that was to be actually carried out. It is an open
question, though, whether it made a significant difference to those
subdued Melanesians facing one or the other colonial power.
The point is that in the day-to-day life of plantation laborers and
the way they were treated by their employers, French and German
authorities alike avoided interfering while explicitly basing themselves
on two distinctive philosophies. In Vanuatu, for instance, there un-
questionably existed permanent collusion between French officials and
planters to tolerate any brutality toward laborers and then to prevent
them from lodging complaints and securing redress (Adams 1986). In
all likelihood, both shortage in government staff and sheer laziness
did as much as true malice to surrender Melanesians to their em-
ployers’ full discretion. As striking evidence of basic carelessness, the
French government did not start inspecting plantations and paying
attention to the workers’ welfare until 1910 (Scarr 1967; Guiart
1986). By contrast, in New Guinea it was in the most official and
straightforward way that the labor force was subjected to a quasi-
military system that always gave the last word to the chief, that is the
planter or his manager, in the name of discipline and efficiency. In the
event of conflict or ill-treatment, European staff were supposed inno-
cent and any unexpected behavior on the part of workers was labeled
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“desertion” or “mutiny,” with all penal consequences. And even if it
is true that the German government had long been short of staff—
which did not number a hundred until 1913—labor patrols did take
place from time to time on plantations but hardly resulted in signifi-
cant improvement in the living conditions of the employees. As regards
food supplied by planters, quantity and quality were repeatedly bound
by strict regulations as determined by medical experts; but most em-
ployers were adamant in having their own way while vilifying bureau-
cratic interference (Panoff 1979:171; 1990:130).1 Finally, wages paid
in New Guinea under government supervision were very much lower
than those paid in the British Solomon Islands and even a good bit
lower than in Vanuatu.
To sum up, then, where the French government was implicitly col-
luding with planters and perhaps feeling ashamed sometimes of doing
so, its German counterpart in all good conscience was declaring and
trying to implement a system geared to reducing the New Guinean to
powerlessness and exploiting his work in the extreme.
What was happening whenever planters went bankrupt in spite of
their most violent efforts to cut down their operating costs? All avail-
able data suggest that both German and French officials usually made
the same response, whereas the British and particularly the Australian
attitude in these territories was altogether different. On the whole,
either by drawing money from the treasury directly or by inducing a
regular bank to give special credit, the state would manage to rescue
sinking plantations in German or French territory, and Sydney-based
merchants or private financiers would take over enterprises under
British or Australian rule, provided in both situations the imminent
bankruptcy was on a large enough scale. How the Compagnie Calé-
donienne des Nouvelles-Hébrides and the Société Française des Nou-
velles-Hébrides were rescued in turn, Ballande debts bought back, the
Neuguinea-Kompagnie liabilities struck out and the gaining “farmers”
subsidized—all are well known and suffice to exemplify the sort of
action taken by the state when grand political interests, if not the
very sovereignty of the nation, appeared to be at risk. But it was a
commercial or an economic logic that probably lay behind most oper-
ations of takeover, merger, or joint venture affecting British planta-
tions. The only exception I know of during the period under review
is the settling of forty-seven people by the Australian government on
Santo in 1904, all costs paid with public money (Adams 1986:49).
Turning now to the planters themselves, is there anything typically
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French to be noticed about them? By and large it can safely be said
that launching a plantation enterprise was an ordered adventure for
many Germans and Britons, but not for French planters, whose
beginnings clearly appear to have been foolishly unprepared. They
expected wonders from this business that they undertook, out of a
whim, on the assumption that tropical soil could not help but be tre-
mendously fertile and bring very large returns without much work or
investment.2 Their lack of finance and technical skills was matched
only by their naive imagination. (Of course a few exceptions could be
mentioned, such as Ferdinand Chevillard on Efate [O’Reilly 1957:38–
40; Adams 1986:46], a planter taken as an example over and over
again, and Maurice Blanc and Fernand Largeau.)3 This assessment of
French individual qualities and defects is confirmed by Higginson’s
large-scale operation, which is strongly reminiscent of Stewart’s initia-
tive in developing Atimaono in 1863: Had those two British business-
men not been cheeky and successful in forcing French officials’ and
politicians’ hands, no real plantation enterprise would ever have
existed in Tahiti, nor would French colonization have taken place in
Vanuatu. Is it mere accident that the only two great achievements
that made their mark in history were precisely due to non-French
nationals?
By contrast, the other two nations present in the region seem to
have been endowed with a more enterprising spirit and more common
sense, the Australians sticking to thrifty habits and the Germans will-
ing to follow technical guidance from the outset.
No less foolish was the way in which many French planters used
whatever money they happened to make, especially in Vanuatu. In-
stead of saving it in case they collapsed later, or investing it in consoli-
dating their businesses, they squandered it in sprees or in buying lux-
uries and other nonproductive items. In Tahiti too this kind of be-
havior, with bouts of gambling, had flourished two decades before
and thereafter infected ‘afa tahiti people when they became wealthy.
Neither Germans nor Australians seem to have surrendered quite so
often to that temptation.
The attitude to their workers of the average French planters again
distinguished them from their foreign counterparts. Theirs was a very
ambiguous game: They could be brutal in the extreme and, alterna-
tively if not simultaneously, quite familiar with their Melanesian
“boys,” to the point of eating and getting drunk with them. In the
end many a Frenchman would indulge in living with a local mistress
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(popiée) and perhaps “go native,” a fate rather rare among British
settlers. To sum it up, a French planter was likely to behave in the
same way as a boatswain among his men or a paratroop petty officer
surrounded by his platoon, which is hardly a model for respectable
entrepreneurs. This could explain why there was less racism on their
part than among British or German planters, as exemplified for
decades until today by the absence of segregation of half-castes in
Tahiti and Vanuatu. Ultimately, French open-mindedness was to cause
political disturbance after colonial rule had subsided, but that is an-
other story.
Finally, if it is true that only hardship can show the real caliber of
men, it is illuminating to look at what happened to those French
planters in Vanuatu who had to take heavy blows—world prices for
their export commodities collapsing, labor no longer available, and
so on. Whenever they failed to hive off their liabilities to the state,
they would leave their enterprises and take jobs in, mainly, the public
service. More than half a century before, the so-called colons mili-
taires (military settlers) had done the same in Tahiti (Panoff 1981). So,
they reacted as if they had entered the plantation business on impulse
or at the first opportunity and had then stayed for a while before
entering a haven of listlessness and mediocrity. At this point one can
see better a basic difference between the French pattern and the Ger-
man one, in which state initiatives at times were decisive. While in
the latter the government supported and supervised the plantation in-
dustry on the assumption that any good done to planters would nec-
essarily profit Germany as a whole, in the former it would act like a
system of social security, relieving the losers and the handicapped
and thus fostering behavior typical of dependents.
Notes
1. The same is true of the first years of the Australian mandate when the
director of the Public Health Department, Dr. Raphael Cilento, had violent
conflicts with the administrator and the planter community. See Rowley
(1958), passim, for indications to the same effect.
2. Even the French planter Alphonse Bernier, though well educated and
apparently of balanced mind, had flurries of such nonsense (see O’Reilly
1957:15–16).
3. Planters like Edmond Caillard, Georges Naturel, and the Rossis would




The New Zealand Wars
and the Myth of Conquest
James Belich
In the mid-seventeenth century, the little island of Britain, rent by civil
strife and internationally impotent, jostled a ravaged and fragmented
Germany for the position of sick man of Europe. A couple of centu-
ries later, Britain ruled large chunks of five continents and dominated
the oceans in between. This rise from rags to riches, obscurity to
world empire, ranks with that of Latin villagers and Mongolian
nomads as a great imperial story. The ascent was shared to some
extent by western Europe as a whole, and it was natural that Euro-
peans should seek explanations for it other than mere accident. Dur-
ing the nineteenth century, for various reasons, the focus of explana-
tion shifted from Christianity and civilization, institutions and geog-
raphy, to a complex and sometimes ambiguous mythology of race
and empire.
While nonviolent agencies—collaboration, conversion, and subver-
sion—played important roles, war was always a key part of both
empire and its myths. It was the “grand test” of racial fitness and
imperial destiny, a leading tool of empire in the Pacific as elsewhere.
Military history has a bad name in some scholarly circles, and many
examples of the genre deserve it. But the fact is that you cannot
understand empire without conquest and its myth. This chapter sum-
marizes an earlier attempt to achieve some understanding through a
This chapter evolved from Chapters 14 and 15 in The New Zealand Wars and the
Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict, by James Belich (Auckland: Auckland
University Press, 1986), which contains fuller documentation. References here are to
the North American edition, The Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict: The
Maori, the British, and the New Zealand Wars, published by McGill-Queen’s Univer-
sity Press, 1989.
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particular case: the New Zealand Wars of 1845–1872 between the
British, imperial and colonial, and the Maori tribes of the North
Island. The main conflicts were the Northern War of 1845–1846 in
and around the Bay of Islands; the Taranaki War of 1860–1861; the
climactic Waikato War of 1863–1864 and its ancillary Tauranga Cam-
paign of 1864; and the campaigns of the Pai Marire or “Hau Hau”
Movement in 1864–1866 and of the great prophet generals, Titoko-
waru and Te Kooti, in 1868–1872.
* * *
At the beginning of these wars, the Maori seemed impossibly out-
matched by the British in military technology, organization for war,
economic resources, and simple numbers. In the end, it required eigh-
teen thousand British troops, together with careful preparation and
logistical organization, to defeat them in the Waikato War. Even then,
the Maori were able to delay and limit British victory. After imperial
troops were withdrawn, Titokowaru came within an ace of success
against vastly superior colonial forces in 1868–1869, a result that
might have reversed the decision of the Waikato War. Prior to this,
the Maori blocked the British in the Northern and Taranaki Wars
and regularly defeated forces several times their own numbers—forces
that were not trapped or surprised, but that actually chose to give
battle. How is the effectiveness of Maori resistance to be explained?
Broadly speaking, it can be said that three types of military resis-
tance to European expansion were possible. First, indigenous methods
of warfare could be used. These were generally traditional, but could
include new local inventions. The heavy Zulu stabbing assegai, and
the tactics associated with it, originated by Shaka as an improvement
on throwing spears, represented a new but indigenous development.
The second type was imitative, the comprehensive copying of the
European system. The Sikh army of the 1840s is a classic example.
Imported weapons could be incorporated into an indigenous system of
war without necessarily revolutionizing it. Gun-armed tribal warfare
still aimed mainly at coping with local enemies of roughly equal re-
sources, and its military and economic character reflected this. The
third type of armed resistance can be described as adaptive innovation:
a system that ideally transcended both of the others and was specifi-
cally designed to cope with European methods—not as a copy of them,
fighting fire with fire, but as an antidote to them, fighting fire with
water.
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The indigenous Maori system of war could not cope with British
warships, artillery, and numbers through open battle or the defense
of traditional pa (Maori fortifications). Guerilla techniques could be
seen as a form of indigenous resistance, and they sometimes used them
against the British, but usually only as a supplement to other forms.
The mainstream of Maori operations falls outside any useful definition
of guerilla war. The axiom that guerilla methods are the only effec-
tive way in which the weak can fight the strong is often parroted
regardless of its applicability. Guerrillas usually pay a heavy price for
their mode of war in social and economic dislocation and in the occu-
pation of their more accessible centers of population. It is not nor-
mally a method of preventing conquest but of making it expensive to
the conqueror. Leaders from Vercengetorix to Mao have therefore
turned to it only as a last resort. The Maori had a system with which
they could hope to protect their land, and they were wise to prefer it
to guerilla methods.
The Maori also rejected imitative methods—not simply because
they could not imitate. As early as the 1820s they had acquired
cannon, and there are signs that the Maori King Movement, founded
in 1858, began developing a regular army. In 1862, a Waikato mis-
sionary saw fifty uniformed Kingite troops who were “apparently
equal to an English regiment as regards order and discipline.” An
official knew of four similar companies and was told that the men
received rations and were paid three pence a day—not a great deal less
than a British infantryman’s pay after stoppages (Ashwell 1835–1880:
April 14, 1862; Gorst 1862). There is no indication that this tiny
standing force was ever employed as such in the Waikato War, and
the Maori were wise to avoid the temptation. Their regulars were
clearly too few to meet the British force in the kind of front-to-front
combat for which they had been drilled.
As for artillery, the Maori used cannon against the British in the
Northern War battles of Ohaeawai and Ruapekapeka in 1845–1846
and at Meremere and Paterangi in the Waikato in 1863–1864. The
Maori had competent gun layers among them—men trained on
whalers and other vessels—and they sometimes had a limited amount
of gunpowder to spare. But their cannon were old, with bores made
irregular by corrosion and with makeshift carriages that made them
difficult to aim and dangerous in the recoil. More importantly, the
available projectiles—stones and pieces of scrap metal—were inade-
quate. These missiles made accurate and powerful fire all but impos-
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sible. Such weapons were of little use in open battle, or even in the
defense of pa. In the latter case, they were almost a liability because
the essence of Maori strategy was the preparedness to abandon pa. A
European-style reluctance to lose their guns might have proved fatal,
and on the few occasions that they used cannon, the Maori derived
little benefit and readily abandoned them.
The method to which the Maori actually turned was essentially
innovative: It differed from both their traditional system and the
British system. It was applied in a variety of ways according to the
needs of a particular campaign, and it was progressively improved,
but it was based on the same principles throughout the wars.
The Maori solution to British numerical superiority was to strike
“attack” and “open battle” off their list of tactical options. Instead,
they developed a new kind of fortification: the modern pa. To achieve
their objectives, the British had to attack these positions. Originally,
pa included a considerable amount of timber palisading, and it was
often this that caught the observer’s eye. But in fact it was the earth-
works that were always the most important, and some pa in Tara-
naki and Waikato included no timber at all. The crucial parts of the
earthworks were those below ground level; tactically, modern pa were
trench systems. As such, they were not an uncommon response to a
situation in which high enemy firepower rendered the open battlefield
almost untenable. Unlike traditional pa, modern pa did not contain
noncombatants, seed crops, tools, equipment, or reserve supplies.
They had no economic function and could readily be abandoned as
required. Easily constructed, cheap, effective, and expendable, modern
pa were the basic building block of the various Maori strategies.
The rifle trenches of pa protected the garrison from small-arms
fire, but two tactical problems remained: protection from heavy artil-
lery bombardment and the actual repulse of the assault. Armed mainly
with muskets, the Maori had no reliable long-range weapons to keep
enemy artillery at a respectful distance, and their pa were often so
small that the British were able to lay down bombardments that were
enormous in relation to the target. Using breech-loading guns throw-
ing shells of up to 110 pounds each, the British fired roughly twenty
times the weight of shell per square yard at Gate Pa (Tauranga Cam-
paign), on April 29, 1864, as they did into the Somme battlefield dur-
ing the initial bombardment of June 24–July 1, 1916 (Belich 1989a:
182–183; Keegan 1976:235–236). Even if generous allowance is made
for the increased effectiveness of explosives and for the fact that some
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shots fired at the Gate Pa missed their target, it is clear that the Maori
underwent a heavier bombardment in one day than the Germans did
in seven.
One method of counteracting the threat of heavy bombardment
was to provide a false target for the enemy. At Puketakauere (Taranaki
War 1860), the Maori placed their main firing trenches well in front
of virtually unmanned stockades, and the British shells passed harm-
lessly overhead (Belich 1989a:91–98). But a more important protec-
tion from heavy bombardment was the antiartillery bunker, first used
by Maori in 1845. The garrison would sit out the cannonade in their
bunkers and then move, through communication trenches or passages,
to their firing positions or rifle trenches. This is strikingly similar to
the pattern on the Western Front in 1914–1918, where static battle
lines made possible concentrations of artillery so large that trenches
alone were inadequate.
The second major tactical problem with the defense of modern pa
was the repulse of the assault. The ferocity, élan, and self-confidence
of British troops made them extremely formidable in the attack—the
conviction that they could not be beaten by inferior numbers of native
warriors added an element that almost amounted to fanaticism. In
some attacks on Maori pa, 40 percent of the assault party had to be
shot down before the rest retreated. Added to this, modern pa often
had to be relatively modest fortifications: low enough to avoid undue
attention from artillery and small enough to be built quickly. The
notion of British assault parties being hurled against massive ramparts
or stockades built on precipitous crags is entirely inappropriate. Ora-
kau (Waikato War 1864), which repelled five assaults, stood on a low
rise and was only 4 feet high.
An even more important aspect of the problem of repelling assaults
related to rapid small-arms fire, or rather, to the lack of it. The
attackers’ possession of rapid-fire small arms did not make a great
deal of difference in assaulting trench-and-bunker systems. Much
lighter defenses than were necessary to stop a shell could also stop a
bullet. This remained true whether the bullet was fired by a musket,
a breech-loader, a repeater, or a machine gun. In the later stages of
the wars, British possession of rapid-fire weapons made little differ-
ence to attacks on pa. The point is not that the British attackers even-
tually got rapid-fire weapons, but that the Maori defenders rarely
had them. They lacked what is usually regarded as an essential ingre-
dient of trench warfare: the capacity to produce rapid long-range
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fire. They had to seek ways of repelling determined assaults without
the benefit of obstructive defenses or modern weapons.
Contrary to legend, the Maori were usually reasonable marksmen,
insofar as good shooting was possible with a musket. This, together
with good firing discipline, was important in the repulse of assaults,
but the decisive factors concerned the construction of pa and the
preparation of the surrounding battlefield. Carefully sited firing posi-
tions and salients for enfilading fire were regular features of pa. So
too were light defenses like the pekerangi, a light fence that impeded
an attacker and allowed time to shoot him. These devices were
common in pa of the intertribal “Musket Wars” of the 1820s, but the
heavy dependence on features that might surprise an attacker was a
new development.
In some cases, the very survival of the garrison after a heavy bom-
bardment had an important shock effect. The lack of damage to a
garrison and its physical defenses was an unpleasant surprise for the
British. Hidden and deceptively weak-looking rifle trenches might also
prove decisive. False targets might distract assault parties as well as
artillery. At Puketakauere, and at Titokowaru’s pa in 1868, the whole
central position was a false target that fixed British attention and
enabled the Maori to pick them off from rifle pits on the flanks. At
Gate Pa, the interior of the pa was in fact a trap—a mazelike confu-
sion of trenches dominated by hidden firing positions. The British
were allowed in and shot down. In terms of protecting the garrison,
modern pa were trench and bunker systems; in terms of repelling
assault, they were carefully prepared killing grounds. These traps and
deceptions, together with the basic features of pa construction, were
functionally analogous to the defender’s rapid-fire small arms of later
trench warfare. The Gate Pa would have done very well indeed as a
tiny section of the Ypres Salient. Modern pa had wooden pekerangi
instead of barbed wire and flax baskets of earth instead of sandbags,
but the trenches and bunkers were essentially the same. In the
long-occupied bunkers of the Taranaki War in 1861, the comparison
extended to graffiti and the comforts of home.
The modern pa system did have its limitations. It was mainly defen-
sive. Only Titokowaru was able to use it consistently to seize and
hold the strategic initiative, and no leader was able to mount a really
substantial tactical offensive and so annihilate a British army. The
modern pa enabled the Maori to repel British assault parties, but
these usually had ample reserves to fall back on, while the Maori
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never had the numbers for counterattack and pursuit. This explains
why casualties on both sides were disproportionately low for the
intensity of the conflict. It is counterattack and all-out pursuit, the
follow-up of victory, that causes really heavy casualties and destroys
armies. In the New Zealand Wars, it rarely occurred. The British had
the numbers but not the opportunities. The Maori had the opportu-
nities but not the numbers. Finally, while sustained by a tribal social
economy, the modern pa system’s capacity to thwart superior forces
was not infinite. Using it, the Maori could block continuous offen-
sives by twice their own numbers or sporadic offensives by several
times their strength. But they could not block the continuous offen-
sive of an army several times as great as their own, and so they nar-
rowly lost the Waikato War.
In military terms, the remarkable thing about the New Zealand
Wars was not the eventual Maori defeat, but the degree of their
success along the way. The key to this was the modern pa system; an
innovative military method designed as an antidote to the British sys-
tem, a form of counter-European warfare. While British possession of
steamships for transport was quite important, the modern pa system
meant that the British did not win the New Zealand Wars through
superior technology, superior methods, or indeed through any kind of
qualitative superiority at all. In the final analysis, they won for the
same reason that the Goths beat the Romans: overwhelming numbers.
* * *
Though the Maori lost in the end, the level and nature of their suc-
cesses along the way contravened some fundamental tenets of Euro-
pean racial and imperial mythology. The essence of their military
achievement was therefore laundered out of contemporary British
interpretations and, to some extent, out of history. The process was
quite subtle. It was systematic but not deliberate or conspiratorial,
and it did not preclude recognition—sometimes generous recognition
—of such things as Maori courage and chivalry. It was never entirely
effective; blatant facts persisted in poking out. But it worked well
enough to consistently misrepresent the New Zealand Wars. Whatever
their historical success, historiographically the British won the wars
hands down.
The driving force behind this myth was an enormously powerful
British expectation of victory. Sometimes it proved so strong that it
simply overshot the evidence—given one element of an equation, com-
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mentators would deduce the second from the principle that the British
always won battles against savages. This tendency often acted in con-
cert with a reluctance to credit the Maori with strategic finesse and
the ability to coordinate the movements of two or more groups and
with the propensity to exaggerate Maori numbers and casualties. The
combined effect was the frequent creation of fictional victories and
the still more frequent exaggeration of real ones. Historical molehills
became historiographical mountains. The expectation of victory also
meant that when defeats were recognized, they created a massive
shock, an acid test for the myth of conquest. British responses to
defeat basically consisted in an effort to absorb this shock; through
some kind of palliative, which counterbalanced the disaster; through
a satisfying explanation that softened the blow by providing accept-
able reasons for it; or through a suppressive reflex whereby the
defeat was played down, ignored, or forgotten.
One kind of palliative involved taking that aspect of a lost battle
in which the British had been least unsuccessful and treating it as an
autonomous operation. This ameliorated or even nullified the disas-
trous aspects. Another was the exaggeration of Maori casualties. The
thin red line may have been worsted, but not before it had piled the
ground high with Maori corpses. High Maori casualties might be
deduced from “bloodstained trenches” observed after a battle or from
the number “seen to fall.” British accounts were liberally peppered
with both phrases. The former made a corpse from a cut finger, while
the latter ignored Maori combat practice: When you were fired at, or
about to be fired at, you instantly dropped to the ground. The British
knew of this practice—some colonial units adopted it—but its impli-
cations for estimates of Maori losses were rarely acknowledged.
Hard evidence of Maori casualties was often manipulated. When
Maori estimates of their own casualties were received, the British dis-
missed or discounted them or assumed that they referred only to
chiefs. When Maori bodies were counted after a battle, it was assumed
that many more had been carried off. This assumption was some-
times true, but more often it was both gratuitous and false. On one
occasion, it was too much even for the colonial press: “It is generally
supposed that the Hau Haus have been exterminated to the extent of
something under 10,000, but with the usual tact and consideration
that distinguishes these playful creatures, they have done their own
undertaking and removed the entire lot” (Punch, or the Wellington
Charivari: August 17, 1868). British exaggeration of Maori casualties
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was important in the manipulation of victory, but it had its greatest
impact as a palliative for defeat. The more damaging or embarrass-
ing the defeat, the greater the tendency to inflate Maori losses. On
some occasions high estimates of Maori casualties lacked even a frail
basis in fact and were created purely by the need for them. “Their
wounded are not more than 8,” wrote one British commentator, “our
wounded come to near 100. From this it will be seen that a large
number of them must have been lost in the lagoon” (Maunsell 1850–
1877:November 30, 1863).
Palliatives were important, but the main way of ameliorating the
shock of defeat was to offer acceptable explanations for it. The first
and most simple acceptable explanation was overwhelming Maori
numbers. There was a tendency to exaggerate Maori numbers at all
times, but immediately after British defeats it suddenly became acute.
As with the exaggeration of Maori casualties, slender favorable evi-
dence was accepted, strong contrary evidence was rejected and, on
occasion, no evidence at all was required. The British were outnum-
bered because they were beaten, and they were beaten because they
were outnumbered. The exaggeration of enemy strength is very
common in war, and emphasis on it may seem to belabor the obvious.
But the tendency was pervasive, influential, and persistent. The Maori
achieved what they did with a quarter as many fighting men as most
contemporary British believed—and half as many as most historians
believe.
Another acceptable explanation was to credit Maori with “natural
advantages” that were formidable but not admirable and that often
acted in concert with an environment allegedly more hostile to Euro-
peans than to indigenes. The “capacity to burrow like rabbits through
the high fern” and survive gunshot wounds through the head are two
of many possible examples (Carey 1863:118; Belich 1989b:34). It was
often alleged that the problem was not beating the Maori but finding
them. Sometimes this was true, and rough terrain was common, but
most often Maori forces took up relatively accessible positions and
waited to be attacked in them. Maori were skilled at bushcraft, but
this scarcely compensated for the huge disadvantage of fighting full-
time soldiers with part-time ones. Colonial conflicts are still often
described as “wars against nature,” but rain falls on black and white
alike.
The third acceptable explanation of defeat was Maori imitation
of Europeans. After perusing Maori Waikato War entrenchments, an
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officer suggested that perhaps “the most studious of them have been
reading our works published on fortification” (New Zealand Herald:
January 15, 1864). European renegades were allegedly the most
common conduits of civilized military knowledge. Sometimes they
existed, but they were not asked for advice on modern trench war-
fare, which they could not have given anyway. More often they were
invented to acceptably explain defeat. “The strength of the place
[Ohaeawai Pa, 1845] has struck me with surprise, and I cannot help
feeling convinced that the Natives could not have constructed it with-
out some European assistance” (Despard 1845:1050, July 12).
Scapegoats provided a fourth way of acceptably explaining defeat.
Maori allies were ideal scapegoats, but when they were not available
British interpreters fell back on their own officers. Very few imperial
and colonial commanders in the New Zealand Wars escaped severe
criticism, often vitriolic. Failed leaders were seen as exceptions to the
rule of British military excellence, rather than used to question the
rule itself. One newspaper was “driven to a painful contrast between
out commanders who imperil New Zealand, and those who saved
our Indian Empire two years ago” (The New-Zealander: October 3,
1860). Some British leaders were mediocre; some were very able in-
deed, but still came to grief against the likes of Titokowaru. Able or
not, their reputations were readily sacrificed by their countrymen on
the pyre of defeat by blacks, screening it with smoke.
These explanations had two things in common: They were accept-
able to the British, and they were inaccurate. What defined accept-
ability and precluded accuracy was a British stereotype of Maori mili-
tary abilities. British commentators were quite capable of recognizing
Maori courage, chivalry, dexterity at guerilla methods, and intuitive
or traditional fort-building skill. But there were other qualities that
they were reluctant to acknowledge. For some commentators, these in-
cluded good marksmanship, discipline, and the capacity for sustained
and well-organized physical labor. Collectively, this could result in
quite serious distortion: Some Maori victories could not be explained
without reference to good shooting, battle discipline, and high work
rates. But a still more important aspect of the stereotype was the reluc-
tance to credit the Maori with the higher military talents: the capacity
to coordinate, to think strategically, and to innovate tactically and
technically.
For some British interpreters, it was less a failure to perceive than
a reluctance to recognize. In 1869, Colonel Whitmore, in commenting
on a minor ambush set by Titokowaru, noted that individual scouts
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had been permitted to pass unmolested. He suspected that the chief
had done this intentionally to avoid springing the trap prematurely,
but he expressed this conclusion quite tentatively: “If this surmise is
too civilized a motive for his [Titokowaru’s] movements, it is very
difficult to understand why he permitted so many individuals travel-
ing almost alone to pass . . . and reserved his attack for the strongest
party likely to pass” (1869:12 March). Whitmore was no fool; he
had recent hard experience of Titokowaru’s abilities, yet he still hesi-
tated to credit him with so simple a trick. The British stereotype of
Maori military abilities created the limits within which the interpre-
tation of events had to operate. According to the stereotype, certain
Maori abilities did not exist and could not therefore be used to
explain British defeats and difficulties. In particular, Maori strategic
skill and field-engineering innovation, products of the higher military
talents, were the last explanation to occur to a British observer. Since
they were also the true explanation, the whole British interpretation
was reduced to something not unlike an attempt to explain a football
game without reference to the ball.
* * *
Some aspects of the British interpretation of the New Zealand Wars
will be familiar to readers of military history. Contemporary accounts
of most wars tend to be biased toward the writer’s own party. But the
natural predilection for reports favoring one’s own side is not enough
to explain the interpretative phenomenon sketched above. Unaccept-
able facts and implications were suppressed almost to the point of
overkill, and the real explanation of British defeats was avoided with
a desperation that might be described as psychotic in an individual. In
the search for alternative explanations, the British did not stop short
of stretching credibility to its limits or of sacrificing the reputations
of their own generals. Why did this strong tendency to mythologize
exist, and why did it have these characteristics?
The myth of conquest was the product of a dialectic between the
stubborn blatancy of fact and the value placed on preconceptions.
Some preconceptions were so widely shared and so highly valued that
most British commentators protected them from threatening evidence.
Protection took the form of converting the realities into the least un-
palatable shape possible. It was a two-way struggle, and preconcep-
tions did not always win; sometimes the evidence was simply too
blatant to be suppressed or acceptably explained. But there was always
a pressure to bring events into conformity with expectations.
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Most of the relevant preconceptions were related to the body of
thought known as Victorian ideas of race. An extensive literature
exists on this subject, and no substantial examination is possible here,
but it should be noted that Victorian racial thought was more com-
plicated and less intentionally malign than is sometimes implied. The
purpose here is not to castigate the Victorians for not being like us,
but to assess the effects of their cherished preconceptions on a histor-
ical interpretation. The Victorians were neither the first nor the last
group of people to see their success as evidence of inherent superiority
and to look to racial and other hypotheses to rationalize this belief.
One effect of British racial attitudes was the totally unselfconscious
use of an ethnocentric system of measurement; a culture-specific frame
of reference. European styles of military organization and generalship
were wrongly assumed to be the only effective forms. Te Kooti was
believed to be the most able Maori leader partly because he adopted
some of the accoutrements of European generalship. On horseback,
“attired in a red shirt with boots and breeches, a sword suspended
from his side,” communicating with his subordinates by orderly, Te
Kooti seemed to control his forces in a way the British understood
(British Parliamentary Papers 1868–1869:386–390). A more tradi-
tional Maori command system was not so easily recognizable. Simi-
larly, it was difficult for the British to accept that the King Movement
was an effective military organization. Where was the chain of com-
mand, the staff, and the commissariat? Equally hard to accept was
the way in which sophisticated artifact technology, the European hall-
mark, was neutralized by superficially less impressive techniques. It
was almost impossible for a Victorian to acknowledge that a wonder-
ful scientific achievement such as the Armstrong gun was functionally
inferior to an antiartillery bunker, a mere hole in the ground.
This ethnocentric frame of reference formed a passive backdrop to
the interpretation of the wars, limiting the British ability to recognize
Maori military achievements for what they were. But there were three
other groups of ideas that played a more active role, joining the events
themselves as the positive determinants of interpretation. The first
was the conviction of British military superiority per se; the second
was the notion that British victory over such people as the Maori was,
by a law of nature, inevitable; and the third was the belief that most
non-European peoples, including the Maori, lacked the intellectual
qualities known as “the higher mental faculties.”
Military achievement was one sphere in which British convictions
of superiority were particularly strong. Recent historians stress the
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undoubted weaknesses of the British regular army, and it is easy to
forget that, on the extant record, this army won four-fifths of its
battles before the Second South African War of 1899–1902. Given this
record, a belief in the superiority of British arms did not have to be
based on anything other than empirical observation, and it both de-
rived from and was reinforced by actual events. But the line of reason-
ing normally used went further than this. Military excellence was
seen not as an acquired attribute of the British regular soldier but as
a characteristic innate in all Britons, including settlers. The typical
qualities of the British soldier were also those of Carlyle’s John Bull:
“Sheer obstinate toughness of muscle; but much more, what we call
toughness of heart, which will mean persistence hopeful and even
desperate, unsubduable patience, composed candid openness, clear-
ness of mind” (Carlyle 1845:215). Not only was military excellence a
constant; it was also a defining feature of the Briton. Consequently,
though the notion of military superiority predated the nineteenth-
century upsurge of interest in race, it lent itself easily to fusion with
ideas of racial superiority.
The second group of ideas concerned the inevitability of British
victory over the Maori. This belief was closely associated with the
idea of Fatal Impact and, from 1859, with Social Darwinism. It was
not derived simply from the fact that the British had more men and
more guns, or indeed from the conviction that they were superior sol-
diers, but from what was widely perceived as a law of nature. A basic
axiom of nineteenth-century racial thought was that Europeans in
contact with lesser races would inevitably exterminate, absorb, or, at
the very least, subordinate them. As with the conviction of military
superiority, this belief arose from an amalgam of experience and
theory. By 1830, the decline of aboriginal populations in many areas
seemed to indicate that “uncivilized man melts ‘as snows in the sun-
shine’ before ‘superior’ capacities” (Bannister 1968:15). In an age
without knowledge of bacterial and viral infection and immunity,
there was a strong tendency to attribute this not merely to practical
factors such as disease and alcohol but also to “some more myste-
rious agency” (Darwin 1906:418).
These two groups of preconceptions combined to create the power-
ful expectation of victory—and its inverse, the shocked reaction to
defeat—that was the dynamic force behind the British interpretation.
But it was the third group of ideas that set the limits within which
this force could work. Though they might select the most favorable
elements available, interpreters drew their particular stereotype of
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Maori abilities from a general stereotype of the savage. A dislike of
steady labor and the “excitability” that led to poor marksmanship
were aspects of this, as were some “natural advantages.” But the most
important feature of the stereotype was the absence of the intellec-
tual qualities of scientific curiosity, inventiveness, and high reasoning
ability. These were collectively known as the “higher mental facul-
ties,” and their warlike manifestation was the higher military talents.
The European monopoly of the higher mental faculties was the
inner tabernacle of Victorian racial attitudes. To question it was to
question a whole worldview. When events did indeed cast doubt on
it, as with evidence of Maori possession of the higher military talents,
Victorian commentators avoided, misinterpreted, or suppressed them.
Thus the real explanation for British defeats and difficulties in the
New Zealand Wars was banished from the realm of the acceptable.
Maori military resistance to Europe may have been unusually effec-
tive, and the interpretative response it invoked may therefore have
been exceptionally strong. But the racial preconceptions cherished by
British interpreters of the New Zealand Wars were widely shared by
Europeans and neo-Europeans. We may be looking at a widespread
myth of European conquest that refracts the history of many conflicts,
though the precise angle of refraction will vary. Scholarly disesteem
has meant that the military history of contact and empire has not
been revised as energetically as other dimensions, which may mean
that a residue of myth survives in today’s received versions. Blatant
racial denigration is easily eliminated, but battles are notoriously dif-
ficult phenomena to reconstruct, and it is tempting to draw on older
works for the fundamentals of interpretation. Hints of a New Zea-
land interpretative syndrome are apparent in quite recent works on
many wars of conquest, in Africa, Asia, the Americas, and the Pacific.
The very phrase colonial small wars is arguably part of a suppressive
reflex. Real conquest existed, of course, and it was important—though
not all-important—to empire. But conquest coexisted and interacted
with a larger shadow of itself: its myth. The myth may have helped
determine history as well as refract it down to us. The European
belief in their invincibility gave confidence, almost fanaticism, to
their arms. If they failed, they tried, tried, and tried again, like
Robert Bruce’s spider, convinced that racial destiny meant ultimate
victory. The myth of conquest had some capacity to be self-actualiz-





Paradoxes of the Colonial Male Gaze
Patricia Grimshaw and Helen Morton
Joel Polack was an adventurer who arrived in New Zealand in 1831
and, like so many of his fellows, set out to make a good living wheel-
ing and dealing in goods and land with Mâori people, first in Hoki-
anga and subsequently in Kororareka. He became more notable than
most early settlers, however, by writing of his experiences. His New
Zealand: Being a Narrative of Travels and Adventures . . . 1831–1837
appeared in 1838, followed by the two-volume Manners and Customs
of the New Zealanders in 1840, the year in which the British claimed
sovereignty over Mâori and their lands. Polack gained a reputation as
a land shark, a charge that he vehemently denied in the preface to his
Manners and Customs. In 1838 he traveled to London to give evi-
dence to a Select Committee of the House of Lords in support of the
colonization of New Zealand, whence he returned for a period when
the British took possession.
As was usual in early accounts of New Zealand travels, Polack
attempted to describe Mâori society for his English readers, and in
doing so specifically addressed Mâori women’s life experience. His
anecdotes and descriptions of Mâori life, mundane or extraordinary,
abound with details of Mâori women as individuals. He told of
women’s active participation in all of the tribal groups’ affairs, of their
energy, their outspokenness, and their efficiency: “In New Zealand
they eat with the men, accompany their lovers, husbands, relatives,
and friends, to a feast or a war expedition, influencing the several
tribes by taking an active concern in all business of life. They are con-
sulted alike in public and domestic affairs, bring large dowers to their
husbands, and even join the war council, which they at periods aid
by their deliberations” (1840:2:94).
Yet, while capable of writing specific descriptions of female be-
havior that implied a significant status for Mâori women, Polack
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could as readily shade into negative generalizations, drawing upon a
code of observation that was familiar to his British readers. This code
placed Mâori women’s lives and their relations with Mâori men
within the context of a supposed scale of civilization that fore-
grounded the place of women in other societies, both European and
non-European. In one passage Polack noted, for example, that the
“forms of the young women are calculated to interest the traveler;
but marriage, and the servitude with which it is accompanied in all
barbarous states of society, cause early anility, and consequent decay”
(1974:1:363). It was to the degraded state of women in these “bar-
barous” countries, he confidently told his audience, that “we”—that
is, Europeans—“must attribute the unsocial habits of the people
towards each other.” He continued: “The example in New Zealand
is not solitary; history has invariably taught us, from the deluge to
our own times, that civilization has been dependent on the influence
which woman has had on society; and it may be even asserted, that
the absolute rise and decline of nations depend much on her conduct
in social life.”
The apparent paradox posed by Polack’s shifting authorial posi-
tion could be brushed aside as idiosyncracy were it not for the fact
that this ambivalence was such a marked feature of colonial writing
on Mâori women generally. Granted the need, so well established
most recently by Nicholas Thomas in Colonialism’s Culture (1994),
that we consider the historical specificities of the creation of colonial
discourses, just as we should at the same time presume variability
within the observed indigenous communities themselves, perhaps we
should not be surprised if there are puzzling inconsistencies within
such literature. But colonial texts constructing images of Mâori
women, with their diversity within and between texts, are strikingly
diverse and confusing and have given rise to subsequent contestations
surrounding the position of women from the late nineteenth century
to the present. What was the basis of this anomaly?
In this chapter we contribute to a discussion of this issue through a
close examination of the writings of certain European men other than
missionaries who traveled through or settled in New Zealand in the
period of early British colonial expansion through to the 1860s. While
the accounts written by missionaries during this period have been
closely analyzed, less attention has been paid to the writings of this
group. Many of these travelers and settlers lived for periods of time
with Mâori, spoke the language if haltingly, and sometimes established
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temporary relationships with Mâori women, becoming involved with
their kin. Such mobility was not an option for European women, and
hence the texts created from this style of intercultural encounter were
predominantly male. Women’s accounts of the early period, even
those by missionary wives, seldom recorded close observations of
Mâori for a public readership. Although there are a number of books
containing the reminiscences of white women from the early colonial
period, they are remarkable for their lack of information on Mâori
women, or Mâori men for that matter. In some accounts there is
simply no mention of Mâori at all. Those that do mention Mâori
people tend to describe women only as the pupils of the settler women,
learning the British forms of domestic skills. Men are described in
stereotypes: as frightening warriors, nuisance beggars, or comic char-
acters. Female travelers also often ignored the presence of Mâori
people or described them as amusing curiosities (see Broome 1904;
Butler 1886; Stewart 1908; Wilson 1894).
Among the most prominent of these male sojourners were, apart
from Polack himself, William Brown, leader of a settler group advo-
cating direct land sales from Mâori; Ernest Dieffenbach, a German
naturalist who worked with the pro-settler New Zealand Company
for several years; Augustus Earle and George Angas, both of them
English artists; and Francis Fenton, a lawyer who served as a magis-
trate in the Waikato and became native secretary in 1856. All these
men benefited from imperial expansion and, though they might decry
certain consequences, none opposed colonization. The overall thrust
of the observations of these writers and others like them ranged from
those who characterized Mâori as ignoble savages unable to control
their immediate impulses to those who portrayed Mâori as noble
savages, losing their best features to corrupting European influences.
The accounts of these men and others like them are important not
only because many were widely read during the colonial period—often
by prospective settlers whose preconceptions of New Zealand were
partly formed by such literature—but also because they have con-
tinued to be cited in anthropological and historical studies through
the twentieth century. As sources for ethnohistory, they are proble-
matic not least in terms of their geographical vagueness. Many authors
indicated that they traveled extensively through New Zealand, yet
few troubled to specify which areas were being referred to in the text.
Herbert Meade, a naval officer who traveled from Auckland to Lake
Taupo in 1864, acknowledged that Mâori of different areas “differ
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much in habits and character” (1870:162), but this was most unusual.
Our aim here, however, is not in this instance to enter into ethno-
historical debates on traditional Mâori culture, but to address instead
the meaning of these men’s representations of gender.
We suggest that the signals to which British observers responded
when decoding gender in Mâori society were ambiguously reproduced
because they at times coincided, and at other times conflicted, with
the colonizers’ fundamental convictions about appropriate femininity
derived from their own frames of reference. Certain aspects of Mâori
women’s behavior and appearance, and aspects of Mâori men’s rela-
tions with Mâori women, resonated positively with male, middle-
class British expectations. Yet other aspects of Mâori women’s lives
seemed demeaning and oppressive when judged against an ideal model
of the European woman. These writers negotiated a constant, sharp
tension between their empirical observations of Mâori women’s lives
and the social theory that informed their efforts to situate those ob-
servations within a comparative context.
By examining particular aspects of the accounts we have chosen,
we draw out this tension in order to show how the accounts can ap-
pear so paradoxical. In each of the three areas of representation dis-
cussed below—women’s position as wives and kinswomen, women as
mothers, and women’s physical appearance—there are both positive
and negative assessments of women, often within the same text. These
varying assessments are based on different and often conflicting sets
of criteria, yet they are always dominated by the basic agenda: to eval-
uate women’s overall status in accordance with contemporary Euro-
pean notions of ideal gender roles and relations. Before turning to the
representations of Mâori women, we briefly discuss these Western
models, together with recent academic reassessments that have
attempted to unravel the paradoxes they created.
Mâori and the “Woman Question”
European intellectuals’ questioning of the social status of
women dated from the Enlightenment and earlier. When French
socialist Charles Fourier wrote in 1808 that “the extension of the
privileges of women is the fundamental cause of all social progress”
(1971:131), he gave enhanced currency to the notion that gender was
a significant marker of social progress, an idea that would be reiter-
ated by eminent social theorists throughout the nineteenth century,
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Karl Marx, John Stuart Mill, and Friedrich Engels among them. For
European intellectuals the fundamental criterion by which women’s
standing would be assessed was the degree to which male power over
women was structured through legal systems and social conventions
and also enforced personally through direct physical violence.
English and American evangelical Christians, from the late eigh-
teenth century onward, substantially enlarged the discourses, con-
structing models of ideal gender relations as they strove to exert
influence over societies fast being transformed by industrialization
and urbanization. The good woman, evangelicals asserted, was the
core of a decent and moral family and community. The adult married
woman was ideally a good helpmeet to her husband, the conscience
and the stabilizer of the man. Chaste in youth, faithful in marriage,
she was also an active mother, close to her children, watchful and
prudent. Women certainly had work to do, since theirs was a utilita-
rian, not a decorative model of femininity, but not in hard physical
labor: Their important work lay in the concerns of the family and the
home (Davidoff and Hall 1987; Grimshaw 1989, 1994).
An excerpt from the account of a naval officer, William Marshall,
who made two visits to New Zealand in 1834, illustrates something
of this integration of notions of women’s social status with women’s
personal behavior. He talked of Mâori women as “everywhere the
miserable drudges of society, except where the benign influence of
Christianity has brought out their emancipation from the galling
yoke of abject servitude to the other sex” (1836:12). Marshall noted
approvingly the labors of the Church Missionary Society among
Mâori communities and applauded the presence of mission wives. His
comment, in fuller detail, is revealing: “Among tribes of savages,
where the women are unchaste, and neither gentle nor kindly affec-
tioned, owing to the miserable state of degradation to which they have
been reduced, the presence of Christian females, as well as of Chris-
tian men, is necessary to raise the morality of those tribes, by rescuing
their wives, and sisters, and daughters, from the twofold degradation
of social inferiority and personal impurity” (52).
The final phrase, “the twofold degradation of social inferiority and
personal impurity,” captures nicely the model of womanhood that
blended questions of civil status with sexual purity and self-restraint.
Marshall was pro-mission, and such attitudes we might expect from
evangelical missionaries and their supporters. But while the male ob-
servers of our study displayed a range of intellectual and religious ori-
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entations, most sustained similar standards to those of Marshall for
evaluating the status of women, even if their personal attachment to
these standards was unevenly or partially applied.
It is not surprising that European men on imperial frontiers who
held such views could assess indigenous women in partially or wholly
negative terms, given the culturally specific bases of their expectations.
Most pertinent for comparative perspectives of Mâori were the Aus-
tralian colonies. Aboriginal women were among those whom settlers
deemed most grievously oppressed, gazed at through this distorting
mirror. Joel Polack was one of many who hastened to compare Mâori
favorably. In sad contrast with Australian Aborigines, Polack claimed,
Mâori women were “not held in the sole light as being creatures of
convenience, and consequently victims to the unceasing caprice and
ungovernable passions of men” (1840:2:130). The artist George
Angas also stated that women held a far higher position among Mâori
than women in “the aboriginal tribes of Australia; by whom the sex
are degraded and despised to the lowest degree—a sure mark of the
inferior grade, of those people in the scale of humanity” (1967:317).
Clearly, the destructive consequences of Australian settlers’ reports
were reverberating widely (Grimshaw and May 1994).
As part of the debate on gender and colonialism, certain postcolo-
nial scholars have suggested a central role for European assessments
of the status of indigenous women in Africa, the Middle East, and
Asia (for example, see Sangari and Vaid 1990). To pursue this issue
for Mâori society brings us immediately to the paradox posed by
Polack’s unstable speaking position, a paradox further exemplified in
twentieth-century ethnohistorical writing on Mâori. Two scholars in
particular, Caroline Ralston and F. Allan Hanson, have in recent years
illustrated the contested nature of writing on Mâori by their striking
revisionist interpretation of the position of women as established in
early anthropological work of such scholars as Elsdon Best (1924). In
this early anthropological work the emphasis was on women’s “pol-
luting” nature, which was said to repel the gods and necessitate the
restriction of women’s activities. We mention Hanson and Ralston
here not to debate their claims but to draw attention to the ways in
which sources such as those we are discussing have been used in dif-
fering ways in both early- and late-twentieth-century representations.
Hanson’s reinterpretation of the early literature on women in Poly-
nesia, in his paper “Female Pollution in Oceania?” (1982), has been
highly influential in Pacific studies. Hanson, with special attention to
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Mâori, challenged the “repellent thesis” found in earlier work, in
which Polynesian women were seen as repelling the gods due to their
inherently polluting nature. He suggested that this reading should be
replaced with an “affinity thesis,” in which women were seen to act
as conduits between the earthly and spiritual realms and therefore to
attract, rather than repel, tapu. “Noa,” which had been translated as
“profane,” should instead be seen as the absence of tapu.
In Hanson’s view, both women and men could be tapu and noa
according to the circumstances, and certain high chiefs and priests of
either sex were always tapu. Women’s association with the supernat-
ural world was, in this revision, especially strong through their repro-
ductive functions. The restrictions on women’s activities that had been
noted since the earliest accounts were reinterpreted in terms of a
careful controlling of women’s potency. Ralston has claimed that this
revised view revealed “the misinterpretations and undervaluing of
female power and participation” in earlier accounts of Polynesian
women (1987:120).
Ralston’s argument in her 1993 article, “Mâori Women and the
Politics of Tradition: What Roles and Power Did, Do and Should
Mâori Women Exercise?” is informed by Hanson’s important paper,
as is true for such Pacific scholars as Roger Keesing (1985) and
Nicholas Thomas (1990), who also supported Hanson’s view. Ralston
read the early sources from New Zealand specifically for evidence of
women’s agency and power. She concludes that there is evidence
of “the independent, politically active, and participatory nature of
women’s lives in the early contact period” (38). Indeed, Ralston im-
plies that strongly negative accounts of Mâori women only began to
emerge in the 1920s, with the early ethnographic work of Elsdon
Best (33). It is these later, negative accounts that she sees as under-
pinning the present construction of tradition, particularly by Mâori
males. Ralston’s selection and interpretation of the early accounts
needs to be understood in the context of a clear agenda, concerning
“the way the denial of rights to speak on the marae is extrapolated to
a denial or questioning of women’s rights to any leadership role in
significant contemporary political, religious, and social affairs” (26).
It is clear that the questions posed by postcolonial scholars cannot
have a simple answer, as shown by the highly ambiguous nature of
the accounts of Mâori gender relations by the British in New Zea-
land. We proceed now to look at the nature of their narratives of
Mâori gender through a closer examination of our chosen texts.
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Wives and Kinswomen: A Share of Influence
or Miserable Drudges?
In Mâori Marriage, Bruce Biggs cites a Mâori saying: “He
puta taua ki te taane he whaanau tamariki ki te wahine” (“The battle-
field for a man, the child bed for a woman”) (1960:60). In the early
literature on Mâori, it is certainly the first that predominates: men
and war. Whatever early male settlers and colonists wrote about
Mâori women was embedded in accounts dominated by European
responses to Mâori men. Visitors were overwhelmed with the force
and power of the men, and in particular, their capacity as warriors,
their martial skills, their bravery, their ferocity. A Marist missionary,
Chouvet, who lived in New Zealand from 1843 to 1846, wrote with
resignation: “After having drunk a war-like temperament with their
mother’s milk, they hear every day of their childhood, their fathers,
their mothers and their neighbors praising the glory of arms, singing
of the courage and deeds of warriors and applauding the massacre of
their enemies. It is easy then to understand why men brought up this
way think only of fighting” (1985:16).
Most of those outside the mission camp referred to this male belli-
cosity with a mixture of awe and admiration, which informed their
descriptions of Mâori male physique and personal appearance. The
darkest side of Mâori warfare, the practice of cannibalism, was spoken
of with fear, but the men’s courage and manly bearing in war evoked
widespread praise. It was not surprising that white male invaders of
Mâoriland would have their main dealings with—and hence form
their most powerful impressions of—Mâori men. Yet their texts also
make clear that Mâori women were visibly present and not to be
ignored.
It must be emphasized that the early chroniclers often left unclear
the status of the Mâori women under examination, whether chiefly
or commoner. They were quite clear about one matter: They insisted
that slave women, along with slave men, were treated cruelly by all
other Mâori, male or female. According to the early accounts the
slaves undertook the hardest labor, were denied basic rights, and led
miserable existences. It was suggested, however, that the condition of
slavery was a temporary condition, not a permanent ascriptive status.
The majority of these texts referred to women who were not slaves.
The visitors and early settlers who described Mâori society pointed
frequently and with surprise to the important place of Mâori women
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and to the degree of influence and power they at times clearly pos-
sessed. Mâori women, it seemed, were extremely significant socially,
and seen so by their husbands, their children, their kin, and their
tribal group. Wrote Brown: “The women are not held in bondage,
but have a share of influence corresponding with the natural strength
of their character” (1845:38). Dieffenbach saw Mâori women treated
by men “with great consideration and kindness, enjoying the full exer-
cise of their free will, and possessing a remarkable influence in all the
affairs of a tribe” (1843:11). Angas noted that Mâori women often
exercised “the greatest influence over their tribes; especially the
widows of important chiefs, or aged women, some of whom are sup-
posed to possess the power of witchcraft and sorcery” (1967:317).
Not apathetic or reticent spectators of any major occasion, Mâori
women organized resources, marshaled a labor force, and welcomed
and entertained guests, visibly and volubly active participants. “On
feasts being given or when a fishing party is proposed, the first wife is
accounted mistress of the ceremonies, and is looked up to with defer-
ence accordingly” (Polack 1840:1:155). This pivotal role flowed from
the active part women played in essential labor: in agriculture, pre-
paring soil for planting, sowing and reaping, in cooking the food;
and in weaving mats, cloaks, and baskets. Non-slave women appear
to have undertaken similar work, whatever their age or standing.
Many men reiterated the claim of the missionary Samuel Marsden of
the Church Missionary Society that female chiefs undertook physical
labor, when on a visit in 1819 he observed the wife of the chief
Hongi Heke digging a potato field. He expressed appreciation that
“a woman of the first rank” would labor alongside her servants and
children (Elder 1932:166). Others recorded chiefly women as princi-
pally overseers of their husbands’ lands, but certainly as not averse to
incidental tasks of an apparently menial kind.
The strength Mâori women displayed in work was portrayed as a
reflection of their wider influence in their families and tribal groups.
In European eyes the most remarkable demonstration of their cour-
age—and their influence—was women’s involvement on the battle-
field. Wives accompanied husbands to battle, spurring them on to
deeds of valor, singing, shouting, and supporting their men in every
way. Sometimes, indeed, they entered the fray themselves. The naval
officer John Nicholas noted one chiefly wife who displayed “the most
undaunted spirit, rivaling the boldest men in deeds of heroism, and
selecting for her antagonist the most formidable she could find.” Such
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warrior women were, he hastened to add, only “certain ladies of
more intrepid character than the rest” (1817:1:199).
Earle, like so many writers, recorded the loyalty and devotion of
women to their husbands. He described elderly couples who had
married in youth, lived happily together all their lives, and “whose
kind and friendly manner towards each other set an example well
worthy of imitation in many English families” (1966:180). Whereas
Dieffenbach described wives as their husbands’ “constant compan-
ions” (1843:39), Brown thought that married couples could sustain a
disconcerting distance from each other, as though unrelated, and
could be found sleeping separately quite soon after marriage. But it
was rare, noted Brown, for married couples to quarrel and “still
rarer for a husband to beat his wife” (1845:33).
The depth of wives’ attachment to husbands was said to be mea-
sured by their supreme bravery, when husbands died or were killed in
warfare, in committing suicide, mostly by hanging or drowning them-
selves. The early observers claimed that the wives themselves took
courageous initiative, apparently driven by their overwhelming grief
and desperate wish to follow their husbands to the grave: No prompt-
ing or persuasion was needed. Stories were told of dramatic, public
acts of suicide at the news of a husband’s sudden death and of ago-
nized wives plaiting their suicide ropes as they kept watch at their
husbands’ deathbeds. “The ardour of affection or rather devotion,
that has been exhibited by the sex in New Zealand, has never been
surpassed in any period or in any country,” thought Polack (1840:
1:156).
Writers of these same accounts detailing the influence and status
enjoyed by many Mâori women frequently made starkly contradictory
statements about women’s status when moved to offer generalizations.
Many commented, after all this description, on women’s “degraded
state.” Nicholas, while claiming that single women were equal to men
in privileges and freedom, added that “when married, their freedom
is at an end; they become mere slaves, and sink gradually into domes-
tic drudges to those who have the power of life and death over them”
(1817:1:180). He used this as an occasion to philosophize—as early
as 1817—about the way in which women were treated more kindly
the more civilized a nation was (2:301).
Within the early settlers’ and visitors’ texts, then, were observations
of discordant elements in women’s roles as wives and kinswomen that
writers sometimes tried to synthesize with these positive observations,
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at other times not. Polack himself pointed to the dramatic feature of
marriage that mesmerized this group of observers: that the errant
wife risked instant death at the hands of her vengeful husband when
she was found in an adulterous relationship. Mâori women were
praised for holding fidelity in marriage in high esteem, but the sanc-
tions for transgression were certainly awful. “The favours of a mar-
ried woman in New Zealand are fully as difficult of attainment as in
any part of the world, the punishment of death being awarded as the
penalty for an infringement of the nuptial bond, which is held by
these people in as sacred a light as in the most civilised states” (1974:
1:369). The traveler Samuel Martin claimed that marriage was “re-
garded as a most solemn ordinance” in which “married women enjoy
as much liberty and exercise as much influence as they do in Europe”
(1845:304). But, he noted, “crimes on their part are visited with the
sternness and cruelty of Eastern despotism. Infidelity is invariably
visited with death.”
And so although casual domestic violence was rarely reported,
writers emphasized that husbands sustained this overwhelmingly ter-
rible right to kill outright an adulterous wife. There was no real reci-
procity in sexual restraint, since polygamy was said to prevail. There
was a great deal of confusion about the extent of polygamy. Some
authors said it only occurred among chiefs, and yet others denied
that it was common at all. Most claimed that men had legitimate
sexual access to several women or wives. The reasons for polygamy
seemed on the face of it to prioritize a man’s sexual interests while
sustaining women’s fidelity through draconian penalties.
As to the origins of polygamy, Nicholas declared himself in favor
of an economic explanation. The first wife was acknowledged as
superior, subsequent wives inferior: “I am disposed to think that the
chiefs take them rather for their manual services, than for the charms
of their persons or the endearments of their society. Indeed they may
be considered in no other light than as hard-working servants, hav-
ing no honor assigned to them but that of distinguished drudgery”
(Nicholas 1817:1:293). Not a few other observers similarly reported
chiefs claiming that without wives’ work in overseeing and working
in gardens, they could not sustain their agricultural enterprises at all.
But polygamy was also seen as the cause of many evils, largely aris-
ing from the jealousy of co-wives. Polack claimed that polygamy was
“greatly abhorred by the females of the country” and that it caused
“unhappiness and incessant brawling” (1840:1:147). Even if this was
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not always so, these writers asked, did not polygamy of itself imply a
low status for women, whatever the justifications? Observers occa-
sionally noted that if men had the power of life and death over wives
in these circumstances, they might well suffer retribution at the hands
of their wives’ relatives. Overall, however, the emphasis was on tales
of swift, brutal, barbaric murder.
Women as Mothers, Women as Murderers?
In contrast to the Mâori proverb claiming “the child bed
for a woman,” European recorders placed Mâori women most cen-
trally as wives rather than mothers. Once again, however, when these
observers did turn their attention to motherhood, they could write
affirmatively of Mâori women’s maternal capacities. The women, it
was said, greatly desired children. Indeed Francis Fenton believed that
a woman was “usually held in respect according to the number of
children with which she had strengthened the tribe” (1859:27). Child-
less wives were inconsolable, he said, and engaged in ceremonies to
intercede with the gods to aid conception (30). Women’s health and
strength were emphasized in descriptions of the ease with which they
experienced childbirth. Nicholas reported that women sat in the open
air, surrounded by men and women, and gave birth “without utter-
ing a single groan.” Thereupon the new mother cut the umbilical cord
herself, and “rose up as if no such occurrence had taken place, and
resumed her ordinary occupations” (1817:2:171; see also Dieffenbach
1843:24; Polack 1974:2:272). Babies were “nursed with affection and
tenderness” (Dieffenbach 1843:26), and breast-feeding was said to
extend as long as to the third year. Mothers showed their young a
fierce loyalty, and children traced their all-important descent lines
through mothers’ as well as fathers’ lineages. The children were intro-
duced very early into the meaning of their place in a family. When a
much-loved husband was killed in battle, a chiefly wife voluntarily
resigned not only herself but her children to the victors, “to kill if
they wished, as they had done to her husband” (Elder 1932:174).
Within the collectivity of the marriage, the family, or the kin group,
mothers fostered their children as precious and similarly loyal young
people. There was no suggestion, as in some other parts of the Pacific,
that mothers were “unnatural” and unable to care for their children
“properly” (see Jolly 1991; Grimshaw 1989).
But motherhood, like wifehood, had its terrible aspect; and the two
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were linked. At the feet of polygamy was laid the cause for a terrible
act perpetrated by mothers: infanticide. Jealous wives were said to
kill their infants to spite husbands who took new wives or offended
them in any way. Brown wrote that “should a husband quarrel with
his wife, she would not hesitate to kill her children merely to annoy
him” (1845:41; emphasis in original).
In this case the wife’s act was seen as one of defiance, implying
power, not as an indication of servility or degradation. Indeed, one
reason given for the surprising observation that fathers, even great
chiefs, could be seen carrying infants around on their backs for much
of the day, nestled into their cloaks, was the fear that the child was in
jeopardy from a revengeful mother (Polack 1840:2:93). For others,
the Mâori fathers’ care of infants and toddlers was in part touching
and impressive, in part puzzling indeed. Why did grown men devote
so much time to the very young? The Europeans knew of “wet
nurses,” but they dubbed these fathers “dry nurses” (Polack 1974:2:
273). What did this imply for the notion of Mâori motherhood? Truly,
both parents seemed amazingly indulgent of young children, scarcely
ever correcting them and leading them with great kindness into the
knowledge and skills they would need in adult life. The Europeans
contemplated the “cheeky” questions and “pestering” behavior of
children askance, but could certainly say that if babies survived their
births, they could look forward to careful and loving nurture.
Infanticide, however, was by far the most widely discussed feature
of Mâori motherhood. Despite the fact that it was rare for observers
to go so far as to claim that they had actually seen the act of infanti-
cide, all claimed that it was common and confessed to by countless
informants. William Yate, who served with the Church Missionary
Society in the Bay of Islands, was one of the few to claim that he wit-
nessed several cases of infanticide, which he, too, blamed on women’s
jealousy of co-wives (1970:98). Other reasons for infanticide were
canvassed, although these were similarly related to the issue of
women’s status. Was infanticide weighted toward infant girls? Many
observers asserted this to be the case. Marshall thought so: “The
murder of the female infant after birth, is however often perpetrated
by its own mother under a smarting sense of the indignities and suf-
ferings to which every female is exposed, long before she arrives at
womanhood, and generally to the latest hour of her life. . . . The for-
titude of women, proof against everything but man’s neglect, may be
overcome, until even natural affection cease to animate her, and the
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love of the mother be absorbed in the misery of the woman. A greater
proof of the degraded estate of the female sex in New Zealand cannot
exist, than that which their very crimes, stated above, supply” (Mar-
shall 1836:14).
Brown wrote that males being much more esteemed than females,
“the latter are chiefly the victims, and are sacrificed that they may
escape future miseries” (1845:41; see also Polack 1840:2:94). Earle
elaborated on this, claiming the women’s excuse given for killing baby
girls was “that they were quite as much trouble to rear, and consumed
just as much food, as a male child, and yet, when grown up, they
were not fit to go to war as their boys were” (1966:179). Again,
Fenton reported that mothers killed daughters in order to flee enemies
unencumbered, but spared baby sons since they would in time be war-
riors (1859:30).
Yet some Europeans denied that infanticide was prevalent, and
others, such as Dieffenbach (1843:26), denied a distinction made by
sex. Despite these conflicting reports, and whatever the truth of the
matter, the existence of so many graphic and emotive accounts of
infanticide meant that assessments of Mâori women as wives and
mothers were inevitably influenced negatively, affecting popular per-
ceptions of Mâori women.
(Promiscuous) Young Beauties and (Chaste)
Old Hags
When Dieffenbach described Mâori women as well treated,
autonomous, and influential in tribal affairs as mentioned previously,
he qualified his remarks with a description of the adverse physical con-
sequences of their arduous work. Apart from the daughters of high
chiefs, Mâori women, he stressed, “are burdened with all the heavy
work; they have to cultivate the fields, to carry from their distant
plantations wood and provisions, and to bear heavy loads during their
traveling excursions” (1843:12). He added that “early intercourse,”
“frequent abortions,” and their prolonged suckling of children con-
tributed “to cause the early decay of their youth and beauty and [were]
prejudicial to the full development of their frame.” Most writers also
found abhorrent the mature women’s moko, or tattooing on the chin.
Observers were unanimous that Mâori women, occasional high-
born women excepted, aged rapidly. Brown stated that “women arrive
very early at maturity, and as early become old and withered” (1845:
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38). As did many other observers, he claimed that girls married very
early, and had lost their youth by the age of thirty (Angas 1967:311;
Polack 1840:2:175). For some this rapid aging was blamed on their
early “promiscuity,” and other women were said to be worn down
prematurely through the physical toll exacted by their bountiful
giving and nurturing of the lives of children, kin, and tribal group.
Amazons, mature women were often called, even if at times there
could be “a good-looking, self-willed sort of Amazon,” as when a
woman saved a group of Europeans from death (Meade 1870:133).
Meade reported that when his party was captured by Kingites and
facing death, a Mâori woman used her influence to help save them.
He described her as “possessing no little influence, a well-made, rather
good-looking person, but strong-minded and imperious” (87).
If the women’s labor was worthy, was it nice? Was it becoming?
Nicholas observed women participating as equals with men in a canoe
race and joining the vociferous singing at the race’s end; he found
their exertions violent, inappropriate: “The distinction of sex appear-
ing no longer visible, was completely lost in their convulsive excesses”
(1817:1:363–364). Mâori women may have often seemed to have
some freedom of action in public domains; but even if this revealed
power, did it go beyond acceptable limits for their sex? And could
these public engagements all be justified if the end result was bodies
marked by time, bodies that were masculinized?
This concern with women’s rapid aging and their “masculine” ap-
pearance and behavior reflects the preoccupation of many of the
male writers with women’s sexuality. Women’s appearance is discussed
as a measure of their sexual attractiveness to the white male observers.
This and other aspects of their sexuality, such as their chastity (or
lack thereof) and the extent of women’s control over their own bodies
in sexual relations and in reproduction were often the predominant
foci of accounts of Mâori women.
The men who settled in and traveled through New Zealand, many
of whom were only in their early twenties, were particularly inter-
ested in young chiefly women. Dieffenbach’s description of such
women’s appearance as “handsome and attractive . . . heightened by
a natural modesty and childlike naivete” (1843:12) echoed the many
similar comments. The attractive Mâori women who caught the male
eye were young—often very young indeed. Many observers likened
these women to beautiful gypsies (for example, Angas 1967:310; Dilke
1869:256), or, as in Polack’s description of a young girl he saw in the
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Kaipara district, to Spanish women: “She was distinguished from the
females of the village by her demeanor, which was dignified and grace-
ful; her countenance was eminently beautiful, which was worthy, as
to complexion and feature, of being put in competition with the
beauteous women of Spain. Her delicacy of appearance was most pre-
possessing; and I imagined her disposition equally pleasing, from a
succession of smiles hovering round her mouth, displaying teeth of un-
rivalled evenness and whiteness. Her charms were much enhanced by
the modest and artless simplicity which evidently composed her usual
manners” (1974:1:124).
Edward Markham, an educated and wealthy traveler, espied many
such pretty young women when he was in Hokianga and the Bay of
Islands in 1834. He wrote: “I have seen some very fine creatures and
even beautiful. The breasts are uncovered in warm weather, and an
unmarried woman takes it as a compliment for you to put your hands
on them” (1963:40). He found it useful to attach himself to one such
chiefly woman for protection “as they are always backed by their
Tribe and you are not robbed or molested in that case; they become
useful and very much attached if used well, and will suffer incredible
persecution for the men they live with.” The Mâori tried to marry
off the girls at a young age, he claimed, because they would not
“keep” (69).
Individual young girls with their fine figures, long flowing hair,
laughing eyes, and delicate hands and feet were portrayed as lovely
indeed, charming potential sexual partners and protectors of Euro-
pean men’s homes. But there was a problem here too, of course,
when their availability was assessed within a context of women’s
status. Young women were apparently not chaste, not chaste at all,
according to these accounts. They were said to have a series of sexual
encounters with Mâori youth. Wrote Earle: “While they remain single
they enjoy all the privileges of the other sex; they may rove where
they please, and bestow their favours on whom they choose, and are
entirely beyond control or restraint” (1966:180). Those living near
ports exchanged sexual favours for European goods with apparent
alacrity, although there was considerable disagreement among ob-
servers as to the extent of women’s willing participation and whether
or not they were “naturally licentious.” Many said that at first these
were slave women (Ollivier 1986:99); others declared any unmarried
women except chiefly women were participating. Was this not sheer
prostitution? And were not prostitutes of low status? But the women
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who were chaste, their mothers and grandmothers, were viewed as
singularly unattractive, unfeminine in appearance and demeanor.
Conclusion
In 1888 a colonist named Thomas Moser published a selec-
tion of sketches of New Zealand life, entitled Mahoe Leaves, that he
claimed offered “a faithful delineation of Mâori life and character”
(Preface). He himself was, he pointed out, “a trifle higher in the social
scale than a Mâori” (83). The tract contains appalling racist sentiment.
Note, for example, this description of an elderly Mâori woman:
“Look at her features, smoke-dried and shrivelled; her back half bent
double; her wretched hands and feet attenuated and shrunk till they
look more like the claws of some horrid bird than a human being.
. . . Some Mummies that I have seen are Venuses compared with her!”
(28) Such grotesque characterizations of Mâori women in the late-
nineteenth-century settler literature are not infrequent and certainly
wounding.
Yet a fuller consideration of gender within colonial discourse in
New Zealand suggests far greater ambiguities than feminist postcolo-
nial scholars have suggested for other times and places. There is no
doubt that decided strengths of Mâori women’s position were widely
canvassed. As Charles Wentworth Dilke wrote in his account of his
travels (he had been to America, India, Australia, Ceylon), published
in the late 1860s: “The delicacy of treatment shown by the Mâoris
toward their women may go far to account for the absence of con-
tempt for the native race among the English population” (1869:270).
Compare the drudgery, he suggested, to which American Indian
women or Indian women were subjected: “It is the New Zealand
native’s treatment of his wife that makes it possible for an honest
Englishman, to respect or love an honest Mâori.”
Here was a positive view of colonial attitudes to Mâori. But others
were not convinced that the settlers pouring into the country saw
things the same way. Edward Shortland was one who, employed as
“Protector of the Aborigines,” strove to defend their reputation. In
January 1850 a writer in the Edinburgh Review claimed that some
years before, a chief’s wife was hung naked by the heels before the
whole tribe and beaten, and that she subsequently committed suicide.
Brown, for one, had related this story in his account of New Zealand
published in 1845. Now, in the early 1850s, it surfaced again. Short-
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land declared in turn that he personally knew the story to be false:
This was “a mode of punishing a female which I have never heard of
as having ever occurred in New Zealand” (1974:64). The story was
fabricated for one reason only, he said, to persuade European settlers
to think unfavorably of Mâori. He pointed at the same time to the
description of Mâori women’s onerous work. Mâori men, not women,
performed the largest proportion of heavy work; some privileged
Mâori women, by contrast, were principally engaged in domestic pur-
suits suitable to their sex. If other Mâori women did perform heavy
labor, he reminded his readers, this was true of many British women
also.
With such defenders, Mâori women would not emerge in this colo-
nial discourse as totally oppressed victims. Yet in so many cases the
early colonial writers raised affirmative descriptions of Mâori gender
only to discount them swiftly with alternative indications of status. It
was these denigratory characterizations that settlers could emphasize
as they systematically dispossessed Mâori of lands and livelihoods. Yet
the same ambiguous signals in the texts have opened the avenue to a






When they start to wear your clothes
do their dreams become more like yours
who do they look like
when they start to use your language
do they say what you say
who are they in your words
when they start to use your money
do they need the same things you need
or do the things change
when they are converted to your gods
do you know who they are praying to
do you know who is praying
for you not to be there





World War II in Kiribati
Sam Highland
World War II in Kiribati was confined mainly to the important govern-
ment bases in Banaba, Tarawa, Abemama, and Butaritari. This paper
is about the Tarawa campaign, one of the bloodiest battlegrounds in
the entire war, and its impact on the Kiribati people, particularly the
inhabitants of Betio village, which was the stage of the main conflict
between the Japanese and the Americans.
Betio is an islet and village located at the southwestern extremity
of Tarawa Atoll. Until the ravages of the war, the Betio people engaged
in a subsistence lifestyle with some affluence. The land abounded with
tropical fruits and crops, mainly coconuts, breadfruit, pumpkins, sweet
potatoes, pandanus, papaya, and traditional root crops. The surround-
ing sea teemed with marine life, fish, and molluscs, readily available all
year round. Life was easy, luxurious, and enjoyable before the threat
of war came in the first week of December 1941. The population of
Betio in 1941 was about four hundred, including a few expatriates.
The Japanese Invasion of Tarawa Atoll
The Japanese landed on the ocean side of the southwestern
part of Betio at about 3 a.m. when the village was asleep. All the
expatriates were captured, interrogated, and threatened unless they re-
sponded accurately to the demands of the Japanese. Everybody was
rounded up near the post office, and some of the captives were tied
up with ropes to coconut trees. The only food store on Betio, that of
Burns Philp, was taken over by the Japanese and later destroyed. The
A longer version of this chapter was published in Remembering the Pacific War, ed.
by Geoff White (Honolulu: Center for Pacific Island Studies, 1991), 109–112.
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Betio villagers had depended on the Burns Philp store for their basic
needs other than traditional food. Curfews were set, and most move-
ments were restricted. At about 4 p.m. that same day, when everyone
had been gathered at the post office, the Japanese flag was hoisted
and the Japanese commander declared Tarawa to be under Japanese
jurisdiction. The Japanese left Tarawa that same day, leaving behind
the Betio people, who were scared and worried about their lands and
lives. They could do nothing to escape a war they had nothing to do
with. They were confused, distressed, and totally lost.
Early in 1942 the Japanese returned to Tarawa. When they landed
again on Betio, the villagers expected more calamity. This came true
when the Japanese destroyed all sailing and fishing canoes to prevent
the people from escaping. Crops such as babai taro (a prestigious root
crop) and coconut trees were cut down and buried. Local houses and
government staff quarters were destroyed. The whole islet was cleared
of trees and houses in the first few weeks to make way for Japanese
fortifications. People were forced to provide free labor and at times
their personal belongings, such as clothing, were taken by the Japa-
nese for their own use. Following several weeks of hard labor, the
local people were forced to leave their home village and find shelter
in North Tarawa where the majority had no lands to stay on. As war
refugees they had to depend on the goodwill and generosity of others
for their maintenance. The move to North Tarawa was made more
difficult because of the destruction of canoes. The Betio villagers
had to walk and navigate the 25-mile stretch of reefs and tidal pas-
sages, laden with whatever personal belongings they could carry. They
believed it was the end of the world for them.
Once the Betio people were evacuated, the Japanese recruited the
men for hard labor to complete the fortification of the tiny islet—the
construction of war bunkers, the laying of concrete structures crowned
with sharpened metal on the reef around the islet, the construction of
the airstrip, which covered almost a quarter of Betio, and the Japanese
quarters. As most of the traditional crops had been destroyed, the
laborers had to find extra food for themselves.
A popular punishment for failure to carry out orders was to tie up
a worker with ropes and place a stick of dynamite between his legs.
Another was flogging. Two locals, both mental patients, were shot
and killed by the Japanese for refusing to carry out orders. With these
cruel and inhuman treatments, the Japanese exploited the gentle char-
acter of the Tarawa people.
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During those days of hard labor, American bombers used to raid
the islet of Betio. Usually occurring during the full moon when visi-
bility was better, the raids caused great suffering. Where could the
people hide from the shelling? The usual place became the hollows of
the taro pits! Two I-Kiribati lost their lives during these raids.
The Arrival of the Americans
The Americans finally landed on November 20, 1943. After
seventy-seven hours of bitter fighting, the Americans recaptured
Tarawa from the Japanese. The British and American flags replaced
the “flag of Nippon.”
A day after the Japanese surrendered, the Americans recruited over
one hundred I-Kiribati to clear dead bodies and war debris on Tarawa.
This time the local people experienced better working conditions.
Heavy equipment was used, rations were issued in abundance, and
those who were selected to work even earned wages. Free clothing
was provided, and each laborer was paid about U.S. $2 per day. The
Americans established good relationships with the I-Kiribati, provid-
ing almost everything for their personal needs. Forced labor as expe-
rienced with the Japanese had ended. The Betio people’s experience
during the American occupation was the opposite of what was expe-
rienced under the Japanese.
During the American and British joint administration, a Labor
Corps was set up. People were recruited not only from Tarawa but
from the rest of the islands as well. The main tasks of this Labor
Corps were to clear the island of Tarawa and to reestablish the
administration of this group of islands. Two companies from the
Labor Corps were sent to the Solomon Islands to do similar work.
Betio’s traditional way of life was gradually restored, but with great
difficulty because of the extensive war damage. When the Betio vil-
lagers returned to their islet they were unable to enjoy again the pre-
war subsistence lifestyle they had known because the islet had been
ruined by the war. More corpses and war debris were evident than
crops and trees on the tiny isle, which is about three miles long and a
quarter-mile wide. The rehabilitation process was not easy. Lands
Commissioner Harry Maude estimated that about 17,000 coconut
trees had been destroyed on Betio to make way for the airstrip and
that about 14,000 square feet of taro pits were buried on Betio alone.
Maude calculated that the financial compensation due the Betio land-
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owners for their loss of traditional crops was £42,600. Note that
these figures relate to the Betio damage alone and do not include the
cost of damage to Butaritari, Abemama, Banaba, and other parts of
Tarawa (Bairiki and North Tarawa). The rich inshore fisheries of Betio
were destroyed and contaminated by the war. Local fish traps were
destroyed and fishing activities were disrupted for several decades. The
lagoon and ocean areas were full of wreckage. Unexploded bombs and
war debris of various descriptions made the marine life inedible. In-
stead, the Betio people had to depend on expensive, imported tinned
foodstuffs for their survival.
The Effects of World War II on Tarawa
The war made a tremendous impact on the life and culture
of the Betio people. It became clear to them that their splendid and
serene isolation could not escape the ripples of international conflicts
such as World War II. The Betio people never regained their tradi-
tional subsistence lifestyle. The ecological damage on the fragile atoll
was so extensive and lasting that both land and marine productivity
were affected severely. The people had to start life all over again. Taro
pits took three years to develop before a crop could be harvested.
Building materials had to be brought in across the lagoon from North
Tarawa for the villagers to build their local dwellings. Countless mate-
rial and psychological losses were sustained by the people of Betio.
The restoration of the past is impossible, of course, but the develop-
ment of their future appears also to have been set back by the impact
of the war. The Betio people have struggled to remain a viable com-
munity against history and time. The lack of war reparations from
the colonial administration and the urbanization process since the war
have exacerbated the economic and social situation of the once happy




A Study of Japanese Views
of Melanesians
Hisafumi Saito
This chapter discusses the experiences of Japanese soldiers in Melane-
sia with special reference to their relationship with and their views of
Melanesians. Contrary to my original expectations, Japanese were
quite interested in Melanesians. This is reflected in the considerable
number of documents I have collected that refer to Melanesians during
the war.
Inhabitants Referred to by Materials
Records pertaining to the people living in the Wewak area of
Papua New Guinea, including the Kairiru and Mushu Islands off
Wewak, Prince Alexander Range, and the basin of the middle and
lower Sepik River, are the most abundant. This is because many Japa-
nese, after failing to attack Aitape in July 1944, survived the war by
depending on food supplied by villagers, mainly in the southern slopes
of the Prince Alexander Range. Though Japanese troops survived the
war in Rabaul (at the eastern tip of New Britain) and in Bougainville
(in the northern Solomons chain), only five sources refer to the people
in and around Rabaul, and just four to those in the Solomon Islands.
There do not seem to be as many Japanese who had close contact with
inhabitants in both of those areas. In Rabaul the Japanese had estab-
lished a “self-supporting system,” which made it possible for them to
survive without commandeering villagers’ harvests. In Bougainville,
Japanese could find few friendly inhabitants (except on Buka), largely
because of the successful campaigns by the Allied forces.
A longer version of this chapter was published in Remembering the Pacific War, ed.
by Geoff White (Honolulu: Center for Pacific Island Studies, 1991), 207–214.
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Intimacy
In the materials there are a number of episodes that speak
of the intimate terms between Melanesians and Japanese soldiers. The
authors are proud that they were good friends of Melanesians, and
think that Japanese soldiers were fundamentally different from white
men in this respect. “While white men discriminated against Melane-
sians and exploited them, Japanese were kind to and worked together
with Melanesians.” This is the view repeatedly expressed in the mate-
rials, sometimes as the words of Melanesians (cf. Izumi 1943:190–
192, 194, 206–207; Suzuki 1982:61; Ochi 1983:121; Mitsukawa
1984:331–332; Murosaki 1984:177; Yamada 1985:165–166; Yama-
moto 1985:252–253). Some of the materials insist that because the
islands in the South Pacific are the birthplace of remote Japanese an-
cestors, the Melanesians are physically similar to the Japanese, and the
Japanese have sympathy with the Melanesians (cf. Izumi 1943:193;
Ochi 1983:223; Yamamoto 1985:252).
On the other hand, the Japanese thought, “We should not spoil
Melanesians. We have to cure their characters stained by laziness, and
raise them up to the point where they willingly obey Japanese. This is
one of the aims of this war” (cf. Izumi 1943:193–197). The efforts at
enlightenment and their positive results are recorded in some of the
materials (e.g., cf. Kitamoto 1970:60; Arao 1975:208; Watanabe
1982:163; Yamanaka 1982:190). However, I have found no evidence
that the Japanese army made enthusiastic and systematic efforts to
make Melanesians “the Emperor’s loyal subjects.” For example, there
are some episodes in which Japanese soldiers persuaded inhabitants to
cooperate with them, but they appear only to have made irresponsible
remarks to suit the occasion (cf. Izumi 1943:200–201; Kitamoto 1970:
32, 41, 45; Mitsukawa 1984:330–332, 356–357). The only feature
common to most of their remarks is the desire to stimulate Melane-
sians’ rebellious attitudes toward white men.
Hostility
The Japanese troops gave Melanesians many things, such as
rice, tinned food, sugar, cloth, and so on, to win their favor. But these
goods were rapidly drained and never resupplied. Starving Japanese
soldiers gave inhabitants everything and did anything to get food.
Out of their small community, the Japanese troops were relatively
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free from their own conscience and the military discipline that did
not directly concern action and class system (cf. Kawamura 1988:
26–27). Contrary to military orders, soldiers frequently used their
arms for hunting (e.g., cf. Yamada 1953:63–64, 87, 126, 192; Kita-
moto 1970:30; Hirao 1980:70; Hoshino 1982:114). It was also
common to expropriate Melanesian villagers’ crops (e.g., cf. Yamada
1953:72, 86, 122; Kitamoto 1970:88; Fukuyama 1980:155). Some
conscientious soldiers even thought that hunger was an adequate
excuse for pillage (cf. Hoshino 1982:139–140). Although the head-
quarters in Wewak prohibited barter with individual Melanesians in
order to regulate food supply (cf. Suzuki 1982:266–267; Murosaki
1984:167), starving soldiers continued adding bandages, watch chains,
razor blades, tweezers, and grenades to their list of merchandise (cf.
Ueki 1982:180; Mitsukawa 1984:248, 290; Murosaki 1994:147).
Plunder caused dispute in every corner of Melanesia under Japanese
occupation (cf. Kitamoto 1970:70; Fukuyama 1980:145; Kitamoto
1984:158–159; Haneda 1985:205). Some Melanesians defended their
gardens with arms (Ueki 1982:202; Murosaki 1984:52; Matsutani
1985:240), and many ultimately revolted against the Japanese (cf.
Fukuyama 1980:179–180; Fuke 1982:16; Hoshino 1982:156–157,
168, 170; Suzuki 1982:271). For example, at the close of the war it
was too dangerous for Japanese troops to approach Melanesian
villages in the Wewak area (cf. Hoshino 1982:138, 177; Yamanaka
1982:221).
Conclusion
The materials referred to in this chapter were written by the
Japanese who experienced the Pacific War in Melanesia. As a result,
the information offered by them is biased. For example, they do not
mention the fact that some starving soldiers ate Melanesians as well
as soldiers of the Allied forces (cf. Hara 1987:151–152, 157–158;
Miyakawa 1985:55–66; Nakazono 1986:43–46, 51–72; Tuzin 1983),
though some cases where Japanese soldiers ate Japanese soldiers are
recorded (cf. Kitamoto 1970:71; Suzuki 1982:242; Watanabe 1982:
177, 192; Ochi 1983:160–161).
However, I think these materials represent their views of Melane-
sians well. Though Japanese soldiers used discriminatory terms to
refer to Melanesians, and thought Melanesians primitive and lazy, they
had not always despised Melanesians. They found many good char-
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acteristics in Melanesians and thought Melanesians similar to Japanese
in some respects. For the Japanese soldiers who believed the ideology
of the Japanese Empire, Melanesians were considered worth saving
from “evil” white men for enlightening by Japanese.
Japanese were urged to the war by the dogma, “You should expel
white men, and enlighten the people in Asia and Oceania.” Contrary
to their intention, the soldiers in Melanesia ended up relying on local
inhabitants for food. In the materials they repeatedly expressed their
regret and thanks to Melanesians (cf. Kitamoto 1970:46, 70, 102,
104; Fuke 1982:17; Watanabe 1982:196; Mitsukawa 1984:308, 369,
394, 400, 433; Yamada 1985:172). Melanesians were generous bene-
factors as well as barefoot primitives for Japanese soldiers.
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A VIEW FROM AFAR (SOUTH ASIA)—
AN INTER VIEW WITH GYAN PRAKASH
• Robert Borofsky: One of the key questions regarding the colonial
period is how to write about it. Both Sahlins and Kituai use colonial
documentation to discuss the complex ways various parties were en-
tangled. To what extent do you think it is possible to write about the
colonial period without staying within the silences and framings of the
data collected by the colonial regimes—without getting entangled, that
is to say, in the colonial entanglements themselves?
• Gyan Prakash: To begin with, one cannot simply use colonial
documents as repositories of information. One needs to take into
account not only the purposes for which they were produced but also
how and why they were preserved. Secondly, one must read them for
the kind of knowledge they authorize, a point Sahlins and Kituai are
both concerned with. One needs to pay attention to the ruling con-
cepts of the documents, to what they render thinkable as well as to
what they imply is unthinkable. If I were to put it in Foucaultian terms,
one needs to consider the type of truth regime the documents establish.
Rather than claiming an all-seeing eye—that allows one to grasp
what colonial officials could not—the intent would be to make the
documents confront their own contradictions, their own silences. I do
not mean the object should be to fill in the silences as a sort of com-
pensatory history, to give the colonized a voice denied them by colo-
nialism. Instead I would make the silences, contradictions, and am-
biguities essential elements in the colonial story.
If I can offer an example from my own book on Indian labor
bondage for a moment, the problem I confronted when reading colo-
nial documents in the archives was that I found the history regarding
this topic had already been written. The question of bondage had al-
ready been posed and answered. Free labor was assumed to be the
natural human condition. And this assumption shaped inquiries con-
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ducted both by colonial officials and others into the reasons for labor
bondage in India. The frame of reference was: Given free labor, or
freedom, is the natural human condition, why then does India differ
from this universal pattern? I confronted this framework by treating
the archive—and how documents were framed in it—as an inextri-
cable part of the history of bonded labor itself.
The second step I took was to write about the visions of the past
that these bonded laborers had. Their visions could not be accommo-
dated within the same framework as existing historical documents.
As a result, I discussed the nature of oral testimony, especially how its
principles of construction differed radically from the kind of ratio-
nalist histories historians generally write.
In other words, my response to the silences and the fabrications of
the archives about the people constituted as bonded laborers was not
to recover a more authentic history. Instead, I argued that the bonded
laborers’ narratives of their past stood at odds with history as a disci-
pline. The narratives were antidisciplinary, in a Foucaultian sense. Or
to put it another way, the silences, myopias, contradictions, and fail-
ures of the colonial archive served as a basis for outlining forms of
knowledge that were incommensurate with those within the archive
itself.
• RB: Building on these comments, one of the common critiques
of anthropology and history today is that they often succumb to cer-
tain essentialisms, certain simplistic oppositions, in discussing colo-
nialism. Certain nationalist writers seem to do the same. What dy-
namics are at work, in your opinion, and to what degree does it seem
possible to step outside of nationalist and Western essentialisms in
writing histories of colonial entanglements?
• GP: Generally, I do not think the issue is essentialism versus
nonessentialism. It is true that essentialisms of various kinds have
served domination, both colonial and nationalist. But I think it would
be too simplistic to just declare oneself against essentialisms. We are
dealing with essentialisms with widely different historical functions
and effects. Many writers—here I am thinking particularly of Partha
Chatterjee, for example—have written about how nationalists em-
ployed many of the same essentialisms as the colonial rulers.
But it is also true they were employed with different aims and
effects. The primary nationalist aim and effect, of course, was to over-
throw the colonial rulers. In doing so, it is true the nationalists im-
posed their own elitist, majoritarian cultural definition of the nation
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that rendered other definitions and other aspirations minor and sub-
ordinate. Even though Indian nationalism represented itself as univer-
sal and secular, for example, it was deeply colored by the Hindu ethos
and symbols. I am not saying the nationalist essentialisms are better.
I am saying they are different.
The general point I would make is that for students of colonialism,
it is necessary to leave aside the essentialism versus nonessentialism
question. Our analyses should focus on the nature and effects of the
complicity between essentialism and domination rather than searching
for a nonessentialist epistemology.
• RB: In discussing the tensions of empire, both Thomas and Panoff
emphasize colonial regimes were never simple, unified affairs. One
model did not fit all sizes: Each European country and each locale
contained its own contradictions and ambiguities in respect to colonial
rule. How would you suggest we go about trying to make sense—in a
general way—of the differences, conflicts, and contradictions within
colonial regimes?
• GP: I agree with both Thomas and Panoff that colonialism was
not a uniform process. French differed from British colonies, German
from American. The Spanish colonization of the Americas in the six-
teenth century differed radically from the nineteenth-century Anglo-
French pattern.
Nor were colonial regimes free from contradictions, as these
authors also point out. One can see contradictions, variations, and
ambivalences as essential characteristics of colonial regimes. Different
interests were at work in different places and different times. Mission-
aries, businessmen, administrative officials, and military commanders
frequently differed regarding the nature of colonialism’s “civilizing
mission.” And Europeans in the colonies often found themselves split
by class, rank, culture, and gender. A lot has been written about these
complexities arguing that neither the colonized nor the colonizers were
monolithic entities. Many motives, many interests were in play.
There is a tendency in the literature, however, to use these com-
plexities to argue against and undo the colonizer-colonized divide—
to argue that reality was far more complicated than the myth and
ideology of the divide. Another version of this is to argue the Euro-
peans subjected their own working classes and women to oppressions
comparable to those experienced by the colonized. I do not disagree
with this.
But I have a sense that this leads into a contest in victimhood: the
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Europeans claiming they were as victimized as the colonized. What
this overlooks is a crucial point about power. Namely, while the Euro-
pean working classes and women were subjected to various kinds of
oppressions, they also were citizens. The colonized, on the other hand,
were not acceptable as citizens but only as subjects. This is the point
that Mahmood Mamdani makes in his book on Africa. It is a signifi-
cant distinction.
So the issue is not whether regimes of power and discipline were not
applied to Europe as well. Of course they were. But they were ap-
plied with different effects. That is one of the points that I would in-
sist on in thinking about the complexities of colonial regimes.
If we come to the colonies themselves, for all the differences be-
tween the missionary and the colonial official, between the poor white
soldier and the general, colonial ideology still mobilized them as the
ruling race, however incompletely. Colonial ideology emphasized the
poor tommy soldier, no matter how subordinate, was still part of the
ruling race. And, as a result, he was expected to behave according to
the standards of that race.
Different categories of Europeans may have held more or less posi-
tive views of the natives. But colonial power still authorized certain
representations of the colonized. There is the example of Las Casas.
Las Casas, in the famous 1550 debate with Sepulveda, held that Amer-
ican Indians were human and therefore possessed certain rights. But
we should not forget that underlying this favorable view of the Indians
was the proposition that the Indians were humans insofar as their con-
duct and beliefs suggested that they were potential Christians. To the
extent that they manifested feelings and practices that he interpreted
as religious, or to put it another way, insofar as they appeared as
crypto-Christians, the Indians met Las Casas’ standard of what con-
stituted human. The point is that the power of representation still be-
longed to Las Casas. This is what I take to be the great lesson of
Edward Said’s Orientalism: It teaches us something about the power
of representation and the power that authorizes such representation.
Keeping this in view, I would say the complexities, contradictions,
and historical variations in colonial regimes have to be seen as pro-
cesses that the colonial divide itself engendered and encountered as
well as something that it sought to contain and control. I do not see
the two as opposites. Contradictions and variations go together with
the colonial divide.
• RB: The chapters by Belich, Grimshaw and Morton, and Merwin
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explore colonial strategies of domination. Your own books, Bonded
Histories and Another Reason, examine this subject as well, emphasiz-
ing the contradictory nature of the process. How would you suggest
we approach the analysis of these ambiguous, ambivalent patterns of
control—in South Asia, in the Pacific, and elsewhere? What guide-
lines would you suggest for assessing these controls’ ambiguous
effectiveness?
• GP: My response flows from what I have just said about the
issue of contradiction. But let me put it in a slightly different way in
the context of Another Reason—as a way of extending the points de-
veloped by Belich, Grimshaw and Morton, and Merwin. In Another
Reason, I argue that various colonial contradictions and ambivalences
do not negate the colonial boundaries of East-West, colonizer-
colonized, or rational-irrational. Rather they are produced by these
colonial dichotomies. The very exercise of colonial power creates
ambivalences and estrangements. Homi Bhabha has made this point
most eloquently, arguing that the pattern of colonial control alienates
Western ideals. To rule despotically in the name of liberty is to
estrange the very ideals of civilization that the colonial rulers said
they had.
What I try to do in Another Reason is to suggest that these contra-
dictions and estrangements become spaces not only for the reiteration
of colonial power but also for its revision. They constitute zones and
moments of struggle and resistance. To be sure, zones of hybridity un-
settle colonial binaries. But I do not perceive them—as is sometimes
seen—as a middle ground, as areas of convergence, accommodation,
and cooperation. Quite the contrary: I view these hybrid zones as
arenas where struggles ensue to rearrange power. I argue in Another
Reason that the very colonial project of using what the British desig-
nate as “universal reason” constitutes a particular means of alien rule.
Universal reason is used as a means for ruling over the colonized.
This alienates the ideology of science’s universalism. Science is unable
to disassociate itself from Western power. And once it is framed in
this fashion, science needs to adopt other guises and languages as
well. In other words, its very functioning as an instrument of power
requires its translation to other contexts. It is this translation or traf-
ficking between the alien and the indigenous, between modernity and
tradition that Indian intellectuals used to formulate ideologies and
institutions directed to redraw colonial boundaries. I see the zone of
hybridity—which in some interpretations is portrayed as a nice, soft,
fuzzy arena—as an intensely conflictual, not consensual, arena.
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The general point I would make is that these kinds of negotiations
and revisions of colonial power do not cancel colonial dichotomies.
Hybridity does not dissolve opposition. Difference does not cancel
identity. Rather, one category enables the reformulation of the other.
I see it as a kind of dialectical relationship.
All of this makes us see colonial power as kind of a dynamic field,
a field in which the very reproduction of colonial power produces con-
tradictions and revisions that can help overthrow it. So it is not that
once colonial power is established, the rest is repetition of that original
moment. The very need to reproduce it produces, in turn, all these
contradictions. What I try to do in Another Reason is address this kind
of dynamism, showing that colonial governance in India produced
conditions under which emerged forces and ideologies that mirrored
Western patterns and yet were undeniably different and challenging
to them.
• RB: World War II was a critical event in reframing colonial poli-
tics. In India, it presaged independence; in the Pacific, a new kind of
development. Without World War II, do you think the colonial era
would have ended as it did?
• GP: I think in general that it is not just World War II but the
entire interwar period that is important, that produced a kind of crisis
in the liberal capitalist-imperialist order. World War II, of course, esca-
lates it vastly. But a crucial part of the change was also the recogni-
tion by Western powers, during this period, that the colonized would
no longer tolerate alien rule in the old form.
In thinking about World War II, one can see the old arrangements
had gone into disarray. An important part of the disarray is the per-
ception by colonial officials that the colonized themselves are making
various demands that cannot be accommodated within the old kind of
arrangement. Something new had to be done. The liberal capitalist-
imperialist system no longer seemed to work as it had before.
• RB: Given your research on South Asia, what seems most striking
and interesting to you regarding colonial entanglements in the Pacific?
What do you think might be intriguing comparative issues—intriguing
questions—to explore?
• GP: One thing is that the Pacific is vast. I would imagine things
would change considerably in speaking about different places.
My general sense is that colonial dynamics in the Pacific seemed to
have followed a much more violent and brutal course than in South
Asia. Colonialism in the Pacific seems to have failed to evolve the
stable, enduring sort of structures that it did in South Asia. Discourses
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of nation, nation-state, governmentality of the scale that rose in South
Asia appear to have been, from my reading of the colonial section,
relatively less important in the Pacific. One gets a sense that colonial
rulers in the Pacific saw populations in far more exotic and exoticiz-
ing terms than colonial rulers in India.
There is a difference in what Said calls orientalizing. Part of the
reason may have been the scale of societies and the nature of polity
that the colonialists encountered in the two places. But I think partly
it is the result of a far more exclusionary version of colonialism in the
Pacific. If I take a comparative example from Latin America, the con-
trast is striking with South Asia regarding how the notion of writing,
the notion of memory, the notion of history were all systematically
supplanted by European forms in the former but not the latter.
A comparative case Africanists note is that no matter how inferior
the British considered Indians, they nonetheless acknowledge they had
a civilization, a philosophy, and a religion. In Africa, the colonists
viewed the colonized as a tabula rasa. They had nothing to offer. I
got a similar sense reading the essays in the “Colonial Engagements”
section. The British did not see the Maori, for example, as having
anything valuable to offer. That is strikingly different from India. The
only parallel to that I can think of is the way the British and then
later on, after independence, the Indian government treated people
called “tribals.”
I think the kind of comparative work that would prove valuable
would be to inquire into how, out of different colonial experiences,
the colonized created different kinds of structures. These structures
might, in the South Asian case, lead to independence and to a kind of
postcolonial state. In the Pacific, on the other hand, they lead to
structures that appear much more under Western domination. Such
comparisons would allow us to think about what “postcoloniality”
actually means: How “post” is postcolonial today?
SECTION FOUR
“Postcolonial” Politics
In “Colonial Engagements,” we noted the difficulty in 
delineating colonialism’s precise beginning. In this section, 
we explore the difficulty in delineating its precise end. 
There are shades and degrees of colonialism today—even 
in nominally independent countries—that make a clear 
distinction between colonial dependence and postcolonial 
independence an uncertain matter at best. A central con-
cern of this section is: To what degree is the “post” (in post-
colonial) an appropriate label for the Pacific’s present 
politics?
General Texts and Themes
The panoramic historical accounts of the Pacific fall into 
two categories regarding the “postcolonial”: Oliver (1989 
[1961]) and Howe (1984), published earlier, do not 
directly address the dynamics of the era. Scarr (1990), 
Howe, Kiste, and Lal (1994), Campbell (1996), and 
Denoon (1997b)—writing later—distinctly discuss it. The 
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region’s history-telling efforts, in other words, have their 
own historical contexts.
Collectively, Howe, Kiste, and Lal (1994), Denoon 
(1997b), Campbell (1996), and Scarr (1990) underscore 
three central themes in their overlapping accounts of the 
“postcolonial” era. First, the energy behind decolonization 
came more from the colonizers than from the colonized. 
Wesley-Smith, in discussing Australia’s and New Zealand’s 
decolonizing efforts, for example, observes: “In Papua New 
Guinea, Niue, Tokelau, the Cook Islands, and to a lesser 
extent Western Samoa, the colonizer rather than the colo-
nised set the pace of change. In all cases except Nauru, the 
colonial power bestowed a greater degree of political 
autonomy than the people themselves sought at the time. 
Political freedom was returned to these colonial peoples in 
the 1960s and the 1970s essentially for the same reason it 
was removed in an earlier era—to meet the needs of the 
colonial power” (Howe, Kiste, and Lal 1994:220–221).
The ambiguities involved in delineating “decoloniza-
tion”—given the colonizer rather than the colonized 
defined its parameters—is made clear in de Deckker’s 
account of France’s Pacific territories: “It may be argued 
that, strictly speaking, colonial rule is not maintained 
in . . . French overseas territories because each of them may 
attain constitutional independence by simply voting for it 
at election time and because they already have, or will soon 
have, some degree of internal self-government. However, at 
all levels, the economic, social, and even cultural systems 
are permeated by remnants of colonial domination” (in 
Howe, Kiste, and Lal 1994:273).
Second, all four texts refer to the continued economic 
dependence of Islanders—whatever their level of political 
independence—on external powers. Typical of the state-
ments is Kiste’s: “While the [Micronesian] Compacts of 
Free association provide . . . sovereignty over both internal 
and external affairs . . . it is an understatement to suggest 
that the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of 
the Marshall Islands are heavily dependent on the financial 
arrangements [with the United States] provided by the 
compact” (Howe, Kiste, and Lal 1994:254; cf. Scarr 1990: 
299). Part of the problem is that many Islanders are caught 
up in a relatively high standard of living, in respect to gov-
ernment services and wages, that cannot be funded by the 
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governments themselves. The result is that 30 percent of 
the Cook Island’s and 36 percent of Western Samoa’s 
national income, for example, comes from outside funding 
(Scarr 1990:340; cf. Denoon 1997b:388). Increased “devel-
opment” has tended to mean increased dependency. “Far 
from decreasing with the passing of time, the need for assis-
tance to Pacific island economies increased,” Campbell 
notes (1996:214). As “the island nations were becoming 
more dependent on foreign assistance, their subsistence 
economies . . . [were becoming] less efficient. Wage labour, 
cash cropping, and a growing sense of individualism . . . all 
weakened the traditional mutual supports of village life, 
while urbanization has placed many outside it altogether.” 
Schoeffel provides an insightful perspective on the dynamics 
at work: “Paradoxically, the more dependent the relation-
ship between a Pacific Island country and a stronger power, 
the better off its population is, in terms of access to basic 
services and social indicators such as life expectancy. Depen-
dency is a problem for the Pacific Islands mainly in terms of 
the insecurity of their links with the outside world. The small 
island countries that are building their links to larger, 
wealthier countries through emigration may ultimately 
have more durable and useful ties than those linked by the 
strategic concerns of the dominant powers” (Howe, Kiste, 
and Lal 1994:374–375).
Third, the four texts discuss diverse efforts at affirming 
cultural identity within the region. On the one hand, such 
efforts emphasize preserving cultural—if not economic—
independence in a rapidly changing world. On the other, 
they emphasize the need to rethink present Pacific para-
digms regarding colonization and decolonization. Hau‘ofa 
writes in “Our Sea of Islands” (see 1994a for the full article; 
cf. Hau‘ofa 1994b):
Nineteenth-century imperialism erected boundaries that led to
the contraction of Oceania, transforming a once boundless
world into the Pacific Island states and territories that we know
today. . . . [People] were cut off from their relatives abroad. . . .
This is the historical basis of the view that our countries are
small, poor and isolated. . . .
The new economic reality made nonsense of artificial boun-
daries, enabling the people to shake off their confinement. . . .
They strike roots in new resource areas, securing employment
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and overseas family property, expanding kinship networks
through which they circulate themselves, their relatives, their
material goods, and their stories all across their ocean. (Denoon
1997b:439)
The boundaries that we presently draw in the region, that is 
to say, tend to obscure salient dynamics by which Pacific 
Islanders craft their senses of self through movement 
within and beyond the region.
Broadening Perspectives:1
How might we refine and enhance our understanding of 
these themes with work from beyond the Pacific? One step 
is to examine the writings of various subaltern theorists on 
India as a way of exploring the subtle (and not so subtle) 
ways colonial hegemonies persist in the present. The fram-
ing of independence in terms of nation-states, for example, 
accepts European colonial categories. Like Hau‘ofa, sub-
altern historians ask: Why must former colonial categories 
remain the units of political governance? And further, why 
must the elite frame the history of independence in terms 
1For further references see: ambiguity in distinguishing between colonialism and post-
colonialism: Petersen 1997:86–87; Larmour 1997:205–206; Nadile 1997:178; Thomas
1994:195; Firth (in Howe, Kiste, and Lal) 1994:303; Macdonald (in Howe, Kiste,
and Lal) 1994:170; O’Regan 1995:184; Denoon 1997a:414; Jolly 1992b:51; Lal (in
Howe, Kiste, and Lal) 1994:440; Macdonald 1997:4, 7; K. Thomas (in Greenwood,
Neumann, and Sartori) 1995:4; Hereniko (in Howe, Kiste, and Lal) 1994:417; Dirlik
1992:65–66; Cooper 1997:426; Kabataulaka 1997:170–171; Subaltern perspectives
on this ambiguity: Prakash 1995:5; Prakash 1990:399–400; Seed 1991:192; Guha
1988a:39, 43; Guha 1988b:47, 51–53, 59, 82; Guha 1989:212, 304–305; Chatterjee
1993:238; Chatterjee 1994:2; Said 1988:v; Spivak 1988:281; Chakrabarty 1992:1;
Pandey 1992:41, 50; Dirks 1992:23; nationalism as a politically constructed narra-
tive: Kelly 1995:257–258, 262, 268; Foster 1995:1–2, 26; Bhabha 1995:327; Parekh
1997:14; Otto and Thomas 1997:6, 11; LiPuma 1995:42, 44, 54; Chatterjee 1993:9–
11; Firth (in Denoon) 1997b:287; Said 1993:267; contradictions in nationalist narra-
tives and attempts at their resolution: Otto and Thomas 1997:10, 12; LiPuma 1995:
44, 48, 50, 56; Chakrabarty 1997:373; Chatterjee 1993:112, 132; Kelly 1995:266;
Foster 1995:7; silencing in nationalist narratives: Chatterjee 1993:154, 238; Cooper
1997:406–407; Chatterjee 1994:49; Parekh 1997:15; LiPuma 1995:61; Foster 1995:
4; Thomas 1997:219; dynamics involved in affirming nationalist narratives: Foster
1995:15, 20, 24; LiPuma 1995:60, 62; Doyle 1986:371–372; Kaplan 1995:95, 118;
when
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that emphasize their roles as leaders (cf. Hau‘ofa 1994c)? 
This is what Prakash refers to when he suggests “nationalist 
historiographers accepted the patterns set for them by 
British scholarship” (1990:388), or what Chatterjee means 
when he suggests nationalist history had “no choice but to 
choose its forms from the gallery of ‘models’ offered by 
European and American nation-states” (1993:9; see also 
Spivak 1987:97 and Dirks 1992:15). As Chatterjee observes, 
framing the colonial/decolonial transition as national 
liberation often marginalizes subaltern voices who resisted 
the British and, yet, remain subordinated in the newly 
liberated state (e.g. 1993:156). “The historiography of 
Indian nationalism,” Guha writes, “has for a long time been 
dominated by elitism . . . [that] originated as the ideologi-
cal product of British rule in India, but . . . [has] survived 
the transfer of power and been assimilated to . . . neo-
nationalist forms of discourse in . . . India” (1988a:37).
Jourdan 1995:127–128; modernization as a political/cultural project: Prakash 1990:
404; Stoler and Cooper 1997:35; LiPuma 1995:43–44; Cooper 1997:406–407; Shapin
1994:412; Said 1995:35; Eagleton 1997:22; problematic dynamics of the moderniza-
tion project: Lal (in Howe, Kiste, and Lal) 1994:452; Chakrabarty 1997:373; Chak-
rabarty 1992:18, 21; LiPuma 1995:56–57; Otto and Thomas 1997:10; Foster 1995:
1–2; Chatterjee 1993:219; Cooper 1997:425; Pels 1997:178; Knapman (in Howe,
Kiste, and Lal) 1994:326–328, 342; Cooper and Stoler 1997:16–17; problematic
dynamics of constructing identities of (quasi?) difference: Lal (in Howe, Kiste, and
Lal) 1994:454; Jolly 1992b:52; Hereniko (in Howe, Kiste, and Lal) 1994:423, 430;
Cooper 1997:427; Chakrabarty 1997:373; LiPuma 1995:44, 54, 56–57; Foster 1995:
1–2, 10; Sherry 1997:29; Useem 1997:A47; Firth (in Denoon) 1997b:254–255; Schell
1997:17; Chatterjee 1993:134, 155; Seed 1995:15; Spivak 1988:275; Hale 1997:574,
578; Thomas 1994:23; Said 1993:314; ambiguities involved in erecting boundaries of
difference: Lal (in Howe, Kiste, and Lal) 1994:441–442; Huggan 1994:125; Here-
niko (in Howe, Kiste, and Lal) 1994:424, 429–430; Phillips 1995:100, 104–105,
114; Mintz 1997:36; Prakash 1990:383–384, 398–399; Steedly 1993:125, 176;
Thomas 1994:185; Comaroff and Comaroff 1991:139; Greenblatt 1991:121; Bhabha
1994:112–114, 118–120, 207, 251; Reilly 1996:389, 400–401, 404; Said 1993:336;
Said 1995:35; Narayan 1993:671, 682; Seed 1995:191; Binney 1995:524; Ballara
1996:133; White 1997:438; Hale 1997:568; Foster 1995:15; Reilly and Heke 1995:
204, 210, 216; O'Regan 1995:183, 186, 189; resisting hegemonies: Guha 1989:220,
309; Prakash 1995:4; Prakash 1992:382; Prakash 1990:402–403, 407; Said 1988:
vii–viii; 1993:13; Young 1990:173–174; Dirlik 1994:346; Hempenstall 1992:74;
Cooper and Stoler 1997:16; Spivak 1988:171; Chatterjee 1994:3; history telling as an
empowering process: Chatterjee 1993:76; Lowenthal 1985:44; Teaiwa 1995:72.
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These points are central to rethinking the nationalist 
narrative of development because the narrative involves a 
critical dynamic that undermines the political effectiveness 
of newly formed nation-states, perpetuating their depen-
dency on the West. Given the tendency for nation-states to 
be formed along colonial borders—involving disparate cul-
tural groups—modernization becomes a central means for 
legitimizing the state’s authority. Modernization offers a 
means for overcoming internal divisiveness by promising 
progress toward broadly shared goals. In other words, 
newly independent nation-states are drawn into the 
modernization/development cum dependency framework 
as a way of establishing and maintaining their political legit-
imacy (cf. Chatterjee 1993:203; Ludden 1992:251; Cooper 
1997:425). To become a nation-state under the terms 
offered by the colonial powers, as Nkrumah observed long 
ago, often generates another form of colonialism.
At the same time they are caught up in this cycle of 
modernizing/dependency—or, perhaps, in an effort to 
moderate the process—newly formed nation-states often 
seek to differentiate themselves from the West by empha-
sizing their cultural independence: to be modern but 
different, to paraphrase Chakrabarty’s phrasing (1997: 
373). The problem is that, in many cases, this national 
culture has to be constructed in a culturally diverse envi-
ronment using rituals of affirmation—at national celebra-
tions and public schools—that in drawing on diverse pasts 
attempt to override them in forging a national unity. It is a 
contingent, constructed affirmation vulnerable to frequent 
disruption. The irony here, if one wants to call it that, is 
these nation-states are thus drawn into Western forms of 
nation building in asserting their difference from the West. 
That is why the West so readily understands the Rest’s affir-
mations of identity—they are framed in ways that reflect 
the West’s own history.
In seeking to separate themselves from the West—within 
this hegemonic framework—new nations often voice 
personal, subjective, and/or spiritual perspectives that 
affirm their worth separate from the West’s materiality or, 
phrased another way, separate from their economic depen-
dency on the West (cf. Chatterjee 1993:6, 75). This involves 
being modern in one sense (i.e., culturally unified and 
developed) and, at the same time, not modern (i.e., “tradi-
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tional,” not Western) in another. The tensions and contra-
dictions embedded in this dynamic make the subject of 
who can speak for whom—that infuses current debates 
between Western and non-Western academics—a ready 
flash point for conflict (e.g., see Denoon 1997a:400; Trask 
1991).
This brings us to the dynamics of history writing as an 
empowering process. “While some of us debate what is or 
was,” Trouillot observes, “others take it in their own hands” 
(1995:153). This is Fanon’s often cited point: “Come, then, 
comrades, the European game has finally ended. . . . It is a 
question of the Third World starting a new history” (1963: 
252, 255; cf. Hempenstall 1992:73). It is Bankim’s point as 
well (written in 1880!): “Bengal must have a history, or
else there is no hope for it. Who will write it? You will write 
it, I will write it, all of us will write it” (cited in Chatterjee 
1994:4). History writing is often a deeply political process 
and, because of this, at times a deeply empowering one. 
Little wonder, then, the past has become a battleground of 
contention.
This returns us to issues of representation and the valu-
ing of difference (discussed in “An Invitation”). Difference 
disrupts the seamless silences by which hegemonies per-
petuate control. One cannot examine several of the poems 
in this section, for example, without a sense that they, in 
that famous Foucault phrase, are speaking truth to power. 
They upset the framings that neatly order the “postcolo-
nial” world, the neat dichotomies and polarities that, in so 
many ways, collectively imprison “us” and “others” intel-
lectually. The various chapters of this section allow us to 
question—to challenge—these frames of reference. The 
hope is that acknowledging and appreciating difference 
constitutes a self-perpetuating process—that one hege-
mony does not simply replace another. All of us in and of 
the Pacific face a critical question: How do we—who share 
an overlapping past and a bound together present—make 
a collective future, in the place we all call home, with our 
various history tellings?
The Selections
The chapters in Section Four are organized around three 
themes that can be viewed as related aspects of the same 
310 “Postcolonial” Politics
issue: What forms of cultural and political independence—
or more importantly, perhaps, interdependence—are viable 
in the Pacific today? Implicit throughout this discussion are 
the limited economic resources Islanders and Outlanders 
can draw on, within presently defined borders, to sustain 
high—that is, expensive—standards of living on particular 
archipelagoes. What forms of independence/interdepen-
dence are possible under such circumstances? It is a ques-
tion that draws on Marxist perspectives: Given certain 
economic structures, what cultural structures may prevail? 
And it is a deeply historical question: Given the region’s 
past dynamics, what forms of “possession” and “reposses-
sion” are possible today?
The first theme, “Continuities and Discontinuities,” 
emphasizes that one cannot draw a clear line between the 
colonial past and the “postcolonial” present. They are inti-
mately entwined. As Clifford noted earlier, the Pacific has a 
more complex sense of decolonization than in many 
regions of the world. In “Decolonization,” Stewart Firth 
observes that different perspectives can be drawn on to 
legitimize “postcolonial” power in the Pacific: democratic 
majority rule, ethnicity, descent, and/or attachment to the 
land. As a result, defining or defending a state’s (or a 
group’s) legitimacy can be a conflict-filled experience. 
“The paradox of decolonization” today, Firth writes, is that 
“Islanders want independence most where it will not 
happen and least where a genuine possibility . . . [for inde-
pendence] exists.” It is one thing, Grace Mera Molisa adds 
in “Colonised People,” to support the liberation of colo-
nized people at a distance. It is quite another to support it 
close at home. Are not Vanuatu women colonized, she 
asks? Why should they not be free as well in a decolonized 
Vanuatu? Konai Helu Thaman’s “My Blood” speaks to the 
opposition scenario that places Islanders and Outlanders 
on different sides of the “post-colonial” divide. More than 
Outlander exploitation, she suggests, the problem today is 
Islander betrayal of fellow Islanders. Margaret Jolly’s 
“Custom and the Way of the Land” discusses the ways in 
which colonial dynamics shape current views of the past. In 
Vanuatu, where the break with colonial forms of exploita-
tion is clearest, the focus is on “postcolonial” cultural revivals 
that exclude European elements, that seek to recapture 
precolonial practices. In Fiji, there was less alienation of 
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land and, generally, a less harsh form of colonial exploita-
tion. Here cultural traditions incorporate important Euro-
pean elements and stress continuities, rather than discon-
tinuities, between the past and the present. One can see 
the chapter as building on a point developed above in 
“Broadening Perpectives”: The forms of “postcolonial” 
independence are very much shaped by the forms of colo-
nial control. In “The Relationship between the United 
States and the Native Hawaiian People,” Brenda Luana 
Machado Lee suggests that the ties between colonizers and 
the colonized are not only political but also emotional and 
ethical —they constitute, in a sense, a form of marriage. She 
asserts that the way the United States treats Native Hawaiian 
constitutes a case of spouse abuse. Her poem draws us into 
reflecting on the moral obligations colonizers have.
The second theme, “Identity and Empowerment,” 
explores the forms of cultural independence possible 
today. As Hau’ofa emphasizes in his “Sea of Islands,” this 
entails reconceptualizing the present as much as changing 
it. Joseph Balaz makes this point in “Moe’uhane.” Instead 
of being lost—in the rush of modern times—the past can 
be nurtured in the way one lives today. Vicente Diaz in 
“Simply Chamarro” stresses that, while times and things 
change, it does not necessarily mean cultural traditions die 
out. Cultural traditions are not static. “How can signs taken 
for cultural demise be reread,” he asks, “as moments of sur-
vival and vitality?” One answer he offers is that we examine 
the ways nonlocal ideas are localized, are made meaning-
ful, to Chamorros. In “Mixed Blood,” Teresia Kieuea Teaiwa 
discusses the hybrid qualities involved in defining identity. 
There are subtleties and complications that subvert easy 
delineations which place a person in this or that category. 
Patricia Grace closes the section with “Ngati Kangaru.” It 
builds on a point Prakash makes regarding victimhood. 
Rather than perceiving themselves as victimized by the 
colonial era, Islanders might reconceptualize past forms of 
exploitation as models for cultural empowerment. Regard-
ing the New Zealand land grabs of the Wakefields, Billy 
observes: “out-and-out crooks, liars, cheats and 
thieves . . . he felt inspired.”
The third theme, “Integrating ‘the Past’ into ‘the 
Present’,” explores how we can come to terms, in the 
present, with the conflicts, injustices, and ambiguities that 
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remain from the past. Vaine Rasmussen’s “Our Pacific” dis-
cusses what it means to live in the Pacific today. She draws 
readers to ponder on the dynamics of being a Pacific 
Islander—coping with the present while listening to the 
past. Alan Ward’s “Treaty-Related Research and Versions of 
New Zealand History” examines the heated politics sur-
rounding the Waitangi Tribunal’s attempt to right a set of 
past wrongs regarding land transactions. It highlights a 
number of issues. There is the problem, for example, of 
culturally relative versus nonrelativistic ways for judging evi-
dence in important land cases (an issue raised in “An Invi-
tation”). Whatever the cultural differences in perspective 
between various groups, it is interesting to note that Maori 
tend to accept the Crown’s colonial documents since they 
clearly affirm colonial abuses. Ward also notes that the pro-
cess of reexamining the past can be divisive for Maori. It 
can resurrect old tribal conflicts forgotten during years of 
colonial exploitation. My piece on “Cook, Lono, Obeyesek-
ere, and Sahlins” considers one of the “hot” debates that 
has sparked recent academic interest. More is involved 
than whether Cook was or was not a “god” to Hawaiians. At 
stake is: Who can speak about (or for) whom in today’s 
polarized politics? Who has the right to represent the past 
in what ways?
Edward Said’s “A View from Afar” interview raises a 
number of critical points. He questions the use of “post-
colonialism,” for example, to describe our present-day 
dynamics. And he is critical of the ideology behind cultural 
nationalism. It brings polarizations and abuses in its wake. 
Citing Fanon, he looks for something beyond cultural 
nationalism—equality, justice, and citizenship. He also 
returns to a theme discussed by Prakash—the way Euro-
peans perceived the Pacific as a tabula rasa, as an empty 
slate to be inscribed upon as they saw fit.
The Epilogue concludes the volume. Webster’s Third 
International Dictionary defines epilogue as “the final part
that serves . . . to round out or complete the design of a . . . 
work.” Epeli Hau‘ofa’s “Pasts to Remember” does this. 
Hau‘ofa suggests developing alternative histories of the 
region to those now published by Western presses. What is 
striking about his concern for ecological time is how it reit-
erates a point Clifford makes—Pacific identity is grounded 
in the land. In considering how to remake histories, he also 
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touches on a point made in Section Three: Colonial hege-
monies, despite their claims to universalizing values, tend 
to be embedded in colonial projects full of contradictions 
—contradictions that open up alternative possibilities for 
history making. It is a thoughtful vision with which to end.
A question readers might ponder in this section is:
•  What are the viable forms of independence and interdepen-
dence in the region today—politically and culturally?
Phrased one way, the question returns us to a previously 
asked question: How do we—who share overlapping pasts 
and a bound together present—make a collective future in 
the place we all call home? Phrased differently, we might 
ask: Following Hau‘ofa’s (and Kame‘eleihiwa’s) Austrone-
sian vision of locating the past ahead of us, what might a 
postcolonial future (without quotation marks) look like? 
Or, rephrasing the question yet again: How do we build, 







Decolonization has one clear and unambiguous meaning in the his-
tory of the international system of states since World War II. It refers
to the withdrawal of the colonial powers from direct legal and con-
stitutional control over their territories. The process by which the
modern states system of Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Islands
came into being is “decolonization” as envisaged by the United
Nations in the 1960 decolonization resolutions, which were passed
at the height of international enthusiasm for the dismantling of the
colonial empires.
If we adopt this straightforward definition in writing a history of
decolonization in the Pacific Islands, we start with the independence
gained by Western Samoa from New Zealand in 1962, proceed to
recount the withdrawal of the Netherlands, Britain, Australia, and
New Zealand from their dependencies in the region up to 1980, move
to the decolonization of American Micronesia, and end with the
achievement of independence by the Republic of Belau in October
1994. We should also note New Zealand’s delegation of certain
powers to the political leaders of Tokelau in 1994 and the prepara-
tions for an eventual act of self-determination in this tiny Polynesian
territory (Levine 1995). A strictly constitutional definition of this kind
underlay the classic surveys of Pacific Islands’ decolonization by J. W.
Davidson (1982), Barrie Macdonald (1982), Peter Larmour (1983),
and Yash Ghai (1983).
By this account, decolonization is a clearly identifiable process of
transferring legal and constitutional power from colonial elites to the
elites of newly formed sovereign states, with some limitations in the
case of the five freely associated states. No further decolonization is
thought necessary within these states because the colonized people are
Stewart Firth 315
deemed to have achieved freedom and self-determination. In the region
as a whole the most obvious exceptions to this process are the French
territories. New Caledonia and French Polynesia in particular fit the
model of territories that the international community regards as re-
quiring to be decolonized. They are territories under the control of
one of the old colonial powers, France, which has retreated from much
of the remainder of its empire and—so the argument goes—should
quit its colonies in the Pacific as well. The process of decolonization is
presented in Table 1.
The simple constitutional model of Pacific Islands decolonization in
Table 1 no longer encompasses the complex reality of the issue. De-
colonization now assumes a variety of meanings in a variety of con-
texts and is the goal of widely disparate political movements—tradi-
tionally anticolonial in the French territories, secessionist in Papua
New Guinea and the Melanesian edge of Indonesia, redistributive and
culturally assertive in Hawai‘i, Guam, New Zealand, and Australia.
Some Pacific Islanders who are not supposed to want decolonization
agitate for it while others who might be expected to want national
freedom prefer to keep territorial status. The rhetoric of decoloniza-
Table 1. Pacific Islands Decolonization
Year of Independence Colonial Power
1962 Western Samoa New Zealand
1963 Irian Jaya Netherlands
1965 Cook Islands* New Zealand
1968 Nauru Australia
1970 Fiji United Kingdom
1970 Tonga United Kingdom
1973 Niue* New Zealand
1975 Papua New Guinea Australia
1978 Tuvalu United Kingdom
1978 Solomon Islands United Kingdom
1979 Kiribati United Kingdom
1980 Vanuatu United Kingdom and France
1986 Marshall Islands* U.S.A.
1986 Federated States of Micronesia* U.S.A.
1994 Belau* U.S.A.
*In free association with former colonial power.
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tion and sovereignty has become ubiquitous in the politics of the
Pacific Islands.
Observers have noted the shift. Robert Kiste’s (1994) survey of the
U.S. role in decolonization includes not only the American withdrawal
from the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands but also resurgent
Hawaiian nationalism and the movement for a sovereign Hawaiian
nation. In a companion study of New Zealand and decolonization,
Terence Wesley-Smith examines Western Samoa, the Cook Islands,
Niue, and Tokelau before adding a discussion of Maori political acti-
vism entitled “Decolonizing New Zealand” (1994). Numerous com-
mentators on the Bougainvillean secessionist revolt have pointed to
what Peter Larmour calls the problematic relationship in Papua New
Guinea between “political system and territory”(1984:397), while the
secessionists themselves have consistently appealed to the logic of de-
colonization by which every nation deserves its own state.
My purpose in this essay is to reflect on the state of Pacific Islands
decolonization at the end of the century and to bring the diverse
strands of the decolonization story together into a more general
explanation.
Legitimating the State
Pacific Islands decolonization is a subject bound up with
strongly held beliefs about “nation,” “race,” and “culture” and there-
fore deeply rooted in ideology. The nation, as Benedict Anderson has
famously phrased it, is an “imagined community,” a projection of
identity by individuals onto others who speak the same language or
live within the borders of the same nation-state (1991); and while this
sense of identity has a natural basis in ease of communication and
the sharing of a homeland, it is also the artificial product of symbols,
rituals, and histories promoted for the purpose of making people
believe that they belong to this community and owe it loyalty. “Race”
and “culture” are notoriously elusive concepts. Yet ideologies of race,
nation, and culture possess a compelling reality in politics and consti-
tute the legitimating underpinnings of the modern nation-state.
The other actor in the story of decolonization is easier to define.
This is the state, the principal political legacy of colonialism and the
characteristically Western and modern form of organizing political
communities on a large scale. The state, that social organization which
claims a monopoly of ultimate political authority within a defined ter-
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ritorial area, needs sustenance in the form of legitimacy. It needs
people to believe it has a right to rule. New states must seek legiti-
macy from new “nations,” that is, from the belief of citizens that
their identity and destiny are bound up with those of others within
the same newly defined political communities. At this point the tan-
gible state, consisting of the government, the bureaucracy, and the
forces of coercive authority (whether police or military or both), comes
to depend on the far less tangible “nation” or “culture,” or in some
cases, the ideologically potent idea of “race.”
By creating the modern state, colonialism redefines forms of polit-
ical legitimacy. Whereas claims to political authority in the past might
have rested on convictions about superior hereditary rank as in pre-
colonial Hawai‘i or superior ability to amass wealth and distribute it
as in precolonial Vanuatu, and even though such beliefs might per-
sist, the new state elites nurture beliefs that are themselves ideologi-
cal inheritances of colonialism. They must do so because, like every-
one else, they are heirs to the nationalist idea expressed in the French
Revolution. Governments in the early twenty-first century, of old
states and new, base their right to rule on the claim that state and
nation coincide and that the state is the expression in political terms
of its cultural counterpart, the nation.
The rhetoric of decolonization in Africa, Southeast Asia, and the
Pacific was inspired by the fiction that, after a period of foreign dom-
ination, an entity called the “nation” or the “people” was once again
being permitted to rule itself; either that, or a new nation was being
born. At independence ceremonies new states are “born” into the
“family of nations” or, in a related analogy, they are children reaching
adulthood and now permitted to make their own way in the world.
President Reagan employed just such a metaphor in his speech to the
peoples of the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated
States of Micronesia when they were deemed to have achieved inde-
pendence in 1986.
But what was the nation and who were the people?
In fact, they were the populations who happened to live within
borders of the colonial territories that became new states and, more
often than not, they were divided linguistically and culturally into
antagonistic or competitive groups (Hobsbawn 1990:170–171). The
colonial powers mostly ignored precolonial group identities when they
partitioned territory. In addition, flows of migrant labor to service
plantation and mining economies in the colonial era left a legacy of
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culturally diverse populations at independence. Sometimes colonial
powers could divide such territories before independence so as to
achieve a better accommodation between self-identifying cultural
groups and new states. When territories consisted of islands, already
separated from others by the ocean, such divisions were easily made.
The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands was once supposed to suc-
ceed to statehood as one country. Under pressure from the Islanders,
the United States partitioned it into four entities, which later became
the Commonwealth of the Marianas, the Republic of the Marshall
Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau.
Similarly, Britain accepted the secession of the Ellice Islands from the
Gilberts in 1976 and the formation of two independent states instead
of one, Tuvalu and Kiribati (MacDonald 1994:186–187).
In the different cultural and geographical circumstances of Melane-
sia, where hundreds of language groups populated each colonial ter-
ritory, such partitions were impossible. The same principle applied to
Melanesian colonial territories would have produced a parody of the
modern states system, with hundreds of microstates each correspond-
ing to a self-identifying micronational group. The ultimate logic of the
nation-state would have been fulfilled at the cost of absurdity. De-
colonization was therefore much more successful in some parts of the
Pacific than in others in creating a strong foundation for the political
legitimacy of new state elites. Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and Papua
New Guinea entered independence as multinational states susceptible
to secessionist movements. The Western Solomons breakaway move-
ment briefly threatened to split Solomon Islands at the point of inde-
pendence in 1978, Vanuatu confronted a secessionist revolt on the
island of Santo in 1980, and Papua New Guinea was torn by the Bou-
gainvillean rebellion for a decade from 1988. West Papua has itself
sought to secede since it was absorbed into Indonesia as the province
of Irian Jaya in 1963 (Bennett 1987, Beasant 1984, Saffu 1992).
Secessions and Sovereignties
The region’s two main secessionist movements have both
occurred in Melanesia, one in the Indonesian province of Irian Jaya
and the other on the Papua New Guinea island of Bougainville. Seces-
sionists seek freedom from new forms of colonial domination created,
ironically, by the decolonization process itself. Most of the Melanesian
population of Irian Jaya, as far as we can determine, do not regard
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their decolonization in the 1960s, when the international community
acquiesced in their being handed over by the Dutch to Indonesia, as
the achievement of self-determination. Quite the reverse: An armed
struggle against the Indonesian authorities has been pursued ever since
by the OPM, the Movement for Free Papua, a loosely knit collection
of jungle guerillas who regard Indonesia as a new colonial overlord
that should be expelled from their homeland. The forgotten war in
Irian Jaya has led to the deaths of ten of thousands of Melanesian
villagers and should be seen as the most important nationalist revolt
ever undertaken by Pacific Islanders.
For as long as Suharto was President of Indonesia, the Indonesian
authorities maintained a tight grip on their easternmost province, sup-
pressing any sign of pro-independence sentiment and arresting activists
who raised the flag of Free West Papua. After widespread unrest
forced Suharto to resign in 1998, his successor, B. J. Habibie, allowed
the governor of Irian Jaya, Freddie Numberi, to meet West Papuans
living in Papua New Guinea and to discuss their grievances. Numberi
admitted that Suharto had made mistakes and that things would now
improve. At the same time an unprecedented meeting occurred be-
tween representatives of the OPM and the head of the Indonesian mili-
tary forces in Irian Jaya.2 Yet none of these developments should be
seen as prefiguring a change in Irian Jaya’s political status. The official
Indonesian position remains as it was: Irian Jaya was incorporated
under UN supervision and with UN approval in the 1960s, and the
armed forces will continue to treat secessionism as subversive. Only a
genuine revolution in Indonesia offers any prospect of independence
for Irian Jaya.
We tend to minimize Irian Jaya in the story of Pacific Islands inde-
pendence. We are caught in a rhetoric of region that brings the South
Pacific to an abrupt end along the Papua New Guinea–Indonesian
border. The standard definition of the region embraces the twenty-two
island states and territories of the South Pacific Commission area from
the Northern Marianas to Pitcairn Island and excludes the western
half of the island of New Guinea. And the standard definition of de-
colonization is that it can occur only once because new states by def-
inition cannot themselves be colonizers. The doctrine is a politically
necessary one for new states threatened by secession, and for this
reason the international community has consistently endorsed a defini-
tion of decolonization that focuses on territories under the control of
the old colonial powers. It recognizes first-stage decolonization move-
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ments, those that seek freedom from the traditional colonial empires,
while seeing second-stage decolonization movements in new states as
threats to international security.
An independence rebellion of this second-stage kind threatened the
political stability of Papua New Guinea for most of the 1990s, from
the time secessionist rebels brought copper mining operations at Pan-
guna to a halt in 1989. Myths of Bougainvillean nationhood com-
peted with myths of Papua New Guinean nationhood. In fact both
the island and the country are fractured along linguistic lines, neither
is a nation, and political unity would be no more likely in an indepen-
dent Republic of North Solomons than in Papua New Guinea as a
whole, as fighting between Bougainvilleans themselves showed. Most
Bougainvillean villagers suffered at different times under both the
Papua New Guinea Defense Force and the Bougainville Revolutionary
Army and simply wanted peace and the restoration of government ser-
vices, schools, hospitals, and public service salaries. Avoidable deaths
caused by the withdrawal of services during the blockade of Bougain-
ville by the national government numbered, by some estimates, as
many as fifteen thousand. A split among leaders of the Bougainville
Revolutionary Army finally produced successful negotiations for a
peace settlement, which was signed in April 1998 and overseen by an
unarmed multinational Peace Monitoring Force from Australia, New
Zealand, Fiji, and Vanuatu. Joseph Kabui and Sam Kauona signed on
behalf of the BRA, leaving their former leader, Francis Ona, isolated
in the hills and issuing orders to only a small remnant of his original
following. The UN Security Council dispatched a representative to
Bougainville to act as a catalyst for the peace process, which was con-
tinuing, though with uncertainties, at the end of 1998. Bougainvilleans
remained divided about what kind of “independence” they could
achieve, with some leaders still imagining a Bougainville separated
from Papua New Guinea as an independent state.
Aboriginal Australians, Maori, Native Hawaiians, and Kanaks are
a second group who favor wider definitions of decolonization in the
Pacific Islands region. Australia, New Zealand, Hawai‘i, and New
Caledonia are the four places in the region where settler populations
have outnumbered the original inhabitants, taken much of their land
and constructed liberal democracies along Western lines. In each of
these four societies a clash between different principles of political
legitimacy lies at the heart of disputes over decolonization and sover-
eignty. New Caledonia illustrates the point. The French authorities
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organized a referendum on the future of New Caledonia in 1987 and
achieved a resounding vote in favor of French rule. But the result,
supported by a large majority of those who voted, did not settle the
matter. The Kanaks boycotted the referendum. Most Kanaks had lost
land and become strangers in their own country. They were too alien-
ated from the political and economic system to accept a decision based
merely on numbers as represented by votes cast in a liberal democratic
system: They stood for a different and conflicting political principle
—rights—above all, rights to land and sovereignty said to belong by
inheritance to the descendants of the original occupiers.
Rights to land have a clear place in the liberal tradition because
they are a species of the rights of property so vigorously protected by
Western law. Ancient, aboriginal rights to land are embodied in legal
instruments such as the Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand and were
recognized in the High Court of Australia’s landmark Mabo decision
of 1992. While such rights are politically contested, they can be in-
corporated into the law of settler societies without difficulty and
without calling the consistency of that law into question. Aboriginal
Australians, Maoris, Kanaks, and Native Hawaiians have all asserted
rights to land in recent years and, in varying degrees, they have all
been successful.
Rights to sovereignty are a different matter. The liberal democracies
of Australia, New Zealand, France (for the French Pacific territories)
and the United States (for Hawai‘i) embody a fundamental principle
of universality in the way in which political power is legitimated.
Citizenship by itself and without reference to ethnicity, descent, or
original attachment to the land is the sole qualification for participat-
ing in the regular elections that confer legitimacy on the government.
No doubt these societies are far less democratic than they appear:
Political power within them is distributed much more inequitably than
the ideology of democracy suggests, and wealth and descent are signif-
icant prerequisites for exercising such power. But the important point
is ideological. Numbers matter because they are believed to matter.
Those who assert claims to control the state on a different basis, such
as descent from the original occupiers of the land, are not likely to
get far unless they also have the numbers in terms of votes.
In most nonsettler societies in the Pacific the argument goes the
other way. Here Europeans were a tiny minority and most people
could claim descent from the original occupiers of the land. So rights
to land and sovereignty based on descent went together with numbers.
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“Descent from the original occupiers of the land” is synonymous with
the “nation,” is used in a variety of definitions as one of the legal
qualifications for citizenship in a number of Melanesian countries and
qualifies people for the sovereignty that comes with decolonization. In
the absence of large settler populations the two principles, numbers
and rights, can be reconciled and can justify the political authority of
the postcolonial state.
But where settlers have formed a large majority, their descen-
dants, not the descendants of the original occupiers, are the ones who
decide which principle legitimates political authority. In Australia, for
example, the descendants of European and other foreign settlers are
more than 98 percent of the population, and the special claims of
Aboriginal Australians are being dealt with by land rights legislation
enacted within the conventional political process. The significance of
talk about decolonization in Australia does not lie in that possibility
itself but in the political leverage created by such talk, as the Torres
Strait Islands show. Torres Strait Islanders, who number about 8,500
in the islands and 15,000 on the mainland, have been calling for self-
government since the 1980s. They resent the fact that federal fund-
ing for their community comes via the Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Commission, an instrumentality that puts them together with
Aboriginal Australians. By emphasizing a distinct ethnic identity, the
Torres Strait Islanders hope to garner a greater share of resources from
Canberra.3
New Zealand’s Maori represent a larger proportion of their coun-
try’s total population than do Aboriginal Australians (by one estimate,
18 percent compared with 1.5 percent), and they have successfully
brought the issue of Maori self-determination to the mainstream polit-
ical agenda. In response to Maori pressure, the Labor government
strengthened the Waitangi Tribunal in 1985 and opened the way for
a flood of Maori land claims going back to the original signing of the
Treaty of Waitangi between Maori chiefs and the British in 1840.
Briefly, before the Labor Party was defeated in 1990, the government
tried to set up a version of Maori self-determination by delivering ser-
vices through local tribal authorities, but the National Party has since
reversed the experiment. From the point of view of most white or
pakeha New Zealanders, their country was decolonized when it be-
came a self-governing dominion in the British Empire early this cen-
tury. But for many Maori, the decolonization of New Zealand remains
incomplete.
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In the heady atmosphere of protest that followed the New Zea-
land government’s 1994 offer of $NZ1 billion in settlement of all land
claims—the so-called fiscal envelope—some Maori leaders called for
sovereignty and an independent Maori nation-state. Maori activists
disrupted the 1995 celebrations of Waitangi Day on February 6, the
equivalent of America’s Fourth of July, by baring buttocks, spitting,
and tearing down the New Zealand flag. Soon afterward Maoris occu-
pied Moutoa Gardens in the city of Wanganui and four other sites of
Maori land claims. Then a mainly pakeha group of Wanganui citi-
zens were also demonstrating, proclaiming a pakeha version of New
Zealand nationhood defined in majoritarian terms, with banners say-
ing “One Nation, One People” and “One Law for All People.” The
Maori occupations were meant to dramatize dispossession by the in-
vading pakeha population in the nineteenth century, and, in the imag-
inations of some radicals, to prepare the way for the full decoloniza-
tion of New Zealand under Maori control. Ironically, many Maori
beliefs about race, culture, and nation have a Western intellectual
heritage and are being pressed into service for the achievement of
Western political goals.
New Zealand will not be “decolonized” in the conventional sense
of the term. It will not become the sovereign state of Aotearoa under
Maori domination. The Maori are too small a minority in the country
of their ancestors, and few of them want a Maori nation-state in any
case. Yet the resurgence of Maori demands for self-determination has
critically influenced the political agenda in New Zealand and will con-
tinue to be one of the ways by which a dispossessed minority group,
held together by a shared sense of history and cultural identity, will
bargain for a fairer share of wealth and status in a westernized and
capitalist society. Subgroups within Maoridom are now doing deals
with the New Zealand government and receiving compensation for
land long lost.
Hawai‘i will not be “decolonized” in the conventional sense either.
Like the Maori, the Hawaiians are a dispossessed minority who
employ an idiom of decolonization in defense of claims to land and
sovereignty. On January 17, 1993, a hundred years after the over-
throw of the Native Hawaiian monarchy by Americans, fifteen thou-
sand Hawaiians marched on ‘Iolani Palace in Honolulu, shouting
slogans such as Ka Lahui Hawai‘i (the Hawaiian nation) and ‘ea
(sovereignty). The fate of the concept of sovereignty in recent debate
in Hawai‘i exemplifies the clash between rights-based and numbers-
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based principles of political legitimacy. A group of international law-
yers and academics who constituted the People’s International Tribu-
nal called upon the United States and the world in 1993 to “acknowl-
edge the right of Lahui Kanaka Maoli to decolonize under provision
of United Nations Resolution 1514,” as if it were possible for Hawai‘i
to follow the example of nonsettler colonies such as Western Samoa
and Kiribati and to gain sovereignty in the name of the nation. By
this theory, the international community should support Hawai‘i in an
act of political independence from the colonizing power, the United
States. The Hawaiian sovereignty movement Ka Pakaukau, which
organized the Tribunal, professes to see Hawaiian independence of
this kind as a possibility that belongs to the real world of politics.
The vast majority of American citizens in Hawai‘i, many of them
Native Hawaiians, do not support such a future for their Islands or
regard it as remotely feasible. In the hands of other Hawaiian sover-
eignty groups, such as Ka Lahui Hawai‘i led by Mililani Trask, sov-
ereignty becomes a more achievable goal, embracing reconciliation
under an Apology Bill, the return to direct Hawaiian control of the
Hawaiian Trust Lands, and the forming of a “nation within a nation”
on the model of Indian nations on the mainland United States. The
goal is redistributive justice for a dispossessed minority within an exist-
ing political system. The state government has embraced the rhetoric
of sovereignty in order to ensure that it does not mean very much at
all, or—to put it another way—to ensure that any entity called a sov-
ereign Hawaiian government or nation is compatible with the rule of
the majority in Hawai‘i. There has been talk of a plebiscite on the
question of restoring a Hawaiian nation, whatever attenuated form
that might take, but not of one on the question of restoring a
Hawaiian state (Young 1995; Kame‘eleihiwa 1993). In liberal politi-
cal systems with principles of legitimacy based on numbers, minority
claims to land might be accepted, but minority claims to sovereignty
based on rights will inevitably be resisted. Something given the name
“sovereignty,” if conceded, will be a mere shadow of itself, with
almost none of the significance it has in international law, yet with
significance of another kind in the restitution of land and new entitle-
ments to resources. Such will be the case in Hawai‘i.
New Caledonia represents a variation on the theme of settler colo-
nies. Here history delivered an ambiguous verdict on the territory’s
future. The original and settler populations are in rough balance.
Settlers, consisting of French, Vietnamese, Wallisians, Indonesians,
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and others, outnumber Kanaks but not by a huge margin. As a con-
sequence, the outcome of the territory’s dispute over decolonization
has much less of the predictability that comes from the presence of a
large majority of settlers. Australia, Hawai‘i, and New Zealand do
not fit the model of territories that the international community re-
gards as requiring decolonization. Settlers there have long since over-
whelmed original populations and, as far as the international com-
munity is concerned, the die is cast. New Caledonia is different. It is
the territory of a European power on the other side of the world and
part of an older colonial empire that once included Vietnam, Cambo-
dia, Laos, Algeria, and a number of west and central African states,
all of which have since achieved independence. The name of its prin-
cipal independence movement, the FLNKS, recalls the FLN of French
Algeria. Above all, the French government considered the FLNKS to
be so serious a threat to its authority that it dispatched thousands of
troops to the territory to keep order. When Jean-Marie Tjibaou talked
of a national liberation struggle and an independent Republic of
Kanaky, he was thought not to be posturing for effect but to be de-
scribing an achievable political goal. For these reasons, and under
pressure from the South Pacific Forum, the United Nations voted in
1986 to put New Caledonia on the list of non-self-governing territo-
ries. New Caledonia conforms with the internationally recognized
paradigm of a colonial territory.
The military raid in which French soldiers killed nineteen Kanaks
on Ouvéa Island in May 1988 spurred the leaders of both sides to
reach an agreement, the Matignon Accords, which have become the
basis of what Stephen Henningham calls the “uneasy peace” in New
Caledonia (Henningham 1993–1994). The essence of the Accords was
that New Caledonia was given a breathing space of ten years before
the territory’s people voted again in a referendum on their political
future in 1998, and that the French government spent public funds in
the territory on an unprecedented scale. The French calculated cor-
rectly that an emergent Kanak middle class, given political responsibil-
ity and access to development money, would moderate its demands
for independence. The independence movement split between those
who profited from the French connection as disbursers of French
funds and those who wanted independence, and the initiative moved
decisively to the French government. Politics in New Caledonia lost
much of its polarized, ideological character as the FLNKS splintered
and was drawn into deals and cross-party arrangements.
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From this political situation there emerged the Noumea Accord,
signed by the FLNKS, the RPCR, and the French government in May
1998. The Accord is the first official recognition in the history of New
Caledonia of the effects of colonization on the Kanak people, who, it
admits, suffered a “lasting trauma” from their loss of land and iden-
tity, who were deprived of political rights, and whose cultural heritage
was “denied or pillaged.” The Accord describes “decolonization” as
“the method to rebuild a lasting social bond between the communi-
ties which live today in New Caledonia.” But “decolonization” in this
context does not mean the imminent removal of French sovereignty
from the islands; it means a process that will last between fifteen and
twenty years, during which a New Caledonian citizenship will be
created, political institutions recognizing Kanak culture will be estab-
lished, and certain powers will be progressively devolved from Paris
to the Pacific territory, though not those dealing with justice, public
order, defense, or foreign affairs. A new referendum will take place in
2013 or 2018 to determine whether New Caledonia will achieve “de-
colonization” in the full sense of the term.
The Noumea Accord includes a fresh French commitment to land
reform in New Caledonia. Except in the Loyalty Islands, where most
of the land remained in the possession of the original inhabitants, the
history of land in New Caledonia is like that of land in Australia.
Settlers came, took land, and pushed villagers into reserves, and today
just a thousand mainly French owners have about two-thirds of the
arable land in the territory. The authorities have redistributed some
land but, even under the Noumea Accord, a wholesale reallocation in
the territory seems unlikely.
Fiji is a further variation on the theme of settler colonies, in this
case an independent Pacific state with a history of British colonization
and a sizable Indian minority whose numbers matched or exceeded
those of the original Fijians from the 1940s after until the Fiji coups
of 1987.4 Fiji Indians, who were targeted by the coup, cannot employ
the rhetoric of decolonization in defense of their interests. Unlike
minorities almost everywhere else in the region, they cannot claim
land or sovereignty on the basis of the rights of the original occupiers.
That is an argument that in the Fiji case belongs to those who are
politically dominant, the Fijians themselves. So like the descendants
of settlers in Australia, New Zealand, or Hawai‘i, the Fiji Indians
have traditionally appealed to majority rule and race-blind citizenship
as the principles on which Fiji’s system of government should be built.
Uniquely among the Pacific’s former settler colonies, and for spe-
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cial historical reasons, Fiji is an independent state where rights-based
legitimacy has prevailed. Under the postcoup 1990 Constitution, all
parliamentary seats were communal in character, reserved for
members of one ethnic group who were elected by members of that
ethnic group. Thirty-seven seats were for Fijians, twenty-seven for
Indians, five for General Voters (Europeans, Chinese, and so on), and
one was for a Rotuman. The 1997 Constitution is a step away from
communalism in parliamentary representation and, in a House of Rep-
resentatives of seventy-one seats, provides for twenty-five open seats
of the kind common to liberal democracies, twenty-three for Fijians,
nineteen for Indians, three for General Electors, and one for a Rotu-
man. Equally importantly, the 1997 Constitution establishes a power-
sharing system that, by giving smaller parties the right to participate
in government, will ensure that, for the first time, a significant
number of Indians sit alongside Fijians in multiethnic cabinets. But
the rights of groups, and in particular those of the descendants of the
original occupiers of the land, remain specially protected in Fiji’s
constitutional arrangements.
The Territories
After more than three decades since the Western Samoans
became the first Polynesians to gain independence, the peoples of the
remaining territories in Polynesia and Micronesia are not rushing to
follow. Underwritten by subsidies from Washington or Paris, the stan-
dard of living is higher in American Samoa, Guam, and French Poly-
nesia than in Western Samoa and Tonga, Kiribati or Tuvalu. It is
higher in Palau or the Marshalls than in Kiribati or Tuvalu, at least
as most people measure these things (though that does not mean that
people are better educated or more healthy). The territories do better
than the freely associated states, which in turn do better than the inde-
pendent states. A direct or indirect connection with a metropolitan
power, bringing subsidies and allowing out-migration, gives people
more choices and life-chances than independence with foreign aid.
Samoans and Tongans, for example, leave their independent home-
lands behind in order to enter the nonindependent territory of Amer-
ican Samoa, where employers pay higher wages. The paradox of
decolonization in this part of the Pacific is that Islanders want inde-
pendence most where it will not happen and least where a genuine
possibility of such a fundamental change in political status exists.
French Polynesia might appear to be an exception. It is a territory
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with a substantial Islander majority, a history of being used for nuclear
tests, and a number of independence parties. Media images of Tahiti
in September 1995, flashed around the world, suggested that French
Polynesia was seething with anticolonial discontent. Following France’s
decision to resume nuclear testing for a final series in 1995 and 1996
and after sustained international protest that put French Polynesia in
the spotlight as never before, the French detonated their first bomb
beneath Moruroa lagoon on September 5. The following day, unionists
called a general strike that quickly degenerated into a riot. Demon-
strators occupied the runway at the international airport at Papeete,
attacked an Air France DC-10 awaiting takeoff, and then stormed
the terminal building with bricks, iron bars, and even a bulldozer,
which someone commandeered in order to smash through the entrance
to the airport terminal. The riots then spread to Papeete itself, where
youths rampaged through the streets, looting, smashing shop win-
dows, and setting numerous buildings alight. As the French authori-
ties flew in extra security forces, including men of the French Foreign
Legion, the rest of the world had its first chance to see modern
Tahiti. What the world saw was a French colonial town ablaze, cars
overturned, stores looted, and street battles between police and young
Tahitians. In Australia, an ABC radio journalist reported the riots
live against a background of regular stun grenade explosions, and in
the print media subeditors chose headlines such as “Bomb ignites
Pacific rebellion,” “French provoke dormant independence move-
ment,” “explosion of independence,” and the inevitable “Rebellion in
Paradise.” Oscar Temaru, the leader of the independence party Tavini
Huiraatira, was quoted as saying: “Today you can hear the French
firing on our people. . . . At this very moment we appeal to the entire
world to call on Jacques Chirac to stop this madness. . . . The whole
people of this country are there fighting against the French army. It is
a decision made by the people themselves.” International journalists
queued eight deep to interview Temaru, whom they portrayed as a
Polynesian Nelson Mandela leading his people to freedom.5
Despite these dramatic events, French Polynesia will probably
remain part of overseas France well into the next century. The terri-
tory is not a modern equivalent of Vietnam or Algeria in the 1950s,
and the 1995 riots have not proved to be the first steps on French
Polynesia’s march to independence, as the 1996 elections for the Ter-
ritorial Assembly showed: More pro-independence candidates were
elected, but, at eleven out of forty-one, they were still a minority.
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Many rioters and looters appear to have been unemployed youths
from the poorest parts of Papeete, venting their anger at having no
jobs and being relegated to the bottom of the social pile. They are not
the shock troops of a disciplined and widely supported movement for
independence. In fact, many other Polynesians make sharp distinctions
between opposing nuclear testing and opposing the French presence
as a whole. A majority of the thousands who marched in a protest
procession around the island of Tahiti in June 1995 wanted an end to
testing but not an end to French rule.
The territory’s income, after all, fell sharply when the nuclear tests
were suspended in 1992. The French government recognized that the
French Polynesian economy required a long-term solution founded on
more than military francs. The result was an agreement approved by
the French parliament in 1994 providing for continued infusion of
French development funds until 2003. This is the Pact for Progress,
based in part on a Development Charter drawn up by leading figures
in French Polynesia soon after the suspension of the tests, when the
need for French Polynesia to generate more of its own wealth became
starkly apparent (von Strokirch 1995:145). During the years of
nuclear testing (1966–1992), the French Polynesian independence
movement in its different manifestations was constantly hampered
by the fact that the French testing center brought money to the terri-
tory, money that underwrote the livelihoods of thousands of Islanders
who were understandably reluctant to call for France to leave. Now
it is hampered by the Pact for Progress, a less generous source of sub-
sidy but a guarantee that France will continue to develop the terri-
tory for years to come. Under these circumstances, the 1995 riots are
more likely to weaken the broad political appeal of Tavini Huiraatira
in the territorial elections than to strengthen it.
French Polynesia has an “economy of transfer,” where money
comes from far away in return for the provision of strategic services.
In Bernard Poirine’s formulation, an economy of transfer is one ver-
sion of a wider phenomenon of “economies of rent,” and in this case
the rent is for nuclear purposes (Poirine 1992:44). Territorial politics,
as Karin von Strokirch has argued, operates on the basis of widespread
patronage networks, in which jobs, services, and property routinely
change hands in return for votes, and which is ultimately under-
written by financial transfers from France and by the lack of what
might be termed “hard budget constraints.” An artificial economy,
built upon the patronage of an external power that values the territory
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for strategic reasons, thus becomes the conduit for patronage at lower
levels, territorial and municipal. Under these circumstances financial
responsibility is lacking, political allegiances tend to be flexible, and
wider ideological considerations have traditionally played a small part
in territorial politics (von Strokirch 1991). These traditional patterns
of politics are likely to reassert themselves when the current French
testing season ends. French Polynesia shows that, however much
people might want to reassert their cultural identity in a decolonized
setting, they fear the loss of a generous metropolitan patron more.
The American territory of Guam exemplifies a similar phenomenon
but in a different way. Here independence is so remote a possibility
that politicians can employ the stirring rhetoric of decolonization
without any fear that it might actually occur. In Guam most talk of
decolonization is strictly for nondecolonizing purposes. Representa-
tives of Guam have appeared in recent years before the United Nations
Decolonization Committee and the Subcommittee on Small Territories
complaining of U.S. imperialism. When Joseph F. Ada introduced him-
self to the Clinton administration at the White House in 1993, he
said he came as “Governor of the American colony of Guam” and
that Guam was “unwilling to remain a colony” (Bettis 1994:173).
Guam, he said, was like the thirteen colonies under the British in the
eighteenth century. The implication might seem to be that Guam wants
to sever ties with Washington and become independent. Yet in fact
the Chamorro self-determination movement in Guam, at least in its
widely supported form, seeks merely an alternative form of connection
with the United States—as a commonwealth rather than an unincor-
porated territory. American citizenship, that envied resource endow-
ment Guamanians have had since 1950, is not to be put at risk, and
the calculation is that lands will be restored to Chamorros at the
same time as federal funding continues to flow from Washington.
Reflections
Certain general conclusions suggest themselves from this
analysis. Decolonization is an ideological as well as a political phe-
nomenon. It is the mechanism of forming new states and is every-
where accompanied by new beliefs of Western origin about political
legitimacy and the justification of authority. The new states of the
Pacific Islands are supposed to be “nation-states” along Western lines,
legitimated in Western ways. Applied to widely different cultural and
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political circumstances across the region, this formula provides a foun-
dation for political stability in some Pacific countries but a recipe for
secession and civil strife in others.
“Decolonization” is a contested concept. Whether or not a territory
deserves to be decolonized and whether or not a people deserve to be
sovereign are not decided simply by reference to international law
and UN resolutions; they are matters of opinion. Whereas the French
authorities conceive of French Polynesia as naturally part of France,
for example, the independence activists think of it as naturally an
independent country, held back from its destiny by foreign occupation.
The language of decolonization and national freedom now serves
a disparate array of anticolonial, secessionist, and sovereignty move-
ments, some of which would regard independence as catastrophic.
None of the anticolonial and secessionist movements is likely to
achieve decolonization in the traditional sense.
Rights-based arguments for land are being accepted in liberal
democracies in the Pacific but, because the legitimating principle form
of political authority in such societies is majoritarian, minorities there
will not succeed with rights-based arguments for sovereignty in its
classic sense of independent statehood. “Sovereignty” may come to
minorities but only in an attenuated and redefined form, principally as
greater freedom of cultural expression, official recognition of cultural
symbols and practices, and a fairer share of resources—especially land.
For some sovereignty movements, this will represent a partial realiza-
tion of their original aims, which did not include independence in the
first place.
Many Islanders in territories no longer want to be decolonized.
The high tide of decolonization in the nonsettler Pacific Islands has
receded. One reason for this development lies in international politics.
For as long as powerful external states wanted Pacific Islands decolo-
nization, it happened; now that the international community regards
the decolonization of the region as virtually accomplished, the Islands’
political map is likely to remain unaltered. But another reason is that
the distinction between colonial territories and independent or semi-
independent states in the region is becoming blurred. Pacific Islanders
have better lives and access to more services in most of the region’s
territories than they do in independent countries. In territories such as
French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna, American Samoa, and Guam,
as well as in the state of Hawai‘i, a decisive majority of Islanders
want to remain firmly tied to the metropolitan patron that is the
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source of their standard of living and would regard decolonization as
a disaster.
What is left behind in this postcolonial and postdecolonial era
differs from place to place. In parts of Melanesia, secessionism con-
tinues to inspire armed conflict. In island groups long since over-
whelmed by settlers, descendants of the first occupiers call for land
and sovereignty in the name of decolonization. In most of the remain-
ing territories the majority of Islanders are wary of what they suspect
is the false promise of independence. The path to independence for
colonial peoples used to be seen as the march of history, temporarily
delayed in some territories but ultimately inevitable. From the per-
spective of the turn of the century, this particular march of history
begins to look like an artifact of a period and set of circumstances,
and decolonization has lost its simple teleology. While the rhetoric of
decolonization expands and diversifies, the reality of decolonization
diminishes.
Notes
1. I would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of Emeritus Pro-
fessor Norman Meller in the preparation of this chapter.
2. Agence France Presse 1, Sept. 22, Nov. 27, 1998.
3. “Islanders may be given more economic say,” Sydney Morning Herald,
Sept. 13, 1995.
4. Brij V. Lal (1988, 1992) has the best analyses from a liberal democratic
point of view of the Fijian coup. Deryck Scarr (1988) is the best from a
rights-based point of view. For a comparison of these approaches, see Stewart
Firth (1989).
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You tell me that I’ve been “exploited”
And that I must rebel NOW;
You tell me that I must be their equal
You tell me that if I don’t
I am sick, apathetic and useless.
But why won’t you face the truth?
Why are you telling me this?
You ride a big car, just like them
You booze, just like them
You love, just like them
You slaughter, cheat, and lie, just like them
Why should I hate them and not YOU?
You are a fraud
Squeezing the dry earth
For something to ease your guilt
Why won’t you admit it?
You have lost your carefree nature
Your easygoing manner
Your humanity and sense of balance;
You have made academia, fame and money
Your gods
And you have let them rule you—
This you wanted all along
This chapter was originally published in Kakala, by Konai Helu Thaman (Suva:
Mana, 1993).
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Come, face your dilemma now, brother
For your pompous friends won’t help you
They have too much to lose;
Your statesmen friends can’t help you
They suffer from the same identity epidemic,
Why don’t you give up?
My brother . . .
My problem is not “exploitation”
Or unequal pay, or unawareness:
My problem is that I
Have been betrayed and trampled on
By my own blood,
Don’t forget YOU are their product
And YOU must sell.
340
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Custom and the Way of the Land
Past and Present in Vanuatu and Fiji
Margaret Jolly
Tradition always encodes a relation between past and present, but
that relation may be constituted as continuous or discontinuous (see
Handler and Linnekin 1984). Pasts are related to presents in different
ways—at one extreme the past may be seen to flow effortlessly and
continuously toward the present, at the other the past may be seen to
be irrevocably separated from the present through a rupture, a break,
which must be bridged through revival. Such differences in the con-
struction of past-present relations are nowhere more apparent than
in how the past is evoked in the politics of tradition in contemporary
Pacific nations. Here I compare these processes in two independent
Pacific states—Vanuatu and Fiji.
The terms kastom (“custom” or “tradition” in Bislama) and vaka-
vanua (“the way of the land” in Fijian) seem to be local variants of a
pan-Pacific concept of tradition. But these terms mark quite different
articulations of past and present. Kastom is predicated on a sense of
rupture and revival, vakavanua on a sense of continuity between past
and present. Kastom tends more thoroughly to expunge European ele-
ments and is associated not just with a moral criticism of European
ways but with more trenchant opposition toward foreigners in general
and whites in particular. Vakavanua incorporates European elements
—Wesleyan Methodism and British codifications of chiefly hierarchies
and land tenure—that are now seen as part of the way of the land.
This is in contrast to “the way of money,” associated not only with
foreigners—Europeans and Indians—but also indigenous practitioners
of “the way of money.” In Vanuatu, Christianity and colonialism are
A longer version of this chapter was published in Oceania 62, no. 4 (1992):330–354.
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seen much more as a rupture with a heathen past, in Fiji (at least from
the viewpoint of the eastern confederacies) as flowing continuously
from ancestral practices (Toren 1988; cf. Lawson 1997).
This contemporary contrast in the meanings of these terms derives
in part from a divergent experience of colonization and decoloniza-
tion. In Fiji, tradition was in large degree legitimated and codified by
the colonial state; in Vanuatu, for the most part, it was not. In Fiji,
independence was attained without a struggle—self-government was
peacefully conferred by Britain in 1970. In Vanuatu, independence
was achieved after a protracted, complicated, and ultimately violent
struggle. Britain, which had long wanted to divest itself of this con-
joint colony with France, supported the nationalist movement from
the early 1970s. But local and metropolitan French interests, American
speculators, and indigenous secessionists opposed independence, cul-
minating in violent struggles on Santo and Tanna in the year of inde-
pendence, 1980.
If traditional cultures persisted in Vanuatu, this seems rarely to have
been the result of deliberate European celebration of tradition but of
economic and political limits—faltering colonial enterprises, contesta-
tory French and British interests, and resultant administrative aporia.
This is in marked contrast to the situation in Fiji, where many colo-
nial officials (if not traders and planters) were committed to the pres-
ervation and codification of traditional culture and where colonial
administration was characterized by greater intervention and surveil-
lance of Fijian communities (Thomas 1990a; Jolly 1998).
Here I schematically suggest these divergent approaches to tradi-
tional culture in both places. I concentrate on the perceptions and
strategies of colonial government in relation to land (and, in passing,
labor). Although missionaries, traders, and planters displayed a nega-
tive attitude to many aspects of tradition and there were radical trans-
formations of ancestral practices in both colonies, the attitudes and
policies of colonial government toward “tradition” were discernibly
different. From the inception of colonial rule in Fiji and in particular
in the Gordon-Thurston period, Fijian culture was seen as something
to be protected from the depredations of settlers claiming land or
recruiting labor (France 1969:107 ff.). There were contests about the
relative emphasis on preserving tradition as against encouraging
progress through the gradual development of an individualist commer-
cial spirit, and the policies of successive colonial governments oscil-
lated between them. Moreover it has been argued for Fiji, as Mar-
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garet Rodman does for Vanuatu (1984:64), that the perpetuation of
tradition in fact served capitalist development (e.g., see Rutz 1987).
But the differences in the policies of the colonial governments are still
arresting.
In Fiji it was variously argued that communal traditions were to
be safeguarded by keeping Fijians from labor recruitment and inden-
tured labor (and instead importing indentured laborers from India and
other Pacific islands), by restricting the movements of Fijian women,
by specifying that taxes be paid in kind and not cash, and by incor-
porating chiefs in a system of “native government” or indirect rule.
By contrast, despite anthropologists’ admonitions, colonial officials
rarely argued for the preservation of traditional culture in Vanuatu.
Many men and some women went to Queensland and to Fiji as in-
dentured laborers up until 1904, and throughout the late nineteenth
and twentieth centuries many also worked on plantations within the
archipelago (see Scarr 1970:176–218; Jolly 1987). Opponents of the
labor trade objected to it on several grounds—that it entailed kidnap-
ping and slavery, that it exacerbated depopulation, and that it con-
flicted with mission projects by depriving them of congregations in
the island and instilling preferences for worldly goods, grog, and guns
rather than Christian values. It was rarely opposed as a threat to tra-
ditional culture, however. Similarly, those arguing for the confinement
of women to their home villages desired to safeguard their chastity
and enlist them in the new Christian projects of domestication and
conversion, rather than to preserve traditional culture.
Finally, although the conjoint colonial authority of Britain and
France did establish local chiefs and assessors to assist in the process
of colonial control, both the achieved system of rank characteristic of
most northern islands and the ascribed chiefly system of some central
and southern islands were seen as unstable or fragile hierarchies,
whose complications and uncertainties defied both European under-
standing and attempts at codification. Thus, there was nothing that
approached the “native government” of Fiji either in its exertions of
power, its centralism, or its codification. There was throughout the
colonial period in Vanuatu a very weak colonial state, partly because
of the Anglo-French rivalries. And insofar as colonial rule was imple-
mented, this was more direct than indirect—European resident com-
missioners and district agents continued to govern alongside indige-
nous functionaries until very late in the colonial period.
Such divergent attitudes to tradition were preeminently manifest in
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colonial land policies. In the next two sections, I recount in some his-
torical detail how land was dealt with and how far customary land
tenure was acknowledged and codified in these two Pacific colonies.
In Vanuatu, despite some moral qualms on the part of the British, a
rapacious policy of European land alienation was pursued. Preserving
traditional culture and customary relation to the land was hardly a
top priority in the workings of the condominium (the joint adminis-
tration of Britain and France, see Van Trease 1987). On the other
hand, it was the basic premise of British colonial policy and land law
in Fiji (France 1969; Rutz 1987). Such differences in the historical pro-
cesses of colonization (and subsequent differences in the character of
the postcolonial state) perhaps partly account for the perceived differ-
ences today between kastom in Vanuatu and vakavanua, the way of
the land, in Fiji.
Land Alienation and the Joint Court in Vanuatu
The early operations of sandalwood traders and missionaries
in Vanuatu occasioned only small-scale alienation of land. From the
late 1860s, land alienation intensified dramatically with the emergence
of a plantation economy. Most of these plantations were small opera-
tions, cultivating cotton, maize, and sugar—seasonal crops that, unlike
coconuts, did not seem to pose a threat of permanent alienation to
local people (Van Trease 1987:19–20). By the end of the decade, these
predominantly Australian planters were going out of business, and
simultaneously French moves to claim land were intensifying. French
settlers, unlike their British counterparts, had strong government back-
ing and started cotton and coconut plantations on Efate, Epi, Mala-
kula, and Santo. Of particular importance in this period was John
Higginson, already a wealthy entrepreneur in New Caledonia, having
opened up nickel mining there. In 1882 he founded the Compagnie
Caledonniene des Nouvelles Hébrides (CCNH, later to become, after
an injection of French government funds, Societe Française des Nou-
velles Hébrides—SFNH). This had a public goal of attaining not only
land and labor in the New Hebrides, but French political control.
Higginson purchased land from the battling British and Australian
settlers and from local owners on Efate, Malakula, and Epi. This ag-
gressive French expansion occasioned a parallel response from British
annexationists in Australia, such as the South Sea Speculation Com-
pany. In 1889 the Australian New Hebrides Company was established
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by a group of wealthy and influential Australian businessmen, includ-
ing James Burns and Robert Philp (Thompson 1980:68 ff.). This was
given a New South Wales government subsidy to run a steamship ser-
vice throughout the archipelago, trading copra for trade goods, and
servicing the Presbyterian missions. It too aimed to encourage British
settlement, especially in South Santo, but again the British and Aus-
tralian settlers quickly fell into debt and had departed by 1892.
French intentions, meanwhile, had become far more serious. In
1886 two French warships were dispatched by the governor of New
Caledonia. This threatening presence, if not actually aimed at French
annexation, did hasten British agreement to French annexation of
Tahiti and triggered a formalization of the rival colonial interest in
the group. In July of that year the French proposed an agreement
whereby the naval officers of both powers would act as a peacekeep-
ing force to maintain order and protect the lives and property of
British subjects and French citizens. The Colonial Office pressed for an
amendment to safeguard native peoples against European aggression,
but this was not included in the Joint Naval Commission of January
26, 1888. In subsequent conflicts, such as that between Higginson and
Presbyterian missionaries on Epi, the Joint Naval Commission re-
mained equivocal and did nothing to intervene.
The British had been pushing for some time for a full-scale land
commission on the model of Fiji and Samoa. In February 1906 an
Anglo-French Convention was held to adjudicate on the question of
land and the sovereignty of the group. French and British approaches
to the land question were diametrically opposed—the French wanted
to restrict inquiries to the disputed areas, the British to do a full
survey of the entire group. The British wanted an interrogation of the
validity of the original transaction and a testament to actual occupa-
tion by the settler. The French wanted neither. At stake were the
thousands of hectares claimed by SFNH to which titles were dubious
and that were often uncultivated and unoccupied. The final regula-
tions amounted to a vindication of the French position. European
occupation was confirmed if the registered deed was more than ten
years old. If less than this, the title deed was confirmed if there was a
legitimate title deed or if there were three years of occupancy and
improvement. Thus even if a recent title was defective, a settler could
be confirmed in their title if there was evidence of development. If
there was no dispute, the title could be registered—the indigenous
owners did not even need to be aware of the claim.
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Ultimately the British capitulated on all the major points and on
February 27, 1906, the text was confirmed. By this convention, the
group was declared a “region of joint influence with each retaining
jurisdiction over its subjects and citizens, and neither exercising a
separate control over the group.” It also established the machinery of
the Joint Court—with one British and one French judge, and a third
appointed by the King of Spain to act as president. This court had
jurisdiction over land and the power to confirm titles if there was a
deed or if there were three years of occupation. It established the
Torrens system, whereby occupation was tantamount to title and
where the proof of impropriety of a claim rested with the challenger.
The bases for legal challenge were even fewer than those originally
proposed in 1895: Basically, a title could be challenged only if it in-
fringed an existing right that was registered. A native advocate was ap-
pointed to represent indigenous people and to declare native reserves
if necessary, but no guidelines were established for either. The resi-
dent commissioners could themselves declare reserves and had an over-
arching authority over native affairs. Natives were defined as “aborig-
inal races of the Pacific” and were expressly not citizens or subjects
of Britain or France.
With the operation of the Joint Court, the rivalry between Britain
and France moved into the courtroom and the different approaches
of the metropolitan governments to their nationals became even more
obvious (see Van Trease 1987:63–91). One Englishman was crucial
in the intensifying legal battle over land: Edward Jacomb, an English
lawyer who came to the group as the assistant to the British resident
commissioner but resigned and practiced privately as a barrister, sup-
porting indigenous interests and protecting them against the excesses
of both labor recruiters and planters. He assisted plantation laborers
against their masters and defended cases for indigenous people in the
Joint Court. Most of these were against the French—he also alleged
the court was unduly influenced by French interests. From 1919 to
1927, the Court ceased to sit.
Struggles to exert control over newly alienated land were thus basic
to the emergence of the condominium government. As in the parallel
debates about the labor trade, the rival colonial powers had different
ends and strategies—the French vigorously supporting their settlers
and traders to secure their presence, the British reluctant to be there
at all, but being pushed by mercantile interests and local settlers ema-
nating primarily from Australia (Scarr 1967; Thompson 1980). Again,
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as in debate about the labor trade, the British made rhetorical refer-
ence to the rights of the natives, but French will triumphed on all
major points of land law (Scarr 1967:225 ff.). The Joint Court rati-
fied massive land claims by individuals and companies, and European
possession was tantamount to freehold title. Small native reserves
were established but, until late in the colonial period, major mer-
cantile companies had huge claims to uncultivated land throughout
the archipelago. As Van Trease demonstrates, early attempts by ni-
Vanuatu to challenge this imperial right were consistently thwarted
(1987:128–133).
The decline of plantation profitability after the Second World War
precipitated European incursions into the “dark bush”—areas long
claimed through the Joint Court but never cultivated. This often pro-
voked local resistance. Many ni-Vanuatu had by this stage them-
selves become commercial producers of copra as well as subsistence
cultivators (see Rodman 1987). They had also, through their experi-
ence of Americans in World War Two, been exposed to other for-
eigners who seemed both more powerful and more generous than the
British and the French (see White and Lindstrom 1990). Anticolonial
movements predated the war but developed a more radical political
stance as a result of the wartime experience. Getting rid of Europeans
and returning land to indigenous owners was a central theme in move-
ments such as John Frum on Tanna. There were some belated attempts
by Europeans to return alienated lands in the 1960s, but anger about
European alienation of land was crucial in the emergence in the early
1960s of Na-Griamel, a movement based in Vanafo, Santo, led by
Chief Buluk and Jimmy Stephens, and in 1971 the New Hebrides
Cultural Association, led by Donald Kalpokas and two Anglican
priests, Father John Bani and Father Walter Lini. This later became
the National Party (NHNP) and subsequently the Vanua‘aku Pati.
Although the aims of the former were later compromised by deals
with French colons and American speculators (see Beasant 1984; Van
Trease 1987:166–168, 246 ff.), the return of land to indigenous people
was supported by most politically active ni-Vanuatu, Anglophone
and Francophone alike. It was the land issue that stimulated political
demands for independence (Van Trease 1987:206–258). Despite many
attempts by the French to impede independence, and foreign support
of the organized resistance movements on both Tanna and Santo,
independence was won on July 30, 1980, with Walter Lini leading a
Vanua‘aku Pati government.1
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By the terms of the independent constitution, “all land in the Re-
public belongs to the indigenous custom owners and their descen-
dants” (Van Trease 1987:238). Foreigners’ rights to own land were
thus abolished, but provision was made for long-term leases to be
negotiated with customary owners to facilitate the continuous man-
agement of plantations, and, under pressure from the French, provi-
sion was also made for some compensation. The new Ministry of
Lands established three classes of land: rural land “owned according
to custom,” and urban and public lands, which were to be held in
perpetual lease to the government. However, customary owners were
entitled to revenue from this land and some control over its adminis-
tration. The nature of customary tenure was not codified but instead
left to determination by local communities. Many of the problems of
the postcolonial state derive from this question of the nature and the
extent of customary tenure (the political struggles in relation to urban
land being one obvious instance).
The Native Land Commission in Fiji
The contrasts with Fiji are arresting: Here, efforts to estab-
lish and codify customary land tenure began very early in the colo-
nial period. Rights of the indigenous inhabitants were initially
guaranteed against the claims of European settlers and later Indian
immigrants. Land assumes quite a different place in the ethnic rela-
tions and the political field of colonial and independent Fiji.
Fijian land was held to be inalienable by customary tenure, except
for the period before Cession in 1874 and a short interlude from 1905
to 1908. Prior to the Deed of Cession in 1874, a number of Euro-
peans had settled in Fiji—first the beachcombers, later sandalwood
and bêche-de-mer traders and a few European settlers in Levuka, all
of whom posed little threat to the indigenous attachment to land or
local customs in general. According to France (1969), the arrival of
missionaries from the 1830s, with their more hostile attitudes to
tradition and their separate domestic establishments, posed the novel
threat of land alienation and exclusive private property. This intensi-
fied with the arrival of planters from the 1860s. Whereas early settlers
had been dependent on Fijian hospitality and local labor, increasingly
these new agricultural operations were drawing foreign labor from
Vanuatu and the Solomons. Estrangement from Fijian culture in-
creased as did the pressure to alienate land (France 1969:41). Chiefly,
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alienation of land increased beyond its precolonial limits with the
promise of payments in trade goods, cash, or services by whites (1969:
51–54). This generated hostilities between chiefs and between chiefs
and commoners.
The first attempts to centralize land policies and codify land alien-
ation were made by American and British consuls (France 1969:55–
72). But a centralized policy of land acquisition did not emerge until
the establishment of native governments and the signing of the Deed
of Cession with Britain in 1874. Native governments in Fiji were at
first European creations. Consul Jones met with chiefs of seven mata-
nitu at Levuka in 1865, and as a result the Confederation of Chiefs
was formed under the presidency of Cakobau. It had aspirations
to act as a central government but had no representation from the
western regions, and its authority even in the east was uncertain. The
government of Cakobau, set up in Bau in 1871, expressly served the
interests of European settlers and sought to guarantee them through
legislation. Large tracts of coastal land were claimed, including land
of those Fijians who had been defeated in battles with Cakobau. The
specter of thousands of Fijians being evicted from their lands was dis-
agreeable both to Chief Secretary Thurston and Minister of Native
Affairs Swanston (France 1969:98–101). But active opposition to
European land alienation awaited the arrival of Gordon, the first
governor of Fiji, after the signing of the Deed of Cession in 1874.
Gordon arrived in Fiji at a time of massive depopulation and pro-
claimed that the “continued existence of the Fijian race was depen-
dent on the preservation of their traditions against the corrupting
influences of the planter community” (cited in Rutz 1987:537). His
policy was to insulate Fijian tradition against the disintegrative effects
of a market in land and labor. He resolved to return all lands alien-
ated prior to Cession to customary owners and to stop Fijians from
being recruited for plantation work in favor of indentured laborers
from India.
Gordon’s moves to formalize customary tenure were not smooth
—since the Great Council of Chiefs he convened in 1876 to ascertain
land tenure initially stressed the diversity and fluidity of Fijian con-
cepts of land tenure. It was the threat of alienation in perpetuity that
arrested their “confusion” and elicited universal endorsement for the
coda, “true and real ownership of the land with us is invested in the
mataqali alone, nor is it possible for any mataqali to alienate its
land” (Rutz 1987:538). This cultivated orthodoxy about land also
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relied on a codification of social units—lineage, clan, and tribe were
neatly defined and marshaled into a segmentary system—a system far
more bounded and less fluid than the precolonial counterpart.
The establishment of the Native Lands Commission entailed a
codification of the concepts of lineage and land and their inherent
attachment (France 1969:123–128). Since land was seen to be held
communally for unborn generations, it could not be alienated and
this trust in perpetuity was held to be immutable. This orthodoxy
about eternal and immutable traditions of customary tenure, which
Gordon initiated, was challenged by the administration of Im Thurn
from 1900 to 1912 and, throughout the twentieth century, successive
colonial governments tried to reverse Gordon’s protectionist policies
toward tradition, communalism, and chiefly hierarchy and to free up
the rigid structure of landholding they had created (see Bayliss-Smith
et al. 1988:67–81). Such reversals were opposed both by some admin-
istrators and by Fijian chiefs, such as Ratu Sukuna.
Colonial policies about land continued to be caught in the “con-
fusing incompatibility . . . between the two official objectives of Tra-
dition and Development” (Spate 1960:50). Several reports by outside
analysts (Spate 1959; Belshaw 1964; Ward 1965) recommended rad-
ical changes—the individualization of land tenure, the encouragement
of independent farming, and substantial modifications to protectionist
protocols. But the major benefits continued to accrue to the chiefly
elites, especially because of the control they exerted over land.
This entered a new phase in the 1940s with the establishment of
the Native Lands Trust Board. The NLTB made inalienable land avail-
able for leasehold and, through a new ordinance in 1940, removed
effective rights from lineages and placed them in the hands of the
NLTB as the agent entrusted with administering all native land “for
the benefit of the Fijian owners” (Rutz 1987:539). The NLTB thus
became the sole agent for leasing native lands and granting conces-
sions, and since this was dominated by chiefly Fijians, it “turned chiefs
into effective landowners, an inversion of Fijian culture which places
ownership into the hands of the commoners” (540; cf. Knapman and
Walter 1980:205; Kaplan 1988:104).
In the postcolonial period in Fiji, the chiefly elite do seem to be
successfully having it both ways in reconciling tradition and develop-
ment. There has since independence been a discernible shift back to
the orthodoxies about tradition and the village as the necessary base
of Fijian life. Despite the enormous shifts of Fijians away from their
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home villages and the emergence of a class of landless poor in the
urban areas, the basis of tradition in village life and customary land
tenure is still celebrated (e.g., see Ravuvu 1983). Even if, in the
period beyond the coups, there was a new concern for Fijian repre-
sentation in commerce and some new sources of disquiet about chiefly
domination, the chiefly elite is still seen as having to maintain its
roots in the land and in the traditional koro.
This thumbnail sketch of land in two colonial histories and
the structure of landholding at independence is suggestive in terms of
its impact on the present meanings of kastom and vakavanua. In
Vanuatu, where customary tenure was neither recognized nor codified,
land became the crucial issue in anticolonial and nationalist move-
ments and was the basis both of hostility to Europeans and of an
independent sense of ni-Vanuatu identity. There was not at the time
of independence a preexisting chiefly elite that was poised to control
the independent state, although an advisory council of chiefs (Malva-
tumauri) was created (see Lindstrom 1998). Problems of codifying
customary land tenure have only been broached in the postcolonial
state, as part of a national policy of reviving kastom. By contrast, in
Fiji, colonial land policies early recognized customary tenure. The
transformations of tenure entailed in its codification enhanced the
power of chiefs so that by independence they were assuming a national
and not just a regional role in controlling land and other resources.
This was presented as a continuation of their hereditary rights in
custom. What I want to stress here is the crucial significance of these
different colonial pasts in the symbolic constitution of tradition in
the present. In Fiji past and present are usually constituted as con-
tinuous; in Vanuatu past and present are more often constituted as
discontinuous.
The Contemporary Meanings of Kastom
and Vakavanua
The contemporary meanings of these two terms diverge in
that kastom is portrayed as ancestral ways that were disrupted by
the colonial presence and that are being consciously revived in the
present. In Fiji, vakavanua is portrayed rather in terms of a continuity
of practices, flowing ceaselessly from past to present.
As many authors have stressed, kastom is a polysemic and a
contested concept (e.g., Keesing 1982). But whereas in this early
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paper Keesing was inclined to stress the vacuity of the concept, recent
writers have rather stressed its variety in different colonial histories
(e.g., Jolly and Thomas 1992; Jolly 1992b). Within Vanuatu I discern
a contrast between those in traditionalist heathen communities such
as those of southeast Pentecost, where kastom is seen primarily as a
whole way of life (see Jolly 1982; Jolly 1994a), and the majority
Christian population, where kastom refers to a selection of ancestral
practices. The traditionalists’ view of an antithetical relation between
kastom and its antinomy skul (“school,” “Christianity,” “European
ways” in Bislama) (see Jolly 1992a; 1994a) differs from that of the
Christian majority who have been trying to combine elements of the
two—to achieve a blend of customary and Christian elements (see
Tonkinson 1982b). Moreover, whereas the traditionalist minority
stresses continuity, the Christian majority stresses rupture and revival.
This was especially marked in the period up until independence in
1980 and immediately afterward. The selective revival of kastom was
a central part of the ideology of the Vanua‘aku Pati and the inde-
pendent state—elements of kastom and Christianity conjoined in the
motto and logo of the new state: an image of a man dressed in indig-
enous attire and surrounded by pigs’ tusks and cycas leaves, but under-
neath the motto, “Long God Yumi Stanap” (“In God We Are Inde-
pendent”). Such creolisms were equally central to the iconography of
anti-independence, secessionist, and resistance movements such as Na-
Griamel and John Frum on Tanna. But importantly, this was typi-
cally seen as a revival of past customs that had been viewed nega-
tively (see Tonkinson 1982a; Larcom 1982; Lindstrom 1982).2
For the state, this revival was a powerful expression of decolonizing
sentiment. Kastom was expressly the reclaiming of a place against
European occupation of the land and the reclaiming of a past that
had been lost or abandoned. In the language of cultural nationalism,
kastom was expressly used against foreigners—not just French settlers
and American land speculators but other outsiders—foreign journal-
ists, expatriate experts, anthropologists. In a poem by Grace Mera
Molisa, all of these are portrayed as “transient scavengers” (1983:
15).3 At the national level, no less than the local level, this rhetoric
had a strong element of primordialism—of reference back to an orig-
inal state, of the condensation of people and place. Again in the
imagery of Grace Mera Molisa’s poetry, Vanuatu was “black stone”
—solidified lava flow, immobile and eternal. In political debates in
Bislama, a central concept was man ples—a condensation of person
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and place. Such imagery was not only crucial in reclaiming the land
as inalienably attached to the people of the place, but proclaiming
local people as rightfully in control of it. The new constitution of
Vanuatu provided for the return of all alienated land to the tradi-
tional owners.
But perhaps it was precisely because land was being reclaimed,
both at the local and the national level, that the assertion was ex-
pressed in these terms. Such a claim to eternal occupation, to primor-
dial possession, was a claim against the rupture of the colonial
period. Colonialism was portrayed primarily as the theft of land, as
the immoral occupation of the place by foreigners (e.g., see Plant
1977a; Sope 1974). Christianity was exempted from its association
with colonialism and viewed positively, not negatively. Although intro-
duced by foreigners, Christianity here as in Fiji has been indigenized
and is viewed as intrinsic to sovereign statehood and personal inde-
pendence: Witness the national motto, in Bislama, Long God Yumi
Stanap. The national anthem echoes this sentiment with its stress on
God as giving the land to local people, thus conferring on them
strength and freedom and of Christianity as a source of national unity
despite local diversity.
The national revival of kastom in association with Christianity has
been paralleled by the revival of kastom in many local Christian
communities. Many aspects of such revivals are, within the limits of
Christian adherence, optional—revivals of the traditional rites of birth,
marriage, funerals, pig killing, kava drinking, dancing and singing,
and making artifacts. This is also the sense of kastom that has been
fostered by the Vanuatu Cultural Center (VCC).
The work of the center both within Port Vila and on the outer
islands has promoted perhaps a more restricted sense of kastom as
material and immaterial property, as commodity rather than a cul-
tural whole. The museum of the VCC is arguably the most successful
museum in the Pacific, distinctive in its stress on a dynamic process
of acquisition and reclamation for local people rather than a conser-
vationist, curatorial function of assembling artifacts for expatriate and
tourist viewing.4 Successive curators have promoted an active program
of indigenous research and revival of kastom. Apart from a recent
debate about whether kastom is exclusively a male codification, under
male control,5 such work has tended to avoid problematic areas, focus-
ing on areas of knowledge, art, and ritual politics, which are less
contentious.
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Three aspects of the national revival of kastom entail vigorous
political debate: the incorporation of kastom leaders, or chiefs, as an
advisory council within the state (Malvatumauri); the decentralization
of justice through a system of island courts; and the return of all
rural land to customary owners (see Lindstrom 1997). Larcom has
focused on the problems posed by the decentralized system of Island
courts in resolving questions about customary land tenure in relation
to the Mewun of Malakula (1990).6
But in all contexts, the majority of ni-Vanuatu who are Christian
see kastom as having been assaulted or abandoned in the colonial
past and as being restored, recuperated, and revived in the present.
They may select distinctive and locally appropriate aspects of kastom
to revive. And even in those communities that insist they have been
living kastom all the while, there have been, through the 1970s and
1980s, efforts to sculpt ancient masks, to revive yam-harvest rituals
abandoned long ago, and even to reinstitute practices associated with
male secret societies.
The contemporary meanings of vakavanua are, I think, different
in terms both of how past-present relations are encoded and in the
ethnic associations of tradition versus modernity. The past-present
relation for most ni-Vanuatu entails a revival of past practices rather
than a continuity insisted on despite transformations. Moreover, in
Vanuatu the indissoluble identity of people and place is posed in oppo-
sition to Europeans, whereas in Fiji it is posed more in opposition to
Indians than nonresident foreigners.
Kastom thus seems significantly different to the way in which
Fijians construct the meaning of vakavanua. Here the concept is much
more a process—the ways of the land seem to be subject to historical
transformation rather than to be ancestral practices that have been
lost and have to be revived. Moreover, the taukei, or the people of
the place, deal not so much with the colonizing European as the
cohabiting Indian. Finally, intraethnic conflict is implicit in the differ-
ential relation of tradition and modernity for the chiefly and rich
versus the commoners and the poor.
Toren (1988) in her study of Fijian tradition suggests that it is not
perceived as objectified inheritance but rather as process, as a way of
living and behaving. The concept of cakacaka vakavanua (“working
in the way of the land”) encompasses both elements of a precolonial
and a colonial past in relation to the present. The attitude to Chris-
tianity is evocative. Although conversion to Christianity is seen as a
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radical disavowal of old ways, it is also thought that ancestral prac-
tice anticipated Christianity. Against this history, the Fijian notion of
tradition as “acting in the manner of the land” makes the present
flow smoothly out of the past; from this perspective, “the coming of
the light” did not violate indigenous cultural practice but revealed
the inherent Christianity of the Fijian people (697).
Christianity is seen to have purified these ancestral elements, divest-
ing them of their devilish aspects and highlighting the inherently Fijian
attributes of kinship concern, hospitality, and respect for the chiefs.
The chiefly in particular are identified as embodying Christianity. But
as well as this stress on continuity rather than a rupture and revival,
there is also an important difference in the ethnic referents of the con-
cept of the way of the land. The “way of the land” is contrasted to
the “way of money,” and in this sense the Fijian way and the Euro-
pean way are counterposed and the latter devalued (Toren 1989). But
there is not a comparable ethnic hostility toward Europeans—indeed,
up until the period of the coups, Fijians were to maintain a broadly
positive relationship to their erstwhile colonizers and to cherish the
Royal Family in particular. Rather, insofar as these moral judgements
become the basis for ethnic political identities, it is the Indians who
are seen as pursuing the way of money.
Kaplan has demonstrated how this contrast between the communal
traditionalism of the Fijians and the individual commercialism of the
Indians derives from British codifications of their respective racial
identities (1988:101–106; cf. Norton 1990). The preservation of Fijian
tradition entailed the preservation of community and chiefly hierarchy.
Colonial relations with Fijians were posited as relations with commu-
nities, mediated through chiefs, and land codifications attached kin-
ship collectivities indissolubly to the land. Individual entrepreneurial
spirit, pursuing the “path of money,” was thus constituted as a rejec-
tion of communal living, expressed in some anticolonial movements
and later to churches like Seventh Day Adventism (see Thomas 1990b,
1991, 1992b), as well as independent farmers or entrepreneurs (Bay-
liss-Smith et al. 1988:74 ff.; Overton 1988).
On the other hand, and in dramatic contrast to colonial policies in
India itself, the British treated Indians as canonically isolated individ-
uals. In the period of indentured labor, Indians were conceived of as
“labor units,” defined by an individualistic contract or girmit with
the employer (Kaplan 1988:106; cf. Kelly 1991; Gillion 1977). Later,
Indians were perceived by the British as disorderly and threatening, a
threat to Fijian dominance, individualist, and disruptive of the foun-
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dations of vakavanua—to indigenous ownership and control of the
land. Both colonial policies and Indian appropriation of their colo-
nial identity associated them with the path of money, although most
were not wealthy businessmen but poor cane farmers, working land
leased from Fijians.
But what of the fact that those canonical actors in maintaining
tradition—the chiefs—are also seen to be pursuing the path of money?
Some Fijians are critical of the chiefs as having it both ways (Toren
1989). Anti-chiefly sentiment has surfaced often in Fiji’s colonial
history. Most recently the shortlived Labor Party government and even
some elements of the Taukei movement instrumental in the coups of
1987–1988 were openly critical of chiefly hegemony and economic
control. But what is striking is the level of support for the chiefs
among rural commoner Fijians, even in those areas of western Viti
Levu where there was a long history of resistance to the colonial alli-
ance between the British and the chiefs of the eastern confederacies.7
Village Fijians in general tend to see the way of the land as charac-
terized by generosity and hospitality, by Christianity and by respect
for the chiefs. It is not just autochthony that is the basis of the claim
for Fijian paramountcy over Indians, but a way of life that is predi-
cated on the perpetuation of chiefly hierarchy. Such associations are
also made in national political rhetoric. Williksen-Bakker (1990) has
shown the links between the values of vanua espoused by villagers,
urban dwellers, and those proclaimed in rituals of chiefly inaugura-
tion in which politicians such as Ratu Mara and Ganilau were pre-
eminent; when the latter was installed as Tui Cakau in 1988, he was
“tied to the land” by a piece of bark cloth wrapped around his arm.
Kaplan has suggested that despite some anti-chiefly elements within
the Taukei movement, Rabuka has consistently stressed that the way
of the land must continue—meaning the dominance of Fijians over
Indians and of chiefs over commoners (1988:109). Thus in the face
of the palpable ruptures of coups, the manifest transformations of the
constitution, and the patent reconfiguration of the political forces
in Fiji, the rhetoric of the continuity of the past in the present is
sustained.8
Some Final Thoughts
In this chapter I have contrasted kastom and vakavanua in
the way that they posit the relations of pasts and presents—a stress on
discontinuity and rupture rather than continuity and linearity. A newly
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arrived national elite wresting sovereign control from the colonizers
had perforce to stress the break and to seek an elusive national unity
through an appeal to kastom as revival and recuperation. On the
other hand, the national elite in independent Fiji was in many ways
continuous with that created during the colonial period. Tradition
had not been so seriously devalued and thus did not have to be so
thoroughly revalued in the interests of national sovereignty. The chiefs
were bequeathed a relationship to the land, to the Fijian people, and
to the state that enabled them to perpetuate hierarchy, albeit in a
transformed way (see Jolly 1994b).
It has been claimed that precolonially, the history of Pacific peoples
was written on the ground (Douglas 1982), but we might also wit-
ness this condensation of time and space in colonial and postcolonial
Pacific history. The telling of pasts in the presents of these two Pacific
states is indissociable from the language of place and the stories
attaching and detaching people and land.
Notes
1. Donald Kalpokas was elected prime minister, heading a Vanua‘aku Pati
(VP) and National United Party (NUP) coalition, on March 31, 1998. Father
Walter Lini, head of the NUP, was appointed deputy prime minister.
2. These historical shifts have been stressed by Ton Otto in his consider-
ation of the Paliau movement, which has in successive phases devalued and
then revalued kastom (1992). In a study of the John From movement on
Tanna, Curtis (1994) suggests that the conversion to Christianity represented
a denigration or an inversion of tradition (in the terms of Thomas 1992a),
while the subsequent revaluation of that tradition in such anticolonial move-
ments represents a negation of that inversion. Both thus stress the importance
of self-conscious historicity on the part of indigenous actors.
3. Grace Mera Molisa was the personal secretary of the prime minister
until October 1990, when she was sacked, ironically after opposing the depor-
tation of two expatriates. As well as being an influential politician, particu-
larly in relation to women’s affairs, she has published several volumes of
poetry. The phrase quoted is from the poem “Newspaper Mania” in Black
Stone (1983).
4. This function, which is more obvious in the Fiji Museum in Suva, was
arguably more apparent in the VCC in the first years after its establishment
in 1961. The new orientation owed much to Kirk Huffman, who arrived in
Vanuatu in 1976, but it has been continued by successive indigenous directors
and curators, including Ralph Regenvanu in the present. For perceptions of
the significance and character of the VCC and the salience of kastom in this
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context, see Bolton (1993). A new museum was opened in 1995 with a mini
arts festival that lasted five days and nights.
5. There have been criticisms of this by the National Council of Women
and individual ni-Vanuatu women. A present project sponsored by the VCC
and UNESCO is attempting to redress this by focusing on the relation of
women to kastom as evinced in their production and exchange of mats. This
involved a collaboration between Lissant Bolton, now an ARC Fellow at the
Australian National University, and women from several regions of Ambae
initially and subsequently from many other islands (see Bolton 1994).
6. In the earlier version of this paper, I had a long critical section on
Larcom’s argument about the “museological” conception of kastom. See also
the discussion in Jolly (1994a; 1996).
7. See Kaplan (1989) for how people in these regions were constructed as
marginal in relation to Fijian custom and threatening in relation to the colo-
nial order. What was seen as pan-Fijian has often been inflected by the inter-
ests of the eastern confederacies—the “myth of cultural homogeneity” effec-
tively obscured the linguistic and the cultural diversity within Fiji (see Lawson
1989). But both Kaplan (1988:109) and Thomas (1990b, 1992b) argue that
despite a sense of linguistic and cultural difference, there is little radical sen-
timent in western Viti Levu.
8. I cannot here consider in detail the politics of tradition involved in the
coups and their aftermath, though this has been explored in different ways by
Thomas (1989, 1990b) and Kaplan (1988). On the coups, see also Scarr
(1988), Robertson and Tamanisau (1988), and Lal (1988). After the exten-




The Relationship between the 
United States and the Native 
Hawaiian People
A Case of Spouse Abuse
Brenda Luana Machado Lee
Hawaii speaks out to the United States:
— I am Hawaii. Remember me? I was once a beauty. My body was 
that of innocence, and then I was discovered.
(My people were innocent and pure, and we had our religious 
beliefs. Our islands were virgin land, then Capt. Cook arrived 
and exposed me to the Western World.)
— I was naked, and so you came to clothe me.
(Your missionaries came to bring in a new religion.)
— I liked my beautiful new clothes.
(The religion they brought was cherished by my people.)
— You craved my love because you saw that I was beautiful, clothed 
as I was, and then you raped me.
(You overthrew the Monarchy of Hawaii, under Queen 
Liliuokalani, in 1893.)
— I was humbled and humiliated.
(My people began to develop inferiority complexes in the 
presence of your haole superiority.)
— Yet you meant me no wrong. You proposed marriage and 
courted me.
(Hawaii was annexed to the United States and became a 
Territory.)
This chapter was first published in Seaweeds and Constructions: Anthology Hawaii
6, 1979.
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— We had a child out of wedlock.
(The Hawaiian Homes Commission Act was created by 
Congress in 1920.)
— You fathered that child, and yet you did not provide support 
payment for that child.
(No money was given to fund the Hawaiian Homes 
Commission Act.)
— And then to make our relationship legal, I badgered you, and so 
you married me.
(Hawaii became a State in 1959, a part of the United States.)
— By then you were taking full advantage of me, being entitled to 
my wifely possessions.
(You lost respect for my people. The Native Hawaiian
people began to lose heavily, especially in the area of land 
possession.)
— You invited so many people into our home, entertaining them as 
you saw fit and you made up all the rules. I sat by submissively.
(People from all over the world reveled and played on the 
Hawaiian shores, coming to start their economic bases 
here—in the way of land investments, hotel building, etc. 
Slowly but surely our people were told to leave their 
ancestral grounds to make way for the newcomers.)
— We’ve been married close to 20 years now.
(Hawaii will celebrate its 20th year of Statehood in 1979.)
— Yet never in all these years have you given a penny to raise
our child, who was born pre-maritally. He has suffered much, 
working his own way through life. He has given much of his life 
to please you.
(The Hawaiian Homes Commission Act was never funded 
and the government has used 44,000 acres out of approxi-
mately 200,000 acres. The federal government uses about 
16,800 acres today. 30,000 acres are “missing.”)
— You have beaten me repeatedly.
(My people have been evicted slowly but surely from their 
homelands and have become dispossessed.)
— I have become so scarred.
(Ugly buildings and highways mar my once beautiful land-
scape. Kahoolawe has been bombed mercilessly.)
— I feel haggard and ugly.
(My people are weary and are feeling very bitter.)
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— Fish that used to in the past, no longer come to play at my feet.
(Even the food is far out of reach of my people. Fish prices 
are so high and there’s a poi shortage because our ancestral 
farmlands on which we grew taro have been denied water, 
which has been diverted to sugarcane lands. So much of what 
we eat is imported.)
— I will no longer pity myself but must stand up to you. I will take 
this treatment no more.
(I will resist you in these demonstrations.)
— You had better straighten up, America, give restitution or ship out!
(I give you a year to make reforms and show good faith. Do 
this or we will declare sovereignty—to be freed of your 
shackles.)
— I have options for the future. I could go to the police.
(I can ask the United Nations to step in-between us.)
— I could turn to the Women’s Counseling Center.
(I could turn to my sisters in all of Polynesia.)
— And then, too, I could have an affair.
(Perhaps I can call Russia or the People’s Republic of China 
to my defense. Or how about Cuba?)
— But then . . . I really wouldn’t want to do that. After all, I do have 
my pride. So for now, I will just settle to be introspective and 
think things over.
(I will turn to my Native Hawaiian people to direct a course 
of action.)
— But I did want to let you know of my thoughts for now and of 







the ways of the past—
I cannot go back.
I hike the hills
and valleys of Wahiawa,
walking through crystal
streams
and scaling green cliffs
I play in the waves
of Waimea,
and spear fish
from the reefs of Kawailoa.
I grow bananas, ‘ulu,
and papayas,
in the way of the ‘aina.
I cannot go back—
I never left.
This chapter was originally published in Ho‘iho‘ihou: A Tribute to George Helm and




Tales of Demise and Survival in Guam1
Vicente M. Diaz
The “Precarious Cultural Position”
of the Chamorro
In 1945, Mavis Warner Van Peenen described the contem-
porary Chamorro—the indigenous people of the Marianas—as teeter-
ing on a “precarious cultural position” (1974:41). Referring to the
Chamorro in the ever-present masculine pronoun, Van Peenen wrote:
“He walks the precipitous ledge of Past and Present, with the abyss
of ‘Americanization’ waiting below to engulf him.”
From Van Peenen’s vantage point as wife of an American naval
officer stationed on Guam right before the Japanese invasion in 1941,
the precipice on which she saw the Chamorro balanced precariously
was composed of a history of Spanish Catholic domination further
weakened by the ravages of a recent war and reconstruction efforts on
terrain and psyche. Below this ledge gaped an abyss into which the
Chamorro was lured by the security of American benevolence and the
hold of its material benefits. For Van Peenen, radical changes in
Guam’s physical and cultural topography in the immediate postwar
era, expressive of American interests in the region, signaled a virtual
end to what she called Chamorro dreams of social independence. Such
dreams were contained in prewar Chamorro legends that featured
ancient heroes and heroines (“Our Before Time People”) whose epics
were inscribed on the land (Gadao’s cave, Puntan Patgon, AluPang,
A longer version of this chapter was published as “Simply Chamorro: Telling Tales of
Demise and Survival in Guam,” Contemporary Pacific 6, no. 1 (1994).
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Orote Point, and Fuuna Rock to name a few), or stories about ances-
tral spirits called aniti and taotaomona. There were also funny tales of
island tricksters and pranksters, such as Juan Malo and his faithful
carabao (water buffalo), who delighted in fooling Spanish colonial
officials. There came a point in history, wrote Van Peenen, when wit,
not arms, were the tools of the Chamorro struggle to endure foreign
control. In the Juan Malo stories the Chamorro turned inward and
laughed at a fledgling colonial presence (1974:v).
But Van Peenen’s interest in the social independence of Chamorros
did not concern questioning American sovereignty; it was rather to
collect and preserve what she called the quaint and charming—indeed
primitive—folklore of the Chamorros. She wrote:
When dreams of social independence die, efforts to conserve a folk-
lore die also. There are many reasons why Guam’s folklore will
disappear. The carabao, that animal so necessary to the island, so
symbolic of it, was killed by the Japanese and eaten for food, and
soon exterminated. The family and neighborly groups which pre-
viously came together for an evening of storytelling and reminisc-
ing now attend the movies. The young people speak English. They
are Christians. The pretty Chamorro girls will find husbands
among the thousands of American military men on Guam. Many
of these girls will leave their Island with their husbands. Many
Chamorro boys will join American Armed Forces and ‘see the
world’ and settle in parts far from Guam. The time will come when
few remember the stories told of ‘Our Before Time Ancestors’ and
the Chamorro legends, uncollected, unwritten, will be forgotten,
one by one. (1974:36–37)
In the face of sure death, Van Peenen the collector, the writer, arrives,
as if to save the day.
Van Peenen’s lament has kin in a parade of foreign observers who
wrote before and after her. In 1820, Captain James Burney of the
Royal British Navy described the Spanish legacy in the Marianas as
“the descending . . . of a plague” that exterminated the hapless natives
(1967:293). In the mid-1980s, social historians Peter Hempenstall and
Noel Rutherford debated a “sorry tale of brutal extermination and
demoralization of a mild island people” (1984:101). Though they
concluded there was no official policy of extermination, they never-
theless declared that among what “failed (the Chamorros) in the
end was the absence of a centralized political organization” (102).
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Whether to assert and justify British imperialism, to document Pacific
Island struggles and resistance, or to collect folklore from “primitive”
societies thought to be on the wane, the theme of the destruction of a
proud Chamorro society at the hands foreign agents and institutions
has simply been a foregone conclusion.
Yet Guam’s history does not have to be understood as the defin-
itive Euro-Americanization of the Chamorro people at the tragic
expense of indigenous culture. Nor does Chamorro culture need to
be understood in terms of an immutably bounded, neatly contained
thing that was once upon a time characterized by essential qualities,
pure and untainted, as in the ways that Chamorro culture has (a)his-
torically been conceived and represented. Rather, the ideas of history
and culture—and historiography and ethnography—can be concep-
tualized in alternative ways. They can be viewed as contested sites
upon which local (and global) identities and communities are built
and destroyed, in highly charged ways (Clifford 1988, 1992; Haraway
1989; Kaplan and Pease 1993; Neumann 1992a; Thomas 1991;
Rafael 1988; Hall 1991). In addition, such a critical approach to his-
torical and cultural studies foregrounds the partiality of any inquiry,
whether of one’s ideological interest, or of the inevitable incomplete-
ness of the analyses. In the latter sense, the idea of partiality also
denotes the absence of an omnipotent vantage point from which to
pronounce the definitive or the whole truth of any human practice or
event. Instead, one always sees only a slice, at a given time, from a
particular vantage point, of a fluid and uncontainable history or
cultural practice.
Partial to such critical ideas, this chapter draws from a variety of
sources (written, spoken, visual, aural, and imagined) and institutional
practices (religious, secular, athletic, scientific) and “national” origins
(Chamorro, Spanish, American) to challenge the hegemony of neo-
colonialism in Guam today. For assistance, I recruit Van Peenen’s list
of reasons for the demise of Chamorro culture but recontexualize the
list within a field of possibilities informed by what I view as a legacy
of Chamorro political and cultural resistance. This legacy is found in
a fierce sense of peoplehood and place that is embedded in language,
in moments of cultural recollection, and finally, from the rawness of
everyday living in Guam. How can signs taken for cultural demise be
reread as moments of survival and vitality and as signs of an eternal
vigilance for future possibilities?
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Tale One: Carabao Tales
Recall Van Peenen’s first example: The carabao, “so neces-
sary to the island, so symbolic of it, was killed by the Japanese and
eaten for food, and soon exterminated.”
In the early 1960s, Monsignor Oscar Lujan Calvo DD, better
known locally as “Pale Scot” (pronounced “Pah-lee”), received the
manuscript that was destined to be the first modern history of Guam
(Carano and Sanchez 1964). A Jesuit-educated Chamorro priest,
Pale Scot came upon the claim that carabaos had become extinct.
“How can this be?” asked the priest incredulously (Calvo, pers.
comm. January 12, 1991). Often in his pastoral rounds in the south,
Pale Scot would have to stop in his path and wait for resident cara-
baos to cross. “Are my eyes lying to me?” he asked himself as he read
the draft. For verification, Pale Scot phoned the government of Guam’s
Department of Agriculture and inquired into the status of the island’s
carabao population. The response was that there were several hundred
carabao on the island, and that one pair had even been shipped to the
San Diego Zoo in order to bolster its own collection of carabao.
Though it may no longer be the primary mode of transportation it
once was to the Chamorros, the carabao is very much present today
in local consciousness. For an update, I called a colleague, Dr. Jeff
Barcinas at the College of Agriculture and Life Sciences, and he perked
up: “My friend, you want to know about carabaos? Let me tell you
about carabaos. I got plenty of big, juicy, meaty carabao stories” (Bar-
cinas, pers. comm., Mangilao, March 23, 1992). Let us wallow in the
juicy stories.
First of all, to this day there is a herd of wild carabao roaming the
valley known as Bubulao, in the restricted area near the U.S. Naval
Magazine. Barcinas speculates that it was the ancestors of this herd
that probably obstructed Pale Scot’s own flock-tending duties thirty
years ago. Barcinas was also grateful that the navy had fenced in and
restricted the area for national security purposes, since it also provided
the herd a place of refuge from hunters. This refuge and the increase
in the wild herd’s population has since converted this area into a
popular off-roading spot for a local Safari Tour that caters to the
Japanese tourist in search of something other than Guam’s Waikiki-
like Tumon Bay.
Barcinas adds that though they are not the indispensable beasts of
burden they were in the prewar years, carabaos are not forgotten and
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are prized possessions for their owners. In addition, carabaos are still
used for pugua (betel nut)-collecting treks into terrain still inaccessible
even to today’s four-wheelers. Collecting two pugua-laden sacks slung
on either side of a carabao is still considered an excellent day’s work,
and will bring a small fortune to the laborer. Pugua, of course, is
Guam’s social glue, the bond that builds and maintains social net-
works among Chamorros.
Another favorite carabao pastime are the races held since time
immemorial during village fiestas (feasts) in honor of the patron saint
of a family or village. One spin-off of this, recalls Barcinas, were
hilarious baseball games that required a batter to mount a carabao in
order to round the bases. Incidentally, in the decisive game of the
1913 “mid-winter” baseball league sponsored by the U.S. Naval
Government of (tropical) Guam, an all-native team beat an all-white
team called “The Allies” (also once referred to as the “White
Hopes”) to win the league championship. The native team’s name:
the Carabaos.
But the juiciest, meatiest tale of all corroborates Pale Scot’s oral
history on carabaos. I asked Barcinas if in his dealings he had ever
heard of carabaos being shipped off to San Diego Zoo. He laughed
and explained that in the late 1970s, as a college student, he took a
vacation to San Diego with his elderly visiting parents. They wanted
to go to the zoo. Jeff’s mother, Tan Rita Barcinas, was especially
anxious to see if her carabao was still alive. This was how Jeff
discovered that when his father was at the Department of Agriculture
he had once sent a pair of carabao—the bull belonged to Jeff’s
family—to zoo officials. In return the elder Barcinas received—and
we quote his son here—“two stupid, undomesticated wild Anguses”
that “I had to feed when I was a kid.” The wild, undomesticated cat-
tle are dead now, but they bore offspring that bore offspring, and the
Barcinas of Malesso to this day are distinguished islandwide for
providing only the freshest, juiciest, and meatiest beef in their village
fiestas.
In the prewar years, carabaos were everywhere, and even ambled
into “most” photographs of this era (Farrell 198:80–81). But the cara-
baos were especially known as indispensable beasts of burden, much
like today’s pickup truck, the virtual carabao of the late twentieth
century. And so, if photos of the prewar years showed a carabao,
then a postwar photo of any road (and off-road) scene on Guam today
would inevitably capture the equally ubiquitous mechanical beast of
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burden. Highly prized and equally worked too, the pickup truck—
lowrider or four-by-four monster truck—is a cherished possession of
cultural and social mobility that not only gets the Chamorro from
here to there (an epic, too, on Guam’s roads) but does so with the
customized signature of its owners.
In the prewar years, when the bicycle and the motor car gradually
displaced the carabao on increasingly multiplying concrete pavements,
the Chamorro stood and watched and participated in the change of
geographical and social terrain. If carabaos are no longer common
sights today, they themselves were, once upon a time, items of novelty.
Introduced commodities, these new technologies of travel were just as
quickly localized by the Chamorros of yesterday as in the way that
the pickup truck has become a common local fixture of today. Work-
ing their ways into the heart and soul and stomach of the Chamorro,
these affectionate beasts of burden themselves became much loved—
indeed, became viewed as cherished icons of Chamorro identity and
possession. Their virtual disappearance could one day mark, too, the
virtual disappearance of the Chamorro culture as a whole.
But have the carabaos and the Chamorros disappeared? Definitely
not on one particular pickup truck that is no less ubiquitous on the
island’s roads today. Emblazoned on the doors of the Bank of Guam’s
armored truck is an image of the ennobled carabao, the prominent
motif of the bank’s logo. Hitching a ride on the “People’s Bank”—as
the first Chamorro-owned and operated bank likes to call itself—the
carabao continues to represent the cultural and material wealth of its
owners. Here it takes its place as but one precarious symbol of the
historical and cultural meandering of Chamorro identity.
Tale Two: Moving Island Images
“The family and neighborly groups which previously came
together for an evening of storytelling and reminiscing now attend
the movies.”
One of the first motion pictures shown on Guam featured a roar-
ing train that, at one point in the movie, appeared headed straight for
the camera and the audience. In a tale that is a classic in introductory
film studies courses everywhere in the world, the image of the ap-
proaching train frightened all but the most courageous natives in the
house, sending the rest scrambling for the exits (Carano and Sanchez
1964:213–214).
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Before World War II moving pictures were intensely popular
pastimes of leisure, if not powerful vehicles in the socialization and
Americanization of the Chamorro people. “My father loved the
movies,” recalls Martha Duenas, whose father was among the throngs
of young men who joined the navy before December 8, 1941 (pers.
comm., Santa Cruz, CA, November 25, 1990), and who eventually
settled their families stateside. Did the movies that Mr. Juan Duenas
loved so much as a youth shape his decision to raise his family in the
States? What was that love affair all about, that affair between
Chamorros like Mr. Duenas (who still resides in a place called “Lei-
sure World” in California) and the motion pictures as brought by
military personnel for their own leisure in this tropical world? What
was shown, and what was seen? What did Chamorros do with these
artifacts?
How were they used? The title of one movie served as a code that
probably saved the life of at least one Chamorro and his family. Dur-
ing the Japanese occupation, Mr. Tomas Tanaka was tending his store
in Agana when Mr. Jake Calvo walked in. Calvo waited for Tanaka
to finish with his customers when he winked and said, “So, ‘Destry
Rides Again,’ huh?” Tanaka was shocked. The movie Destry Rides
Again had just been shown, but what Calvo referred to cryptically
was his knowledge that Tanaka was harboring George Tweed, the
last American fugitive who had been hiding out from the Japanese,
and over whose capture many Chamorros were being beaten and
killed. In his autobiography, Tweed recalls that Tanaka hurried back
to him and told him to leave his premises (1945:133). “Calvo runs
around with a group of fellows, and if Jake knows, they know.”
Moving pictures in the Islands: Why must Chamorro culture be
visualized as necessarily at odds with the movies? What notions of
culture prevail that make these things mutually exclusive? Why aren’t
there Chamorro movies? Are we sure there aren’t? If we count video
technology as films, then there exists a genre of Chamorro family
films, of funerals, weddings, christenings, baseball games, of kids
playing, parents talking, laughing.
Shortly after the return of the Americans in 1944, Pale Scot cele-
brated a Thanksgiving Mass in honor of the Americans and in mem-
ory of the Chamorros who did not survive the Japanese occupation.
After Mass, Alvin Josephy (then a war correspondent) appeared with
news photographers to take pictures of the people (1946:88). Josephy
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recalls that the “young barefoot girls saw (the photographers) and
scampered back into their huts. A few moments later they reappeared
with their long tresses combed and filled with flowers and ribbons.”
This scene irritated a photographer, who turned to a nearby Chamorro
and asked, “What’s the idea? We came to take pictures of refugees,
and they doll themselves up.” The Chamorro grinned, “They think
some movie scout may see the pictures. . . . They all want to go to
Hollywood” (1946:88).
Prewar Chamorro fascination with Hollywood and postwar possi-
bilities of stardom, of fame, of glamour, frustrate the conventions of
war correspondence and its inscription of heroic narratives of national
history. There would be no image of war-torn refugees liberated by
American freedom fighters in this particular scene.
Incidentally, while these Chamorro women were acting out of char-
acter, so to speak, Dr. Jeff Barcinas’ uncle and another companion had
escaped a Japanese concentration camp in the south and paddled out
on a canoe to an American ship anchored just beyond the reef. Once
aboard, Chamorros thanked the ship’s captain for returning to liberate
the islanders. The captain responded: “Liberate? We are here to flatten
the rock” (Barcinas, pers. comm., Mangilao, March 23, 1992).
The story of Guam’s “liberation” by the Americans is about as
dramatic and moving as any movie ever made. Every year on July 21,
the island celebrates “Liberation Day” with a big parade, carnivals,
beauty pageants, and increasingly, with moving films of the war expe-
rience. Liberation Day 40 and Man Libre are two such videos, which
also happen to be cosponsored by the Bank of Guam (Donner n.d.).
Interestingly enough, the documentaries themselves use rare footage of
prewar Guam taken from the home movies of the Felix Torres and
Joaquin Sablan families (Souder, pers. comm., April 20, 1993). Com-
bined with war and immediate postwar propaganda footage and
present-day interviews with survivors, these images of a tranquil pre-
war island society wax nostalgic and heighten the villainy of the sub-
sequent Japanese invasion and occupation as a prelude to the heroism
of America’s return in 1944. This postwar narrative of Guam’s liber-
ation relies upon these images—and Chamorro gratitude—to con-
struct yet another powerful and compelling storyline: the American
patriotism of the Chamorro. And yet, not all Chamorros equate
America’s return to Guam with liberation (See Santos 1991; Hale’Ta
1993; Diaz forthcoming Ms.a).
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Tale Three: “English the Chamorro Way”
Reason number three: “The young people speak English.”
The title for this reconstituted tale is pilfered directly from a local
publication called English—The Chamorro Way (1987). The relation-
ship between the English language and the Chamorro people precedes
the American takeover of the island in 1898. Indeed, that earlier his-
tory was explained to Oscar King Davis, a special correspondent of
the New York Sun, who traveled to the Far East with the “Army
of Occupation” in 1898 (Davis 1898). At what is now called Apra
Harbor, the boat that carried Davis and the American occupation
forces was guided into berth by young Chamorro boys from the
village of Sumay. Davis recalls the first encounter: One Chamorro
“came straight out to the boat and said ‘Good morning’ in English,
with a grin that showed a double row of betel-stained teeth. Every-
body in the boat replied ‘good morning,’ though they were too much
astonished at his use of English to say more at first. Then someone
said ‘Where is the channel.’ The young Chamorro grinned and replied
‘Here. Plenty water’” (78). The young Chamorro was soon joined by
others, also speaking English, who together guided the boat safely.
They then took Davis and others on a tour of the village. In Sumay,
Davis was introduced to brothers Vicente and Nicolas Diaz who
said, in English, that in spite of their names they were full-blooded
Chamorros. Davis observed that these Diazes “speak the best English
in the village, and they explained how it is that every able bodied
man in Sumay can understand and make himself understood in that
tongue. They do it with the single word: ‘Whaler.’ They go on to say
that for many years it has been the custom of whalers to come to
Guam to get oarsmen. Along the beach in front of Sumay there are a
score or more of fine whaleboats” (82).
He continued: “On the whalers the Chamorros learn to speak
English more or less well. The Diaz brothers began that way and have
kept it up by practice with the whalers, who have come to Guam.
Since then they became sufficiently far advanced in property to quit
such service. Now they trade with whalers and sell them pineapples,
bananas, coconuts, limes and such things” (Davis 1898:82).
Davis’ chronicle provides a hint of some of the historical and cul-
tural stakes involved in the early use of English for enterprising Cha-
morros. Yet the use of English or any other foreign language on
Guam does not necessarily constitute the demise of the native lan-
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guage. The history of English usage on Guam, to be sure, must take
into account the ongoing colonial legacy under which it and all other
non-Chamorro languages arrived and took hold among the Cha-
morros. English under naval administration was in fact made manda-
tory at the expense of the local vernacular. The effect of “English
only” policies by the U.S. naval government played the key role in
the devaluation of the Chamorro language and in the making of a
generation of Chamorros who would abandon their own language
and look down on it as an expression of backwardness.
But English—the Chamorro way, as filtered through the play of the
indigenous vernacular through its inflections, glosses, accentuations,
and so on—also suggests histories that exceed official naval and civil
requirements and mandates. These histories are embedded in discur-
sive practices that always betray a memory of the violence of an on-
going colonial past and a vigilance for new futures, for the new pos-
sibilities that contest prevailing rules.
For an illustration we might consider two items from the Guam
Recorder in the mid-1920s. The Recorder was the organ of expres-
sion for America’s colonial presence among the Chamorros before
World War II. The first is an extract from an article entitled “Cross
Section of a Typical Hearing before the Chief of Police” (GR 1925:
42–43). A typical hearing:
Chief of Police: (questioning a native charged with disturbing the
peace) “Do you speak English?”
Native: “Yes Sir.”
Chief of Police: “What’s the matter with you? Can’t you behave
yourself?”
Native: “No Sir.”
Chief of Police: “What?”
Native: “No Sir.”
Chief of Police: “Why can’t you behave yourself?”
Native: “Yes Sir. I no understand very well what you are
making me tell.”
There is anxious humor in the entanglement of English and the white
law: It’s funny that the native doesn’t really speak English after all.
Yet it is possible that the native in fact speaks English very well but
plays the fool to get off free from the charge of disturbing the colony’s
peace. Incidentally, “public whistling” and the ringing of church bells
at 4 a.m. were among some of the island practices once prohibited by
a naval governor precisely because they disturbed the peace.
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The second example of the colonial imperative around the English
language is a joke submitted by Jose A. Mendiola (GR 1925) in a bid
to distinguish himself from other presumably ignorant and trouble-
making Chamorros. The distinction lies in literacy and the ability
to pun:
Teacher: “Peter, give me a sentence.”
Peter: (thinking) “I is . . .”
Teacher: (interrupting) “You mean ‘I am . . .’.”
Peter: “I am the ninth letter of the alphabet.” (1925:45)
In the humor of this exchange, the protagonist Peter (not Pedro!) com-
pletes his sentence that turns out to have been (initially) grammatically
correct. In text and context the native not only demonstrates skill and
competence in the colonizer’s language, but also mocks the colonial
presumption of native ignorance as illustrated in the authority figure
of the English teacher.
Even Van Peenen herself unwittingly takes stock of other local his-
tories of English. In a subsection titled “The Influence of English
upon the Chamorro language” (1974:37), Van Peenen provides an
anecdote that goes against what she asserts, revealing not the influ-
ence of English upon the Chamorro language but the Chamorro lan-
guage upon English and Spanish, as articulated by an anonymous
native Chamorro girl. Before she left Guam in October 1941, Van
Peenen chanced upon two Spanish priests playing tennis in Agana. At
that moment a young Chamorro girl happened by and inquired, “Pale,
haye kekeep score?” (“Father, who is keeping score?”)
Van Peenen rightly notes the simple phrase’s historical complexity
“right down,” she says, “to the year 1941,” although she misunder-
stands this history. She explains: “‘Pale’ [is] the Chamorro adapta-
tion of the Spanish word ‘Padre’; ‘haye’ [is] a pure Chamorro interro-
gative pronoun meaning ‘who?’; ‘kekeep’ [is] an English word [whose]
first syllable [is] reduplicated in the Chamorro manner to show tense,
and finally, the word ‘score’ [is] a pure English word” (1974:38).
To be sure, this anecdote of discursive and linguistic play about
play in Agana reveals an ongoing history. Against perceived notions
of the purity of language or culture as noted by Van Peenen, how-
ever, this anecdote asserts not the ensuing demise of the Chamorro
language, but its durability and tenacity in the colonial entanglements.
Van Peenen should have called her section “How Chamorro people
and the Chamorro language make Spanish and English work for their
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purposes,” for it describes as much a process of Chamorro influence
on how Spanish and English are used on Guam as on the “impact” of
these languages on a passive people. Social practices and discourse
around practices—even in trivial events such as playing tennis and
asking scores—refract deep political histories. But for Spanish and
American imperialism, could two Spanish padres be caught playing
tennis by an American naval wife on the island of Guam?
From Van Peenen’s vantage point, this anecdote contains the essen-
tial truths of colonial history and indigenous demise, “right down,”
she said, “to the year 1941.” The utterance “Pale, haye kekeep score”
reveals a chronological colonial history in which Chamorro language
(and culture) was passing from its purer forms, through hybridity
with Spanish and English forms, to its present day “pure” English
form as symbolized by the final term “score.” When Van Peenen says
“pure,” she is referring not to how the term “score” is spared from
being reconfigured, influenced, by the vernacular, but to the term’s
supposed “authenticity” as an English word. Thus she was able to
read this anecdote as an instance of outside influence upon the Cha-
morro language.
The idea of a historical passing (away) that Van Peenen saw in this
Chamorro utterance is also precisely what inspired her to collect
what she erroneously believed to be a vanishing corpus of Chamorro
folklore. This idea was one of the reasons why she would point to the
increasing usage of English as a sign of the demise of the Chamorro
people.
The simple but complicated question “haye kekeep score?” can be
repeated today in the spirit of re-presenting both the Chamorro past
and present. An anonymous Chamorro girl’s interrogation can be rein-
terpreted as an utterance of persistence and resistance rather than one
of demise. It reveals a political history of the subject(ificat)ion of
English and Spanish terms by Chamorro linguistic rules, drawing
from the specific materiality found in the twilight of World War II in
Guam. It begins by addressing the priest properly, that is, in his ver-
nacular as well as in the appropriate title “padre,” but through the
flicking of a Chamorro tongue (pale). It pauses and then continues in
Chamorro with its own interrogative pronoun haye (“who”), and then
taps into the English term keep, subjected, however, to a persistent
Chamorro rule of reduplication for tense (kekeep) for what is gram-
matically called “present tense.” The utterance ends with the unadul-
terated (vs. “pure”) English word score. In its procedure, the utter-
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ance illustrates the persistence of the Chamorro language, especially
as it subjects remnants of Spanish and American colonialism. At this
time America had already abandoned Guam to an imminent Japa-
nese invasion (Maga 1988; Farrell 1991); indeed, the supposed “lib-
eration” of the Chamorros three years later was in fact only America’s
return with a vengeance.
The utterance in 1941 is also more than an instance of a Cha-
morro discursive maneuver on the remnants of Spanish and American
language and colonialism on Guam. It also provides a contemporary
political commentary: Whose frame of reference will prevail—who
gets to keep the score of the contest that features Spanish padres play-
ing an American sport in the land of the Chamorros? Though it
traffics on other languages, this interrogation insists on Chamorro
conventions of discourse. “Pale, haye kekeep score” interrogates the
priest through the discursive subjectification of Spanish and English
terms in demand to know who is keeping score in 1941. In the form
recollected by Van Peenen in 1941, the Chamorro language is still
keeping score. In 1996, the phrase can be reconstituted as a veritable
slogan, one that checks the score of other contests: How fares the
Chamorro language in its historical usage of English? What of that
generation of Chamorros who have learned English at the expense of
their native tongue? What is the score there? And who is “keeping”
score—in the present tense? In 1941 and in 1996, the practice of his-
torical narration is not finished. The story of Chamorro culture is not
to be spoken about in the past tense.
There are many postwar Chamorro parents who today regret their
decisions to not teach their children the Chamorro language. The
perennial parental desire to see one’s child progress farther than one
was able to was expressed on Guam after the war by encouraging the
command of the English language at the expense of the vernacular.
This generation of parents, as children in the prewar years, was in-
doctrinated by lessons of the cultural superiority of America and the
command of English as the primary vehicle to participate in that great-
ness. If English was the ticket to all the benefits that civilization has
to offer, Chamorro took you in the opposite direction. The Chamorro
language would come to be viewed as an impediment to individual
and island development. That generation of Chamorros would decide
not to teach their children the vernacular so that the children could
get further ahead in life than their parents had been able to. What
stifled that generation of Chamorro parents and grandparents, in fact,
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was not their indigenous language, but stifling and condescending
naval policies. But “Pale, Haye Kekeep Score” anyways?
Tale Four: Repositioning the Missionary
“The Chamorros are Christians.”
The history of the Spanish Catholic mission among the Chamorro
people occupies a central role in the historiography of Guam. In that
writing, the story of the arrival and adventures of the padres (pale)
effectively structures the history of relations between the Chamorros
and colonial ventures by the United States from 1898 to the present
and the brief and brutal Japanese occupation between December 1941
and July 1944. The general history is structured as an opposition
between a romantic, heroic celebration of the arrival of the West on
the one hand and the bereavement of its tragic effects on the other.
On the one hand, the arrival of Spain, and then America, signaled the
beginnings of historical and cultural progress and civilization; on
the other hand, it was the worst thing that ever happened to the
Chamorros.
Though they are oppositional, these two narratives are in fact two
sides of the same coin whose value, as it were, comes at the system-
atic expense of Chamorro “agency” in history. For better or for worse,
the story is about the Euro-Americanization of a passive, hapless
people. For Spanish Catholic historians and their sympathizers, the
story is about the heroic effort to convert the Chamorro heathens; for
others, notably French, British, and American secular historians, the
story had been about the tragic destruction of an innocent and helpless
island people—in the past tense.
Yet we need to rethink such narrow determinations and emplot-
ments, to shift the focus onto the processes of mutual but unequal
appropriations that exist between colonizer and colonized, indeed
among a multilayered and restless colonized population itself (Diaz
1989, 1993). This entangled history is illustrated, among other ways,
in a twentieth-century revival of a historic effort to canonize Blessed
Diego Luis de Sanvitores, the seventeenth-century Spanish Jesuit who
was martyred in the act of establishing the Catholic mission among
the Chamorros (Ledesma 1981). Elsewhere I try to reposition the mis-
sion story as it is embodied in the historic and contemporary effort to
canonize Sanvitores (Diaz forthcoming Ms.b). Beatified by Rome in
1985, the now “Blessed” Diego is on the penultimate stage to full
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sainthood. Attention to the cultural and political stakes involved in
the historical proceedings elucidates how the official canonization
effort “works” the native to produce a saint insofar as the crafting of
heroic narratives of salvation are performed at the expense of indige-
nous cultural and historical orders of difference. Yet the native can
also be shown to “rework” the saint to produce what can be called
new canons of “indigenous” selves, new narratives that often tend to
disrupt extant notions—whether colonial or anticolonial. Within a
deep and ongoing colonial and neocolonial legacy, local investment
in the making of a saint in particular, as well as participation in a
wider array of Catholic practices and rituals, have become powerful
and troubled forms of native survival and political expression. At
stake are the formation and re-formation of indigenous as well as
exogenous cultural identities. Chamorro spirituality and its temporal
and political benefits, now expressed in Catholic practices such as
novenas, fiestas, and rosaries, are celebrated vicariously through the
elevation of Sanvitores to the highest honors of the altar—but not
without local contestation.
If the elevation of Sanvitores’ singular story would elevate, too, the
cause of Chamorro cultural survival and revival, then Spanish Catho-
licism can be deemed a virtual Chamorro domain, a kind of surro-
gate cultural space. As many others have argued, Christianity—
Roman Catholic or other—can be seen not simply as the mark of
indigenous death, but as a marker of all kinds of possibilities and
limits (Rafael 1988; Hanlon 1988; Taussig 1987).
The theme of Chamorro continuity in Christianity is found in the
work of the American anthropologist Laura Thompson, who visited
Guam a few years before Van Peenen. In her portrayal of prewar
Guam, Thompson wrote: “In the shadows of the early evening moves
the cassocked figure of a priest, and a child runs toward him, stoops
to kiss his hand. A dog barks and in the distance sounds the chant of
a novena, primitive as a Chamorro folksong echoing through the
ages” (1974:5).
Van Peenen herself describes another history of conversion than
that which foresees the demise of indigenous folklore. Her observation
on this particular facet of folk and lore, however, is structured in a
schizophrenic narrative that cannot decide once and for all who are
the subjects and objects of historical and cultural agency. First, she
writes, it is the Chamorros who “did not completely abandon their
own religious past” but instead took up the new religion “according
to the infantile manner of primitive people” (1974:32). They were
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“charmed,” she wrote, especially with the wood and ivory images of
the Church. If they get to have agency, it is a primitive, infantile one
that is short-lived anyway in the consciousness of the author’s intent.
For Van Peenen, it was the missionaries who were “astute enough”
to employ these artifacts in their efforts to “insinuate” the spiritual
aspects of Christianity—especially with the women. Van Peenen
asserts that “the most saintly women of the island were allowed
[watch what we might call the “passivication” of native agency] to
take turns guarding, in their homes, the excess images not at the
moment used at the Church” (emphasis added). Continuing a narra-
tive of external action on a passive people, Van Peenen writes that
“the priests cultivated the idea of possession and personal interest in
church figures.” Yet primitive agency prevails, especially for collec-
tors of such lore. She writes: “The Chamorro people—who could
never take a religion passively—were surrounding themselves with a
personality which was particularly Chamorro. They made figures
theirs by connecting them with the particular natural background of
the island just as their ancestors before them had done with their
gods. And they, like their ancestors, produced miracle legends which
necessarily showed Spanish influence” (32–33).
Some forty years after Van Peenen, the late Archbishop Felixberto
C. Flores—the first native Chamorro to hold such a position—gives
testimony to the “necessary Spanish influence” on Chamorro dreams:
“[The beatification of Sanvitores] brings to reality a dream the people
of the Mariana Islands have prayed for. These islands . . . have re-
tained many features of Spanish Catholicism. Fiestas in honor of our
patron saints for each village, public processions, rosaries and novenas
are all woven into our cultural traditions. All of these are a part of the
legacy that Blessed Diego and his successors brought to us—the people
of the islands they converted. . . . Today the faith that Blessed Diego
brought to the islands is embraced by virtually all the local popula-
tion of the Marianas” (Hezel 1985:5).
Tale Five: Moving Motherhood
“The pretty Chamorro girls will find husbands among the
thousands of American military men on Guam.”
One must consider today the many “American” surnames on
Guam, whose families’ “Chamorroness” nobody can doubt: Under-
wood, McDonald, Pelkey, Dierking, Dudkiewicz, Meek, Wesley,
Emsley, Johnston, Manley, Portusach, Surber, Payne, Thacker, Souder.
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This is only a sampling of Chamorro surnames, some which span at
least two centuries of interaction or intercourse with non-Chamorro
men. They take their place among other Chamorro surnames that
have arrived earlier and later: Chamorro surnames that are mistaken
as European (for example, Pereira, Wilson, Anderson, Hoffschneider,
Stein, Kaminga, Sgambelluri, Pellicani, Bordallo, Millenchamp);
Spanish, Mexican, or Filipino (for example, Santos, Langas, Cruz,
Candaso, Perez, Delfin, Munoz, Baza, Guerrero, Benavente, Artero,
Manalisay, Lizama, Barcinas, Camacho, Dela Cruz); Chamorro sur-
names mistaken for Chinese or Japanese (for example, Ada, Ogo,
Yamaguchi, Chaco, Tanaka, Shinohara, Unpingco, Quenga, Okada,
Dungca, Susuico, Yamanaka, Won Pat); and Chamorro surnames
that have persisted (for example, Taitano, Afaisen, Manglona, Taita-
gue, Quitugua, Tainatongo, Aguon, Charfauros, Maanao, Terlaje,
Goffigan, Finona, Pinaula, Manajane).
Local Chamorro women—patronized and stereotyped as “pretty
Chamorro girls”—marry non-Chamorro men and produce Chamorro
children. A powerful tradition of “motherhood,” locally called Si
Nana, was responsible for the survival and revival of Chamorro fam-
ilies or the familia through what is called Kustumbre Chamorro
(Chamorro Customs). With the population reduced to about 5 percent
of its former size after the Spanish Chamorro wars (1672–1700) and
the introduction of deadly diseases, primarily Chamorro women and
some children survived. Chamorro women married non-Chamorro
men under the Spanish and American regimes, assumed the names of
the non-Chamorros, but proceeded to produce Chamorro children.
Si Nana is best understood, according to Chamorro scholar Laura
Souder, in the play of the Chamorro term haga (1985:5). Pronounced
one way, haga means “blood.” Pronounced differently, haga means
“daughter.” Combined, hagan haga, “blood daughter,” can be seen as
the privileged term in a history of indigenous survival and revival. So,
Spanish and American surnames do not mark the limits of Chamorro
cultural survival. Rather, through the offices of Si Nana, the antes are
raised in issues such as the antiabortion debate on Guam (Diaz 1993).
Tales Six and Seven: Traveling Culture
and Moving Histories
“The pretty Chamorro girls . . . will leave their island with
their husbands. Many Chamorro boys will join American Armed
Forces and ‘see the world,’ and settle in parts far from Guam.”
Vicente Diaz 379
These tales are about the spawning of vital Chamorro communi-
ties far away from Guam, about the travels and travails of Chamorro
culture. How many of these young couples—married to each other or
not—have spawned Chamorro communities in Hawai‘i, San Diego,
Long Beach, Fairfield, San Jose, or anywhere else in the world? In the
summer of 1989 while away at school, I attended the first annual Cha-
morro Cultural Festival in Vallejo, California. The event was spon-
sored by the various Chamorro clubs of Northern California and the
government of Guam. Subsequent fiestas in Long Beach, Fairfield, and
then again in San Diego in 1992, were even bigger, with much more
money involved. To anybody who questions the authenticity of the
cultural festival, let me report the presence at the Fairfield festival of
island politicians, in full force, with their white pants and hand-
shakings two years before election time! The 1992 and 1993 festivals
were so “political” that even the island’s politicians themselves opted
not to get involved! Still unconvinced? The fiesta in Fairfield began
with a Chamorro mass, celebrated by none other than distinguished
visiting guest, Archbishop Anthony S. Apuron. Ancient Chamorro
chants echoed historically through Spanish Catholic hymns sung in a
northern California county park.
The viability of Chamorro communities outside of Guam is illus-
trated graphically in a banner that welcomed families and friends to
the first festival in Vallejo. The banner featured the familiar sling-
stone-shaped Guam Seal. What is interesting about this particular
seal, designed by the “Bay Area Chamorro Kids,” is that behind the
coconut tree and lateen sailboat, one finds not the expected Two-
Lovers Point—the familiar and mythical landmark on Guam—but
coastal points of San Francisco and Sausalito that are spanned by a
bright orange Golden Gate Bridge. I find it usefully ironic that a
mural that depicts a Chamorro proa heading in the direction of the
Golden Gate Bridge stands as the emblem for a cultural event that
served to finance the return of “Chamorro kids in California” to
study at the University of Guam.
Children of far-flung Chamorros have been known to return to
their roots; to reroute their roots. Often it is they and not those who
have never left that hold the resources for reinvigorating Chamorro
culture, provided they learn what has been made of Chamorro culture
while they were away by those cousins who have never left the island.
Can indigenous culture be defined by dint of its farthest point of
travel (Clifford 1989)?
Unlike canonical cultural historiography, Chamorro history and
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culture are not about the tragic death of quaint native customs.
Rather, Chamorro history and culture are better understood as con-
tested sites, local spaces here in Guam, and sometimes there, outside
of Guam. The multiple origins and destinations that inhabit Chamorro
culture are Chamorro by virtue of its discursive claims—that is, by
virtue of Chamorro ways of speaking as well as unique Chamorro
ways of doing things. The claims, however, work through the materi-
ality of things and ideas that are non-Chamorro in origin. And where
these claims are recalled, remembered, throated, invoked, and where
these are worked upon in conscious (and unconscious) ways, there is
Chamorro culture in struggle.
Struggle: Today, Chamorros continue to employ and to be deployed
by a distinctive vernacular and a set of behavioral codes that struggle
to maintain their hold over social and political affairs, indeed over the
island itself. Other nations and governments may have claimed polit-
ical sovereignty over Guam, but Chamorros have always maintained
a level of control over their identity and their lands, always, that is,
until the horrors of World War II and its aftermath, especially in the
last two decades. There appears to be an unprecedented political and
cultural predicament facing the Chamorros today: There are many
non-Chamorros in the land while many Chamorros no longer have
access to land. There are also more Chamorros in other lands than
there are Chamorros in Guam. And there are many Chamorros, in
Guam and elsewhere, who are not fluent in the Chamorro language.
Chamorro survival appears especially urgent, and the stakes appear
even greater today than ever before in Guam’s long colonial history.
This twentieth-century cultural crisis makes it even more important
to rethink the reigning ideas of culture, politics, and history in places
such as Guam. In spite of (or precisely because of) nearly four hun-
dred years of ongoing colonial domination, we must scrutinize the
historical processes by which the natives have learned to work within
and against the grain of colonial intrusion. We might look at the ways
that the Chamorros have “localized” the nonlocal ideas and practices,
how they’ve sought to convert the dangerous into the pleasurable, the
foreign into the local, the tragic into the comic; how they anticipate
future possibilities. We might look at the ways in which the Cha-
morros have in fact built a kind of central political organization of
resistance around, paradoxically, a polyglottal language—around am-
bivalent discourses of Chamorro culture—and in the process subverted
reigning local conceptions of identity and community as well.
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Island Amnesia and Other Forms of Remembrance
In her list of reasons, Van Peenen predicted that “the time
will come when few remember the stories told of ‘Our Before Time
Ancestors’ and the Chamorro legends, uncollected, unwritten, will be
forgotten, one by one.” As I suggested at the outset of this chapter, in
wanting to collect and document the remnants of such lore, Van
Peenen hoped to salvage the memory of a folk from their eventual
extinction. I will conclude with a final instance of (re)collection,
and the possibilities of other forms of historical narration suggested
therein, forms that I’ve tried to enact in the reconstituted tales I’ve
spun here.
In a preface to a collection of photographs taken by Pulitzer Prize
winner Manny Crisostomo, Chamorro scholar (turned politician)
Congressman Robert Underwood recalls that growing up Chamorro
was “extraordinarily simple, that is, until you asked simple ques-
tions” (Crisostomo 1991:14–15.). To ask simple questions such as
why we had to go to so many rosaries, fiestas, weddings, and chris-
tenings was to invite lectures from the manamko (the elders) about
how that person’s uncle’s son helped your brother’s friend’s sister
during times of crises. To Underwood, what helped the curious
youngster survive the lectures was the patience that the manamko
exhibited in their dealings with such naive and simple-minded ques-
tions. Through Underwood’s memory, the careful listener will get a
sense of what we might call the “complexity of Chamorro simplicity,”
or, in reverse, the “simplicity of Chamorro complexity”—especially
as these are contained in simple family stories of politically fraught
historical narratives.
By way of keeping score—for this is as good a way to narrate
Guam’s history as any other chronological accounting—let me sug-
gest, then, not the collection of quaint lore of a primitive folk in
doom, but the re-collection of island memories that sit restlessly in
the ritual of everyday language of everyday island historical realities.
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Notes
1. This chapter deals specifically with the politics of Chamorro cultural
history in Guam and not in the rest of the Northern Mariana Islands. A
good countercolonial study of Chamorro culture should pay attention to how
Chamorros from Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands have been severed
and governed separately. At the risk of colonial complicity, my exclusive focus
on Guam stems from the limits of my own familiarity in and formal study
about Guam, including a general ignorance of Chamorro cultural politics in
the Northern Mariana Islands. Chamorro cultural politics has traditionally
been highly local and fiercely competitive. The terms of its relations with
others have always concerned the fortification of local identities and commu-
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As if it were a
contract.
This chapter was originally published in Searching for Nei Nim’anoa, by Teresia
Kieuea Teaiwa (Suva: Mana, 1995), 6–7.
384 “Postcolonial” Politics—Identity and Empowerment
. . . initiate
my identity,
as if it were a
neophyte?
. . . appreciate
my identity,
















appreciates . . .





Billy was laughing his head off reading the history of the New Zea-
land Company, har, har, har, har.
It was since he’d been made redundant from Mitre 10 that he’d
been doing all this reading. Billy and Makere had four children, one
who had recently qualified as a lawyer but was out of work, one in
her final year at university, and two at secondary school. These kids
ate like elephants. Makere’s job as a checkout operator for New
World didn’t bring in much money and she thought Billy should be
out looking for another job instead of sitting on his backside all day
reading and laughing.
The book belonged to Rena, whose full given names were Erena
Meretiana. She wanted the book back so she could work on her
assignment. Billy had a grip on it.
Har, har, these Wakefields were real crooks. That’s what delighted
Billy. He admired them, and at the beginning of his reading had been
distracted for some minutes while he reflected on that first one, E. G.
Wakefield, sitting in the clink studying up on colonization. Then by
the time of his release, EG had the edge on all those lords, barons,
MPs, lawyers and so forth. Knew more about colonization than they
did, haaar.
However, Billy wasn’t too impressed with the reason for EG’s incar-
ceration. Abducting an heiress? Jeepers! Billy preferred more normal,
more cunning crookery, something funnier—like lying, cheating and
stealing.
So in that regard he wasn’t disappointed as he read on, blobbed out
This chapter was originally published in The Sky People, by Patricia Grace (Auck-
land: Penguin Books, 1994), 27–43.
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in front of the two-bar heater that was expensive to run, Makere
reminded him. Yes, initial disappointment left him the more he pro-
gressed in his reading. Out-and-out crooks, liars, cheats and thieves,
these Wakefields. He felt inspired.
What he tried to explain to Makere was that he wasn’t just spend-
ing his time idly while he sat there reading. He was learning a few
things from KG, WW, Jerningham, Arthur and Co., that would even-
tually be of benefit to him as well as to the whole family. He knew it
in his bones.
‘Listen to this,’ he’d say, as Makere walked in the door on feet that
during the course of the day had grown and puffed out over the tops
of her shoes. And he’d attempt to interest her with excerpts from what
he’d read. “ ‘The Wakefields’ plan was based on the assumption that
vast areas—if possible, every acre of New Zealand would be bought
for a trifle, the real payment to the people of the land being their ‘civil-
izing’ . . .” Hee hee, that’s crafty. They called it “high and holy work”.
‘And here. There was this “exceptional Law” written about in one
of EG’s anonymous publications, where chiefs sold a heap of land for
a few bob and received a section “in the midst of emigrants” in return.
But har, har, the chiefs weren’t allowed to live on this land until they
had “learned to estimate its value”. Goodby-ee, don’t cry-ee. It was
held in reserve waiting for the old fellas to be brainy enough to know
what to do with it.
‘Then there was this “adopt-a-chief scheme”, a bit like the “dial-a-
kaumatua” scheme that they have today where you bend some old
bloke’s ear for an hour or two, let him say a few wise words and get
him to do the old rubber-stamp trick, hee, hee. Put him up in a flash
hotel and give him a ride in an airplane then you’ve consulted with
every iwi throughout Aotearoa, havintcha? Well, “adopt-a-chief” was
a bit the same except the prizes were different. They gave out coats of
arms, lessons in manners and how to mind your p’s and q’s, that sort
of stuff. I like it. You could do anything as long as you had a “worthy
cause”,’ and Billy would become pensive. ‘A worthy cause. Orl yew
need is a werthy caws.’
On the same day that Billy finished reading the book he found his
worthy cause. He had switched on television to watch Te Karere,
when the face of his first cousin Hiko, who lived in Poi Hakena, Aus-
tralia, came on to the screen.
The first shots showed Hiko speaking to a large rally of Maori
people in Sydney who had formed a group called Te Hokinga ki
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Aotearoa. This group was in the initial stages of planning for a mass
return of Maori to their homeland.
In the interview that followed, Hiko explained that there was dis-
illusionment among Maori people with life in Australia and that they
now wanted to return to New Zealand. Even the young people who
had been born in Australia, who may never have seen Aotearoa, were
showing an interest in their ancestral home. The group included three
or four millionaires, along with others who had made it big in Oz, as
well as those on the bones of their arses—or that’s how Billy trans-
lated into English what Hiko had said in Maori, to Hana and Gavin.
These two were Hana Angeline and Gavin Rutene, the secondary
schoolers, who had left their homework to come and gog at their uncle
on television.
Hiko went on to describe what planning would be involved in the
first stage of The Return, because this transfer of one hundred fami-
lies was a first stage only. The ultimate plan was to return all Maori
people living in Australia to Aotearoa, iwi by iwi. But the groups
didn’t want to come home to nothing, was what Hiko was careful to
explain. They intended all groups to be well housed and financed on
their return, and discussions and decisions on how to make it all
happen were in progress. Billy’s ears prickled when Hiko began to
speak of the need for land, homes, employment and business ventures.
“ ‘Possess yourselves of the soil,” ’ he muttered, ‘ “and you are
secure.” ’
Ten minutes later he was on the phone to Hiko.
By the time the others returned—Makere from work, Tu from job-
hunting and Rena from varsity—Billy and the two children had
formed a company, composed a rap, cleared a performance space in
front of the dead fireplace, put their caps on backwards and practiced
up to performance standard:
First you go and form a Co.
Make up lies and advertise
Buy for a trifle the land you want
For Jew’s harps, nightcaps
Mirrors and beads
Sign here sign there
So we can steal
And bring home cuzzies
To their ‘Parent Isle’
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Draw up allotments on a map
No need to buy just occupy
Rename the places you now own
And don’t let titles get you down
For blankets, fish hooks, axes and guns
Umbrellas, sealing wax, pots and clothes
Sign here, sign there
So we can steal
And bring home cuzzies
To their ‘Parent Isle’
Bought for a trifle sold for a bomb
Homes for your rellies
And dollars in the bank
Bought for a trifle sold for a bomb
Homes for your rellies and
Dollars in the bank
Kiss Aue. Aue.
Hi.
Billy, Hana and Gavin bowed to Makere, Tu and Rena. ‘You are
looking at a new company,’ Billy said, ‘which from henceforward (his
vocabulary had taken on some curiosities since he had begun reading
histories) will be known as Te Kamupene o Te Hokinga Mai.’
‘Tell Te Kamupene o Te Hokinga Mai to cough up for the mort-
gage,’ said Makere, disappearing offstage with her shoes in her hand.
‘So all we need,’ said Billy to Makere, later in the evening, is a vast
area of land “as far as the eye can see”.’
‘Is that all?’ said Makere.
‘Of “delightful climate” and “rich soil” that is “well watered and
coastal”. Of course it’ll need houses on it too, the best sort of houses,
luxury style.’
‘Like at Claire Vista,’ said Makere. Billy jumped out of his chair
and his eyes jumped out, ‘Brilliant, Ma, brilliant.’ He planted a kiss
on her unimpressed cheek and went scrabbling in a drawer for pen
and paper so that he could write to Hiko:
‘ . . . the obvious place for the first settlement of Ngati Kangaru,
it being “commodious and attractive”. But more importantly, as
you know, Claire Vista is the old stamping ground of our iwi that
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was confiscated at the end of last century, and is now a luxury
holiday resort. Couldn’t be apter. We must time the arrival of our
people for late autumn when the holidaymakers have all left. I’ll take
a trip up there on Saturday and get a few snaps, which I’ll send. Then
I’ll draw up a plan and we can do our purchases. Between us we
should be able to see everyone home and housed by June next year.
Timing your arrival will be vital. I suggest you book flights well in
advance so that you all arrive at once. We will charter buses to take
you to your destination and when you arrive we will hold the official
welcome-home ceremony and see you all settled into your new
homes.’
The next weekend he packed the company photographer with her
camera and the company secretary with his notebook and biro, into
the car. He, the company manager, got in behind the wheel and they
set out for Claire Vista.
At the top of the last rise, before going down into Claire Vista,
Billy stopped the car. While he was filling the radiator, he told Hana
to take a few shots. And to Gavin he said, ‘Have a good look, son,
and write down what the eye can see.’
‘On either side of where we’re stopped,’ wrote Gavin, ‘there’s hills
and natral vejetation. There’s this long road down on to this flat land
that’s all covered in houses and parks. There’s this long, straight beach
on the left side and the other side has lots of small beaches. There’s
this airport for lite planes and a red windsock showing hardly any
wind. One little plane is just taking off. There’s these boats coming
and going on the water as far as the I can see, and there’s these two
islands, one like a sitting dog and one like a duck.’
Their next stop was at the Claire Vista Information Center, where
they picked up street maps and brochures, after which they did a syste-
matic tour of the streets, stopping every now and again to take photo-
graphs and notes.
‘So what do I do?’ asked Tu, who had just been made legal ad-
viser of the company. He was Tuakana Petera and this was his first
employment.
‘Get parchments ready for signing,’ said Billy.
‘Do you mean deeds of title?’
‘That’s it,’ said Billy. Then to Rena, the company’s new researcher,
he said, ‘Delve into the histories and see what you can come up with
for new brochures. Start by interviewing Nanny.’
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‘I’ve got exams in two weeks I’ll have you know.’
‘After that will do.’
The next day Billy wrote to Hiko to say that deeds of title were
being prepared and requested that each of the families send two thou-
sand dollars for working capital. He told him that a further two
thousand dollars would be required on settlement. ‘For four thou-
sand bucks you’ll all get a posh house with boat, by the sea, where
there are recreation parks, and amenities, anchorage and launching
ramps, and a town, with good shopping, only twenty minutes away.
Also it’s a good place to set up businesses for those who don’t want
to fish all the time.
‘Once the deeds of sale have been made up for each property I’ll
get the signatures on them and then they’ll be ready. I’ll also prepare
a map of the places, each place to be numbered, and when all the
first payments have been made you can hold a lottery where sub-
scribers’ tickets are put into “tin boxes”. Then you can have ceremo-
nies where the names and numbers will be drawn out by a “beautiful
boy”. This is a method that has been used very successfully in the
past, according to my information.
‘Tomorrow we’re going out to buy Jew’s harps, muskets, blankets
(or such like) as exchange for those who sign the parchments.’
‘You’ll have a hundred families all living in one house, I suppose,’
said Makere, ‘because that’s all you’ll get with four thousand dollars
a family.’
‘Possess yourselves of the homes,’ said Billy.
‘What’s that supposed to mean?’
‘It’s a “wasteland”. They’re waste homes. They’re all unoccu-
pied. Why have houses unoccupied when there are people wanting to
occupy them?’
‘Bullshit. Hana and Gav didn’t say the houses were unoccupied.’
‘That’s because it’s summertime. End of March everyone’s gone
and there are good homes going to waste. “Reclaiming and cultivating
a moral wilderness”, that’s what we’re doing, “serving to the highest
degree”, that’s what we’re on about, “according to a deliberate and
methodical plan”.’
‘Doesn’t mean you can just walk in and take over.’
‘Not unless we get all the locks changed.’
By the end of summer the money was coming in and Billy had all
the deeds of sale printed, ready for signing. Makere thought he was
Patricia Grace 391
loopy thinking that all these rich wallahs would sign their holiday
homes away.
‘Not them,’ Billy said. ‘You don’t get them to sign. You get other
people. That’s how it was done before. Give out pressies—tobacco,
biscuits, pipes, that sort of thing, so that they, whoever they are, will
mark the parchments.’
Makere was starting to get the hang of it, but she huffed all the
same.
‘Now I’m going out to get us a van,’ Billy said. ‘Then we’ll buy the
trifles. After that, tomorrow and the next day, we’ll go and round up
some derros to do the signing.’
It took a week to get the signatures, and during that time Billy and
the kids handed out to park benchers in ten different parts of the city
one hundred bottles of whisky, one hundred packets of hot pies and
one hundred old overcoats.
‘What do you want our signatures for?’ they asked.
‘Deeds of sale for a hundred properties up in Claire Vista,’ Billy
said.
‘The only Claire Vistas we’ve got is where our bums hit the
benches.’
‘Well, look here.’ Billy showed them the maps with the allotments
marked out on them and they were interested and pleased. ‘Waste
homes,’ Billy explained. ‘All these fellas have got plenty of other
houses all over the place, but they’re simple people who know nothing
about how to fully utilize their properties and they can “scarcely cul-
tivate the earth”. But who knows, they might have a “peculiar apti-
tude for being improved”. It’s “high and holy work”, this.’
‘Too right. Go for it,’ the geezers said. Billy and the kids did their
rap for them and moved on, pleased with progress.
In fact everything went so well that there was nothing much left to
do after that. When he wrote to Hiko, Billy recommended that settle-
ment of Claire Vista be speeded up. ‘We could start working on
places for the next hundred families now and have all preparations
done in two months. I think we should make an overall target of one
hundred families catered for every two months over the next ten
months. That means in March we get our first hundred families home,
then another lot in May, July, September, November. By November
we’ll have five hundred Ngati Kangaru families, i.e., about four
thousand people, settled before the holiday season. We’ll bring in a
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few extra families from here (including ourselves) and that means that
every property in Claire Vista will have new owners. If the Te Karere
news crew comes over there again,’ he wrote, ‘make sure to tell them
not to give our news to any other language. Hey, Bro, let’s just tap
the sides of our noses with a little tip of finger. Keep it all nod nod,
wink wink, for a while.’
On the fifth of November there was a big welcome-home cere-
mony, with speeches and food and fireworks at the Claire Vista hall,
which had been renamed Te Whare Ngahau o Ngati Kangaru. At the
same time Claire Vista was given back its former name of Ikanui and
discussions took place regarding the renaming of streets, parks, boule-
vards, avenues, courts, dells and glens after its reclaimers.
By the time the former occupants began arriving in mid-December,
all the signs in the old Claire Vista had been changed and the new
families were established in their new homes. It was a lovely, soft
and green life at that time of the year. One in which you could stand
barefooted on grass or sand in your shorts and shirt and roll your
eyes round. You could slide your boat down the ramp, cruise about,
toss the anchor over and put your feet up, fish, pull your hat down.
Whatever.
On the day that the first of the holidaymakers arrived at 6 Ara
Hakena, with their bags of holiday outfits, Christmas presents, CDs,
six-packs, cartons of groceries, snorkels, lilos and things, the man and
woman and two sub-teenagers were met by Mere and Jim Hakena,
their three children, Jim’s parents and a quickly gathering crowd of
neighbors.
At first, Ruby and Gregory in their cotton co-ordinates, and Alister
with his school friend in their stonewash jeans, apricot and applegreen
tees, and noses zinked pink and orange, thought they could’ve come
to the wrong house, especially since its address seemed to have
changed and the neighbors were different.
But how could it be the wrong house? It was the same windowy
place in stained weatherboard, designed to suit its tree environment
and its rocky outlook. There was the new skylit extension and glazed
brick barbecue. Peach tree with a few green ones. In the drive in front
of the underhouse garage they could see the spanking blue boat with
Sea Urchin in cursive along its prow. The only difference was that the
boat was hitched to a green Landcruiser instead of to a red Range
Rover.
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‘That’s our boat,’ said Ruby.
‘I doubt it,’ said Mere and Ken together, folding their arms in
unison.
‘He paid good money for that,’ a similarly folded-armed neighbor
said. ‘It wasn’t much but it was good.’
Ruby and Alister didn’t spend too much more time arguing. They
went back to Auckland to put the matter in the pink hands of their
lawyer.
It was two days later that the next holidaymakers arrived, this
time at 13 Tiritiroa. After a long discussion out on the front lawn,
Mai and Poto with their Dobermen and a contingent of neighbors
felt a little sorry for their visitors in their singlets, baggies and jandals,
and invited them in.
‘You can still have your holiday, why not?’ said Mai. ‘There’s the
little flat at the back and we could let you have the dinghy. It’s no
trouble.’
The visitors were quick to decline the offer. They went away and
came back two hours later with a policeman, who felt the heat but
did the best he could, peering at the papers that Mai and Poto had
produced, saying little. ‘Perhaps you should come along with me and
lay a formal complaint,’ he suggested to the holidayers. Mai, Poto
and a few of the neighbors went fishing after they’d gone.
From then on the holidaymakers kept arriving and everyone had
to be alert, moving themselves from one front lawn to the next, some-
times having to break into groups so that their eyeballing skills, their
skills in creative comment, could be shared around.
It was Christmas by the time the news of what was happening
reached the media. The obscure local paper did a tame, muddled
article on it, which was eclipsed firstly by a full page on what the
mayor and councillors of the nearby town wanted for Christmas,
and then by another, derived from one of the national papers, reveal-
ing New Year resolutions of fifty television personalities. After that
there was the usual nationwide closedown of everything for over a
month, at the end of which time no one wanted to report holiday
items any more.
So it wasn’t until the new residents began to be sued that there was
any news. Even then the story only trickled.
It gathered some impetus, however, when the business people from
the nearby town heard what was happening and felt concerned. Here
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was this new population at Claire Vista, or whatchyoum’callit now,
who were permanent residents and who were big spenders, and here
were these fly-by-night jerk holidaymakers trying to kick them out.
Well, ever since this new lot had arrived business had boomed.
The town was flourishing. The old supermarket, now that there was
beginning to be competition, had taken up larger premises, lowered
its prices, extended its lines and was providing trollies, music and
coffee for customers. The car sale yards had been smartened up and
the office decor had become so tasteful that the salespeople had had
to clean themselves up and mind their language. McDonald’s had
bought what was now thought of as a prime business site, where they
were planning to build the biggest McDonald’s in the Southern Hemi-
sphere. A couple of empty storerooms, as well as every place that
could be uncovered to show old brick, had been converted into better-
than-average eating places. The town’s dowdy motel, not wanting to
be outdone by the several new places of accommodation being built
along the main road, had become pink and upmarket, and had a new
board out front offering television, video, heated swimming pool, spa,
waterbeds, room service, restaurant, conference and seminar facilities.
Home appliance retailers were extending their showrooms and in-
creasing their advertising. Home building and real estate was on an
upward surge as more business people began to enter town and as
those already there began to want bigger, better, more suitable resi-
dences. In place of dusty, paintless shops and shoppes, there now ap-
peared a variety of boutiques, studios, consortiums, centers, lands
and worlds. When the Clip Joint opened up across the road from
Lulu’s Hairdressers, Lulu had her place done out in green and white
and it became Upper Kut.
After that hair salons grew all over town, having names such as
Head Office, Headlands, Beyond the Fringe, Hairport, Hairwaves,
Hedlines, Siz’s, Curl Up and Dye.
So the town was growing in size, wealth and reputation. Booming.
Many of the new business people were from the new Ikanui, the
place of abundant fish. These newcomers had brought their upmarket
Aussie ideas to eating establishments, accommodation, shops, cinema,
pre-loved cars, newspaper publishing, transport, imports, exports, dis-
tribution. Good on them. The business people drew up a petition
supporting the new residents and their fine activities, and this peti-
tion was eventually signed by everyone within a twenty-kilometer
radius. This had media impact.
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But that wasn’t all that was going on.
Billy had found other areas suitable for purchase and settlement,
and Rena had done her research into the history of these areas so that
they knew which of the Ngati Kangaru had ancestral ties to those
places. There were six areas in the North Island and six in the South.
‘Think of what it does to the voting power,’ said Hiko, who was on
the rise in local politics. Easy street, since all he needed was numbers.
Makere, who had lost her reluctance and become wholehearted,
had taken Hiko’s place in the company as liaison manager. This meant
that she became the runner between Ozland and Aotearoa, conducting
rallies, recruiting families, co-ordinating departures and arrivals. She
enjoyed the work.
One day when Makere was filling in time in downtown Auckland
before going to the airport, she noticed how much of the central city
had closed up, gone to sleep.
‘What it needs is people,’ she said to the rest of the family when
she arrived home.
They were lounging, steaming themselves, showering, hair-dressing,
plucking eyebrows, in their enormous bathroom. She let herself down
into the Jacuzzi.
‘Five hundred families to liven up the central city again. Signatures
on papers, and then we turn those unwanted, wasteland wilderness
of warehouses and office spaces into town houses, penthouses and
apartments.’ She lay back and closed her eyes. She could see the
crowds once again seething in Queen Street renamed Ara Makere,
buying, selling, eating, drinking, talking, laughing, yelling, singing,
going to shows. But not only in Queen Street. Not only in Auckland.
Oh, it truly was high and holy work. This Kamupene o te Hokinga
Mai was ‘a great and unwonted blessing’. Mind-blowing. She sat up.
‘And businesses. So we’ll have to line up all our architects,
designers, builders, plumbers, electricians, consultants, programmers,’
she said.
‘ “Soap boilers, tinkers and a maker of dolls’ eyes” ’, said Billy.
‘The ones already here as well the ones still in Oz,’ Makere said.
‘Set them to work and use some of this damn money getting those
places done up. Open up a whole lot of shops, restaurants, agen-
cies. . . .’ She lay back again with her feet elevated. They swam in the
spinning water like macabre fish.
‘It’s brilliant, Ma,’ Billy said, stripping off and walking across the
floor with his toes turned up and his insteps arched—in fact, allow-
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ing only part of each heel and the ball joints of his big toes to touch
the cold tile floor. With the stress of getting across the room on no
more than heel and bone, his jaw, shoulders, elbows and knees be-
came locked and he had a clench in each hand as well as in the bulge
of his stomach.
‘Those plumbers that you’re talking about can come and run a few
hot pipes under the floor here. Whoever built this place should’ve
thought of that. But of course they were all summer people, so how
would they know?’ He lowered himself into the water, unlocking and
letting out a slow, growling breath.
‘We’ll need different bits of paper for downtown business proper-
ties,’ said Tu from the steam bench.
‘Central Auckland was originally Ngati Whatua I suppose,’ said
Rena, who lost concentration on what she was doing for a moment
and plucked out a complete eyebrow. ‘I’ll check it through then
arrange a hui with them.’
‘Think of it, we can influx any time of the year,’ said Billy. ‘We can
work on getting people into the city in our off-season. January. . . .
And it’s not only Auckland, it’s every city.’
‘And as well as the business places there are so many houses in the
cities empty at that time of the year too,’ said Makere, narrowing her
eyes while Billy’s eyes widened. ‘So we can look at those leaving to go
on holiday as well as those leaving holiday places after the season is
over. We can keep on influxing from Oz of course, but there are plenty
of locals without good housing. We can round them all up, the solos,
the UBs, pensioners, low-income earners, street kids, derros.’
‘Different papers again for suburban homes,’ said Tu.
‘Candidates and more candidates, votes and more votes,’ said Hiko,
who had come from next door wearing a towel and carrying a brief-
case. ‘And why stop at Oz? We’ve got Maori communities in Utah, in
London, all over the place.’
‘When do we go out snooping, Dad?’ asked Hana and Gavin, who
had been blow-waving each other’s hair.
‘Fact finding, fact finding,’ said Billy. ‘We might need three or four
teams, I’ll round up a few for training.’
‘I need a video camera,’ said Hana.





‘Two motorbikes,’ said Billy.
‘Bigger offices, more staff,’ said Tu and Rena.
‘See to it,’ said Billy.
‘Settlements within the cities,’ said Makere, who was still with
solos, UB, check-out operators and such. ‘Around churches. Churches,
sitting there idle wastelands, wildernesses of churches.’
‘And “really of no value”,’ said Billy. ‘Until they become . . .’
‘Meeting houses,’ Makere said. ‘Wharenui.’
‘Great. Redo the fronts, change the decor and we have all these new
wharenui, one every block or so. Take over surrounding properties for
kohanga, kura kaupapa, kaumatua housing, health and rehab centers,
radio stations, TV channels. . . .’
‘Deeds of sale for church properties,’ said Tu.
‘More party candidates as well,’ Hiko said. ‘We’ll need everything
in place before the new . . . government comes in. . . .’
‘And by then we’ll have “friends in high places”.’
‘Have our person at the top, our little surprise . . .’
‘Who will be advised that it is better to reach a final and satisfac-
tory conclusion than . . .’
‘ “. . . to reopen questions of strict right, or carry on an unprofitable
controversy”.’
‘Then there’s golf clubs,’ said Makere.
‘I’ll find out how many people per week, per acre use golf courses,’
said Rena. ‘We’ll find wasteland and wilderness there for sure.’
‘And find out how the land was acquired and how it can be re-
acquired,’ said Billy.
‘Remember all the land given for schools? A lot of those schools
have closed now.’
‘Land given for the war effort and not returned.’
‘Find out who gave what and how it will be returned.’
‘Railways.’
‘Find out how much is owed to us from sale of railways.’
‘Cemeteries.’
‘Find out what we’ve saved the taxpayer by providing and main-
taining our own cemeteries, burying our own dead. Make up claims.’
‘And there are some going concerns that need new ownership too,
or rather where old ownership needs reestablishing. . . .’
‘Sport and recreation parks.’
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‘Lake and river retreats. . . .’
‘Mountain resorts. . . .’
Billy hoisted himself. ‘Twenty or thirty teams and no time to
waste.’ He splatted across the tiles. ‘Because “if from delay you allow
others to do it before you—they will succeed and you will fail”,’ and
he let out a rattle and a shuffle of a laugh that sounded like someone
sweeping up smashings of glass with a noisy broom.
‘Get moving,’ he said.
399





There is not one Pacific
There are many
From the solid slopes of Mount Hagen
and Porgera’s wealth in the west
To the Pearl locked islets
of Tuamotu’s east
From the chilly tips
of Maoridom south
To the borders of the Northern territories
and her mysteries that span from equator
to Cancer.
There is not one troubled region
There are many
Trade links and nuclear free zones
cohabit with foreign assistance
and internal discord
my sister does not speak with me anymore
and old ways of doing things are re-looked at
Children go to faraway places
and babai pits lie idle and still.
This chapter was originally published in Te Rau Maire: Poems and Stories of the
Pacific, ed. by Marjorie Tuainekore Crocombe, Ron Crocombe, Kauraka Kauraka,
and Makiuri Tongia (Rarotonga: Rauranga Vananga and Suva: Institute of Pacific
Studies 1992), 13.
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There is not one Pacific
Only one common theme
That development is certain
Though foreign
And coconuts will continue
to fall,
The Pacific ocean will camouflage
superficial dreams
and the faint sound of drums
will still be heard
if we pause a while to listen.
401
27
Treaty-Related Research and 
Versions of New Zealand History
Alan Ward
Prodigious research efforts and outpourings of new writing on Maori-
settler history have been associated largely with the enactment into
New Zealand’s statute law in 1975 of the Treaty of Waitangi. The
treaty, signed between the British Crown and some five hundred Maori
chiefs in 1840, had been drawn up by British officials and their mis-
sionary advisers for the purposes of securing Maori consent, under
Article I of the treaty, to the transfer of sovereignty of the New Zea-
land islands to the British Crown. It was the act of two “executives”
and, of itself, it had no force in domestic law, although it did influence
British governments subsequently to uphold Maori rights to land, rec-
ognized in Article II. However, the treaty guarantee was not consid-
ered by New Zealand officials or courts to prevail against the Crown’s
prerogative rights, under British common law, to foreshores, harbors,
and navigable waters (McHugh 1991:112–116).
The Crown’s own dubious land purchases—from some but not all
of the rightholders—caused Maori to begin to form supratribal com-
binations such as the kingitanga (the ‘King movement’) to control
landselling factions. The anxiety of the settlers and British officials that
colonization of the North Island would be effectively blocked caused
the British army to be used by Governor Gore Browne over the Wai-
tara purchase in Taranaki in 1860 and by Governor George Grey to
attack the Waikato district, the heart of the kingitanga, in 1863 (Sin-
clair 1957). Thereafter New Zealand governments passed legislation
through the settler-dominated parliament giving authority to confis-
cate Maori land and to take roads and surveys through it. Treaty guar-
antees could not prevail against these statutory powers. Even the
Native Rights Act of 1865, which gave statutory authority to the third
article of the treaty—according Maori the rights and privileges of
British subjects—proved a double-edged weapon. It enabled Maori to
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bring actions in the Supreme Court in defense of their legal rights and
led, in 1867, to their representation in parliament; it also enabled the
government to treat those who took up arms against them as rebels
rather than foreign belligerents—and to hang them (Ward 1974:
167–193).
Meanwhile, sections of Maoridom had nurtured a different view of
the treaty, the Maori-language version which was the one most had
signed. In that version they had ceded to the British, under Article I,
kawanatanga or “governorship”; under Article II they were confirmed
in their tino rangatiratanga or “full chieftainship” of their lands, and
other taonga (valued things). The British did indeed intend to sup-
port the local authority of chiefs, then becoming Christian, but their
efforts to define chiefly authority in the emergent state were miser-
able; indeed, beneath a patina of bribes and blandishments they set
out to undermine chiefly authority in order to secure the land. Many
chiefs who sought cooperation with the government were driven in
the end to join the military resistance of the kingitanga, or of the
politico-religious “prophets” whose guerrilla tactics carried the wars
into the early 1870s (Ward 1974:194–223).
After the wars, Maori leaders attempted a whole variety of strate-
gies to secure recognition of their rangatiratanga, and of mana Maori
motuhake, “Maori self-determination.” The kotahitanga, or “unity
movement,” had mobilized most Maori by the 1890s in a boycott of
the Native Land Court, justifiably perceived as an instrument for
recognizing Maori land rights only as a prelude to alienating them.
They won some concessions in 1900 in the form of committees and
councils to manage the remaining Maori land, but when these proved
reluctant to alienate land, the land councils (renamed boards) were
soon put under the control of their Pakeha members. Piecemeal land
alienation, under the individualized titles awarded by the Native Land
Court, continued; indeed the Maori Land Boards were given certain
compulsory authority under new legislation to take control of un-
developed land and alienate portions of it (Williams 1969:33–129).
All the while, Maori involved in the kotahitanga—or those who
brought actions in the superior courts—tried in vain to cite the Treaty
of Waitangi as the foundation of their rights in the New Zealand
state. There grew up two histories of New Zealand, running parallel
and rarely touching each other (Orange 1987a:159–225). The general
settler and official version was that Maori had been given the full
rights and privileges of British subjects from 1840 in a remarkable
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effort at racial “amalgamation” and equality unique in British colo-
nization. If this had exposed them to certain commercial risks, through
the transformation of their customary land tenure into individual
marketable titles, that was one of the hazards of entering into the
modern world. And indeed, by 1900 some Maori had prospered, be-
come farmers, gained education, graduated from universities, held
seats in parliament, intermarried with the Pakeha, been ordained in
the Anglican clergy, shared in the local sporting clubs and social
venues. It was New Zealand’s proud boast, not entirely without foun-
dation, that the age-old problem of intercommunal relations had been
solved in a society where racial equality was real. Pakeha did not
mention the treaty much in their discourses but, except for the few
who got closer to Maori realities and viewpoints, they considered that
they had honored it.
The majority Maori version of post-1840 history was very dif-
ferent. They had genuinely sought to engage with the incoming new
world, the world of money and commerce and economic development,
with the British settlers who knew about these things, and with the
machinery of state that had undertaken to protect their rangatiratanga
and their fair share of status and wealth in the new order. Instead
they had found themselves fobbed off with tokenism and condescen-
sion. Economically, they had been systematically marginalized. Most
Maori lived in rural slums, amidst harsh poverty and appalling health.
Lacking access to capital, they had had to sell far more land than
they intended in order to buy commodities and to start their own
ventures. Caught in a debt trap, they had to sell yet more land. Fac-
tionalism and pseudo-individualization of titles enabled the purchasers
to take advantage of inexperience and cupidity (Ward 1974:308–315).
It was no accident that both the formally educated and traditional
leaders at the turn of the twentieth century made demands for hapu-
based rather than individual control of land and for capital for devel-
opment, already available to Pakeha under the Advances to Settlers
Acts. These modifications were grudgingly admitted by settler govern-
ments in respect of portions of remaining Maori land—about 4 million
out of 64 million acres were left in the 1930s.
After the First World War, in which Maori soldiers fought along-
side Pakeha comrades, a new effort to secure ratification of the treaty
was made by the Ratana Church, founded by Wiremu Ratana after
1926, again with the traditional features of prophecy and faith heal-
ing, but looking always to gain access to modernization and genuine
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socioeconomic equality. A remarkable compact between Ratana and
the leaders of the emergent New Zealand Labour Party saw Labour
choosing Ratana candidates as its nominees for the four Maori seats
in parliament. By 1943 they had won all four and were crucial to
Labour retaining office (Henderson 1963:85–106). Even so, Labour’s
policy, in its long period of government from 1935 to 1949, did not
substantially alter the direction of policies toward Maori. Labour’s
Keynesian-style economics, its housing, medical, and family support
systems, its extension of state secondary education to rural areas,
benefited the Maori poor more than the Pakeha poor only because
Maori were previously worse off. The Maori Social and Economic Ad-
vancement Act of 1945 revived the network of tribal committees to
assist in the delivery of welfare and increased support for Maori farm-
ing (Orange 1987b). Some very limited payments were made to tribal
Trust Boards in recompense for land confiscations, acknowledged by
a commission of inquiry in the 1920s to be unjust. Full employment
and state housing schemes enabled a massive Maori urban migration
to occur relatively painlessly. From the non-Maori perspective, the
integration of Maori and settler into one New Zealand society seemed
entirely successful.
Most New Zealanders then were taken completely by surprise
when this Maori hidden history erupted into increasingly fierce pro-
tests from the late 1960s. The trigger, appropriately enough, was a
set of seemingly innocuous amendments relating to Maori land in the
annual “wash-up” bill of 1967. Maori land titles had become increas-
ingly fractionated as the Maori population burgeoned and the interests
of one generation were divided among many descendants in the next.
It seemed only sensible to the planners, including Maori planners in
the Department of Maori Affairs, to pool these “uneconomic inter-
ests” and to convert some categories of “Maori freehold land” into
“general land,” able to be leased, mortgaged, willed, or even sold
without any of the confused constraints that now applied to Maori
land. But to Maori, the bill was an act of latter-day paternalism at
best and threatened the remaining land interests of many Maori, hence
threatening their identity. New Zealand was in fact on the eve of a
vast Maori cultural resurgence. Protest was led by educated young
Maori and by the official New Zealand Maori Council, formed in
1962. They were quickly joined by widespread urban and rural pro-
test organizations (Kawharu 1977:251–293; Walker 1991:615–624).
Land occupations began on blocks acquired (like Raglan golf course)
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or about to be acquired (like Bastion Point in Auckland city) under
planning legislation. A great “land march” from North Cape to the
parliament in Wellington was organized by the protest groups and
led by a venerable kuia, a leader of the Maori Women’s Welfare
League, Dame Whina Cooper (Ward 1991:97–98). Meanwhile, the
period of economic boom and full employment had given way to
recession and unemployment. This intensified the problems of newly
urbanized Maori. The social control exercised in semitraditional
fashion in rural areas was not wholly reestablished in the cities, and
crime and violence among young Maori rapidly increased.
In Parliament, Maori Ratana/Labour members continued to press
for statutory recognition of the treaty as an important step toward
recognizing Maori rights and needs (Orange 1987a:232–249). In
1975, “with the footsteps of the land marchers ringing in their ears”
(as one Opposition speaker taunted), the Labour government accepted
a bill proposed by Mr. Matiu Rata, minister for Maori Affairs, which
provided that, henceforth, any Maori or group of Maori who consid-
ered they were prejudicially affected by any act of the Crown or its
agents in breach of the principles of the treaty, could bring a claim to
a new tribunal, the Waitangi Tribunal. This body, comprising three
Maori and Pakeha members, would act as a commission of inquiry,
investigate widely, and make recommendations. The Treaty of Wai-
tangi Act was not retrospective, and many Maori groups—such as the
Ngai Tahu of the South Island, who had for a century pursued their
claims arising from the Crown’s acquisitions of the island in the 1840s
and 1850s—were disappointed. Few claims were brought to the tri-
bunal and major demonstrations, sometimes violent, continued, not-
ably on Waitangi Day itself, established by Labour as a national holi-
day but rapidly becoming a focus of protest.
In 1982, however, Mr. Edward (“Eddie”) Taihakurei Durie became
chief judge of the Maori Land Court and, ex officio, chairman of the
Waitangi Tribunal. Durie began to use the tribunal’s investigations
and reports to spell out the principles of the treaty, to develop a
bicultural jurisprudence, and to review history that bore on the con-
temporary issues at hand. The Motunui report of 1983, for example,
concerning the pollution of a fishing reef by sewage from the town of
Waitara (the very same area over which war had begun in 1860) em-
phasized Maori spiritual and cultural values in relation to seafood and
to water. It advocated a more genuine place for Maori in the control
of such resources, as a treaty right. Subsequent reports spelled out the
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historical relationship between Maori and settler in respect of plan-
ning and conservation and the impact of colonization on Maori
resources and values, reaching back to 1840 (Oliver 1991:10–17;
Renwick 1990:16–44). Largely the product of Durie’s subtle mind and
writing skills, which eschewed legalistic and jargonistic language, the
reports evinced an essential reasonableness and powerful but gentle
reminders of the engagements the Crown had solemnly and publicly
entered into with the Maori.
Sensitive to its somewhat undeserved reputation for good race rela-
tions and bewildered by the escalating social problems and protests,
middle-class New Zealand began to look to the Waitangi Tribunal as
an avenue for reform. A huge hui, an “economic summit” in effect,
convened at Ngaruawahia, the seat of the kingitanga, in 1984, called
for a significant transfer of resources back to Maori ownership and
control in order to relieve Maori marginality, unemployment, and
sense of alienation in their own country. The concept was thus born
of linking the resource transfer to the investigation and redress of his-
torical injuries. In 1985 the Labour government of David Lange
amended the Treaty of Waitangi Act to give the tribunal jurisdiction
back to 1840.
The amendment—a two-line amendment to the principal act—re-
flected the ignorance of the Labour ministers (in particular the attor-
ney-general, Geoffrey Palmer) of New Zealand history and Maori
understandings of it. It was apparently assumed that the grievances
would be relatively few and manageable—the land confiscations of the
1860s, taking of Maori land for public purposes and not returning it
when it was not required, unfulfilled promises about reserves in Well-
ington and the South Island, for example. The legislators did not ap-
prehend that for Maori, the key issue was the treaty guarantee of tino
rangatiratanga and its erosion by myriad acts of the Crown since
1840. Most notably they did not apprehend that, in many Maoris’
view, the Native Land Acts, while initiating a process of legalized
transfer of Maori land, had seriously distorted or misconstrued cus-
tomary rights. Under the Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act of 1985,
virtually all Maori land transfers could be reviewed.
Thirty or forty claims were lodged in the first two years after the
amendment. Claims then grew rapidly to 88 in 1987, 216 in 1991,
289 in 1992, 360 in 1993, 442 in 1994, and 720 by 1998, at which
date about 190 had been investigated and reported upon, 31 settled by
direct negotiation with the government, and 19 withdrawn (Waitangi
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Tribunal annual reports). Many claims overlap because of competing
tribal or factional interests in the same land. The tribunal was ex-
panded to seven members in 1985 and sixteen in 1988 (comprising
senior Maori and Pakeha community leaders, as well as lawyers and
academics), with several panels working simultaneously. Its research
staff was also expanded, and claims were grouped and treated on a
regional basis as far as possible. Even so, the researching and hearing
of claims cannot possibly keep up with the applications if serious
investigation is to be done.
The complexity of the process was revealed in the first major set of
claims heard in the post-1985 process, those of the Ngai Tahu tribe
of the South Island. The claimants used professional historians both
to comb the documentary record and to assemble oral tradition. The
Crown did the same, appraising the evidence of the claimants and add-
ing much of its own. The tribunal itself also hired historians to ap-
praise Crown and claimant evidence and to fill any gaps in the
research. The exchange of argument, rebuttal, and fresh submissions
went on for three years. Evidence and inference from evidence were
very finely weighed. In the process, manifold different understandings
were revealed that would delight any cultural relativist or “montage”
historian.
It is perfectly obvious, of course, regardless of any tendentious selec-
tion or weighting of evidence to show the Crown guilty or innocent
of wrongdoing in the great South Island purchases of the 1840s and
1850s, that various versions of what happened were genuinely held
by different parties. What was “true” for one was not “true” for an-
other. One of the great values of the Waitangi Tribunal proceedings is
to enable Maori claimants to voice their understandings and concerns
about land alienations before a tribunal of the state, including known
and reputed Maori leaders. The satisfaction of voicing their long-
submerged histories is one of the reasons for the outpouring of
claims. An important outcome for non-Maori (for those who care, at
least) is a much better understanding of Maoris’ sense of grievance and
alienation, even if Maori claims are not found to be well grounded,
or not wholly so.
But the Waitangi Tribunal, and the general public behind them,
have not the luxury of merely noting different “discourses” or per-
ceptions of the past and accepting the relativist position that the vari-
ous Maori perceptions are as equally valid as one another or as the
various versions delineated by Crown or tribunal historians. The tri-
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bunal is obliged to try to disentangle fact from myth or misunder-
standing as far as possible, even while acknowledging the multifaceted
nature of “facts” and the reality of mythological and symbolic mean-
ings. Its statutory obligation is to determine whether actions by the
Crown breached principles of the Treaty—principles that were defined
by the Court of Appeal in 1987 as including the duty of “active pro-
tection” of Maori rights (consistent with evident public necessity),
consulting meaningfully with them on matters affecting them, and
dealing with them reasonably and with the utmost good faith.
The task of disentangling and decoding the evidence was addressed
again and again in the Ngai Tahu proceedings, in the seemingly small
as in the great matters. Thus, among Ngai Tahu there was a belief
that a British warship had conveyed the northern chief Te Rauparaha
(of Ngati Toa) on his devastating raids on Ngai Tahu in 1830 in order
to make them more amenable to land selling. However, there is a
substantial documentary record to show that Te Rauparaha was con-
veyed south by a merchant captain, Stewart, in exchange for a cargo
of flax, and that, far from condoning the incident, the authorities in
New South Wales prosecuted Stewart in their courts. Notwithstanding
the popular belief among Ngai Tahu that stems from a tendency to
see the British Crown as the root of all their evils, the Crown was not
to blame on this occasion (Ward 1990:151–152).
Important issues about memory and silence arose in respect of the
Otakou purchase of 1844 for the settlement of “New Edinburgh,” or
Dunedin. The central issue was the extent of reserves promised to the
vendors. In 1844 Governor FitzRoy was initiating a policy of reserving
to the Crown a tenth of all the sections in subdivision sales as an
endowment principally for Maori purposes. But the “tenths” had
proved dissatisfying to Maori in Wellington, and in the tribunal the
Crown produced evidence to show that in Otakou, Maori preferred
reserves in three or four bigger blocks, in their own name—notably
their own little township built with the whaling captains at Otakou
heads. The claimants in 1987 argued that there were still unfulfilled
promises of “tenths” in Dunedin itself, and that the Ngai Tahu had
never ceased to press for these. There was, however, no sign of evi-
dence in the documentary record of any early protest on the matter
after 1844, despite detailed records of protest on other matters when
the governor or a minister visited the area. Not until 1867 did protest
really surface, and then it was over a particular canoe landing site
and hostel in Dunedin (Waitangi Tribunal 1989, Document Wai 27,
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T1:73–109). The tribunal found that there was no unfulfilled promise
of “tenths” in New Edinburgh.
In subsequent discussion at the New Zealand Historical Association
conference of 1990, some speakers alleged that the proceedings of
the tribunal were Eurocentric in that they favored Pakeha written evi-
dence over Maori oral tradition. Tribunal scholars argued that it was
not a question of Maori or Pakeha, written or oral, but that the earliest
evidence was preferred to evidence generated later, that evidence of
the words and actions of the participants at or immediately after the
events at issue were thought more significant for the purpose of assess-
ing breaches of the treaty than the evidence of traditions or under-
standings that grew up subsequently (Ward 1990).
These matters also arose in respect of the Canterbury purchase of
1848. A key issue was whether the western boundary extended only
to the foothills of the Southern Alps, or right across to the west coast,
including the Alps in the sale. In February 1848, Ngai Tahu leaders
had met with Governor Grey and made an offer that clearly referred
only to the Canterbury plains and foothills. But in June 1848, the
actual land purchase commissioner, Kemp, negotiated for all Ngai
Tahu interests from coast to coast. Given that he had spent three
days discussing the purchase with Ngai Tahu chiefs visiting his ship,
given that he had drawn up and displayed on the deck a large map
showing the western coast and place names on it provided by the
chiefs, given also that several chiefs thereafter discussed reserves on a
coast-to-coast basis, the tribunal rejected the 1987 assertion by the
claimants that they had not included the mountains in the sale.
This discussion nevertheless yielded very important evidence of
different cultural understandings about what “sale” meant within
general boundaries. At a Commission of Inquiry of 1879 (when ver-
batim evidence had been taken in Maori), an elderly Ngai Tahu chief,
Tiramorehu, said that he and his kinsmen had intended to keep the
use of the swamps and streams and valley floors for their traditional
economy, and named a range of such areas. When asked, “What land
then did you sell to the government?” he replied, “The same land.”
In other words, he considered that a number of different interests
could coexist in the same land, held by different parties. That was the
way of things in Polynesian tenure, not sharply defined zones and
boundaries or the English concept of “exclusive possessions.” He had
no difficulty including the Pakeha as graziers on the ridge tops (Ward
1994, reference to the evidence of Tiramorehu before the Smith-Nairn
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commission, 1879). Fortunately for Ngai Tahu, the Kemp deed had
reserved mahinga kai—places of hunting and gathering—to the ven-
dors, and the tribunal upheld this claim and many others in the pack-
age of claims lodged in 1987.
The question of Maori understandings of tuku and hoko—Maori
words generally used to translate the English “sale”—was heavily at
issue in the Muriwhenua claims in the far north of the Northland
peninsula, a remote region. Several noted New Zealand anthropolo-
gists—Dr. Margaret Mutu, Professor Anne Salmond, and Dame Joan
Metge—presented submissions to the effect that Maori in the 1830s
and 1840s could not have conceived of sales as complete and perma-
nent alienations. They argued that a “tuku whenua” was a grant of
use rights, conditional on good behavior and continued exchange of
prestations, and with certain uses of the ground by the Maori group
also continuing (Waitangi Tribunal 1991, claim Wai 45, Documents
F-12 [Mutu], F-13 [Metge], D-17 [Salmond]). The basis of the anthro-
pologists’ argument was cultural structuralism, a delineation of tradi-
tional institutions, and historical evidence (Waitangi Tribunal, Wai 45,
F-17) that Maori views of transactions persisted into the period of
settlement and land “sales.”
Rebuttal came from two directions. Ms. Lindsay Head, a linguist,
basing her arguments on the Maori texts that accumulated rapidly
when Maori became literate in the 1830s, showed considerable vari-
ation in the meanings of tuku and hoko. She considered the anthro-
pologists’ arguments to be altogether too reductionist and reifying
(Waitangi Tribunal 1991, Wai 45, F-21). A historian for the Crown,
Mr. Fergus Sinclair, then combed exhaustively the voluminous mis-
sionary records from the wider Northland region and showed that
many Maori there had been involved in commerce for two decades
and had very clear notions of full and permanent transfer. It appears
that some deliberately sold land, in the European sense, in the 1830s,
for a variety of reasons, often moving away from the areas sold and
leaving missionaries or other settlers in undisturbed possession (Wai-
tangi Tribunal, Wai 45, 1993, I-3). The tribunal reported on the Muri-
whenua claims in 1997 and found strongly in the claimants’ favor.
Maori worldviews clearly operated at the time of the land transac-
tions, and very few settlers arrived to disturb it before 1865 (Wai-
tangi Tribunal, 1997, Muriwhenua Land Report).
The debate is far from finished, but taking a broader and more na-
tional perspective, the treaty-related research suggests at least three
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main phases in Maori attitudes to land sales. Early “alienations” of
huge tracts in the 1820s and 1830s in the South Island show very
plainly that Maori were including the Pakeha into their own society
and expecting them to behave accordingly on land that was still seen
as under Maori mana. Then, in the 1830s and 1840s, especially in
the north (with European shipping and settlement abundant), there
appears to have been a phase of competitive selling between hapu
who had overlapping interests in a relatively small area. One motiva-
tion appears to have been to sell before someone else sold the land
from underneath one; selling was a kind of assertion of mana, with
Maori perhaps not yet appreciating that (according to the British)
they no longer had any rights in the land. Later, in the 1850s, there
was a widespread revulsion against this trend, particularly in South
Auckland, Hauraki, and Hawkes Bay. Throughout the North Island,
tribal (not hapu) and supratribal organizations emerged to stop the
competitive selling. In remote areas such as Poverty Bay, it began to
be made clear to settlers that the earlier transactions there were not
considered sales of absolute title, partly because not all rightholders
had been involved and partly because Maori were not thinking in
these terms anyway.
The main vehicle for this analysis is empirical history, focused by
the claims brought against the Crown and informed and enriched by
much better understandings of Maori values and institutions. In the
process, the dichotomies between oral and written and Maori and
Pakeha evidence break down. For example, Maori have become aware
of the very rich stock of Maori-language documentation from the
1830s and are thronging the archives to find out what their tupuna
wrote, or their words as recorded by others. The vast records of the
Native Land Court, recording the whakapapa and other oral testi-
mony of Maori leaders from 1865, are being tapped extensively (Dr.
Angela Ballara’s book Iwi: The Dynamics of Maori Tribal Organisa-
tion from c. 1769 to c. 1945, Victoria University of Wellington Press,
1998, is a fine product of this research). Not much high theory is in-
volved in this, but hermeneutic and semiotic understandings are habit-
ually invoked in the detailed explication of “what happened” or of
what was culturally constructed and understood. There is constant
recognition that, as in the Ngai Tahu examples cited above, different
understandings were sometimes held by various parties to the same
action. Misunderstanding was obviously commonplace, but the evi-
dence of mutual understanding between Maori and Pakeha actors on
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an ongoing basis is also strong. Frequently it is plain that each under-
stood the other all too well, and that the jockeying for control created
an inexorably mounted pressure over twenty years as Maori or Pakeha
sought to make the other conform, until the cataclysm launched in
1860 by Pakeha who recognized that an impasse had been reached
and sought to enforce their system of land title and land purchase by
use of the army.
Although there is increasing mention in anthropology departments
of a distinct Maori epistemology, the tribunal’s essentially nonrela-
tivist view of history meets the current purposes of most Maori per-
fectly well because the research shows the Crown to have been in the
wrong, again and again, in terms of Maori treaty rights and even of
common-law rights. Apart from the tuku whenua debate, there is no
widespread call for a general relativized view based on cultural dichot-
omy and “talking past each other,” although that is apparent in spe-
cific matters. The tribunal’s tendency to distinguish, where appro-
priate, between the understandings of the actual Maori parties to a
land transfer and the modified understandings (“myths”) that grew
subsequently is not always pleasing to Maori claimants.
Another pressure toward a culturally sensitive but positivist view
of the evidence of the past is the rapidly increasing competition be-
tween Maori groups for the same land or for the Crown’s compensa-
tion payments. Historians and anthropologists alike have shown that
Maori whakapapa (genealogy and associated stories) were quoted
selectively by the tellers to support claims against rivals (Ballara 1991;
Binney 1987; Salmond 1991). This was consistent with the constant
flux in the human boundaries of hapu and hapu clusters. Traditionally,
Maori society had happily used this process to maximize group
strengths and control over resources. But of course it did not result in
tidy boundaries between groups and their lands.
The contact period, the very fact of landselling, and the later pro-
cess of proving claims in the Native Land Court after 1865 (with one
group “winning” and the others “losing” in the Pakeha-dominated
judicial process) produced a quasi-reconstruction of Maori social
order. About forty major “tribes” were identified and maps drawn
with neat “tribal” boundaries demarcating them. Scores of other iwi
(tribal) or hapu names disappeared from the public record. The result-
ing orthodoxy, shaped by the Land Court and early Pakeha anthro-
pology, came to be accepted by many Maori themselves.
The treaty processes have blown all this to the four winds. To the
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puzzlement and sometimes the dismay of modern Maori leaders, the
submerged traditional dynamics and complexity of Maori social order
has reasserted itself with astonishing vigor. The Ngai Tahu “tribe,” for
example, tenuously held together for the purposes of the claim by Sir
Tipene O’Regan, has since produced fiercely independent claims by
Waitaha hapu in the far south and Tuhuru hapu on the West Coast,
with the latter represented by the able member of parliament, Sandra
Lee, a constant irritant to Sir Tipene. In 1990, the Labour Government
enacted a Runanga Iwi Act to empower local iwi councils and to re-
place the centralized Department of Maori Affairs with an “Iwi Tran-
sition Authority” (ITA). The intention was to decentralize expenditure
and promote real self-determination at iwi level, but with positions and
budgets on offer, Runanga Iwi proliferated across the country, absorb-
ing development funds in fees and expenses. O’Regan jibed at the “add
water, instant iwi” phenomenon and the integrationist Maori leader,
Winston Peters, briefly minister for Maori Affairs in the National
Government of 1992, abolished the Runanga Iwi and the ITA.
But the tendency toward reassertion of local hapu identity is real
and fundamental nevertheless, and it constantly bedevils attempts at
treaty “settlements.” Negotiations over valuable railway lands in cen-
tral Auckland and central Wellington in 1992–1993 produced claims
not only from Maori groups now resident in the area, but from groups
defeated and expelled in intertribal war just before white settlement.
They had left their place names and their dead on the land too, they
argued; they too were therefore tangata whenua—people of the land.
The conquering groups expostulated; the defeated parties might have
certain sacred sites (wahi tapu) where their dead lay, they acknowl-
edged, but mana whenua, the authority over the land, generally lay
with the invaders. Yet, say the defeated, the invaders intermarried with
us; we too can “whakapapa in” to those lands (Ward 1993:196–200).
Most recently the urban immigrant groups, now in their second and
third generation of residence in the cities, have also begun to claim
rights as tangata whenua of those lands. The terms “tangata whenua”
and “mana whenua” have thus become problematic. Clearly there
were various claims of right to land, but how were the priorities be-
tween them decided? Was it essentially a matter of dominant power?
Or (as the Moriori of the Chatham Islands argue against their Maori
conquerors of 1835) did conquest only give mana tangata, not mana
whenua, which still lay with the first occupants? And when did rights
grow so “cold,” by nonresidence, as to cease altogether?
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These questions are so serious and so contentious for modern
Maori (let alone for Pakeha administrators) that Chief Judge Durie has
recently secured the cooperation of the New Zealand Law Commis-
sion to launch a research project, designed to run over four years,
into Maori customary law. The project has since been taken over by
the Law faculty of the University of Waikato. The research will be
cross-disciplinary and biracial, involving Maori elders and Maori and
Pakeha academics and lawyers. It was intended to focus on determin-
ing a Maori “jurisprudence”—that is, the principles and values under-
lying customary practices, as well as the customary practices them-
selves. The long series of meetings and discussion papers will involve
Maori people throughout the community in what is hoped to be both
an intellectual decolonization and to revive values and procedures that
will enable Maori to resolve differences and work for mutual advance-
ment in modern New Zealand. Similar research projects have been
launched by the Maori Studies faculty of Massey University.
Meanwhile, efforts at transfer of resources to Maori have begun,
notably in the area of sea fisheries. Maori claims to unextinguished
rights in the sea and foreshore were greatly assisted by a 1986 decision
of the High Court in the case of Te Weehi v. the Regional Fishing
Officer. When charged with taking undersized shellfish, Te Weehi
claimed to be exercising a customary fishing right. The trial judge
referred to recent Canadian judgments such as Calder’s case, Guerin’s
case, and Sparrow’s case and found similarly: That unless expressly
extinguished by legislation, customary rights survive the transfer of
sovereignty. The superior courts also supported claims by the New
Zealand Maori Council in support of Waitangi Tribunal findings in
the Muriwhenua Sea Fisheries report, and ordered the Crown to nego-
tiate with Maori representatives (McHugh 1991:130–132).
The negotiations came dramatically to a climax in 1992 when the
giant Sealords fish processing corporation put much of its sharehold-
ing on the market. The government offered the Maori Fishing Corpo-
ration NZ$150 million to purchase the shareholding, plus 20 percent
of fishing quotas not yet allocated, as full settlement of Maori com-
mercial fishing claims. Maori were deeply torn between accepting an
excellent offer, including immediate ownership of much of the fishing
industry, and signing away indefinitely their treaty claims to commer-
cial fisheries. Given that the Crown would have contested further
claims in the courts, it was sensible to accept. But the subsequent allo-
cation of the quotas and interests between Maori has proved very divi-
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sive, pitting the iwi (tribes) claiming customary control of long coast-
lines against the inland iwi, some very numerous, who seek a distri-
bution mainly on a population basis. Well-organized urban Maori
groups in Auckland, such as the Waipareira Trust, have also claimed
recognition as iwi, entitled to share in the distribution of fishing
quotas. Interim arrangements have been made, but the issues are
repeatedly before the courts.
The intensity of feeling over the divisions of the fisheries has caused
Maori leadership to be increasingly concerned about the basis of
eventual distribution of remedy for historical claims about land. The
New Zealand Maori Council was again successful in the High Court
in an action regarding the sale of Crown assets in the government’s
privatization policy, launched in 1986. Crown lands and forests, coal,
hydroelectricity, and geothermal power are assumed by Maori to be
important sources of redress for historical injury. On behalf of
claimants, the Waitangi Tribunal secured the addition of a clause in
the State Owned Enterprises Act of 1986 requiring the Crown to act
consistently with the principles of the treaty. The following year the
Maori Council secured a High Court judgment to the effect that the
Crown had a duty “analogous to fiduciary duties” to affirm those
principles, the court noting that the duty of the Crown “is not merely
passive but extends to active protection” of Maori people’s interests
in lands and waters. The Court again required the Crown to satisfy it
that the Treaty obligation in the SOE Act would be complied with.
The outcome was that memorials were placed in the titles of land
sold by state-owned enterprises whereby the Crown would be obliged
to buy back the land if it was determined necessary by the Waitangi
Tribunal to remedy a grievance (Renwick 1990:57–59).
A similar question arose in regard to Crown forests, between 10
and 20 percent of which are estimated to be on land still technically
Maori land or land acquired in breach of the treaty. The government
established a Crown Forestry Rental Trust (CFRT) to receive rentals
and cutting-rights payments, pending determination by the tribunal, of
claims over forested land. The trust meanwhile was authorized to
fund research by and on behalf of the claimants in respect of these
lands (Renwick 1990:73–76). The CFRT is now by far the best-funded
organization for research in New Zealand history. Not surprisingly,
some of the most able young historians in the country are now work-
ing for tribal groups on CFRT funding. This, to some extent, has
sapped the research skills of the tribunal itself, which is tied to public
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service salary scales, with a resultant threat to the institutional knowl-
edge of the tribunal.
Nevertheless, CFRT and tribunal researchers collaborate in the
shaping of projects. Many of these fall within a program called
Rangahaua Whanui (“Research Widely”) launched by Chief Judge
Durie in 1993. The purpose of this project was to supplement research
done in respect of claims, which are inevitably somewhat capricious
and incomplete in their coverage. Various themes, such as the opera-
tion of the Native Land Acts in the nineteenth century or of Maori
Land Boards in the twentieth, have national application; projects on
these themes relate to most or all local claims. By these means the tri-
bunal is seeking to meet the research needs of treaty-related claims, in-
creasingly numerous and complex as they are. Meanwhile, the Pakeha
electorate and successive governments have been increasingly impa-
tient of the proliferation of Maori claims and the high value of settle-
ments sought by Ngai Tahu (on the basis of the exhausting tribunal
report on their claim) and by the Tainui tribes, the core of the kingi-
tanga whose claim for compensation for land confiscation the govern-
ment has, in principle, acknowledged. Very high expectations have
been generated among Maori by the 1985 amendment and the legis-
lation affecting SOE assets and Crown forests. Estimates of the total
value of Maori claims range as high as $93 million, far beyond the
capacity of the economy to bear. By 1994, with no agreement on a
benchmark settlement and both government and Maori impatience ris-
ing, the government—guided by Mr. Doug Graham, minister for Jus-
tice and minister in charge of Treaty of Waitangi negotiations—sought
to impose what it regards as realistic bounds on the whole process.
On December 8, 1994, amidst considerable fanfare, the government
released a set of “Crown Proposals for Settlement of Treaty of Wai-
tangi Claims.” The essence of the proposal was a “Fiscal Envelope”
or “Settlement Envelope” of $1 billion, less the direct cost of the fish-
eries settlement, estimated to be $170 million, and less research costs
funded by the Crown since September 1992. This sum was fixed and
nonnegotiable. All other settlements of historical grievances were to
be met from this “fiscal envelope” over about a ten-year period. Each
claim was to be individually negotiated and settled; there would be
no “global” or pan-Maori settlement. The government would require
to be satisfied that Maori negotiating parties were properly recognized
representatives of their group; the Waitangi Tribunal or the Maori
Land Court could hear objections on that point. A date by which his-
torical claims should be lodged would also need to be agreed upon.
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The proposal immediately met with concerted opposition from
Maori. The government had hoped to oblige Maori to come to real-
istic negotiating positions, having regard both to the economy as a
whole and to those groups coming later in the queue (rather than
having Ngai Tahu and Tainui, for example, carry away the bulk of
the recompense, leaving little for those who come after). From Maori
points of view, however, the “fiscal envelope” invited an unseemly
scramble for hopelessly limited payments. More seriously, many senior
and moderate Maori leaders were affronted that the whole proposal
had been determined without widespread formal consultation with
Maori: They saw it as Pakeha paternalism again, diminishing Maori
rangatiratanga.
Indeed, the proposal had about it the air of an attempt to stuff the
genie back in the bottle, after another paternalistic and ill-considered
act of government in 1985 had let it out. It is indeed understandable
that government in the mid-1990s should try to bring within bounds
the so-called “grievance industry” launched in 1985, but it has gone
about it in a somewhat inept fashion. Just as Geoffrey Palmer and
David Lange in 1984–1985 essentially bypassed much of the Maori
leadership, so did Messrs. Graham and Bolger in 1994. They fear
that the “grievance industry” is divisive of Maori against Pakeha,
threatening to economic stability and indeed to civil order, since extra-
vagant claims cannot be met and some Maori radicals have made
threats to property if they do not get their way. But most Maori do
not want instability either and are concerned about the increasingly
fierce divisions between Maori that the claims have fostered. The gov-
ernment could well take them more into their confidence in addressing
these matters. For Maori too have vested interests in the New Zea-
land economy. Either they are themselves entrepreneurs and farmers,
or they know well that the horrendous unemployment among Maori
needs to be reduced by economic development. More fundamentally,
they are angry about being treated as junior players, not equal treaty
partners, as the rhetoric of governments and judges since 1985 would
have them believe.
Ultimately self-defeating too, probably, is the government’s deter-
mination to negotiate each and every claim, with a “global” Maori
settlement ruled out. For many Maori are not tribal; at the last census
some 20 percent could not name their tribe. Yet Maori as a whole
were injured by the landgrab. A more flexible strategy is certainly
called for, with particular injuries addressed but also the systematic
and structural causes of marginalization, namely the advent of a
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money economy—an economy based on capital investment among a
people who could raise no capital except by selling land and who were
then prevented by the divisive land laws and compulsory acquisitions
from readily engaging in development themselves.
Some Maori leaders are urging that too much focus on the past is
intensifying divisions and is wasteful of precious energies and re-
sources, leading to exaggerated demands. They would settle for an
adequate transfer of capital and resources to provide an economic base
for each region, including interests in urban developments—a demand
common to the whole Pacific region in fact. Generally, however, re-
source transfer to Maori remains linked to treaty claims.
Moreover, there have been some important settlements of claims.
Within a week of announcing its proposals, which included the “fiscal
envelope,” the government announced that it had reached agreement
with the Tainui tribes of the central North Island with regard to
claims arising from the vast confiscations of land in the Wiakato
Valley in the 1860s. The settlement was for $170 million, partly in
land (including that upon which the University of Waikato has been
built) and partly in cash. Although not all hapu were content with a
settlement far below the current value of the land taken, Sir Robert
Mahuta and the central leadership of the kingitanga (essentially a
Tainui organization) believed that time was important: With capital
of that order they could set about achieving their social, economic,
and educational goals and buy back more land in the bargain. So far,
their management strategies suggest that their optimism is entirely
justified.
In 1997, Ngai Tahu also agreed with the Crown a settlement
package of $170 million in land and money. Ngai Tahu also won
important rights of comanagement in the conservation estate, which
is so important to both Maori and non-Maori in New Zealand’s beau-
tiful South Island.
In the light of the Tainui settlement and of research that has shown
the level of claims settlements still to be faced, the coalition govern-
ment that took office in late 1996 declared that the fiscal envelope of
1994 was no longer official policy and that existing levels of settle-
ment would be regarded as a benchmark for future settlements. The
Tainui (Waikato confiscation) claim is widely accepted to be one of
the three or four biggest historical treaty claims. It may be assumed
that others will be ranked against it.
Unfortunately, although the Waitangi Tribunal had issued more
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reports favorable to Maori claimants (notably regarding Muriwhenua
and the Taranaki district, where some 1.2 million acres were confis-
cated in the 1860s), no other major settlements with the Crown have
yet been agreed to. This is largely because of the complex divisions
within Maori society, where each hapu is jealous of its mana and
reluctant to surrender the power of negotiation (and the assets that
might follow) to an overarching central body. Yet if settlement funds
and assets were divided among the many hapu in a district, the devel-
opment opportunity offered by a substantial pool of capital and assets
would be dissipated. The Waitangi Tribunal has power to mediate
between contending hapu, but there is a growing need for it to be
given a statutory power of arbitration as well, so that the rights of
hapu are not overlooked by a central multitribal authority—but that
an intransigent hapu cannot frustrate the opportunity for benefits to
flow to the wider Maori community of the area.
The treaty claims process in New Zealand has evolved remarkably
over the last ten years to the point that relevant systems of knowledge,
both Maori and non-Maori, have been brought to bear very effectively
to evaluate Maori claims regarding breaches of treaty principles. There
have been enormous benefits from this in terms of understanding of
Maori culture and Maori history—understandings that are seeping
into the public consciousness and the formal education systems.
Maori, too, have recovered a sense of their own identity, at hapu as
well as tribal and national levels, and a much greater understanding
of just what happened to them during colonization. As regards the
retransfer of wealth by way of reparation for breaches of the Treaty
of Waitangi, it is almost as if Maori society had become too dynamic.
Adjusting the traditional social order to the exigencies of the modern
world has been a demanding and ongoing task since the eighteenth
century. It poses difficult new challenges to Maori today, and there is
some danger of polarization between the pragmatic Maori leaders
who desire to reach swift settlements with the Crown and the tradi-
tionalists who assert a kind of tribal (hapu) fundamentalism, compet-
ing with their kin for large shares of the settlement assets. The
controllers of knowledge systems in New Zealand have a huge respon-
sibility to understand all sides of these complex processes and help
their clients—in particular Maori students in schools and universities
—to appreciate their history, their tradition, and the change in their







The recent cause célèbre between Marshall Sahlins and Gananath
Obeyesekere involves more than a tempest in a teapot of exotic
details. Behind the obvious issue—of whether Captain James Cook
was perceived by Hawaiians in 1778–1779 as a manifestation of
their akua (a term at times translated into English as “god”) Lono—
are broader ones critical to both anthropology and history today: To
what degree, for example, do the present cultural politics of identity
demand a rethinking of anthropology’s ethnographic effort? Who
has the right to speak for whom in politically volatile arenas today?
Also: How does one evaluate conflicting claims about someone else’s
past? Must politically charged events in other societies at other times
generally remain enigmas to Western historians or can they, while out-
siders, still make sense of them? And looking at the controversy from
still another angle: Is academic scholarship mostly a matter of vexa-
tion and debate or is something approaching a common, cumulative
understanding of other people in other times possible? However we
frame the controversy, one point is clear: Behind the surface simplici-
ties, behind the antagonizing arguments, illuminating issues exist that
demand our attention.
Contexts
In contextualizing this cause célèbre, one might reasonably
begin with a rarely cited piece by Sahlins (1977), sketching out an
intellectual direction for anthropology in the 1980s. Here Sahlins first
A longer version of this chapter was published in Current Anthropology 38, no. 2
(1997):255–282.
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uses Cook’s apotheosis as Lono to illuminate broad themes of cul-
tural process in which efforts to reproduce the social order lead to
changes in it. Or, as Sahlins later wrote in Historical Metaphors and
Mythical Realities: “The great challenge to an historical anthropology
is not merely to know how events are ordered by culture, but how, in
that process, the culture is reordered. How does the reproduction of
a structure become its transformation?” (1981:8) The events set in
motion by Cook’s visits to the Hawaiian islands in 1778–1779 became
a prominent example of this thesis: Hawaiian efforts to cope with the
anomalies of Cook’s visit—by incorporating him into their cultural
order—led, over time, to transformations in that order. While not nec-
essarily stressed in key publications, Sahlins’ discussion of Cook’s iden-
tification with the Hawaiian akua Lono and his subsequent murder
attracted much attention from others interested in understanding these
well-known events. “The killing of Captain Cook was not premedi-
tated by the Hawaiians,” Sahlins wrote. “But neither was it an acci-
dent, structurally speaking. It was the [religious celebration of the]
Makahiki in an historical form” (1981:24). In Islands of History, he
added, “Cook’s death at Hawaiian hands just [after the Makahiki
could] . . . be described as [a] . . . ritual sequel: the historical metaphor
of a mythical reality” (1985b:105–106).
In The Apotheosis of Captain Cook (1992), Obeyesekere sought to
turn Sahlins’ thesis regarding Cook on its head. Instead of interpreting
Cook’s apotheosis as Lono in terms of Hawaiian mythology, Obeyese-
kere interpreted it in terms of European mythology. Instead of focus-
ing on Hawaiian rituals and symbols, he emphasized Hawaiian prag-
matics. Critically, he asserted the Hawaiians did not see Cook as the
god Lono; rather he was viewed as a chief named Lono.1
At the core of Obeyesekere’s analysis were two points. First, Obeye-
sekere stated that Cook’s apotheosis was based on European, not
Hawaiian, mythmaking: “To put it bluntly, I doubt that the natives
created their European god; the Europeans created him for them. This
‘European god’ is a myth of conquest, imperialism, and civilization”
(1992:3). And second, the plethora of sources cited by Sahlins (in
confirmation of his thesis) could be interpreted in a number of ways.
“The very possibility of a plausible alternative interpretation,” Obeye-
sekere noted, “is at the very least a demonstration of the folly of
attempting any rigid interpretation of symbolic form” (82).
Obeyesekere suggested that Western anthropologists such as Sahlins
had taken away Hawaiian voices by portraying their cultural catego-
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ries in a manner that separated rather than united them with Euro-
peans. He pointed out that Hawaiians possessed as shrewd a sense of
the pragmatic—what he termed “practical rationality” (i.e., “the pro-
cess whereby human beings reflectively assess the implications of a
problem in terms of practical criteria” 1992:19)—as Europeans did.
Obeyesekere felt as a Sri Lankan—as one from a country only recently
freed from colonialism—he had a certain insight into the colonial
politics affecting Hawaiians in times past that let him grasp their
experiences in ways that Western scholars such as Sahlins might not
(8–9, 21–22).
Sahlins first reaction was not to respond to Obeyesekere. He pre-
ferred leaving that task, he said, to reviewers (1995:ix). But the overall
tone of the more than twenty-nine reviews of The Apotheosis of Cap-
tain Cook that have appeared in print has been fairly positive. In fact,
Obeyesekere won two awards for the book, the Louis Gottschalk Prize
from the American Society for Eighteenth Century Studies being the
more notable. Clearly, if someone was going to defend Sahlins, it
would have to be Sahlins himself. Only he knew the primary material
in enough depth to answer the specific charges leveled against him.
(Being unfamiliar with key aspects of Hawaiian ethnography, most
reviewers tended to evaluate the controversy in fairly broad terms.)
How “Natives” Think: About Captain Cook, for Example (1995)
was Sahlins’ response. Hacking, in the London Review of Books,
called it a “work of refutation and revenge, judicious and remorse-
less” (1995:6). It focused on two central themes. The first restated
Sahlins’ position regarding various specifics Obeyesekere questioned
him on and sought to refute Obeyesekere’s criticisms point by point.
Sahlins considered a wide range of historical documentation involving,
to quote Hacking, “an immense amount of detail” (9).
Sahlins’ second theme related to broader issues raised by the
controversy. Where Obeyesekere emphasized transcultural aspects of
Hawaiian thought (in relation to practical rationality), Sahlins focused
on its cultural-specific qualities. “Epistemologies,” he stated, “vary
. . . with world views (cultural ontologies)” (1995:179). “Different cul-
tures, different rationalities” (14). Sahlins also accused Obeyesekere
of conducting “pidgin anthropology”—“substituting a folkloric sense
of ‘native’ beliefs for the relevant Hawaiian ethnography” (60). “When
I say . . . [Obeyesekere’s] distortions amount to a ‘pidgin anthropol-
ogy,’ I mean that they have the quality of ad hoc fabrications based
on a sort of generic primitivism, like Fenimore Cooper Indians. They
appeal to a popular sense of common average ‘native’ thought” (62).
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Differing Readerships, Differing Styles of Knowing2
A careful examination of Obeyesekere (1992) and Sahlins
(1995) suggests the two books are partly talking at cross-purposes.
No matter how much data each presents to buttress his case, the
other does not concur because each uses a different, but related, per-
spective to demonstrate different, but related, points.
Two central concerns pervade Obeyesekere’s analysis. They are ones
most readers today would readily accept. And for those not deeply
familiar with the Hawaiian data, they are concerns that indicate
Obeyesekere is “on target,” so to speak, in his analysis.
The first emphasizes the problematic nature of the historical mate-
rial. “One must probe into the hidden agendas underlying the writing
of [historical] . . . texts,” Obeyesekere notes (1992:66). In The Work of
Culture, he indicates: “A text does not exist by itself; it is embodied
in a context” (1990:130). For Obeyesekere, historical accounts “have
to be deconstructed before they can be effectively reconstructed as
reasonable history” (1992:144). Take Kotzebue’s account of his
Hawaiian visit, for example. While Kotzebue tends to be sympathetic
to indigenous Hawaiians, Obeyesekere observes, the material cannot
be accepted uncritically. To assess its value, one must carefully examine
the account’s contexts of production. Such cautiousness is particularly
important in respect to “on the spot” reports written by the British
during their stay. The unpublished journals and logs of the visit differ
in significant ways from later published versions, Obeyesekere notes.
Rickman’s published account at times “widely deviates,” for example,
from Rickman’s unpublished log (214, fn.73). Similarly, King’s offi-
cial account of the voyage differs from his original journal (124–125).
Second, Obeyesekere suggests that various agents of Western expan-
sion—explorers, traders, and missionaries—misperceived Hawaiians’
understandings of Cook. He asserts the apotheosis of Cook “was
created in the European imagination of the eighteenth century . . .
based on antecedent ‘myth models’ pertaining to the redoubtable ex-
plorer cum civilizer who is a god to the ‘natives’ (1992:3). The “idea
that the European is a god to savages is . . . a structure of the long
run in European culture and consciousness” (123). Also, accounts
written by Hawaiians under missionary guidance as statements about
the Hawaiian past—such as Mooolelo Hawaii—show considerable
missionary influence, Obeyesekere suggests. Mooolelo Hawaii could
be seen, he indicates, as “a mythic charter for the new vision of
Hawai‘i of the evangelical missionaries” (162). This is why Obeyese-
424 “Postcolonial” Politics—Integrating “Past” and “Present”
kere, in various conversations, has suggested his book is more about
European than Hawaiian society. It involves exploring the distorted
lenses through which westerners see Hawaiians. In a way, certain
of Obeyesekere’s criticisms regarding Sahlins derive from this point:
Sahlins, as a Western scholar, continues earlier European “myth
models” of Hawaiians (177). Embedded in Obeyesekere’s statements
is a certain moral positioning. Given the gaps and silences that exist
in various historical accounts, modern scholars need give new voice to
indigenous perspectives, he says, by “reading across the grain” of
previous history tellings. Obeyesekere states: “One of the disconcert-
ing features of contemporary scholarship on Cook . . . is the cavalier
manner in which bits and pieces from the missionary and Mooolelo
Hawaii narratives are taken to prove the hypothesis of the apotheosis.
I think these procedures are endemic to the scholarship pertaining to
nonliterate people who cannot strike back” (154). And later he adds:
there is much in the Mooolelo Hawaii “that is hidden, waiting to be
brought to the surface . . . an examination of [the Hawaiian] Kama-
kau’s text with a gaze of suspicion sheds considerable light on the
nature of an indigenous Hawaiian discourse that is the very opposite
of the evangelical” (168).
In emphasizing these concerns, Obeyesekere seems more intent on
creating doubt about previous analyses—and what else might be pos-
sible because of them—than in defending a particular position. Thus,
for example, he questions Sahlins’ interpretation of the initial “thefts”
at Kauai (in 1778) based on Cook’s limited knowledge of Hawaiian
and notes “alternative interpretations are possible” (1992:70). He
hazards his own “guess.” But it is only a guess. He never suggests it
as something definitive—presumably because he is sensitive to the
ambiguities of interpretation (82). Again and again he questions ear-
lier (especially Sahlins’) accountings of Cook’s visit (e.g., 86, 95).
Again and again, he suggests alternatives with such phrasings as:
“hence my hypothesis (78), “my own guess” (95), and “it is likely
that” (103). Rarely, however, does he take a definite stand regarding
the provocative possibilities raised.
Because Obeyesekere perceives a host of biases in the data, he is
selective concerning what he does and does not consider reliable evi-
dence. “I do not treat all texts the same way,” he writes. “I am suspi-
cious of some and treat others more seriously. I try to disentangle fan-
tasy, gossip, and hearsay from more reliable eyewitness accounts”
(1992:xiv). He relies, for example, more on Ledyard’s than Rickman’s
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account of the British stay at Kealakekua Bay (215 fn.78, fn.83).
Sahlins’ reliance on accounts by Kamakau and Malo for a description
of precontact beliefs he finds “untenable” (164). Obeyesekere is cau-
tious about taking a host of sources and, despite their various limita-
tions, piling one on top of another to get some overall sense of what
transpired at a particular time. By the way he contextualizes sources,
by the way he evaluates texts, it is clear he weighs the evidence with
deliberation (cf. 67).
Finally, I would add that Obeyesekere’s analysis often resonates
with our own understandings and our own times. The notion that
European explorers would see themselves as gods to Pacific Islanders
(1992:123), for example, makes sense to many in the context of
today’s postcolonial critiques. When Obeyesekere suggests something
“is therefore entirely possible” (e.g., 86), it is often a possibility that
makes sense to many Western readers. When he uses other Polyne-
sian chiefs to make deductions about the Hawaiian Kalani‘òpu‘u’s
motivations, such deductions fit with anthropological notions of com-
parison within a common cultural area (see Salmond 1993). And
when Obeyesekere talks of conspiracies (203, fn. 29), “shredding of
damaging evidence” (216, fn.29), and a “cover-up” (112), I have dis-
covered that many scholars think it makes perfect sense given our
times.
Sahlins takes a different tack. On the surface, he appears less con-
cerned with the relation between text and context and more interested
in specifics of the evidence. “An anthropology that defines itself as
‘cultural critique’,” he suggests, “too often dissolves into a ‘pseudo-
politics of interpretation’” (1994:41). He approvingly quotes Lucian:
“This, then, is my sort of historian . . . in his writings . . . [he lays]
out the matter as it is.” Compared to Obeyesekere, Sahlins speaks
with more confidence regarding what the documentary material sug-
gests. There is less hesitancy, less guess and hypothesis: “It will be
easy to show,” he writes, “that, in word and deed, Hawaiians received
Cook as a return of Lono” (1995:2). And in respect to the nature of
the makahiki celebration at the time of Cook, he suggests it is “an
empirical issue for the most part, to be settled by comparing the Cook
documents with the later Makahiki corpus” (31).
In contrast to Obeyesekere’s selective embracing of the documen-
tary evidence, Sahlins seeks to be more inclusive. One can hardly read
Sahlins (1995) without recognizing the enormous command he has
over the material. One can see it in details. He points out that Obeye-
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sekere’s depiction of Lono’s canoe, for example, is a misinterpretation
based on a missionary mistranslation of a Hawaiian text (105, 109).
One can also perceive it in citations. Sahlins repeatedly makes refer-
ence to a number of sources in developing a point: He cites Ellis,
Mariner, Dimsdell, the Vancouver people, and Little, for instance, in
respect to the role of Cook’s bones in post-Cook makahiki cele-
brations (110). Seven lines later, in relation to Cook’s divinity at
the time of his death, he considers Ellis, Judd, Kotzebue, Bachelot,
and Kamakau. (Sahlins’ bibliography contains 316 references; Obe-
yesekere’s 152.)
Rather than weighing one context of production against another,
Sahlins weighs one piece of evidence against another to ascertain gen-
eral patterns, to verify a particular assertion. Thus he notes that both
the Cook journals and the Mooolelo Hawaii “corroborate each other”
in respect to Kalani‘òpu‘u’s fighting on Maui and both are “consistent
with” the classic description of the makahiki calendar (1995:36).
In discussing the historiography of the makahiki, he refers to Malo,
K. Kamakau, I‘i, and Kepelino, noting “none of them seriously con-
tradicts the others or is in any way aberrant” (209). And in respect to
two of Ledyard’s assertions (regarding dismantling of a Hawaiian
heiau’s palings for firewood), he states “neither . . . can be corrobo-
rated from other accounts and the second is clearly contradicted by
later events” (268). Rather than dismissing this or that text because of
biases in its production, Sahlins prefers to see textual biases as cul-
tural information. He notes that “a report may be historically in-
accurate . . . yet still structurally revelatory”—such as the claim by
Hawaiians that Cook slept with the daughter of Kamakahelei at
Kaua‘i (43, 280; cf. Beaglehole 1967:266).
Sahlins does not deny the problems that Obeyesekere deals with
regarding the relation of text to context. But his weighing of infor-
mation, his examining the contexts of production, tends to be more
implicit than explicit or, perhaps better phrased, they are not so con-
sciously tied one to the other as they are with Obeyesekere. Sahlins
indicates in respect to the makahiki, for example, that “the evidence
shows substantial continuity and regularity of the celebrations” (1995:
27). But he does not elaborate on the point in ensuing paragraphs.
He waits until a few pages later to provide relevant documentation
(31, 208). Similarly, in reference to the makahiki he uses the phrase
“according to the classical rules,” implying some sense of definitive-
ness is involved (37). On the next page, however, in another context,
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we learn that “Hawaiians knew how to overcome their ritual
scruples.” And later still it is clear that Sahlins is well aware that
ritual can be flexible in nature (39, 251). The one notable exception
to this general style of presentation concerns his replies to Obeyese-
kere’s criticisms. Here he looks very intently at the relation of text to
context. In respect to Obeyesekere’s use of Chamisso (and Kotzebue)
as sources, for example, Sahlins considers in detail the various editions
of the text, even comparing English translations (99). And in defend-
ing himself against Obeyesekere’s assertions regarding the makahiki,
he contextualizes the basis of various Hawaiians’ knowledge claims,
especially K. Kamakau’s (208–209).
Sahlins’ assertions are commonly bold ones. He suggests that
Cook’s return (on February 11, 1779), for example, “presented a
mirror image of Makahiki politics” (1995:81). There are none of
Obeyesekere’s qualifiers here. Later he states: “The Hawaiian schema
of things can be understood as a unitary system of two dimensions”
(167)—again, few cautions and hesitancies. The use of “perhaps” and
“maybe” does occur. Regarding the opposition between the Lono
priests and “the king’s party,” he states (comparing accounts from
Cook’s visit with those of Portlock and Dixon seven years later): “The
opposition thus seems to have been recurrent, perhaps structural” (71;
see also 24 fn.10, 83). In relation to Obeyesekere, however, doubt,
qualification, hypothesis, and uncertainty are less central to Sahlins’
modus operandi.
It is here that Sahlins appears the most brilliant and, at the same
time, the most vulnerable. His powerful syntheses allow others to
make better sense of old confusions and complexities. He brings
diverse material together in an insightful, thoughtful manner. But it is
also this clarity of vision that sets off alarm bells in scores of post-
modern scholars sensitive to the ambiguities of interpretation and the
complexities of life. These alarm bells constitute a central element in
Obeyesekere’s critique (e.g., see 1992:67). While Sahlins may seem out
of step with current scholarly trends, a careful analysis of his work
shows he remains sensitive to the ambiguities of interpretation and
the flexibilities of structures. He simply does not emphasize them to
the same degree Obeyesekere does. They are not, as noted, always
closely enmeshed, one to the other. One needs to search a little—
which is why, perhaps, a number of anthropologists continue to insist
Sahlins seems insensitive to such issues. Yet a careful reading makes
clear he is sensitive to them. Take, for example, Sahlins’ statement:
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“Nothing guarantees that the situations encountered in practice will
stereotypically follow from the cultural categories by which the
circumstances are interpreted and acted upon” (1981:35). Or again:
“Every reproduction of culture is an alteration, insofar as in action,
the categories by which a present world is orchestrated pick up some
novel empirical content” (1985b:144). Or again: “To say that an event
is culturally described is not to say it is culturally prescribed. To con-
flate the cultural structuration of events with the necessity of one par-
ticular ordering is abusive” (1995:251).
Still, we might wish to ask Sahlins certain questions: When he
states, “‘Laying out the matter as it is’ . . . [involves] the historical issue
of understanding people’s cultural constructions of events” (1994:
41), what pitfalls does he see to the process? How are they different
from the one’s Obeyesekere takes up? Why quote Lucian rather than
Carr, Foucault, E. P. Thompson, or Dening as an anthropological
model for history telling? Why not weave text and context more
closely together?
Evaluating Conflicting Claims3
Given the different perspectives involved in the controversy,
how do we make sense of the different knowledge claims? If one thing
is certain, it is that we must move beyond first impressions.
One of the intriguing aspects of the controversy is that the dif-
ferences between Obeyesekere and Sahlins—on certain issues—are
not necessarily that great. This is true regarding Cook’s status as Lono
and the notion of “practical reason.” It is a small step, for example,
from saying Cook was perceived as a chief named Lono (Obeyese-
kere’s position) to saying Cook was perceived as a manifestation of
the akua Lono (Sahlins’ position) if one accepts that some chiefs pos-
sessed divine qualities. Obeyesekere acknowledges “it is possible that
Hawaiians had some notion of divinity inherent in chiefs of high
descent” (1992:198; cf. 91 and Sahlins 1995:128). Valeri—who is
well steeped in the material—perceives “no necessary contradiction
between the view that Cook was Lono the chief and the view that he
was Lono the god. A contradiction only arises when a non-Hawaiian
view of ‘divinity’ . . . is introduced into the situation” (1994:126). To
be a human chief, then, did not preclude the possession of divine at-
tributes. Or to reverse the statement, to be seen by various Hawaiians
as a manifestation of Lono did not mean Cook was perceived by these
Hawaiians as somehow less human.
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In respect to “practical rationality,” one might note that neither
Obeyesekere nor Sahlins disputes that “magical” and “practical” rea-
soning can be entwined, one with the other (see Obeyesekere 1992:
15, 21, 205 fn.48; Sahlins 1995:6, 155). Nor would either disagree, I
presume, with Obeyesekere’s statement that a “common humanity
. . . [underlies] formal differences” (1990:218). But how does one give
this statement concrete form? If one seeks specific examples of “prac-
tical rationality,” there is a rich literature in Polynesia on pragmatic
perspectives (e.g., see Borofsky 1987; Howard 1970, 1974; Levy
1973; Marcus n.d.; Shore 1982). But isn’t such cultural specificity the
very specificity that Sahlins stresses (e.g., see Sahlins 1995:155, 169)?
The question really involves an empirical issue: How does a postulated
pragmatic transcultural tendency work itself out in a specific island
environment? What seems to be cultural-specific? What might be
viewed as transcultural?
A careful reading of the published and unpublished accounts of
the British visit to Hawai‘i makes another point: The British did not
grasp everything that was happening around them (e.g., see Beaglehole
1967:506). Whatever their linguistic and ethnographic abilities, it is
clear they did not fully comprehend certain Hawaiian perspectives and
practices (cf. Sahlins 1995:275–277). Most sought to report events as
they saw them—as was their task (cf. Smith 1960:2; 1992:25–26). But
different people saw different things and people seeing the same event
reported it differently at times. The result is a set of overlapping but
divergent accounts. This means modern scholars can comb through
the material, selectively choosing quotes here and there to support dif-
ferent arguments. While reading eyewitness accounts of centuries’ old
cross-cultural events may impress some ethnographic historians, they
need to be rather cautious about relying too much on any single
account. Each account must be viewed within the context of the
whole corpus of material. The plausibility of any assertion has to be
judged in relation to what others reported at the same time in the same
place (cf. Sahlins 1995:117; Obeyesekere 1992:203 fn.29).
Parenthetically, I would also add—and this is obvious to some but
not others—that whether Obeyesekere’s or Sahlins’ analysis makes
more sense to us is not the central issue. What we need ask is which
analysis accords better with Hawaiian and British understandings of
1778–1779—as they have come down to us today (cf. Sahlins 1995:
127, 151–152). As one works one’s way deeply into the material—first
in terms of the logic of each argument and secondly in terms of the
supporting documentation—certain points, I believe, become clear.
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First, there are serious problems with Obeyesekere’s argument.
Geertz’s statement that Obeyesekere’s argument follows the “beat-
the-snake-with-whatever-stick-is-handy” (1995:4) strategy catches the
sense of Obeyesekere’s presentation. His subarguments do not neces-
sarily tie together as a coherent, cogent whole. Important discrepan-
cies and contradictions exist. Obeyesekere’s central premise that a
European myth of the long run depicts Europeans as gods to savage
peoples’ faces, for example, a basic contradiction. Both Sahlins and
Obeyesekere agree that nowhere else in Polynesia did the British
describe Cook as being taken for a god (Obeyesekere 1992:87; Sahlins
1995:178)—even where indigenous populations seemingly did hold
such an opinion of him (e.g., see Salmond 1993:51). If Cook’s apo-
theosis was a European myth (rather than a Hawaiian assertion),
should it not have also been noted elsewhere as well? The one related
example Obeyesekere notes for the Pacific—involving Wallis at Tahiti
(1992:123; Robertson 1973:43)—is ambiguous and incomplete. It in-
volves a single phrase. It needs to be supplemented by a host of addi-
tional cases, especially from the Cook voyages. The myth, I would
add, also runs counter to a sense among many in England during
this period—particularly among those of “middling” rank—that it
was improper to place oneself at the level of God. What is intriguing
is that documentation for this point—a frequently cited passage by
Cowper (e.g., see Beaglehole 1964:289), a popular poet (see Davidoff
and Hall 1987:92, 157)—is right in Obeyesekere (1992:126; cf. Sahlins
1995:200). One need not really reach beyond Obeyesekere’s own
volume, in other words, to counter his thesis! One simply needs to
systematically sift through the data he presents. More generally, for a
book that focuses on the dynamics of a European myth, relatively
little space is taken up with examining the European contexts of the
myth (120–137; cf. Robertson 1981). Which Europeans at what time
adhered to this myth—before and during Cook’s years of exploration
—is left stunningly vague. Combining the Spanish Cortés with the
British Cook (two and a half centuries later) is a fairly broad stretch,
especially when so few other examples are given, especially when
contradictory information clearly exists for Cook’s time. A little in-
vestigation will also indicate to readers that, on various occasions,
Obeyesekere uses the same source in contradictory ways. He notes
that King’s published account differs from his shipboard journal (68),
for example, and uses this difference to discount a passage in Cook
and King (1784), the official admiralty account. Yet on the page before
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that, he indicates the shipboard journals might well be biased (67),
and a few pages later he cites both King’s journal and Cook and King
(1784) in discounting Rickman’s account (72). As for Rickman,
Obeyesekere doubts his linguistic ability and reliability as a journalist
(72–73) but then, shortly afterwards, cites Rickman as a definitive
source (81). (Rather than citing Rickman’s ambiguously reliable jour-
nal, in fact, he cites the still less reliable—by Obeyesekere’s assessment
—published account [217 fn.48, 71–72].) And he asserts S. M. Kama-
kau “has excellent accounts of native cosmology” but then indicates
they possess a range of biases that makes Sahlins’ reliance on them
“quite untenable” (164). Yet Obeyesekere himself cites Kamakau in
respect to pre-Christian Hawaiian understandings of akua (140).
Intriguingly, though these contradictions and gaps in argumentation
are fairly self-evident (I selected these examples for that reason), few
of the twenty-nine reviews of Obeyesekere’s (1992) book that I have
read refer to them. Of the reviews examined—Alter (1992), Levy
(1992), Burce (1993), Ernst (1993), Hanson (1993), Gough (1993),
Knauft (1993), Lamb (1993), Linnekin (1993), Martin (1993), Rose
(1993), Salmond (1993), Smith (1993), Thomas (1993), Campbell
(1994), Carter (1994), Frost (1994), Hanlon (1994), Kaeppler (1994),
Kame‘eleihiwa (1994), Lindstrom (1994), Linnekin (1994), Modell
(1994), Osborne (1994), Parmentier (1994), Thomas (1994), Valeri
(1994), Friedman (1995), and Parker (1995)—only Linnekin, Parker,
and Valeri discuss the second problem noted above and only Hanlon,
Linnekin, Knauft, Parmentier, and Parker discuss the third. No one
refers to the first. Part of the reason for this dearth of comment, pre-
sumably, is that reviewers must be highly selective, in the space allot-
ted, regarding their remarks. But such a shortage of space cannot
account, I believe, for the largely positive tone of most reviews—
especially when such contradictions are reasonably clear on close read-
ing. The dearth of critical comment on Obeyesekere’s arguments, I
suspect, stems from two other factors. The large number of citations
of unpublished and/or unfamiliar material can be intimidating to
reviewers. And, as noted above, Obeyesekere’s style and perspective
closely fit with current trends. The rush to review and the accepting
of current scholarly trends, I am suggesting, tended to have a beguiling
effect. It lulled many reviewers—particularly those unfamiliar with the
primary documentation—into accepting on trust Obeyesekere’s argu-
ments. After all, they do make sense to us.
What of the specific details that few reviewers could readily delve
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into? Obeyesekere (1992) contains much imprecise scholarship in this
regard. Sahlins accuses Obeyesekere of “selectively ignoring or mis-
representing the primary documents” (1995:117; cf. 193). That is true
in my opinion. Let me cite a few examples (leaving others to Foot-
note 3). Obeyesekere asks: “Who would have expected Cook, even
in his first voyage, to be a bit of a crook” (23)? The reference is to
Cook adding his two sons to his ship’s rolls—a practice Beaglehole
admits is “chicanery, but accepted naval custom” (1974:141). Obeye-
sekere, while citing Beaglehole’s reference to chicanery (and para-
phrasing the reference to accepted naval custom), emphasizes this
practice was “in flagrant defiance of an act of parliament which
threatened the penalty of permanent dismissal from the service” (23).
The fuller quote reads: In wanting his sons able to be naval lieu-
tenants before they were forty, Cook “was willing to follow the
example of post-captains and admirals innumerable, in flagrant defi-
ance of an act of parliament” (Beaglehole 1974:141). The fuller quote
makes Obeyesekere’s question a bit too dramatic. Cook seems much
less “a crook” given the British context and period—with such a per-
vasive practice, with such distinguished company. And it makes the
comparison (and generalization) that follows to “Italians and other
Third World peoples” (23–24) puzzling, especially given that the
above example appears the sole basis for Obeyesekere’s analysis of
eighteenth-century British morality as “moral familism.” A closer
study of British laws and their violation would be in order (e.g., see
Hay and Snyder 1989; Linebaugh 1992; Gilmour 1992; Thompson
1963). Obeyesekere (206 fn.10) indicates that Beaglehole does not
refer to the prize for discovering the Northwest Passage. That is in-
correct. It is dealt with fairly extensively (1974:478, 484)—more accu-
rately and in more detail, in fact, than in the reference Obeyesekere
cites. Obeyesekere (44, 209 fn.118) quotes Beaglehole (1973:646) as
indicating “it begins to look as if Cook . . . had lost touch with his
men.” Such a quote may exist. However, it does not exist on the cited
page. Obeyesekere refers several times (e.g., 44, 53, 64) to Cook
going “round and round” the island of Hawai‘i. Beaglehole (1967:
268, Figure 8) and Cook and King (1784:3:map prior to page 1)
indicate this is incorrect. The British sailed around the island once.
And finally, Obeyesekere cites Todorov’s Conquest of America as the
“immediate intellectual precursor of Sahlins’ own work” (16). Todo-
rov’s book was published in French in 1982—a year after Sahlins’ ini-
tial major statement (1981)—and in English in 1984. (The reference
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Obeyesekere cites for Todorov is a 1987 edition.) The statement makes
no sense as presented.
Obeyesekere at times significantly misrepresents Sahlins’ work. For
example, he argues that: “Hawaiian culture . . . Sahlins says . . . is
given to ‘stereotypic reproduction’”(1992:55). Yet Sahlins actually
says: “as for stereotypic reproduction, strictly speaking, it does not
occur” (1977:23). And later, in a book Obeyesekere repeatedly cites,
Sahlins writes: “I argue that . . . the theory [of stereotypic reproduc-
tion] is better reversed: plus c’est la même chose, plus ça change”
(1980:7). When Obeyesekere finds data contradicting “stereotypic re-
production”—such as in regard to the makahiki’s ritual schedule in
relation to Cook’s visit (64–65)—he claims it casts doubt on Sahlins’
position. It might more reasonably be construed as why Sahlins never
held that position in the first place. On page 181, Obeyesekere states:
“Sahlins has to alter the British accounts to make them fit his myth
. . . Sahlins has to distort the evidence . . . [and] Sahlins again misunder-
stands the evidence.” A careful reading of the cited references will
indicate that none of these statements is true. Readers might perceive
these commentaries, at first glance, as significant critiques of Sahlins’
work. But a careful examination of the documentary material, refer-
ence by reference, indicates otherwise.
I asked Obeyesekere on two occasions why he wrote his book in
such a polemical style (he agrees it is polemically written). And both
times I received the same answer—to stir things up. Yet what he has
done, more than simply stir things up, is show how academic scholar-
ship often depends on appearance and trust, as the reviews make clear.
We are thus left with some significant questions: With so much
going for him—in terms of general concerns most modern scholars
would concur with—why did Obeyesekere frame his arguments and
supporting data so much at odds with key portions of the documen-
tary material? For someone so concerned with text/context relations,
why did he take so much of Sahlins’ work out of context? And why
make The Apotheosis of Captain Cook so polemical that the chance
for meaningful dialogue with Sahlins—about a host of critical anthro-
pological issues—was essentially destroyed?
Reexploring the Documentary Data
If we set aside the controversy’s polemics and work our way
once more through the documentary materials (and the contexts
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within which they were produced), considerable headway, I believe,
can be made in unravelling certain issues.
In respect to Cook as Lono, a few points shine through the data.
First, there are a host of ambiguities regarding what “Hawaiians”—
as some collective unit—thought of Cook. Let me provide a sampling
of the uncertainties. Valeri suggests Lono may have been associated
with the color black (1985:15) and Malo indicates the makahiki image
associated with Lono involved white tapa cloth (1951:144). But there
are a host of occasions in which Cook is associated with the color
red—especially being wrapped in red cloth: Cook and King (1784:3:
5, 7, 13, 18), Beaglehole (1967:504, 505, 1195), Obeyesekere (1992:
46, 65), and Sahlins (1995:69, 224). What did it signify? Red may
not have been specific to a particular akua (Sahlins 1995:54; Valeri
1985:390 fn.79), but Valeri suggests that it might well have been asso-
ciated with the Hawaiian akua Kû (12, 15, 270, 322). Cook’s identi-
fication with Lono in respect to color, in other words, is not neces-
sarily clear cut. We might add, given that Hawaiian akua tended to
be transcendent—appearing in various forms (Sahlins 1995:196; Malo
1951:83; Valeri 1985:325, 327)—a host of Hawaiians were presum-
ably uncertain as to Cook’s relation to Lono no matter what color he
was wrapped in. Nor is the ritual ceremony at Hikiau involving Cook
necessarily that clear in respect to Cook’s association with Lono. The
concluding rite, the Hânaipû, is definitely associated with Lono (see
Sahlins 1995:55–58)—but the rites preceding this? That is less certain.
They involved “most probably,” Valeri states, “an ad hoc creation
that combines the crucial rite in the cult of Kû with the crucial rite in
the cult of Lono” (1994:129). Nor, as Kane (1994:19) points out, did
chiefs prostrate themselves to Cook in the kapu moe position; only
commoners did. In their gift exchanges, there was often a sense of
equality (see Beaglehole 1967:513, 517–518). A careful reading of the
documentary material suggests, then, that ambiguities exist concern-
ing who believed what about Cook during which period of the British
stay (cf. Obeyesekere 1992:65 and Sahlins 1995:65, 66, 279). The real
problem here lies not with the data, I would suggest, but with our
efforts to make sense of the data—with our believing Hawaiians pos-
sessed some consistent, collective “group mentality” regarding Cook.
But if not all people seemingly concurred on Cook’s status, we need
ask who, at Kealakekua Bay, would most people have turned to—or
felt obliged to defer to—in respect to such matters? If a belief in the
akua Lono existed among Hawaiians—and neither Obeyesekere nor
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Sahlins has ever suggested anything to the contrary—then who had
the authority to specify Cook’s relation to this akua? The documen-
tary material makes clear the priests of Lono at Kealakekua Bay (e.g.,
Kanekoa, Kuakahela, Ka‘ò‘ò, Keli‘ikea, and Omeah)—because they
were the priests of Lono—had this authority. They were, as Sahlins
notes, Lono’s “legitimate prophets” (1985b:122). But I would add
that, given the oppositions that clearly separated chiefs from priests
(e.g., see Beaglehole 1967:510, 543, 560; Cook and King 1784:3:69;
Sahlins 1995:80, 256–263; cf. Obeyesekere 1992:171), not all Ha-
waiians apparently accepted these priests’ authority all the time.
One other point seems clear. We know these same Lono priests
continually supported the British—both during and after the maka-
hiki at Kealakekua Bay. From repeatedly providing food (Beaglehole
1967:510; Cook and King 1784:3:14–15) to the returning of a piece
of Cook’s “hind parts” (Beaglehole 1967:560; cf. Sahlins 1995:68),
the British noted “the very extraordinary marks of attention & disin-
terest’d proofs that the fraternity of Priesthood had paid the Captain
& we who liv’d on shore” (1967:560, also 509). It was these same
priests, moreover, who continually reinforced Cook’s association with
Lono: “Whenever Captain Cook came on shore, he was attended by
one of these priests, who went before him, giving notice that the
Orono had landed, and ordering the people to prostrate themselves”
(Cook and King 1784:3:14). The documentary material indicates not
everyone was so deferential or so loyal: “We had not always so much
reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the warrior chiefs . . . as
with that of the priests,” Cook and King states (1784:3:15). “In all
our dealing with the former, we found them sufficiently attentive to
their own interests.”
The controversy thus revolves around who among the “powers
that be” had the power to objectify their interpretations of Cook (cf.
Sahlins 1985b:121–122; 1995:65)? With the onset of the makahiki—
especially if we follow both Obeyesekere and Sahlins and assume there
was some flexibility in its scheduling (Obeyesekere 1992:99; Sahlins
1995:32–33, 220–222)—we might assume the Lono priests were at
the relative apex of their power for the year. Many others deferred to
their interpretations. After the makahiki—during Cook’s second stay
at Kealakekua Bay—it was a more open matter. This would explain
the varied attitudes toward Cook on February 13 and, especially, Feb-
ruary 14. Cook’s status at this time was an open question for negoti-
ation—not between the British and the Hawaiians, though that clearly
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went on—but, in respect to Cook’s relation to Lono, between the
priests of Lono at Kealakekua Bay and other Hawaiians. The contro-
versy thus hinges not on Western versus Hawaiian conceptualizations
of Cook but on different Hawaiian conceptualizations of Cook. The
British (and their mythology and/or rationality) had relatively little to
do with it. Only a sense of European self-importance would suggest
Hawaiians were the supporting characters in a British play rather
than that the British were the supporting characters in a Hawaiian
play at the Bay in 1778–1779. (For those interested, material indi-
cates how the dynamics of this Hawaiian drama unfolded in ensuing
decades: see Sahlins 1995:85–116, 134, 256–263; Valeri 1982.)
And yet, it is only fair to say, the British did have a part to play
in this Hawaiian drama. They selected who—among the British—
received deference from Hawaiians. When a Hawaiian chief (on
December 1, 1778) came on board the Discovery looking for “our
Arrona” (see Edgar’s journal of this date), he, unbeknownst to him-
self, got the wrong ship. Cook captained the Resolution. Similarly,
King and Bayly (Beaglehole 1967:504–506) were at the Hikiau cere-
mony, but neither of them reported they were the focus of Hawaiian
attention. When Clerke was given various signs of respect/adoration
(see Beaglehole 1967:1165), again, this did not upset the equation.
From a British view, the British Lono had to be Cook. He stood at
the top of the British social hierarchy.
In a way it would be fair to say—though space does not really
allow for an elaboration of this theme here—that the British had a
drama of their own to play out. There seems little doubt, for example,
that the British—with their weaponry, astronomical navigation, and
ability to manufacture daggers prized by Hawaiians—viewed them-
selves as technologically superior to Hawaiians. We see, on the colo-
nial periphery, an important result of the industrial revolution. It gave
Europeans a sense of intellectual superiority over others (cf. Adas
1989:7, 134 ff.). One might also note the British use of outward
mobility—movement to the colonial fringe—as a means for upward
mobility. Cook’s explorations, Smith notes, “provided the material
. . . [for] a new kind of hero . . . Cook is the self-made man. While
hidden among the obscurity of the vulgar, he . . . raised himself above
his station in life by assiduous application” (1992:225, 228). The
British, in brief, were involved in a play of their own—regarding def-
erence, technology, and social mobility (cf. Dening 1992). But such
upward mobility had its limits and, most certainly in the late eigh-
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teenth century, this mobility clearly stopped short of the divine—even
when it was framed in terms of those on the colonial fringe. The
closest one probably ever got—in the very best of circumstances—
would be the “demi-god or hero and distinguished title” status given
to Cook in Omai (see Dening 1986:114; cf. Obeyesekere 1992:129)
or given to Nelson after his death. More would be offensive to most
British sensibilities.
Deciding Who Can Speak for Whom
This brings us to one of the central as well as one of the
most problematic aspects of the controversy: the way various people
(including myself) claim insight into what earlier Hawaiians and Euro-
peans thought. How can others evaluate such claims? What does a
person need to know—to experience or learn—in order to possess
such authority? Obeyesekere feels he can understand earlier Hawaiians
through an intensive examination of the ethnohistorical sources, as
well as through his Sri Lankan experiences (e.g., 1992:xiv, 8–9, 21).
Sahlins feels he can understand them based on more than two decades
of ethnohistorical investigation (see Kirch and Sahlins 1992:1:ix and
references under Sahlins in 1995:299).
Such claims are not isolated, academic assertions. They occur
within a broader context that complicates their clarity. The right of
Western anthropologists to translate or speak for others (in Evans-
Pritchard’s sense, 1962:148–149) is very much under attack (cf. Asad
1986). Standing at the margins of one culture and speaking for those
across the “borderlands” of difference in another—speaking, that is
to say, for those who are deemed “different” from “us”—is not the
politically innocent experience it was perhaps once deemed to be.4 A
host of indigenous scholars now stand at these borderlands who find
an anthropological presence intrusive. Western anthropologists com-
pete for the authority these scholars would claim as spokespeople
for others. Such is the case in Hawai‘i. Anthropological authority in
matters Hawaiian is often viewed with suspicion, is often questioned
in the archipelago, particularly by Hawaiian activists (e.g., see Trask
1991; Kame’eleihiwa 1995).
The issue is further complicated by the fact that the intellectual au-
thority to make statements regarding who can speak for whom across
these borderlands is often based on criteria that explicitly or implicitly
exclude others. It involves less a discussion among claimants; more a
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setting up of barriers against others. Thus, for example, Obeyesekere
implies his experiences as a Sri Lankan provide him with insights into
Hawaiian behaviors that Sahlins lacks (1992:9, 21). And he suggests
that key portions of Sahlins’ argument cannot necessarily be taken
seriously because Sahlins does not really consider text/context rela-
tions (67–73). Sahlins accuses Obeyesekere of misrepresenting histor-
ical documentation to such a degree that he “systematically elimi-
nates Hawaiians from their own history” (1995:116; cf. 117, 193,
233). Both would speak for Hawaiians. And both would generally
dismiss the other’s claims to do so (e.g., for Obeyesekere see 1992:
21, 66–67, 155). As for Hawaiians, Kame‘eleihiwa asserts: “Natives
have often wished that white people would study their own ancestors
. . . instead of us, whom they generally misunderstand and thus mis-
represent” (1994:112; cf. Trask 1993:161–178). And Kane sees anth-
ropologists mostly talking about, rather than with Hawaiians. He
notes that anthropologists “seem to be in a system which rewards abil-
ity to spout current fad theory” (personal communication, 1996). He
suggests Sahlins’ (1995) book might be better entitled How Anthro-
pologists Think: About Polynesians, for Example.
Such barriers mean little sharing, little conversation, takes place
across the borderlands of difference. This is a shame because, first,
there are serious issues to be addressed here. There is the question of
to what degree being born and raised in a locale leads to effective
knowledge of that locale’s history. Reading references such as Den-
ham (1912:259), da Silva Cosme (1990:279–280), and Abeyasinghe
(1966:76–77) suggests ambiguities in Obeyesekere’s assertion regard-
ing Sri Lankans not treating Europeans as gods (see 1992:8–9). There
is also the question of whether one should apply the same standards
of morality to Polynesians as to Europeans. In discussing “terror”
(xv–xvi), Obeyesekere, for instance, is fairly critical of British vio-
lence toward Hawaiians (e.g., 41). Yet he seems to downplay similar
“terror” espoused by Hawaiian chiefs (e.g., see Beaglehole 1967:589;
cf. 1992:29–32 in relation to Beaglehole 1967:101). There is, more-
over, the intriguing situation of various modern Hawaiian scholars
siding generally with Obeyesekere against Sahlins (e.g., Kame‘elei-
hiwa 1994; Kane 1994) but siding with Sahlins in relation to key spe-
cifics against Obeyesekere (e.g., see Kame‘eleihiwa 1994:116; Kane
1994:20). Kame‘eleihiwa conveys both in print (117) and in personal
conversation that Obeyesekere’s perspective is acceptable to her as
long as he attacks Sahlins. But he need tread more carefully—and with
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more knowledge—if he is going to probe further into Hawaiian his-
tory and challenge other people’s interpretations.
Second, we lose the ability to evaluate scholarly works. In the social
sciences (especially in anthropology where few can “check” an ethnog-
rapher’s observations), intellectual authority does not tend to reside
in scholarly assertions. It comes from interactions of scholars with
their audiences through time. It is something that gradually gets estab-
lished through collective conversations, through “comparison, evalu-
ation, and debate” (Kuper 1989:455). Without such broader discus-
sion, without such interaction, we can only whistle in the dark,
trusting our own impressions as to what is (and is not) credible. We
saw this in respect to the reviews of Obeyesekere’s Apotheosis. Re-
viewers mostly responded based on what made sense to them. Just as
critical, the loss of conversation means we rarely learn from our dif-
ferences with others. We become frozen into positions, we become less
able to move beyond the complacency of our own constructions
toward increased knowledge (Borofsky 1987:155). Scholarship then
often becomes a matter of political positioning, of power and control.
What can result can be seen with Anahulu (Kirch and Sahlins 1992)
—one of the most sophisticated ethnographic histories ever produced
in the Pacific (and arguably one of the best ethnographic histories
produced anywhere in the last decade). By suggesting that the Ha-
waiian elite, as much as the foreign haoles, were responsible for the
immiseration of the maka‘âinana (commoners) during the nineteenth
century, Kirch and Sahlins have run afoul of certain Hawaiian activ-
ists. Sahlins is now deemed to “misunderstand” Hawaiian culture
(Kame‘eleihiwa 1995:16). Before Anahulu, Kame‘eleihiwa perceived
Sahlins in much more positive terms; not now (see also Kame‘elei-
hiwa 1994). The irony—tragedy would perhaps be a better word—is
that as Obeyesekere is being drawn into the meatgrinder of Sahlins’
determined scholarship—what Hacking calls Sahlins’ “revenge”—
Sahlins is being drawn into the meatgrinder of Hawaiian political
correctness—where one might perceive Obeyesekere as having his
“revenge.” Where will it end?
It might end with our conversations with one another—across our
differences—to build common points of reference. What the Obeyese-
kere-Sahlins controversy (and the larger controversy regarding who
can speak for whom) emphasizes is the need for common points of
reference regarding how we might (or might not) judge the credibility
of scholarly assertions about the Hawaiian past—or about any other
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past (or present) for that matter. What are the common points of ref-
erence that unite us in evaluating divergent knowledge claims? What
seems clear is that excluding others’ accounts as less than credible
based on one’s self-appointed criteria, one’s self-appointed authority,
shuts down meaningful conversation. It becomes the chosen only talk-
ing to the chosen. In claiming to speak for others, we seem mostly to
speak to and for ourselves—Kane’s point.
I am not dismissing the pervasive presence of politics and power in
intellectual controversies. But I am saying controversies such as this
one cannot only be a matter of politics—because this destroys our
ability, through shared, open conversation, to learn from our differ-
ences, to move beyond appearances of the moment to deeper under-
standing. The “real” issue behind this controversy, I would suggest,
is not how deep cultural differences go—with Sahlins stressing differ-
ence, Obeyesekere, cross-cultural similarities (cf. Geertz 1995:5). It is,
rather, to what degree we (and others) can converse across our differ-
ences—whatever they are, however deep they go.
The common points of reference are there to be built on. I sug-
gested above that we can make considerable headway in clarifying
the present controversy by focusing on three critical points: consis-
tency of argumentation, comparison of particular assertions with
material printed elsewhere, and paying particular attention to events
people generally agree occurred (such as the Lono priests’ consistent
support of the British up to and even after Cook’s death).
We are left with important questions for all of us—not just
Obeyesekere and Sahlins: What should the role be of ethnographic
history (and ethnographic historians) in this new “borderland” poli-
tics—now that indigenous scholars, from Hawai‘i to Haiti, challenge
the right of Western scholars to speak about “others” in other times?
What should our collective points of reference be? How can we best
“check on” each others’ assertions? How shall we converse in ways
that encourage shared learning?
Notes
1. Obeyesekere did not acknowledge similarities between parts of his thesis
and Friedman (1985). Rather, he preferred citing another predecessor—the
part-Polynesian anthropologist Te Rangi Hiroa, Peter Buck (1992:75).
2. Readers interested in additional references on points raised in this sec-
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tion may wish to consult the following: [1] on Obeyesekere’s perspective: his-
torical data problematic: 1992:xiv, 67, 69, 112, 116, 159); Western misper-
ceptions: (1992:20, 120, 123, 137, 140, 147–148, 173); creating doubt:
(1992:78, 86, 90, 98, 144); selective: (1992:154, 163, 182, 212 fn.54, 215
fn.78); one might also refer to Obeyesekere 1993, 1994, 1995; [2] on Sahlins’
perspective: concern for evidence: (1995:2, 100, 115–116, 117); command of
material: (1995:199–285); Geertz (1995:6); Hacking (1995); Fagan (1995);
Powers (1995); Corrigan (1995); weighing of evidence: (1995:21, 27, 43,
45, 51, 71); implicit concern: (1995:8, 10, 11, 14, 32, 38–39, 86, 97); ex-
plicit concern: (1995:98, 100, 108, 174, 279–280); bold daring: (1995:22–
23, 24, 45, 70, 71, 83, 218, 228); ambiguities and flexibilities: (1995:104,
106–107, 221, 222, 228).
3. Readers interested in additional references on points raised in this sec-
tion might consult the following: similarities, chiefs: Obeyesekere (1992:86,
91, 197); in relation to Sahlins (1995:2, 99, 128, 144, 196; 192, 194 et
passim, cf. 136); similarities, practical rationality: Obeyesekere (1992: 10, 18,
19); in relation to Sahlins (1995:152, 154, 169, 170); divergent accounts: e.g.,
Beaglehole (1974:674–675); Beaglehole (1967:547, 561, 567); cf. Obeyese-
kere (1992:234 fn.66); making sense: Sahlins (1995: 9, 118, 119, 121, 151,
152); problems with Obeyesekere’s arguments: Sahlins (1995: 110, 192, 236);
examples—[1] criticism without analyzing the context of Cook’s “terror”—
Obeyesekere (1992:xv–xvii, 27, 29, 30, 41, 80, 139); cf. Beaglehole (1967:
589); Rodger (1986:205–251); [2] the basis for choosing Obeyesekere’s inter-
pretations over others is unclear—e.g., (1992: 73, 155); in relation to (1992:
83–86); [3] the degree to which the Kâli‘i was a coherent ritual and what con-
stitutes “all sources” as the basis for deductions regarding the Kâli‘i: (1992:
182); in relation to (1992:199); [4] the basis for perceiving and/or deducing
major social divisions, such as between priests and “counselors” in Hawaiian
society: e.g., see Obeyesekere (1992:91, 93, 171); in relation to Sahlins (1995:
72, 197–198, 227, 256–263); Obeyesekere’s imprecise scholarship: (not tol-
erating resistance: 1992:6 vs. 27), (date of Sahlins’ talk: Obeyesekere 1992:8
vs. Sahlins 1995:3), (1992:32—Cook’s violence “unrecorded by any,” also full
Gilbert quote in relation to what is cited), (context of 1992:33–34 regarding
Cook at ‘inasi, e.g. limited citation of quote involving fn. 47 in relation to
Beaglehole 1967:151), (headshaving: 1992:36 vs. Cook and King 1784:2:
82), (1992:44 vs. Beaglehole 1974:648), (1992:45—Watts in relation to the
more complete quote in Beaglehole 1967:479–480), (1992:49—“every biog-
rapher and historian,” 1992:50 “most of these versions”), (1992:58—basis
for statements regarding makahiki’s occurrence, especially in relation to later
comments, e.g., 1992:95), (1992:116—“fabrication” overstates what Beagle-
hole reference asserts; while Ledyard’s book is not cited Ledyard clearly is in
Beaglehole 1974), (1992:159—citing of Stokes rather than actual, and full,
quote by Dibble 1909:iii–iv), (1992:83–84—basis for assertions regarding
Hikiau ritual, e.g., “it is clear,” “it is reasonably clear”), (1992:198 regard-
ing Dening in relation to Sahlins 1995:282–283), (1992:14—Cook’s beatings
in relation to Bligh, see full Dening citation 1988:22 or Dening 1992:61–62),
(1992:14—“curse the scientists” in relation to full Zimmermann 1926:48
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quote and context), (1992:203 fn. 29—basis of statements regarding “unre-
liable by modern standards” and “plagiarized” as a dismissal for Beaglehole
1967:ccviii–ccix, also the degree to which Obeyesekere then heeds such
statements in documenting his argument), (1992:203 fn. 29—basis for “silent
conspiracy” given citations relating to Cook’s role in his own death in Beagle-
hole 1967:clxxvi n.1, 537, 1536, Beaglehole 1964:305, and Gilbert 1926:
11; see also Fisher and Johnston 1979), (1992:75–76—“not one of the ships’
journal writers” in relation to Samwell [cited same page], King [cited same
page], and Clerke [cited in Beaglehole 1967:1536]), (1992:61—basis for de-
ductions regarding appearance of [given Malo 1951:83; Valeri 1985:325, 327]
and language spoken by Hawaiian akua); misrepresentation of Sahlins’ posi-
tion: (1992:21—“not much difference between King Kalani‘opu‘u . . . and the
god Kû”; also on what basis is Kalanio‘pu‘u interpreted as “king” rather
than a paramount chief), (1992:53—implication that Sahlins indicated “rit-
uals exactly paralleled”), (1992:56—“Sahlins does not explain why . . .”),
(1992:59—Sahlins never indicated intra- and interisland makahiki variations
did not exist), (1992:67—“virtually no instances in Sahlins’ corpus where a
source is critically examined . . .”), (1992:67—“information from any text is
used as long as it fits the structuralist thesis”), (1992:159—“if Mooolelo was
a product of . . . as Sahlins implies”), (1992:177—“empirical accounts . . . have
been subtly, and sometimes not so subtly rephrased or altered . . .”), see also
Sahlins (1995:29, 49, 193, 239–240).
4. A host of people use the term borderlands in overlapping but slightly
different ways (e.g., see Anzaldúa 1987; Rosaldo 1989; Thelen 1992; Alvarez
1995; Gutiérrez-Jones 1995). I would use it here in a general sense—as involv-
ing the ambiguous zone of transition between differences deemed important,
as a zone where hybridity flourishes (cf. Bhabha 1994; Gilroy 1993), and as
a zone where those who police border crossings—by others—assume much
authority.
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A VIEW FROM AFAR (MIDDLE EAST)—
AN INTER VIEW WITH EDWARD SAID
• Robert Borofsky: In the first chapter of Culture and Imperialism,
you write: “Appeals to the past are among the commonest of strategies
in interpretations of the present. What animates such appeals is not
only disagreement about what happened in the past and what the past
was, but uncertainty about whether the past really is past, over and
concluded or whether it continues, albeit in different forms.” One of
the key issues facing both the Pacific and the Middle East today—that
is brought out in the Firth and Jolly chapters and the poems by Lee,
Thaman, and Molisa—is to what degree colonial hegemonies of the
past remain in place in what is often referred to as the postcolonial era.
What is your opinion?
• Edward Said: First of all, I would not use the word postcolonial.
As implied in several chapters, the postcolonial period has not really
occurred. A lot of people ascribed to me the view that I am a postco-
lonial critic and that, in my books on Orientalism and Culture and
Imperialism, I played a role in establishing the field. But I do not
think that is accurate, because my interest is in showing that there is
a continuity between colonialism and postcolonialism. The people
who were oppressed before are often still oppressed, though perhaps
in different ways.
I think, then, it is very important to establish the continuities be-
tween colonialism and what follows it. In the 30s and 40s of this
century, the people of India and Indonesia and various parts of the
Middle East and North Africa, as well as in the Pacific, were op-
pressed and directly colonized people. What used to be called by world
historians “peripheries” are today still mostly peripheries. The domi-
nant powers are still the Western powers.
Second, the issues considering native people, whether they are in
the Pacific (in places like Hawai‘i and New Zealand) or elsewhere,
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concern oppressed minorities and the degree to which they have lost
their land and nationhood. Take the case of the Kurds, who have not
had a nation for dozens if not hundreds of years, or the Palestinians.
Their struggles still continue because a nationalist memory still exists
and because, in my opinion, insufficient restitution has been given
them.
• RB: Ward discusses the same issue regarding the Treaty of Wai-
tangi in New Zealand.
• ES: Exactly. Do not forget that until very recently historians wrote
the history of the New World from the point of view of Columbus,
not from the point of view of the people who lost it. So I think that
battle is still there. And within societies like the United States, if you
take the case of American blacks, Afro-Americans, the issue of what
is to be done about their long history of suffering, slavery, and in-
justice still continues because their descendants, those who are alive
today, remain in subordinate and subsidiary positions.
The point I am trying to make, and is in both your and Ward’s
pieces, is the debate still goes on because there is not a consensus as
to what happened. Most official historians, for example, would dis-
pute Howard Zinn’s A People’s History of the United States. If you
compare Howard Zinn on the history of New England settlement with
Bernard Bailyn or Oscar Handlin, both of whom are eminent histo-
rians, the latter emphasize a history of progress and development and
enlightenment and what happened to the Native Americans is inci-
dental. Whereas to Zinn, it is crucial. So I think whether on the level
of education, on the level of the writing of history by professional his-
torians, or on the level of teaching history, the whole thing is still up
for grabs. There is still a debate going on.
• RB: One point that is brought up in the “Postcolonial” Politics In-
troduction—and implicitly runs through several pieces—is the proble-
matic nature of nationalism and the nation.
• ES: That is correct. The nation is one thing. But nationalism, as
you note, is quite another. Nationalism as I read it is fairly universal
today. If you look at the ideology of nationalism, which generally I
am very critical of, there is always a component in it of celebrating
the nation, of making one nation central (versus other nations)—cele-
brating a particular national essence.
There is a certain kind of essentialism which seems to me constitu-
tive of every nation and every nationalism. I feel we need ask: Has
nationalism and building the nation for the common good actually
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produced more problems than it has resolved? Personally, I think that
it has created more problems.
• RB: There are certainly suppressions in nationalism.
• ES: Exactly. Take, for example, nationalism in, say, India in 1947.
There was the great movement of national independence from the
British. But central to it, we now know, was a movement of partition
and separatism: It was not a message of “we are all Indians together”
but rather “we are Muslims and Hindus.” Instead of living together
in some new group we might call a nation, or at least one India, each
wanted their own nation—a nation of Muslims and a nation of
Hindus.
So one of the tendencies of nationalism, in other words, is not to
unify but in some cases to suppress and other cases, in part because
of imperial policy, to encourage separation and partition, divide and
quit. On the whole, these tendencies have not been very healthy.
In nationalism, there is always an “other.” If you go back to Hero-
dotus, there are the Greeks and the Barbarians. This opposition is
absolutely central to all these things.
A lot of my work involves questioning the usefulness of this for-
mulation. I am interested to show the history of it—that there is a
long history going back to ancient times. The fact is that this sort of
“we-they” opposition seems to be increasing rather than decreasing.
That is what bothers me.
• RB: Some scholars suggest people in the Third World have tended
to construct their social identities around Western notions of nation-
hood and, as a result, have become entwined within Western hege-
monic frameworks even when opposing them.
• ES: I am not sure I agree with that. The argument is made by
modern historians of nationalism who say the whole idea of the nation
comes from the West. I am not sure that is true. If you look at, for
example, the ancient Near East or Africa—if you read the work of
Basil Davidson, Mahmood Mamdani, and other historians of Africa,
there are clear instances of what appears to be nationalism and
national identity well before it developed in Europe. On the other
hand, the Europeans did add something to the idea of nationalism.
But the argument that some make that nationalism comes from
the West I think is a flawed, partial, and really, in the end, a false
argument. It is another example of the West imposing itself on
others.
Or take the question of whether or not people have a “history.”
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Everybody has a history. I would say to be human is to have and to
make history. That is what distinguishes us from animals.
• RB: Let me turn to another theme of the “Postcolonial” Politics
section. The prose pieces by Diaz, Grace, Ward, and myself as well as
the poems by Balaz, Teaiwa, and Rasmussen revolve around questions
of identity and empowerment. How does one make sense of the colo-
nial past in a way that facilitates empowerment and identity today?
• ES: It is a central question these pieces raise. I am not so sure that
simply asserting one’s identity is enough. Let me take the case of the
Palestinians. We feel that we are threatened, so our cultural sense and
even national survival is very important to us. I think that it is abso-
lutely necessary to defend against your own extermination—whether
as a people or as a nation.
On the other hand, as Fanon says, that often is not enough. Take
Algeria. The French entered Algeria in 1830. Between 1830 and about
1850, the population of Algeria was decimated, almost literally. About
50 percent of the people of Algeria were killed. During that period of
slaughter, there was resistance. The resistance continued right up until
the official declaration of the Algerian revolution in 1954. After eight
years of colonial war, the Algerians drove the French out. The Alge-
rians may have lost militarily, but they won politically. The French
were forced to negotiate with them. In 1962 a new Algeria was born,
the nation of Algeria—independence. But look what has happened
since then. Today, Algeria is in the middle of a fantastically bloody,
murderous battle between religious extremists on the one hand and
murderous military forces on the other, representing the authority of
the state. The organizational authority that won the war against the
French is now engaged in a murderous war against its own citizens.
So Fanon was right. Nationalism is never enough. Once you have
nationalism in the form of independence and you win the war of
survival, there has to be a new consciousness born. Fanon called it a
social consciousness which transcends the national and sets about
defining relationships between people on something other than the
nation or nationalism—on class, on notions of equality or democ-
racy, for example.
The same is true in Palestine. As a result of the peace process,
Palestinians for the first time have something that is called a self-gov-
erning authority represented by Arafat and the Palestinian Authority.
What has happened? For years we spoke of wanting a democratic
state. We were going to be more enlightened than other Arab states.
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Well, in fact, there are often summary executions. There is no basic
law. There is no democracy. The newspapers are censored. Anybody
who says anything critical is put in jail. All this to supposedly protect
national identity. Well, I do not agree with that. It is not a reasonable
excuse.
So I think there has to be something more than nationalism and
national survival. And that has to be justice, there has to be a form, a
concept of citizenship, which allows people to engage with other
people in the same society on the basis of decent and fair participa-
tion. Unfortunately, that has not often been the case.
• RB: If we turn to literary forms of history telling—such as the
poems by Lee, Thaman, Molisa, Balaz, Teaiwa, and Rasmussen and
the short story by Grace—what role would you suggest such literary
efforts play in empowering people vis-à-vis their pasts?
• ES: That is a very good question. In fact, I have written a presi-
dential column for the Modern Language Association on that sub-
ject. First of all, I do not think that the classroom or the study of
literature in the classroom ought to be a place where social and polit-
ical problems are solved. One of the things that I noticed when I
went to South Africa, just after apartheid ended, was the understand-
ably triumphalist sense that injustice has been defeated. The old
apartheid culture was to be replaced by a new culture, more inclusive
of the oppressed black majority. I would be less triumphant. I do not
think that literature or the classroom can be used for the settling of
scores. On the contrary, I think the classroom ought to be protected.
Here we come to the study of literature. Students and teachers
should be able to read the major texts of their own and others’ pasts
under the same heading—of humanity’s general history. I think it is
very wrong and invidious to say we should only study the Western
tradition. I think the Western tradition by itself makes no sense be-
cause . . . it has a tremendous element in it of other cultures. So I am
in favor of a more ecumenical sense of literature.
Second, there is no substitute for careful and close reading. I mean
one of the problems that many of our students face, in the age of tele-
vision, is that they have lost the power to concentrate and read care-
fully a text which is complicated—one that has figures of speech in it,
different rhythms or ironies, different tones and voices. I think that is
terribly important.
And third, it is incredibly important not to read literature—this
perhaps is the most important point I can make—as if you were read-
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ing a sacred text, in order to venerate it and its authority. Rather you
should read it as a way of better understanding the human adventure
and the cultural context from which it came. That can lead you to
other literatures, other experiences.
And fourth and last, it should give rise in you to a certain critical
sense. In other words, what the reading of texts should leave you
with is an appetite for asking more questions—what you refer to in
the book as conversations. How did this come about? Where did that
come from? What are the uses to which it can be put? There is a sense
that this remains an everlasting effort. You do not read to learn sacred
truths and then walk out armed with them forever. Rather, reading
creates in the reader a skeptical sense.
As a teacher, I believe it is absolutely central that my role is not to
tell students to become my disciples. On the contrary, I should say
what I have to say and encourage my students to question it. Only in
the classroom can you have that. At the moment that you turn the
classroom into a place where you expound on your philosophy and
political ideas then, especially in the teaching of literature, that is
horrible.
Let me give you an example from my own experience. I am not
from the West. I am an Arab. I grew up in the Arab world. English
and European literature are not “my” literature. But I have never
taught anything else because it seems to me important to study it as
carefully and in as disciplined a way as possible. I should not use the
classroom as a way for pushing my identity and my background and
my literature on to students who therefore become captives of my
political philosophy.
• RB: In terms of the fragmented conversations you see academics
having today—regarding the past’s relation to the present and the
present’s relation to the past—what do you perceive as the cause?
What is behind the obscuring, fragmented language that you discuss
in your spring (1999) Modern Language Association Presidential
Column?
• ES: The reason for the factionalization—that I think is the main
problem—and the resulting jargonization is there no longer exists a
consensus about the object of knowledge. For the last twenty or
thirty years, there has been a steady erosion due to a number of
factors regarding what it is we are supposed to be doing. For example,
in a department of literature such as my own, a generation ago it
was understood that if you studied literature, you studied principally
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English literature. (I am talking about departments of English, now.)
You studied English literature and the approach was largely chrono-
logical. You started with old English, you did Chaucer and middle
English, then you went into the Renaissance, you studied Shakespeare
and Milton and then you did the Restoration, the eighteenth century,
the Romantics, and so on up to roughly the present. There was an
agreement on who the major figures were. Every student had to have
some knowledge of Chaucer, Spenser, Shakespeare, and Milton and
so on. And there was an agreement on what was literary and what
was not. There was a clear distinction made between literary writing
and nonliterary writing. In the case of ambiguous figures like Burke
or Gibbon, who were respectively a politician and an historian, there
was some consensus that they were also literary figures because they
wrote well and because their ideas merited that description.
In the last generation all this has disappeared. We no longer have,
in my department, any agreement on what the required body of liter-
ature is. We do not have a chronological sequence. We do not have
an agreement on the major figures. And we do not offer any standard
curriculum. The reasons for that go across the board, including
changes in the makeup of the student body, which is no longer will-
ing to accept the notion that literature written by largely white men
is literature.
The politics of identity, certainly feminism, has played a role here.
But gender studies and gay and ethnic studies have also encouraged a
revision of what is deemed literature. But with this expansion of the
boundaries regarding what is deemed literature has come a suppres-
sion of previously studied books that are no longer considered inter-
esting and important.
Second, there has been a dissipation of the consensus caused by
critical methods which—whether you talk about structuralism, post-
structuralism, deconstruction, or any other such approach—suggests
that the unit of study is no longer the literary work. You cannot say
where the literary work begins and where it ends—or even if there is
such a thing. Why should a pamphlet be less important than a novel?
Why should a great novel be more worthy of study than a minor
novel, which is perhaps more symptomatic of trends in demography
and property?
And third, there is general isolation of people in the humanities
from the outside world. Politics is no longer thought of as something
that you do outside the university, for various reasons. Politics has
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become too expensive. There is a general demotion of citizenship and
participation. The media, in a sense, have taken over the role played
by books and literacy. Today, people in the university confine their
politics to academic politics. It is easier to be a Marxist inside the
university than it is to be one outside. In a very sad way, the public
sphere has become somewhat irrelevant to the much more amenable
space within the academy, with its freedom and insulated comfort. It
is a new kind of provincialism.
• RB: As the general introduction to the volume suggests, there is
a need to broaden our conversations beyond the academy. What
would you see as the role of public intellectuals today?
• ES: In Representations of the Intellectual, I tried to address the
public role of the intellectual rather than the role of the public intel-
lectual. Roughly, summing up the argument, I feel there is a differ-
ence, first of all, between a professional and an intellectual. An
intellectual answers the demands not only of his conscience (or her
conscience) but also a public cause relating to justice or injustice.
Second, in terms of language and accessibility, the intellectual has
to use a language that is comprehensible, that is not technical, spe-
cialized or jargonistic, and must expose him or herself to public scru-
tiny and investigation.
And third, the intellectual has to be independent. There is a differ-
ence between alignment and complete conscription. I separate myself
from intellectuals who think their role is to advise power. My con-
ception of the intellectual is that of a dissenter, that of somebody
who speaks the truth to power but is not of power, is opposed to it in
some way, is independent from it.
And lastly, I suggest the intellectual ought to uphold universal prin-
ciples even though they may hurt himself or his people. Let me use the
example of the United States. If you condemn the invasion of Kuwait
by Iraq, then you ought, by the same token, to condemn all invasions
—illegal and unjust invasions, including the invasion by the United
States, for example, of Panama, Grenada, or Vietnam. You do not just
limit it to attacking foreign devils. You begin at home and are critical
of those you interact with where your role is the most important.
• RB: This brings me to the question of cultural sovereignty—a
subject that arises in the Obeyesekere-Sahlins dispute regarding Cap-
tain Cook and frames the writing of history today in the Pacific and
elsewhere. How do you make sense of cultural sovereignty beyond the
Pacific, and the politics that surround it?
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• ES: I think that it is often a dangerous formula for two reasons.
Number one, cultural sovereignty often can be used as a way of
giving people—to go back to South Africa or Indians on American
reservations—cultural rights but no political rights. The idea is you
can wear your costume, you can speak your language. That is what
they have tried to do with the Palestinians. They have given them
“autonomy,” which means they can teach what they like in the
schools. They can speak their language. But they do not have real self-
determination and remain without political sovereignty.
And number two, cultural sovereignty is often used as a club to
beat other people: saying I want, in this territory of mine, that only
certain languages, certain customs be observed. It is a way of curtail-
ing independence and freedom. My interest is in expanding these. I
think cultural sovereignty is very frequently a ruse of some authority
to browbeat and bully minorities.
There is the whole question about minorities. What happens to
them? I tend to think that we should really think about not so much
the abrogation as the abridgement of cultural sovereignty in order to
coexist peacefully with others. The moment that we start saying our
goal is cultural sovereignty, then my God, there is no end to it. Then
there are officially designated enemies, there are languages that are
declared to be no good, and so on.
• RB: Let me draw our discussion to a close by asking: What do
you think would be interesting comparisons one might make between
the Middle East and the Pacific? What would be interesting questions
to explore?
• ES: It depends, in part, on what part of the Pacific you are talk-
ing about. If you are talking about Hawai‘i, then you have almost
exactly the same story as Palestine. Europeans come there and claim
it is an empty place. They either destroy or subjugate the indigenous
population. In other words, many places share a common history of
colonialism.
There are also common histories of resistance. I think resistance is
terribly important because in no place did people just give up and
say: Okay, you can have the land, we are leaving. They always stood
and fought. And with that resistance came a culture of resistance, a
history of opposition. There was a notion of the indigenous peoples
uniting to fight outsiders so as to preserve their identity.
Also, in the case of successful struggles—there are not too many of
them—what happens after “independence”? To what degree is there
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now a new kind of dependency between the newly independent nation
and the former dominant power, or a new dominant power of the
day. This is what we are witnessing with globalization. In the case of
unsuccessful movements, what happens? How are they incorporated
or marginalized?
And of course, in both instances, there is a similar stress on the
need to hold on to the indigenous language. We are not going to learn
English. We are not going to learn Spanish. We are not going to learn
French. We have to concentrate on learning our own languages and






Shatrugun spots the boy in the crowd; he is standing under a
breadfruit tree at a distance from the watchers. All at once his
hair turns to resin, his arms become boughs and his feet sprout
roots that are driven miles into the earth. . . . Drive your roots
deep enough and you end up in infinity, says the breadfruit
tree. . . . But infinity does not nourish, retorts the boy-tree, and
promptly withdraws his roots to a patch of land beneath the
breadfruit tree. And then his roots are too close to the surface
and he reverts to the condition of a boy-farmer with feet, and
is instantly seasick.
—Sudesh Mishra in Lila
In an earlier publication (1994a), I offered a view of ourselves that is
more optimistic than the currently prevailing notions of our present
and future as peoples of Oceania. That view is tied to my firmly held
belief that all social realities are human creations, and that if we fail
to construct our own realities other people will do it for us. It can be
said that this concern is much ado about nothing. I wish that this were
true, but it is not. People with powerful connections have presented us
in certain ways, which have influenced our self-perceptions and the
ways in which we have been perceived and treated by others. In his
book Island Boy, Sir Thomas Davis, former prime minister of the
Cook Islands and prominent Pacific Islands regional leader in the
1970s and 1980s, says, in a telling statement of what could happen
when we accept other people’s representations of us, that:
Because we were told that small Pacific Islands states could never
make a go of it without largesse from their former colonial masters,
we did not try very hard to see the possibilities from our own points
This chapter evolved from talks delivered as an Oceania Lecture at the University of
the South Pacific, October 1994, and at the Pacific Writers Forum, East-West Center,
August 1994.
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of view which had to be quite different from theirs [Australians’
and New Zealanders’]. . . . We therefore accepted largesse as a right
without questioning the matter any further, and without the thought
that one day it may not be forthcoming. (1992:305)
As I said at the beginning, I have tried to deal with aspects of our
present and future. I propose now to look into our past. I believe that
in order for us to gain greater autonomy than we have today and
maintain it within the global system, we must in addition to other
measures be able to define and construct our pasts and present in our
own ways. We cannot continue to rely heavily on others to do it for
us because autonomy cannot be attained through dependence.
Intermittently in the 1980s and through to the very early 1990s, I
followed the discussions of ideas propounded by certain anthropolo-
gists about the constructions of the past and the politics of culture.2
What these cultural constructionists are doing is what we have been
doing all along—that is, constructing our pasts, our histories, from the
vast storehouses of narratives, both written and oral, to push partic-
ular agendas. One of the more positive aspects of our existence in
Oceania is that truth is flexible and negotiable, despite attempts by
some of us to impose political, religious, and other forms of abso-
lutism. Versions of truth may be accepted for particular purposes and
moments, only to be reversed when circumstances demand other ver-
sions; and we often accede to things just to stop being bombarded, and
then go ahead and do what we want to do anyway.
But cultural constructionists of a certain persuasion have gone be-
yond the bounds by arrogating to themselves the role of final arbiters
of what is true or false in our societies: true history, false history; gen-
uine culture, spurious culture. It is a new hegemony, or perhaps it is
the old one in a new guise. Our chiefs and other leaders have been
doing it, but we have ways of dealing with this sort of thing. Our
freedom lies in part in the flexibility in all kinds of discourses on the
nature of our societies and on the directions of our development.
There are no final truths or falsehoods, only interpretations, tempo-
rary consensus, and even impositions, for particular purposes. Cultural
constructionists aim to control and direct our discourses on our own
affairs, which is unwarranted. It is also potentially dangerous, for
these scholars could be politically influential, as Haunani-Kay Trask
(1991) asserted.
Until recent years with the rise into prominence of historical anthro-
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pology and ethnographic history, there has been a near-total domina-
tion of the scholarly reconstructions of our pasts by the Canberra
school of Pacific historians. From their works we can see that funda-
mental to the conceptualization and writing of our histories is the
division of our past into two main periods: the precontact and post-
contact periods. The determining factor for this is the presence of
Europeans with their traditions of writing and recording. Many years
ago, while visiting a rural community in Papua New Guinea, I was
invaded by a particularly virulent kind of lice. Some people call them
crab lice, but these looked more like giant lobsters. I went to a nearby
hospital run by a group of missionary sisters, one of whom told me
in a serious and concerned manner to be very careful, for any slight
body contact with the local inhabitants would cause much misery.
Since then I have always associated the word contact with nasty infec-
tions. As used by historians and other scholars the term is very apt; it
describes accurately the first and early encounters between Oceanians
and European sailors as carriers of dangerous diseases that wiped out
large proportions of our populations in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. Within one hundred years the indigenous population of
Hawai‘i, for example, was reduced by more than 90 per cent. There
was a real concern toward the end of the last century that we would
vanish from the face of the earth because of rampaging introduced
diseases. Ironically, a major concern in these twilight years of the twen-
tieth century is that there are too many of us around.
Marxist sociologists, who began arriving at our university in the
early 1980s, would not use the term contact because of its capitalist
association. Instead they introduced a beautiful substitute, penetration,
as in “capitalist penetration of the Pacific” or “get penetrated.” This
is also a very apt term for it connotes consummation without mutual
consent. We should get rid of these words and use better ones like
meet, encounter, and so on.
The point is that for Pacific scholars the main factors for the recon-
structions of our pasts are events determined by Euro-American im-
perialism. Our histories are commonly structured on the temporal
division of the past into precontact, early contact, colonial, and post-
colonial or neocolonial periods. In this formulation, Oceania has no
history before imperialism, only what is called “prehistory”: before
history. In many if not most of our history books, more than 90
percent of the period of our existence in Oceania is cramped into a
chapter or two on prehistory and perhaps indigenous social organiza-
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tion. These comprise a brief prelude to the real thing, history begin-
ning with the arrival of Europeans. As it is, our histories are essen-
tially narratives told in the footnotes of the histories of empires.
For those of us who want to reconstruct our remote and recent
pasts in our own images, for the purpose of attaining and maintaining
cultural autonomy and resisting the continuing encroachments on and
domination of our lives by global forces aided and abetted by com-
prador institutions, this kind of history is a hindrance. Although it is
very useful and essential for the understanding of vital aspects of our
heritage, it is a hindrance in that it marginalizes our peoples by rele-
gating them to the roles of spectators and objects for transformation
into good Christians, democrats, bureaucrats, commercial producers,
cheap laborers, and the like. It does not see them as major players in
the shaping of their histories. The main actors are explorers, early
traders, missionaries, planters, colonial officials and regimes, and so
forth.
Pacific histories also marginalize almost all our pasts by considering
them not history, or prehistory, to be dealt with by folklorists and a
dwindling number of archaeologists and linguists. It can be argued
that it really is the case that we have no history before imperialism. I
cannot accept that, because we can argue that the much maligned oral
narratives are as reliable or unreliable, biased or unbiased, as are
written documents for sourcing history. We do know that all sources
are contestable, else history is complete and closed, which is nonsense.
Every generation rewrites its history, as the saying goes. Besides, main-
line history is only one way of reconstructing the past, which has no
existence without reference to the present. How one reconstructs the
past, as history or whatever, is a political act, a choice from valid
alternatives made for particular purposes.
When you view most of a people’s past as not history, you shorten
very drastically the roots of their culture, or declare their existence
doubtful. It is not surprising then that many academics hold the view
that the peoples and cultures of Oceania are inventions of imperialism.
This view has attained the status of truth only because people have
been sidelined from their histories and conceptually severed from most
of their pasts. It has been used to frustrate our endeavors to attain
autonomy by characterizing most of what we say or do as being
borrowed from the “dominant culture.” This is as if borrowing is
unique to us. As far as I know our cultures have always been hybrid
and hybridizing, for we have always given to and taken from our
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neighbors and others we encounter; but the “dominant culture” is
undoubtedly the most hybrid of all, for it has not just borrowed but
looted unconscionably the treasures of cultures the world over. Like
cultural constructionism, the prevailing Pacific historiography is hege-
monic. It admits of no other than mainline historiography with only
minor concessions.
Having identified the problem, we may ask: Where do we go from
here? What should or could we do? If we are to go beyond adding
our viewpoints to history as usual, we have to devise other methods,
using our own categories as much as possible for producing our his-
tories, our cultures. We could learn from the works of ethnographic
historians and historical anthropologists, as well as from mainline his-
torians, but we Oceanians must find ways of reconstructing our pasts
that are our own. Non-Oceanians may construct and interpret our
pasts or our present, but they are their constructions and interpreta-
tions, not ours. Theirs may be excellent and very instructive, but we
must rely much more on ours. The rest of this chapter suggests some
ideas for getting the ball rolling.
We may begin with delineating a new temporal dimension of his-
tory by doing away with the division of the past in which most of it
lies outside history. Our histories did not begin with the coming of
Europeans. If we continue to rely for the reconstructions of our remote
pasts mainly on the works of archaeologists, linguists, botanists, zool-
ogists, and the like, we will still be trapped with our pasts as pre-
history. We must resort very seriously to our ecologically based oral
narratives. Most historians, nurtured on written records and other
kinds of concrete documentation as their primary sources, are leery of
oral narratives, which they take to be free-floating tales disconnected
from the physical world, impossible of verification, and therefore out-
side their purview.
A few years ago I came across the work of an Oceanian historical
anthropologist, ‘Okusitino Mahinâ, who argued very strongly that
ecologically based oral traditions are as valid sources for “academic
history” as are written documents (see Mahinâ 1992). On reading
Mahinâ’s work, which is an entire history based largely on oral tradi-
tions backed wherever possible with the findings of archaeology and
related disciplines, it dawned on me that here in the making was a
new Pacific historiography by an Oceanian scholar. A few historians
may be working along similar lines, but it is significant that Mahinâ’s
background is anthropology, the discipline that has spearheaded the
458 Epilogue: Pasts to Remember
rethinking of Pacific historiography. The point at issue here is whether
there are legitimate histories apart from mainline history. If there are,
and I believe that there are, then our histories are as old as our
remembered pasts.
Human events occur as interactions between people in time and
space. First we look at people. In our reconstructions of Pacific histo-
ries of the recent past, for example, we must clear the stage and bring
in new characters. We bring to the center stage, as main players, our
own peoples and institutions. For this purpose we lay to rest once and
for all the ghost of Captain Cook. This is not a suggestion to excise
him entirely from our histories—far from it. Others, especially in New
Zealand and Australia, will still consider him superstar, so he will be
looming large on the horizon. As for us, we merely send Captain Cook
to the wings to await summons when necessary to call in the Plague,
and may recall him at the end to take a bow. As long as this partic-
ular spirit struts the center stage, our peoples and institutions will
remain where they are now: as minor characters and spectators. Once
we sideline Captain Cook it will be easier to deal with other and lesser
intruders. As long as we rely mainly on written documents, and as
long as Europeans, Americans, and similar others are seen to dominate
our pasts as main actors or manipulators of local people to carry out
their designs, our histories will remain imperial histories and narra-
tives of passive submission to transformations, of victimizations and
fatal impacts. There have been tragic and awful victimizations, but
from a long-term perspective, which is the best kind of historical out-
look, what is of more importance is how people, ordinary people, the
forgotten people of history, have coped and are coping with their
harsh realities, their resistance and struggles to be themselves and hold
together. Patricia Grace’s brilliant novel, Cousins (1992), is the best
record I have yet read of how an ordinary Oceanian family struggles
to maintain its coherence in the face of adversity. Until relatively
recently, Pacific histories have generally been silent on resistance and
struggles to cohere that went on, mostly unnoticed, through decades
of domination and exploitation. Even in the late 1960s, Hawai‘i and
New Zealand were still touted as societies of multiracial harmony.
In order to bring into the center stage grassroots resistance and
other unnoticed but important events for our peoples, we must refocus
our historical reconstructions on them and their doings. The new
knowledge and insights we could gain from this reversal of historical
roles could open up new and exciting vistas. Let others do their re-
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constructions of our pasts; we have dialogue with them, and form
alliances with some. But we must have histories—our roots and iden-
tities—that are our own distinctive creations.
Second, we introduce into our historical reconstructions the notion
of ecological time, which is perhaps both the egg and the chicken to a
marked emphasis in our traditional notions of past, present, and
future. Our modern conception of time stresses linear progression in
which the past is behind us, and receding ever further, while the future
is ahead, in the direction of our progression, which is an evolutionary
process leading to ever higher and more advanced forms. Let it be
clear that by “linear progression” I include the notion of cumulative
development or modernization, which is equated with progress toward
the capitalist utopia, the dream of the wretched of the earth. Lineality
was not absent in our traditional notions. In fact it was particularly
strong in Central and East Oceania,3 where it featured in genealogies,
especially those of high chiefs and their deeds. Histories obtained from
genealogies have a lineal emphasis, and they are also aristocratic histo-
ries. In West Oceania, where genealogies were relatively shallow,
lineality was expressed in other ways. However, Oceanian lineality
was neither evolutionary nor teleological, but rather sequential; it had
much to do with assertions of rights for succession and inheritance,
not, perhaps ever, with evolutionary development as we know it.
We can see our traditional nonlinear emphasis in the languages of
Austronesian-speaking peoples, which locate the past in front and
ahead of us and the future behind, following after us. In her remark-
able book, Native Land and Foreign Desires, Lilikalâ Kame‘eleihiwa
says:
It is interesting to note that in Hawaiian, the past is referred to as
Ka wa mamua, “the time in front or before.” Whereas the future,
when thought of at all, is Ka wa mahope, or “the time which comes
after or behind.” It is as if the Hawaiian stands firmly in the
present, with his back to the future, and his eyes fixed upon the
past, seeking historical answers for present-day dilemmas. Such an
orientation is to the Hawaiian an eminently practical one, for the
future is always unknown, whereas the past is rich in glory and
knowledge. It also bestows upon us a natural propensity for the
study of history. (1992:22–23)
In the Fijian and Tongan languages, the terms for past are gauna i
liu and kuonga mu‘a, respectively; gauna and kuonga meaning “time”
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or “age” or “era”; and liu and mu‘a meaning “front” or “ahead.”
When Fijian and Tongan preachers or orators point their fingers to
the past, they never say gauna i liu or kuonga mu‘a and point to the
back; that would only bring the Lord’s house down. They say the ap-
propriate term and point ahead. And the further the past, the higher
the finger points. But the finger never goes straight up for that would
be the wrong direction and in any case, the Lord does not relish being
pointed at by unbelieving preachers. The conception of the past as
ahead or in front of us is not a mere linguistic construction. It has an
actual historical basis in the documentation of our oral narratives on
our landscapes. I say more on this later.
The terms liu and mu‘a may be used as verbs, as in au sa liu and
teu mu‘omu‘a, meaning, “I am going ahead of you,” or more graphi-
cally in the popular Fiji English, “I am taking the lead,” which is the
literal translation of au sa liu. The past then is going ahead of us,
leading into the future, which is behind us. Is this then the case of the
dog chasing its tail? I believe so. From this perspective we can see the
notion of time as being circular. This notion fits perfectly with the
regular cycles of natural occurrences that punctuated important activ-
ities, particularly those of a productive and ritual/religious nature that
consumed most of the expanded human energy in the Oceanian past
and still do in many parts of our region today. This is ecological time,
an idea that we could use for the reconstruction of many of our
histories. I shall return to this point shortly. But let me say here that
the English language incorporates this notion of past as “ahead” and
future as “behind,” as in “let us pay tribute to those who have gone
before us,” and “the generations that are coming behind us.”4 But the
main emphasis in Western and hence our modern notion of time is
not circular, except in Christian calendrical rituals and festivals,
but rather linear progressive and teleological, which might have been
strengthened immeasurably by the rapid changes that have occurred
since the Industrial Revolution.
That the past is ahead, in front of us, is a conception of time that
helps us retain our memories and to be aware of its presence. What is
behind us cannot be seen and is liable to be forgotten readily. What is
ahead of us cannot be forgotten so readily or ignored, for it is in
front of our minds’ eyes, always reminding us of its presence. The
past is alive in us, so in more than a metaphorical sense the dead are
alive—we are our history.
Where time is circular, it does not exist independently of the natu-
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ral surroundings and society. It is very important for our historical
reconstructions to know that the Oceanian circular time emphasis is
tied to the regularity of seasons marked by natural phenomena such
as cyclical appearances of certain flowers, birds, and marine creatures,
shedding of certain leaves, phases of the moon, changes in prevailing
winds and weather patterns, which themselves mark the commence-
ment of and set the course for cycles of human activities such as those
related to agriculture, terrestrial and marine foraging, trade and ex-
change, and voyaging, all with their associated rituals, ceremonies,
and festivities. This is a universal phenomenon stressed variously by
different cultures. With its unquenchable thirst for growth propelled
by its mighty technologies, modern society, however, is disengaging
itself from natural cycles, which, as we shall see, is the major factor
for the global environmental degradation.
Time is so subsumed under these cycles and other more discrete
events that precise dating, which is a main preoccupation of mainline
history, is of no importance. In the past, as it is with many people
today, it was not so much when events occurred but rather where,
how, and in what sequences they occurred that was important. Of
course our ancestors did not have the means to date events, which
should not unduly concern us, especially when we are dealing with
remote pasts. Moreover, when things occur or are done in cycles,
dating, which is tied to lineality, is in fact not quite relevant. How-
ever, now that we have the means for dating we use them; but in our
reconstructions, it is broad periods and the social and political impli-
cations for the present of remembered pasts that are paramount.
Of equal importance in the consideration of the relationships be-
tween Oceanian societies and nature is the role of technology. The
driving force that propelled human activities was the knowledge and
skills developed over centuries, fine tuned to synchronize actions with
the regularities in nature. As it provided the vital link between society
and nature, technology cannot be dissociated from or seen to be inde-
pendent of either. It was a vital and compatible component of the
cycles. This made for balance and continuity in the ecological rela-
tionship. “Living in harmony with nature” is a more popular way of
putting it. For a genuinely Oceanian historiography, we could use this
notion to reconstruct some of our pasts in terms of people’s endeavors
always to adapt and localize external borrowings and impositions,
fitting them to their familiar cycles. In this way they actively trans-
formed themselves rather than just being passively remodeled by
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others.5 This has been the case since the early settlement of Oceania;
it still holds true for much of our region today. Anthropologists, espe-
cially those who worked in the Papua New Guinea Highlands in the
1950s and 1960s, have in fact recorded such indigenizations among
peoples who had just encountered westerners for the first time. And
more recently, growing numbers of anthropologists are writing their
works as historical anthropology and historians writing theirs as
ethnographic histories.6
But things have not always fit into familiar cycles, which provides
a problem that lies at the core of the study of social change and his-
tory. One of the cardinal tenets of modernization, a notion of linear
progression that takes little or no consideration of natural cycles, is
the necessity and hence the moral imperative of the transfer of tech-
nology. Modern technology is conceived of as independent of both
nature and culture and could therefore be transferred anywhere in the
world unencumbered with natural or cultural baggage. This has, on
application, wreaked havoc on human lives and nature everywhere.
The attempt to transfer high technology as the engine for moderniza-
tion to societies that have for ages accommodated themselves to nat-
ural cycles of ecological relationships is like leading an elephant into
a china shop.
But, it may be asked, what is the relevance of this view of history
to the linear processes that presently dominate modern society, world-
wide processes driven by transnational capital and the global econ-
omy? We have other means of dealing with this kind of situation and
must use them. We should, however, keep in mind the fact that we
live in societies with most of our peoples dwelling in rural and outer-
island communities. Much of their existence revolves on their en-
deavors to cope with invasive technologies and to adapt them to their
familiar cycles. Most of us who are urbanized and living in accor-
dance with the demands of the contemporary global culture still
maintain relationships with our nonurban relatives and are therefore
entangled in the tussle between tradition and modernity, however
defined. Their narratives are therefore ours, as has always been the
case before modernization separated us. For the reconstruction and
analysis of historical processes of this kind, we could use the notion
of the spiral, which connotes both cyclic and lineal movements.
Most of our remote and so much of our recent pasts are not docu-
mented and therefore lie outside the purview of mainline history. We
must in that case devise other methods, based on different perspec-
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tives of history, to reconstruct such pasts to suit our purposes, includ-
ing those of maintaining the depths of our roots and the strength-
ening of our autonomous identities. We have to bequeath to future
generations more memories of our recent past and our present than
we ourselves remember of our remote pasts. We must remember and
reconstruct as much of our pasts as we can to present to the future.
This is not sentimental nonsense on the part of someone who is
getting on and is reflecting on lost youth and idealized pasts; far from
it. Recall Milan Kundera’s immortal statement: “The struggle of man
against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting.” Relation-
ships of power such as those between nations, classes, and other
groupings are often characterized by the dominant going out of their
way to erase or suppress memories, or histories, and implant what
they wish in order to consolidate their control. Take, for example, the
history of England and the British Empire taught in colonial schools,
in place of local histories, so as to direct human thought and there-
fore more easily manipulate the colonized. The near extinction of
Celtic languages in the British Isles, and of New Zealand Maori and
Hawaiian languages, were deliberately engineered to destroy memo-
ries and cultures and thereby to absorb the vanquished more smoothly
into the dominant cultures. Fortunately this has not been com-
pletely successful; and a major feature of the Maori and Hawaiian
struggles for sovereignty is the revival of their indigenous languages
and histories.
Other examples may also be taken from Central and East Oceania
where our aristocracies have for centuries encapsulated most if not all
our remembered pasts. Most of our ancient and even our more recent
oral histories are about the lives and heroic and horrific deeds of our
great chiefs, their families, and kin groups. Our histories, cultures, and
group identities are focused almost entirely on them. Without them
we have only a few roots, because the lives and deeds of the majority
of our peoples have been erased from memory. This is a pillar of the
aristocratic power over us. We cherish and respect our connections to
our aristocracies, mainly because we have no choice; and for the same
reason “we love and respect our oppression,” as a waggish colleague
puts it. Nevertheless, they are the major component of our heritage
and so we must carry them all, the good and the ugly, for only then
can we learn properly from our histories.
In view of this, we have to take careful note of our indoctrination
by our contemporary elite groups and ruling classes, of which we, the
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senior staff of the university, are members. How and for what pur-
poses are we directing our people’s thinking and memories? What do
we allow to be taught thoroughly, to be taught only cursorily, or not
taught at all, in our schools and other institutions of learning? What
do we read or not read, hear or not hear, see or not see in our mass
media? Where and wherefore are the silences?
I am reminded here of a piece of advice by Machiavelli to his
Prince, which was rather extreme so I do not advocate its being fol-
lowed to the letter. Machiavelli said that when you kill someone, kill
everyone else connected to him so that no one survives to nurse the
memory and plot to do you in.
We cannot therefore have our memories erased, foreshortened, or
directed. With weak roots we would be easily uprooted, transplanted,
grafted upon, trimmed, and transformed in any way that the global
market requires. With little or no memory, we stand alone as individ-
uals with no points of reference except to our dismally portrayed
present, to our increasingly marketized national institutions, to inter-
national development agencies, international lending organizations,
transnational corporations, fit only to be globalized and whateverized,
and slotted in our proper places on the Human Development Index.
Let Eric Waddell have the final say on this:
I hear the same voices in the Pacific today: “It is forbidden to speak
Fijian (Hindi, Cook Island Maori, Samoan, Tongan . . .) in the class-
room and the school playground.” Everything must take place in
English (or French). On entering the school the child must take
leave of his past, his present, his kin. The classrooms and corridors
may be decked with flowers, the teachers smiling, the joys immense.
But it is like a door which is sealed behind him, so that a new
world may be designed afresh, unhindered by the weight of tradi-
tion, unmoved by the voices of the ancestors. And in this new
world, . . . each child stands alone: small, remote and ultimately
helpless. (1993:28–29)
I submit that this is not confined to our primary schools. It is charac-
teristic of all our formal educational institutions and of our work-
places. In our educational programs we provide our students with
materials most of which have been produced by people in the United
States, Britain, and other leading countries of the global system.
Ideas that we impart to our students pertain mainly to these societies,
even though they may be projected as universal verities. We and our
students digest these notions and then enter international discourses
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on progress almost always on other people’s terms. We play their
games by their rules, and accept the outcomes as inevitable and even
morally desirable, although these may, as they have often turned out
to be, against our collective well being. We are thus eroding whatever
that is caring and generous in our existence, sacrificing human lives
and our natural surroundings in order to be competitive in the world
market. We need therefore to be much more inventive and creative
than we have been for our own humane development. Our vast region
has its own long histories, its storehouses of knowledge, skills, ideals
for social relationships, and oceanic problems and potentials that are
quite different from those of large landmasses, in which hegemonic
views and agendas are hatched.
In addition, we could use the notion of natural cycles and of our
traditional ecological relationships to formulate our own philosophies
and ideologies for resistance against the misapplication of modern
technologies on our societies. We cannot do away with the global sys-
tem, but we can control aspects of its encroachment and take oppor-
tunities when we see them in order to create space for ourselves. We
could, for example, formulate a benign philosophy that would help
us pay greater reverence and respect to our natural environment than
we do today. I have touched on the development of traditional tech-
nologies to link natural cycles and cycles of human activities in en-
during, total ecological relationships. As has been pointed out, one of
our major contemporary problems is that linear progression is based
on systematic and cumulatively destructive deployment of dissociated
technology on dissociated nature and society, as required by the global
economy. But if we believe that we are dependent on nature to tell us,
as it told our ancestors, when and how to derive our livelihood from
it, and how to care for it, we would think very hard before meddling
with it for short-term advantages, knowing that our actions could
break the cycles and probably do irreparable damage to ourselves. Ear-
lier on I said something about the idea of the spiral as a model for
historical reconstruction. We could go further and incorporate this
notion in the formulation of an Oceanian ecological ideology, tying
linear development to natural cycles, with the view of guiding the ap-
plications of modern technologies on our environment. Our long-term
survival within Oceania may very well depend on some such guidance.
Kalani Ohele, a Hawaiian activist, told me something that has been
said before but is worth repeating here: “We do not own the land, we
only look after it.”
This leads us to the consideration of the relationship between his-
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tory and our natural landscapes. I first came upon this in reading
‘Okusitino Mahinâ’s thesis, although I later found out that this has
been done for Hawai‘i and that the New Zealand Maori have been
working on it for quite some time. Most of our sources of history are
our oral narratives inscribed on our landscapes. All our important tra-
ditions pinpoint particular named spots as landing places of original
ancestors or spots from which they emerged, as arenas of great and
decisive battles, sites of past settlements, burials, shrines and temples,
routes that important migratory movements followed, markers of
more localized mobility out of one’s own into other people’s territo-
ries, which made much of the land throughout our islands enduringly
contested by parties deploying not only arms but also oral narratives,
including genealogies, to validate their claims and counterclaims. Pop-
ulations seem always to be in flux and so were the dispositions of
land, providing much of the flexibility and motion to the operation of
Oceanian societies. All of these are recorded in narratives inscribed on
the landscape. Our natural landscapes then are maps of movements,
pauses, and more movements.
Sea routes were mapped on chants. Nearly twenty years ago,
Futa Helu wrote a series of articles on a particular dance chant, the
me‘etu‘upaki, believed to be Tonga’s most ancient. The chant is in an
archaic form of the language that almost no one today understands,
which is taken to be the indication of its antiquity. Helu’s translation
reveals that it is about a voyage from Kiribati to Tonga. The verses of
this chant pinpoint places along the route arranged precisely in their
geographical locational sequence.7 I believe that the chant is the chart
of a long and important sea route that people used in the past. I once
asked a very knowledgeable seaman how people of old knew sea lanes,
especially between distant places. He replied that these were recorded
in chants that identified sequences of landfalls between points of de-
parture and final destinations. Distances were measured in how long
it generally took to traverse them. I believe that the Australian Aborig-
ines did similarly with their songlines that connected places all across
their continent from coast to coast.
Our landscapes and seascapes are thus cultural as well as physical.
We cannot read our histories without knowing how to read our land-
scapes (and seascapes). When we realize this, we should be able to
understand why our languages locate the past as ahead or in front of
us. It is right there on our landscapes in front of our very eyes. How
often, while traveling through unfamiliar surroundings, have we had
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the experience of someone in the company telling us of the associa-
tions of particular spots or other features of the landscape traversed
with past events. We turn our heads this way and that, and right ahead
in front of our eyes we see and hear the past being reproduced through
running commentaries. And when we go through our own surround-
ings, as we do every day, familiar features of our landscapes keep
reminding us that the past is alive. They often inspire in us a sense of
reverence and awe, not to mention that of fear and revulsion.
These are reasons why it is essential that we do not destroy our
landmarks, for with their removal very important parts of our mem-
ories, our histories, will be erased. It may be significant in this regard
that in several Austronesian languages the word for placenta and
womb is also the word for land. Among a group of people once well
known to me, the Mekeo of Papua New Guinea, the dead were tradi-
tionally buried in front of their houses on the sacred ceremonial
ground that ran through the center of their rectangular villages. The
term for the ceremonial ground is ango inaenga, the “womb of the
land.” The womb nurtures and protects the unborn child, as the land
nurtures and provides security for humanity. At the end, the departed
are returned to the womb of the land. From the womb we come and
to the womb we return. It is a much richer and more ennobling image
than “earth to earth, ashes to ashes . . . ,” in which there rings an in-
glorious destiny for our mortal remains.
This very intimate association between history and the natural
landscape and between us and our Earth is, I believe, the basis for the
oft asserted and maligned notion that we are spiritually and mysti-
cally related to the lands to which we belong. It is very difficult for
the urban-born and the frequently mobile people to comprehend this
kind of relationship. They have little or no appreciation of the fact
that for very many of us, people and land are indivisible. Indigenous
Fijians have always insisted that the word vanua means the land and
its people. The Tongan terms for traditions and culture are tala e fonua
and ulungaanga fakafonua, the “stories of the land” and “the way of
the land,” respectively. People are one with their culture and land.
This brings to mind an occasion in the late 1960s when a Tongan
extended family was brought to Fiji and resettled on native land in
western Viti Levu. It transpired that when the last surviving member
of a particular “landowning” lineage passed away, the clan to which
the lineage belonged searched for nonresident offshoots and located
the only ones in Tonga. These latter were invited to come to the land,
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awaiting its rightful complements. They belonged to it and vice versa,
they went to it, and are still there today. No one else could have
occupied it in the accepted manner. When I bought a house in Suva a
few years ago, my colleagues who were from outside Oceania or
were descendants of more recent arrivals commented on it as an act
of property investment. On the other hand, indigenous Fijian and
Tongan colleagues and friends said without exception, “so you are
going to live here forever,” or words to that effect. To some I was
acquiring a property, disposable at a good profit at some future date;
any improvement I might make on it would enhance its sales value.
To others I was establishing a home that would tie me to it forever;
any improvement on it would be a further contribution for the bene-
fit of my family, and the future generations. In saying that I was
going to live here forever, my friends meant not just me but also my
descendants.
There is a vast difference here that shows diametrically opposed per-
ceptions of our relationship with our world: world as property, and
world as lasting home. Home as a heritage, a shrine for those who
have cared for it, and passed it on to us, their descendants. For those
of us who hold this view, our relationship with our Earth is indeed
spiritual.
Opponents and even some sympathizers of resistance and sover-
eignty movements in Oceania and elsewhere frequently express utter
disbelief in and contempt for assertions of this kind of relationship,
the importance of which is felt most acutely when your ancestral home
lands are gone or are threatened. I recall having read a statement by a
New Zealander who characterized Maori spirituality as so much
mumbo jumbo. This could have been an expression born of ignorance,
or an unconscious trivialization of something that is powerfully threat-
ening. I once met a very liberal-minded person in Australia who talked
of Aboriginal spirituality in a manner that was perfectly correct and
no more. At least she was trying to come to grips with it. Whatever
others may say, we need to include in our philosophy of reverence for
nature a strong element of spirituality that we may borrow from our
pasts, other people’s pasts, or even invent it ourselves, because our
Earth is being subjected to intolerable pressures.
To remove a people from their ancestral, natural surroundings or
vice versa, or to destroy their lands with mining, deforestation, bomb-
ing, large-scale industrial and urban developments, and the like, is to
sever them not only from their traditional sources of livelihood, but
also and much more importantly, from their ancestry, their history,
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their identity, and from their ultimate claim for the legitimacy of their
existence. It is the destruction of age-old rhythms of cyclical dramas
that lock together familiar time, motion, and space.
Such acts are therefore sacrilegious and are of the same order
of enormity as the complete destruction of all of a nation’s libra-
ries, archives, museums, monuments, historic buildings, and all its
books and other such documents. James Miller (1985), the Australian
Aboriginal educator best known for his book Koori, told me that his
people, the Wonnarua, who once occupied the Hunter Valley all the
way down to the central coast of New South Wales, have a history
that dates back only to the beginning of the British settlement. Their
lands are gone, and only a handful of the words of their original lan-
guage are still in use. They have no oral narratives, no memory what-
soever of their past before the invasion and obliteration of their an-
cestral world.
We, who are more fortunate, cannot afford to believe that our his-
tories began only with imperialism, or that as peoples and cultures
we are the creations of colonialism and Christianity. We cannot afford
to have no reference points in our ancient pasts, to have as memories
or histories only those imposed on us by our erstwhile colonizers and
the present international system that seems bent on globalizing us
completely by eradicating our cultural memory and diversity, our sense
of community, our commitment to our ancestry and progeny, and
individualizing, standardizing and homogenizing our lives, so as to
render our world completely open for the unfettered movement of
capital and technology. We must therefore actively reconstruct our his-
tories, rewrite our geography, create our own realities, and disseminate
these through our educational institutions and our societies at large.
This is absolutely necessary if we are to strengthen our position for
surviving reasonably as autonomous peoples within the new interna-
tional order.
We, who are more fortunate, cannot afford to let our own com-
pradors continue to conspire with transnational corporations and
others to strip and poison our lands, our forests, our reefs, our ocean.
Many of the critical problems that we confront today are conse-
quences of acts, such as large-scale land deals, committed by our very
own ancestors. We must be careful not to continue repeating similar
acts, thus bequeathing to future generations a heritage of misery. We
cannot talk about our spiritual relationship with Earth while allow-
ing ourselves and others to gut and strip it bare.
We need to strengthen cultures of resistance within our region. For
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generations, our peasantries have resisted many if not most introduced
“development projects” simply through noncooperation or through
withdrawal of support as soon as they realized the harmful implica-
tions of such projects for their lives. In more remote eras our ances-
tors devised very effective and at times drastic methods of political
resistance. For instance, the greatest fear of high chiefs in the past was
the ever-present threat of assassination. The heads of despots every-
where in Oceania were taken regularly, in a literal and figurative sense.
The Tu‘i Tonga, for example, were so often taken care of that they
created a lower paramountcy to be a buffer between them and an op-
pressed and enraged population. Series of assassinations of these offi-
cials compelled them to establish an even lower paramountcy to take
the heat. And so it went. And so we must follow and resist the ero-
sions, the despoliations, and the exploitations that are going on in our
region. We owe this much to ourselves and to the future.
I shall conclude with the following reflection on past, present, and
future. Wherever I am at any given moment, there is comfort in the
knowledge stored at the back of my mind that somewhere in Oceania
is a piece of earth to which I belong. In the turbulence of life, it is my
anchor. No one can take it away from me. I may never return to it,
not even as mortal remains, but it will always be homeland. We all
have or should have homelands: family, community, national home-
lands. And to deny human beings the sense of homeland is to deny
them a deep spot on Earth to anchor their roots. Most East Oceanians
have Havaiki, a shared ancestral homeland that exists hazily in pri-
mordial memory. Every so often in the hills of Suva, when moon and
red wine play tricks on my aging mind, I scan the horizon beyond
Laucala Bay, the Rewa Plain, and the reefs by Nukulau Island, for
Vaihi, Havaiki, homeland. It is there, far into the past ahead, leading
on to other memories, other realities, other homelands.
Notes
1.The co-sponsors of the Pacific Writers Forum, the Program for Cultural
Studies, East-West Center, and the Center for Pacific Island Studies, Univer-
sity of Hawai‘i, provided large amounts of uninterrupted time to think and
write early drafts of this paper. I benefited very much from discussions with
Sudesh Mishra, Nora Vagi Brash, Marjorie Crocombe, and Alberto Gomez
outside Lincoln Hall. Vilisoni Hereniko, Geoff White, and Vimal Dissanayake
were wonderful organizers, hosts, and stimulating company. Haunani-Kay
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Trask and Lilikalâ Kame‘eleihiwa of the Center for Hawaiian Studies gave
me much encouragement to continue writing this paper. Tony Hooper read
the original version and gave the much-needed constructive comments. I owe
much to him.
2. See for example, The Contemporary Pacific. Vol. 1 Nos. 1 and 2, 1989;
Vol. 3 No.1, 1991.
3. In order to do away with the racial/cultural connotations of the three-
fold division of Oceania into Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia, I have
used the substitute terms: West Oceania (for Melanesia); North Oceania (for
Micronesia); and East Oceania (for Polynesia). The renaming is geographic
rather than racial/cultural; it reflects better the contemporary population com-
positions of our countries.
4. Tony Hooper alerted me to this, as well as to Oceanian lineality.
5. At a time when I was fairly despondent about developments in our
region, Marshall Sahlins converted me to this view through personal conver-
sations and in a University of the South Pacific 25th Anniversary Lecture he
delivered in Suva in early 1993. He has since published this in his “Goodbye
to Tristes Tropes: Ethnography in the Context of Modern World History”
(1994a). This is an essential reading for all of us who are concerned with the
constructions of our pasts, our cultures, and with our future prospects.
6. See articles by historians and anthropologists in Brij V. Lal (1992a),
Donald H. Rubinstein (1992), and Robert Borofsky (1994). An excellent piece
of historical ethnography is Geoffrey White (1991). It is beautifully written
in an accessible language and is about Santa Isabel in the Solomon Islands.
7. Futa Helu 1979 and 1980, “Tongan Poetry IV: Dance Poetry” (Faikava
nos. 4 and 5). At the December 1994 conference on Pacific History: Decon-
structing the Island Group, at the Australian National University, it was
pointed out that voyagers from Central Oceania traveled to Kiribati and even
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